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This thesis investigates certain key positive aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy of religion, 
while respecting the way his philosophy as a whole changed throughout the course of his life. In 
the end, the aim is to produce a just portrait of Nietzsche, a philosopher who, contrary to the 
popular image of his being anti-religious, recognised keenly the positive effects a certain type of 
gods can have on human beings. I begin the thesis by suggesting that, after his abandonment of 
his early ‘religious communitarianism’, Nietzsche became a ‘religious’ aristocratic individualist 
who set the nurturing of ‘higher types’ as his highest goal and attempted to find the way to 
achieve it in a certain type of gods, what I call ‘the life-affirming type of gods’. Then, after 
discussing some interpretative issues concerning his writings in general, I examine his early 
positive religious thinking. Next, I discuss Nietzsche’s concern for the nurturing of ‘higher 
types’. I suggest that his conception of ‘higher types’ is an ultimate representation of his idea of 
‘human greatness’ capable of creating cultural greatness and new ‘life-affirming’ values, all of 
which is connected with his concern for ‘suffering’. Further, to clarify the nature of ‘higher 
types’ in greater depth, I examine other related conceptions of his, namely ‘nobility’ and 
‘life-affirmation’. In the final part of the thesis, as I illustrate how Nietzsche’s mature positive 
religious thinking focuses on ‘the life-affirming type of gods’, I examine his idea of the nature 
and effects of these gods, with reference to his criticism of the Christian conception of God. 
Finally, I present and argue for my view of how he intends the life-affirming type of gods to 
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The aim of this thesis is to investigate certain key positive aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy 
of religion that have been often neglected in Nietzsche studies. Since his death, countless 
studies have been conducted on Nietzsche by numerous people belonging to very diverse fields 
and movements, and his philosophy of religion has always served as one of the most popular 
topics for commentators. Until thirteen years ago or so, most commentators considered 
Nietzsche to be anti-religious, a “professed” atheist who considered the belief in God as “an 
historically determined symptom of man’s weakness and subordination”. 1  Therefore, the 
tendency of studies of Nietzsche’s philosophy of religion was to concentrate on its negative 
aspect, namely, his criticism of Christianity. As the result, the positive aspect of his philosophy 
of religion was largely ignored. 
Certainly, a reasonable number of studies were conducted on Nietzsche’s ambivalent 
attitudes towards Judaism and Christianity that were both negative and positive. A commentator 
who took this direction was Weaver Santaniello. By recognising Nietzsche’s affirmative attitude 
towards both the ancient Hebrews and modern Jewry, as well as his ambivalent attitude towards 
prophetic-priestly Judaism, Santaniello in her Nietzsche, God and the Jews examined “the 
personal and religiopolitical aspects” of his positive stance towards Judaism, and illustrated his 
strong identification with the Jewish minority in then Germany.
2
 Some commentators even 
                                                 
1 Stern (1985): p.14. Certainly, not everyone perceived Nietzsche to be anti-religious. Notably, Lou Salomé, to 
whom Nietzsche famously proposed, emphasized in her Nietzsche [originally published in 1894] that Nietzsche 
should be interpreted as a religious thinker who was obsessed with God throughout his life (see Salomé 2001: 
passim). A similar view was also expressed by Walter Schubart in his Dostjewski und Nietzsche: Symbolik Ihres 
Lebens [originally published in 1939], who described the theme of Nietzsche’s thought as “Die Suche nach Gott” 
(see Schubart 1946: p. 15). 
2 See Santaniello (1994): pp. 3-4. 
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argued for a deep affinity in outlook between Nietzsche and Christianity. For instance, Karl 
Jaspers in his Nietzsche & Christianity attempted to show “how much of a Christian” Nietzsche 
actually was by illustrating “the Christian basis of . . . [the] real motivating forces” of his 
thought.
3
 Similarly, F. A. Lea in his The Tragic Philosopher: Friedrich Nietzsche attempted to 
illustrate how the attitude of Nietzsche was actually more approximate to that of “the authentic 
Jesus of Nazareth” and even to that of both Paul and Augustine than Nietzsche himself had ever 
imagined. And Lea argued that Nietzsche misunderstood Jesus only because he had always seen 
him through “Schopenhauer’s dark glasses”, as the “personification of denial of the will to 
live”.4 
However, I find these types of studies somewhat unsatisfactory, since what they attempt to 
do is, most fundamentally, to limit the significance of Nietzsche’s criticism of Christianity and 
Judaism by revealing possible causes behind what they perceive to be Nietzsche’s 
misunderstanding of these religions.
5
 As a result, I think, the positive aspects of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy of religion still remain overlooked. For instance, while commentators have taken 
notice of many remarks Nietzsche made on the Olympian gods of ancient Greece in his works, 
there has hardly been any study that examined seriously the possible significance of his 
life-long affirmative attitude towards this particular type of gods. 
But the situation is starting to change at last. Recently, there has been the publication of a 
collection of papers written specifically on the theme of Nietzsche’s relation to religion, 
Nietzsche and the Divine, edited by John Lippitt and Jim Urpeth, who write in the introduction, 
                                                 
3 See Jaspers (1963): pp. vii-viii 
4 See Lea (1993): pp. 334-349. Recently, Bruce Ellis Benson has examined the commonality between Nietzsche and 
Paul in terms of their tasks – such as the ‘revaluation of all values’ –, and has argued that “Nietzsche turns out to be a 
“second Paul”” (see Benson 2008: p. 119ff). 
5 Stephen N. Williams is a recent commentator who has examined and illustrated Nietzsche’s misunderstanding of 
Christianity extensively (see Williams S. N 2006: passim). 
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“Many readers of Nietzsche will, no doubt, be uneasy about the tendency of a number of papers 
in this collection to complicate considerably and to render ambiguous Nietzsche’s relation to the 
‘divine’. They will be even more nervous when, as in some cases, a ‘religious’ sensibility is said 
to underpin and pervade Nietzsche’s thought”. 6  This was immediately followed by the 
publication of a collection of essays of a similar nature, Nietzsche and the Gods, edited by 
Santaniello, who writes in the preface, “it is seldom recognized that Nietzsche thought more 
about the gods and how they functioned in the human psyche and in culture than do most 
religious thinkers. . . . [Nietzsche] was a profound religious thinker who spent much of his 
writing career reevaluating the concept of god that prevailed in nineteenth-century Germany. . . . 
this edition will also serve to challenge impulsive claims that Nietzsche was “atheistic” or 
“irreligious,” rendering such statements as needing dire qualification”.7 
More recently, this new endeavour to question and refute the traditional view of Nietzsche 
as an ‘anti-religious’ and ‘atheistic’ thinker has been followed up by the publication of 
Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Religion by Julian Young: a book dedicated solely to the in-depth 
investigation into the positive aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy of religion. In this book, Young 
claims that in his maiden work BT Nietzsche both regarded pre-Socratic Greek tragedy as a 
“communal religion” which solidified the bonds of Greek community in the sight of its 
divinities, and recognised how a society would decline without such a religion. Accordingly, 
Young claims, Nietzsche believed that modernity could be redeemed from the decadence only 
through the rebirth of Greek tragedy as a communal religious festival promised by Wagner’s 
music drama. From this early thinking of Nietzsche’s, Young identifies both “communitarian 
thinking” that regards the flourishing of community as the highest object of its concern, and 
                                                 
6 Lippitt & Urpeth (2000): p. xvi 
7 Santaniello (2001): pp. xii & xvi 
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“religious thinking” that regards a communal religious festival proper as the essential ingredient 
to the flourishing of community, classifying Nietzsche’s early thinking as a whole “religious 
communitarianism”.8 
Now, apart from the term ‘religious communitarianism’, there is nothing new about 
Young’s claim, since most commentators have always acknowledged – in one way or another – 
the presence of such a kind of – religious – thinking in BT. But this kind of thinking has been 
traditionally regarded as something exclusive to Nietzsche in the early ‘romantic’ period.9 The 
consensus has been that Nietzsche eventually abandoned his ‘religious communitarianism’ after 
his separation from Wagnerianism, and that he became an atheist, anti-religious. However, 
against this fixed idea, Young claims that Nietzsche “never was” an atheist, never was 
anti-religious, for “Nietzsche in fact never abandoned his religious communitarianism”: 
Nietzsche’s highest value always was the flourishing of community, which, he continued to 
believe, could only be achieved by the re-creation of ‘communal’ life-affirming religious 
festival modelled on pre-Socratic Greek tragedy. Hence, Young argues, “Though atheistic with 
respect to the Christian God, Nietzsche, I hold, ought to be regarded as a religious reformer 
rather than an enemy of religion”.10 
                                                 
8 See Young (2006): p. 1 
9 It has become a standard practice among commentators to divide Nietzsche’s works into three periods, the early 
‘romantic’ period [1872-1876], the middle ‘positivist’ period [1877-1882] and the late period [1883-1888], though 
there are different interpretations of details. See, e.g., Jaspers (1997): pp. 42-57. 
10 See Young (2006): p. 2. More recently, after the publication of Young’s book, Benson in his Pious Nietzsche: 
Decadence and Dionysian Faith has also strongly argued for the “deeply religious nature of Nietzsche’s thought”. 
Benson claims that not only does Nietzsche begin as a Pietist, but also he “remains essentially a Pietist to the end of 
his life”, since his goal is “to overcome his early religiosity in order to move to a new religiosity”, to free himself 
from “the [orthodox] Christian Pietism of his youth” by creating “a new – and significantly different – Pietism” (see 
Benson 2008: pp. 3-8). 
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Now, I welcome and agree with Young’s claim that Nietzsche always was a profoundly 
religious thinker. However, Young seems to me to get it wrong when he claims that Nietzsche 
always maintained his religious communitarianism. For, on this point, I agree with many 
commentators that Nietzsche ultimately abandoned religious communitarianism, and embraced 
instead a kind of ‘individualistic’ thinking which is primarily concerned with the flourishing of 
few exceptional individuals whose existence itself forms the cultural greatness of the 
community, and whom he calls ‘higher types’. More precisely, my view is that he always 
possessed both communitarianism and individualistic thinking. And while he gave priority to 
the former in the early ‘romantic’ period, he began attaching far greater significance to the latter 
from the middle ‘positivist’ period onward. So, while he continued to possess a concern for the 
flourishing of community generally, his highest value ultimately became the flourishing of those 
whom he calls ‘higher types’, extraordinarily creative individuals with superior human 
greatness who can create new life-affirming values. 
Accordingly, it seems to me that Young, in failing to recognise this significance of 
Nietzsche’s individualistic thinking, which decisively constitutes the backbone of his mature 
philosophy as a whole, also misinterprets the real positive aspects of the mature Nietzsche’s 
philosophy of religion. That is, in my view, as Nietzsche eventually accepted the nurturing of 
‘higher types’ as his highest value, his positive religious thinking also came to change its shape 
and nature. And, contrary to Young’s view, what Nietzsche ultimately came to focus on and 
value in his mature works is no longer the ‘communal’ life-affirming religious festival that can 
contribute towards the flourishing of ‘community’, but rather what I call ‘the life-affirming type 
of god[s]’, a certain type of ‘god[s]’ symbolised by the Olympian gods of ancient Greece, who 
can help individuals to flourish and thus contribute towards the nurturing of ‘higher types’. And 
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the aim of this thesis is to argue for this view of mine, in order to make a further contribution 




In Chapter 1, I explain the exact nature of individualistic thinking I attribute to Nietzsche. 
As I examine several different kinds of ‘individualist’ readings provided by commentators, I 
propose my ‘un-militaristic’, ‘moderately political’ and ‘religious’ aristocratic individualist 
reading, which regards Nietzsche both as a philosopher who shows concern for actual 
socio-political life but does not possess a proper political philosophy that justifies and endorses 
specific political ideals, and as a religious thinker who sets the nurturing of ‘higher types’ as his 
highest goal and attempts to find the way to achieve it not in any ‘militarism’ or ‘politics’ but in 
a certain conception of ‘god[s]’. 
In Chapter 2, I investigate Nietzsche’s early religious thinking presented in BT. But firstly, I 
discuss some interpretative issues concerning Nietzsche’s historical narratives and genealogical 
accounts. I argue that Nietzsche’s historical narratives and genealogical accounts are not 
‘factual’, but essentially ‘fictional’ narratives that are created by Nietzsche as means to illustrate 
and illuminate his ideas. Then, I examine the nature and effects of two types of ‘life-affirming’ 
religion which Nietzsche proposes in BT as the two possible solutions to make our life possible, 
bearable and worth living. As I discuss Nietzsche’s key ideas in this regard, I point out several 
fundamental problems concerning his arguments for these types of religion. 
In Chapter 3, I provide a general discussion on how we should interpret ‘higher types’ as 
Nietzsche’s value. As I outline how Nietzsche’s thinking as a whole changed from the early 
period, I suggest that his conception of ‘higher types’ is essentially an ultimate representation of 
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his idea of ‘human greatness’ capable of creating cultural greatness and new ‘life-affirming’ 
values, all of which is connected with his concern for ‘suffering’. Then, as I continue to develop 
my view on how we should interpret his conception of ‘higher types’, I argue that Nietzsche 
actually provides us with no concrete example of a higher type in his works, and that his 
conception of higher types is also essentially a product of various fantasies, a fluid compound 
made up of ever-changing longings and desires for certain characteristics by which Nietzsche 
was himself fascinated and sometimes gripped. 
In Chapter 4, to clarify the nature of ‘higher types’ further, I examine other related key 
conceptions of Nietzsche’s, namely ‘nobility’ and ‘life-affirmation’. By exploring two different 
conceptions of ‘nobility’ and ‘life-affirmation’ he presents in his works, I attempt to establish 
some of the key distinctive characteristics that he ascribes to ‘higher types’. In the process, I 
particularly highlight and illustrate how Nietzsche’s writings display a strong tension between 
the desire to endorse a certain brutal way of life, that, for example, led by people like Napoleon, 
and the recognition that such a way of life is just not possible in the modern world and also in 
itself hollow. And I also argue that one of his ideas of life-affirmation expressed by his doctrine 
of ‘the eternal recurrence’, which Nietzsche claims to be the ‘highest formula of affirmation’, 
can actually become life-denying in certain contexts. 
In Chapter 5, I investigate the nature of Nietzsche’s mature positive religious thinking. As I 
illustrate how Nietzsche’s mature positive religious thinking focuses on ‘the life-affirming type 
of gods’, I examine his idea of the nature and effects of these gods, with reference to his 
criticism of the Christian conception of God. Then, I present and argue for my view of how 
Nietzsche intends the life-affirming type of gods to contribute towards the nurturing of ‘higher 
types’. I argue that Nietzsche does not aim to recreate a Greek religion or a new religious myth, 
and that what he actually provides or wishes to offer through his continual positive valuation of 
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the life-affirming type of gods is a particular religious perspective on ‘life’. More concretely, 
through his symbolic image of the life-affirming gods, what he tries to give us readers is a new 
religious sensibility. 
The general aim of this thesis is to construct a coherent view of Nietzsche’s positive 
religious thinking from his published works, while respecting the way his philosophy as a whole 
changed throughout the course of his life. Concerning the Nachlass, I refer to this only when it 
actually endorses the points I make from his published works. Throughout the thesis, I follow 
traditional practice and, where appropriate, use the masculine pronoun to refer indifferently to 





Nietzsche’s individualistic thinking 
 
In this chapter, I examine the nature of Nietzsche’s individualistic thinking. Firstly, in 
Section A, against Julian Young who claims that Nietzsche always maintained the religious 
communitarianism which sets the flourishing of the community as its highest value, I argue that 
Nietzsche eventually abandoned religious communitarianism, and embraced instead a kind of 
‘individualistic’ thinking which is primarily concerned with the flourishing of few exceptional 
individuals, whom he calls ‘higher types’. More precisely, I suggest that Nietzsche always 
possessed both communitarianism and individualistic thinking. And while he gave priority to 
the former in the early period, he began attaching far greater significance to the latter from the 
middle period onwards. Hence, in the end, while he continued to possess a concern for the 
flourishing of the community, his highest value became the nurturing of ‘higher types’. 
Then, through Section B and Section C, I explain the nature of individualistic thinking I 
attribute to Nietzsche. As I examine several different ‘individualist’ readings provided by 
commentators, I propose my ‘un-militaristic’, ‘moderately political’ and ‘religious’ aristocratic 
individualist reading, which regards Nietzsche both as a philosopher who shows concern for 
actual socio-political life but does not possess a proper political philosophy or theory that 
justifies and endorses specific political ideals, and as a religious thinker who sets the nurturing 
of ‘higher types’ as his highest goal and attempts to find the way to achieve it not in any 
‘militarism’ or ‘politics’ but in a certain conception of ‘gods’. And in the process, I also discuss 
how we should approach disturbing elements of Nietzsche’s writings, such as his seemingly 
affirmative remarks on ‘war’ and ‘slavery’. 
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Section A: Nietzsche’s abandonment of ‘religious communitarianism’ 
 
Young in his Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Religion claims that Nietzsche presents in BT 
‘religious communitarianism’, which regards the creation of a new ‘communal’ life-affirming 
religious festival modelled on pre-Socratic Greek tragedy as the key to the regeneration of 
authentic community, as the only solution to modern-day decadence. And Young argues, 
“Nietzsche in fact never abandoned his religious communitarianism. To the end . . . Nietzsche’s 
fundamental concern, his highest value, lies with the flourishing of community, and to the end 
he believes that this can happen only through the flourishing of communal religion”.1 
Let me provide a more detailed summary of the nature of religious communitarianism that 
Young attributes to Nietzsche. According to Young, on the one hand, Nietzsche’s thinking is in 
proximity to the ‘Volkish’ (Völkisch) thinking of the late nineteenth-century German 
conservative anti-modernists. They both similarly regard ‘modernity’ as a sick culture and 
subsequently idealise ancient Greece and medieval Europe. They also similarly reject 
‘democracy’ both as an impediment to the production of eminent leaders and as a cause of 
various insecurities among ordinary people. And they also similarly condemn ‘stateism’, which 
disavows the priority of the ‘Volk’ (Volk) over the state,2 and deplore the ‘shopkeeper’ 
mentality in which the pursuit of private advantage replaces the community as a whole as the 
object of primary commitment. And, in terms of their redemptive side, they both similarly seek 
                                                 
1 Young (2006): p. 2 
2 According to Young, Völkisch thinking originated from the anxiety and critical reactions of German romantic 
thinkers against the eighteenth-century Enlightenment rationalism and the subsequent industrial modernity in which 
every aspect of human life is invaded by instrumental reason. And a ‘Volk’ as ‘an organic totality’ which precedes 
both the state and the individual is what was discovered in an idealised image of the pre-Enlightenment past by those 
thinkers who were pursuing a spiritually unified ‘organic’ society capable of producing the authentically human 
individual (see Young 2006: pp. 4-5 & 202-6). 
18 
 
to cure the sickness of modernity by developing new spirituality through a kind of ‘life-reform’ 
movement that concerns itself with bodily ‘hygiene’ in a broad sense, by returning to a 
hierarchical society under the rule of an exceptional leader, and, most crucially, by reintegrating 
the Volk through the re-creation of ‘a communal religion’. On the other hand, Nietzsche’s 
thinking also shares cosmopolitanism with Enlightenment thinking, whose chief concern is the 
whole world as a community. That is, Nietzsche is an internationalist who sought a revived 
European culture as world culture. Hence, his thinking is “a unique mixture of Enlightenment 
and anti-Enlightenment ideals”, a harmonious mixture of religious communitarianism and 
cosmopolitanism that aims to establish the religiously based world community with ‘unity in 
multiplicity’ through the rebirth of the medieval ‘Roman’ Church with Christian gods 
supplanted by ‘Greek’ ones, which functions as a cosmopolitan, unifying institution.3 
Now, I think Young is correct in some respects. Nietzsche was clearly concerned with the 
sickness of modernity throughout his life. He can be plausibly classified as an anti-democratic 
figure who favours an old type of hierarchical society, and he clearly romanticised ancient 
Greece in this context. Moreover, his various comments about the effects of food, drink, place 
and climate on the body, such as his suggestions on what one should eat and drink, also prompt 
us to see him as a kind of life-reformer (see, e.g., EH: Clever, 1-2). He was in the end not a 
German nationalist, as he came to abhor and reject the German imperialism vehemently. And, 
as far as looking at BT is concerned, Nietzsche clearly did set the flourishing of community as 
his highest goal, and regarded the re-creation of the ‘communal’ life-affirming religious festival 
analogous to pre-Socratic Greek tragedy as the key to his goal. 
However, Young seems to me to get it wrong when he claims that Nietzsche always 
maintained the religious communitarianism that sets the flourishing of community as its highest 
                                                 
3 See Young (2006): pp. 201-215 
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value. For, on this point, I agree with many commentators that Nietzsche eventually abandoned 
the religious communitarianism, and embraced instead a kind of ‘individualistic’ thinking which 
is primarily concerned with the flourishing of few exceptional individuals, few extraordinary 
creative individuals capable of creating new life-affirming values, whose existence itself forms 
the cultural greatness of the community, whom Nietzsche often describes as ‘higher types’. To 
be more exact, my view is that Nietzsche always possessed both communitarianism and 
individualistic thinking. And while he gave priority to the former in the early ‘romantic’ period, 
he began attaching far greater significance to the latter from the middle ‘positivist’ period 
onwards. Hence, in the end, while he continued to possess a concern for the flourishing of the 
community generally, his highest value, his fundamental and foremost concern, became the 
flourishing of those few exceptional individuals, the nurturing of ‘higher types’. 
Let me start clarifying my view. The youthful Nietzsche clearly presents in BT the 
communitarian thinking that sets the flourishing of community as the highest object of its 
concern. Despite having already acquired Swiss citizenship when he was writing the book, he 
still strongly identified Germany as his own community and was ardently concerned for the 
critical state of its culture. His highest value was the redemption of Germany as a community 
through the flourishing of its culture, through the establishment of its cultural unity. And he 
aimed to achieve this by the means of reviving a ‘communal’ life-affirming religious festival 
analogous to pre-Socratic Greek tragedy, which he believed to be now embodied by Wagner’s 
music-drama. So, in ‘Preface to Richard Wagner’ of BT which was written at the end of the 
year 1871, he describes the matter with which BT is concerned as “a seriously German problem” 
(BT: Preface). And he claims in a main section of BT, “Let no one try to blight our faith in a 
yet-impending rebirth of Hellenic antiquity; for this alone gives us hope for a renovation and 
purification of the German spirit through the fire magic of music. What else could we name that 
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might awaken any comforting expectations for the future in the midst of the desolation and 
exhaustion of contemporary culture?” (BT: 20). 
However, it is interesting to note that when we glance at the suppressed earlier version of 
‘Preface to Richard Wagner’ of BT which was written on February 1871, this youthful 
Nietzsche was also originally planning to present in BT ‘individualistic’ thinking that regards 
the flourishing of few exceptional individuals as the highest object of its concern. In this 
suppressed manuscript, he claims explicitly that “Neither the state, nor the people, nor mankind 
exist for the sake of themselves, but the goal lies in their peaks, in the great ‘individual’, the 
saints and the artists”, i.e. “the genius”, and that even “the state” is “only a means” to “the 
preparation and production of the genius” which is the highest “cultural tendency” (see KSA: 
VII, II = Mp XII I b. Febuar 1871, pp. 354-355). Such ‘individualistic’ thinking is similarly 
reflected in his unpublished early essay TGS, which was also originally intended to be a part of 
BT. In this essay, Nietzsche describes the process of society as “the continuing, painful birth of 
those exalted men of culture in whose service everything else has to consume itself”, and claims 
that the state is “the means” of setting this process of society “in motion and guaranteeing its 
unobstructed continuation” (see TGS: p. 168). 
This, I think, raises a possibility that Nietzsche was in fact always an individualistic thinker. 
That is, on the basis of all those ‘individualistic’ remarks he makes in the suppressed 
manuscripts for BT, we could suspect that the communitarian thinking he presented in BT was 
not something which sprang out from his true inner-nature, and that his highest value was 
actually already placed in few exceptional individuals when he wrote the book. And this seems 
to be a genuine possibility, since there are other adequate grounds on which to doubt the 
seriousness of his commitment to the communitarianism in BT. 
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Firstly, the person who decisively inspired and motivated Nietzsche to write BT was 
Wagner, whom Nietzsche idolised as a living creative genius. It seems that Wagner’s influence 
on Nietzsche and on his religious communitarianism in BT cannot be underestimated. For, 
according to Silk and Stern, who have examined the biographical background of BT, though 
Nietzsche was already interested in Greek tragedy before he came to know Wagner, it was in all 
likelihood Wagner’s music-drama that reignited his interest crucially. Further, it is also very 
likely that Wagner himself got involved in the planning of BT to some degree.
4
 And secondly, 
it appears to be the case that in the youthful Nietzsche’s mind, his admiration for Wagner as a 
living creative genius always outweighed the significance he felt for Wagner’s music-drama as 
a communal religious festival. For Silk and Stern interestingly document that the youthful 
Nietzsche was at first not overwhelmingly attracted to Wagner’s music, and that his conversion 
to Wagner, which was gradual transition, became truly decisive only when he met Wagner in 
person. In other words, what ultimately drove Nietzsche to idolise Wagner was Wagner’s 
powerful and impressive personality as well as his professed enthusiasm for Schopenhauer, of 
whom Nietzsche was already a great devotee. Moreover, Silk and Stern also document that, 
despite forming close relations with Wagner, Nietzsche’s experience of Wagner’s music-drama 
in its proper theatrical setting was very limited at the time of publication of BT: “the only 
Wagnerian work he had seen performed remained Meistersinger”.5 On these grounds, it could 
be suggested that the religious communitarian element found in BT is an additional element 
Nietzsche as a Wagnerian attached purely from a sense of obligation to Wagner, in order 
academically to promote the significance of Wagner’s music-drama and to endorse Wagner’s 
                                                 
4 See Silk & Stern (1983): pp. 33 & 40 
5 See Silk & Stern (1983): pp. 24-29 & 52 
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forthcoming Bayreuth Festival, and that he was in fact already an out-and-out individualistic 
thinker when he wrote the book. 
Again, I find this to be a genuine possibility, since even long after he separated himself from 
Wagnerianism, Nietzsche still acknowledged that what he cherished most in his life was the 
friendship he had had with Wagner. As he remarks in EH written near the end of his career, “I’d 
let go cheap the whole rest of my human relationships; I should not want to give away out of my 
life at any price the days of Tribschen [Wagner’s home in Switzerland where Nietzsche visited 
frequently and enjoyed an intimate association with Wagner] – days of trust, of cheerfulness, of 
sublime accidents, of profound moments” (EH: Clever, 5). 
So, should we conclude that Nietzsche was always an individualistic thinker? Not 
necessarily so, I think. For Silk and Stern seem right when they suggest that “notwithstanding 
the extent of Wagner’s influence, there is no good reason to suppose that Nietzsche ever went 
against his own inclinations for Wagner’s sake, whether by adding material, changing it or 
suppressing it”.6 Hence, it seems reasonable to believe that Nietzsche, at one point, seriously 
devoted himself to religious communitarianism. That is, we should accept that the youthful 
Nietzsche sincerely aimed for the establishment of cultural unity of Germany which, he believed, 
would make Germany flourish as a community, and regarded Wagner’s music-drama as a new 
‘communal’ religious festival which would be the key to such cultural unity. But then, we 
cannot ignore the existence of the above-mentioned suppressed manuscripts for BT completely. 
The fact is that, despite his communitarian stance in BT, the youthful Nietzsche was clearly 
toying with individualistic thinking when he wrote the book, though he independently chose not 
to express it openly at the time, presumably for the sake of his commitment to 
communitarianism. Accordingly, whereas Young seemingly believes that the youthful 
                                                 
6 See Silk & Stern (1983): p. 43 
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Nietzsche possessed only communitarianism, I suggest that the youthful Nietzsche’s thinking 
was actually a mixture of communitarianism and individualistic thinking, in which the former 
was given priority. 
Now, contrary to Young, I also suggest that Nietzsche did not always maintain the religious 
communitarianism he presented in BT, and that such thinking is something exclusive to him in 
the early ‘romantic’ period. It is a widely acknowledged fact that, after attending the Bayreuth 
Festival, Nietzsche came to realise that Wagner’s music-drama was nothing like a new 
‘communal’ religious festival, and that this realisation ultimately led him to separate himself 
from Wagnerianism. And in my view, with this separation, which marks the end of his early 
period, Nietzsche eventually abandoned his religious communitarianism. 
However, this does not mean that I am suggesting that the mature Nietzsche shook off all 
communitarian elements from his philosophy and embraced instead individualistic thinking 
alone. Rather, my view is that the balance between communitarianism and individualistic 
thinking in Nietzsche started to change after his separation from Wagnerianism and he began 
attaching far greater significance to individualistic thinking from the middle ‘positivist’ period 
onwards. For it is clear that, even after the early period, Nietzsche still continued to express his 
concern for the flourishing of community generally, in the shape of his persistent criticisms of 
contemporary Europe and the sickness of modernity. And, needless to say, Nietzsche at no point 
in his life ever wished for the decaying of community in any way. So, naturally, we still find 
some communitarian elements in his mature works, as Young has enumerated with force in his 
book. 
However, what Young fails to recognise is the fact that, with this change in the balance 
between communitarianism and individualistic thinking in Nietzsche, his communitarianism 
naturally lost its significance, and consequently his view on the flourishing of community 
24 
 
changed its nature. That is, from the middle period onwards, what came to constitute the very 
backbone of Nietzsche’s philosophy most decisively was no longer the communitarianism in 
which, as Young suggests, “the flourishing of individuals presupposes the flourishing of 
community”, but instead a type of individualistic thinking in which the flourishing of 
community presupposes the flourishing of few exceptional individuals whose existence itself 
forms and shapes the cultural greatness of community, and whom Nietzsche calls ‘higher 
types’.7 
Indeed, immediately after BT, Nietzsche began to present openly the type of individualistic 
thinking he expressed in the suppressed manuscripts for BT, as he claims explicitly in UM that 
“the goal of humanity cannot lie in its end but only in its highest exemplars” (UM: II, 9). And it 
is simply an undeniable fact that we see the clear presence of such individualistic thinking 
constantly throughout his mature works, as he repeatedly discusses ‘higher types’ and expresses 
his anticipation for their emergence in various contexts. 
To be sure, Young does not ignore the importance of ‘higher types’ for Nietzsche: he in fact 
acknowledges that Nietzsche greatly values those few exceptionally creative individuals. 
However, on the basis of his reading of Nietzsche as a life-long communitarian, Young claims 
that Nietzsche values higher types “only as a means to the flourishing of the social organism in 
its totality”: “it is not the case that the social totality is valued for the sake of the higher types. 
Rather, the higher types are valued for the sake of the social totality”.8 In fact, Young further 
claims that both ‘higher types’ and the ‘herd type’, the ordinary masses, are valued equally by 
Nietzsche, because Nietzsche “values, continues to value, social stability and cohesion at least 
as much as he values individual creativity”, and that Nietzsche’s real interest lies in “resolving 
                                                 
7 Young (2006): p. 2, n. 1 
8 See Young (2006): pp. 3 & 135 
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the tension” between higher types – ‘individual creativity’ – and the herd type – ‘social stability 
and cohesion’ –, since the flourishing of community “consists in a dialectical interplay between 
the two”. Hence, Young writes, “As a type the exceptional individual is of no greater value than 
the ‘herd’ type, since the ‘virtuously stupid’ and the ‘free spirit’ are equally necessary to a 
flourishing community. As individuals, however, Nietzsche would certainly want to add, free 
spirits are of infinitely greater value, since while they are few and far between, herd-individuals 
are everywhere”.9 
I think Young’s claim cannot be a correct interpretation of Nietzsche’s view, since 
Nietzsche clearly does not value both higher types and the ordinary masses equally in any sense. 
Certainly, as I said, even after his abandonment of his religious communitarianism, Nietzsche 
still continues to care about the flourishing of the community generally. And it is also true that 
he sometimes seems to suggest that the ordinary masses have a role to play in the flourishing of 
the community, as he speaks of them as being used as a stepping-stone for the flourishing of 
few exceptional individuals. But then, he also often insists that the masses hinder the 
appearance of exceptional individuals, that they are a serious impediment to the nurturing of 
higher types. Moreover, there are also many critical remarks he makes on the masses which 
strongly indicate that he does not recognise any intrinsic value in them, and that he considers 
them valuable, or rather ‘useful’ or simply ‘tolerable’, only insofar as they are means to the 
nurturing of higher types. On the other hand, he clearly considers those few exceptionally 
creative individuals to be intrinsically valuable, as he in his mature works increasingly values 
‘creativity’ almost more than anything, certainly more than ‘social stability and cohesion’, 
insisting constantly how we must perform the ‘revaluation of all values’ and create new 
life-affirming values. 
                                                 
9 See Young (2006): pp. 88-89 & 97-98 
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Indeed, I think Tanner is right when he suggests that Nietzsche, who sometimes affects to 
“take a kind of god’s-eye view of the world”, seems to have become “wearied by ‘mass man’”, 
since “Nietzsche seems to think that a collection of extremely similar people would be as boring 
and superfluous as one of extremely similar works of art”.10 So, as we shall see in later chapters, 
Nietzsche in his mature works instead became increasingly interested in and fascinated by the 
existence of a few selected peculiar and exceptional individuals who brought something new, 
beautiful, intoxicating and life-affirming to the world, especially those historical figures with 
extraordinary creativity whose existence itself shaped the cultural greatness of their 
communities, such as Napoleon, Goethe and Beethoven. 
Further, it is also clear to me that what Nietzsche’s mature texts, especially those written 
after his middle period, increasingly display are not only a sense of weariness concerning, and 
indifference towards, the existence of the masses, but also a profound sense of responsive 
‘disgust’ towards the masses: “Nausea over man, over the “rabble,” was always my greatest 
danger” (EH: Wise, 8). Throughout his mature works, by using intensely corporeal vocabulary, 
he repeatedly portrays the images of the masses’ being something unclean and filthy, and of his 
being physically suffocated and nauseated by their bad smell: it almost gives the impression that 
what he finds repulsive is not just their spiritual mediocrity and pettiness, and that he actually 
thinks that he would be polluted and contaminated by their mere physical presence (see, e.g., 
GM: I, 12, III, 14 & AC: 38). 
Accordingly, my view is that while Nietzsche’s thinking always was a mixture of 
communitarianism and individualistic thinking, it is individualistic thinking to which in his 
mature works he ultimately attached far greater significance, as he became much more 
concerned with the flourishing of few exceptional individuals than the flourishing of the 
                                                 
10 Tanner (2000): p. 95 
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community as a whole. And in fact, I argue that Young, in failing to recognise this significance 
of Nietzsche’s individualistic thinking, which decisively constitutes the very backbone of his 
mature philosophy as a whole, also misinterprets the real positive aspects of the mature 
Nietzsche’s philosophy of religion. That is, in my view, as Nietzsche eventually accepted the 
nurturing of ‘higher types’ as his highest value, his positive religious thinking also came to 
change its shape and nature. And, contrary to Young’s view, what Nietzsche ultimately came to 
focus on and value in his mature works is no longer the ‘communal’ life-affirming religious 
festival that can contribute towards the flourishing of ‘community’, but rather what I call ‘the 
life-affirming type of gods’, a certain type of ‘gods’ symbolised by the Olympian gods of 
ancient Greece, who can help individuals to flourish and thus contribute towards the nurturing 
of ‘higher types’. I will come back to this later in the thesis.
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Section B: Nietzsche and ‘war’ 
 
Now, through the rest of this chapter, I explain the exact nature of individualistic thinking I 
attribute to Nietzsche. For, though interpreting Nietzsche as an individualistic thinker has today 
become a dominant approach among commentators, there exist many different kinds of 
‘individualist’ reading. To give a brief description at this point, my individualist reading is not 
what I call an ‘anti-political’ individualist reading that regards Nietzsche as an antipolitical 
thinker who only pursues his own flourishing without having any interest for the actual 
community. My reading is also not what I call a ‘militaristic’ aristocratic individualist reading 
that regards Nietzsche as a thinker who sets the nurturing of ‘higher types’ as his highest 
concern and aims to achieve it chiefly by militaristic means. And my reading is also not what I 
call a ‘political’ aristocratic individualist reading that regards Nietzsche as a proper political 
thinker with specific political ideals, who sets the nurturing of ‘higher types’ as his highest goal 
and strives to achieve that by establishing a particular kind of socio-political structure. Rather, 
my reading is an ‘un-militaristic’, ‘moderately political’ and ‘religious’ aristocratic individualist 
reading that regards Nietzsche both as a philosopher who shows concern for the reality of 
socio-political life yet does not possess a proper political philosophy which justifies and 
endorses specific political ideals, and as a religious thinker who sets the nurturing of ‘higher 
types’ as his highest goal and attempts to find the way to achieve it not in any militarism or 
politics but in a certain conception of ‘god[s]’. 
Among Anglophone commentators, it was Kaufmann who first endorsed the ‘individualist’ 
reading. Presumably motivated from his personal sense of duty to separate Nietzsche from 
Nazism as much as possible, Kaufmann in his Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist 
interprets the “leitmotif of Nietzsche’s life and thought” as “the theme of the antipolitical 
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individual who seeks self-perfection far from the modern world”.1 Another commentator who 
takes a similar line is Nehamas. Nehamas in his Nietzsche: Life as Literature interprets 
Nietzsche as a figure who is solely concerned with his own self-creation, arguing, “Nietzsche 
exemplifies through his own writing one way in which one individual may have succeeded in 
fashioning itself . . . This individual is none other than Nietzsche himself, who is a creature of 
his own texts . . . a literary character”.2 
Now, I think such type of interpretation cannot be correct. To be sure, as I shall discuss in 
the following chapters, there is no doubt that Nietzsche is strongly concerned with the 
flourishing of individual life, or, more specifically, with individual ‘health’, mainly 
‘psychological’ health but also to some degree ‘physical’ health, especially his own: so, he often 
likes to style himself as a ‘psychologist’ or a ‘physiologist’ rather than as a traditional 
philosopher who tackles abiding metaphysical or epistemological questions. And he is also 
clearly a thinker who attaches great importance to the value of ‘solitude’, as he himself was 
forced to live most of his mature life in solitude, far from life as an active member of a 
particular society, owing to his persistent illness. And he certainly claims in EH that he is “the 
last anti-political German” (EH: Wise, 3). But then, this does not mean that he is a completely 
isolated, disengaged, anti-political thinker. For, contrary to Nehamas’ deeply aestheticized 
interpretation of him as being purely interested in his own self-development, his writings clearly 
indicate that he is very much interested in the actual community and deeply concerned about the 
state of its culture. For instance, in his early unpublished essay TGS he specifically discusses 
the relation between ‘a community’ and ‘politics’, as he examines what constituted healthy 
politics in ancient Greece. And as I suggested, even after the early period, even after his 
                                                 
1 Kaufmann (1974): p. 418 
2 Nehamas (1985): p. 8 
30 
 
abandonment of his religious communitarianism, he still continues to express his concern for 
the flourishing of community generally, in the shape of his persistent criticisms of contemporary 
Europe, especially the critical state of its culture, and the sickness of modernity. And though 
‘politics’ is never a dominant theme in any of his published works, he still makes many remarks 
on socio-political issues, such as ‘the state’, ‘democracy’ and ‘socialism’. In this sense, his 
thinking clearly possesses some political aspects. 
This leads me to suggest that Nietzsche is not an ‘antipolitical’ individualist whose only 
interest lies in his own flourishing, but rather an elitist individualist, or, as it is commonly called, 
an ‘aristocratic’ individualist, who is chiefly concerned with the nurturing of few exceptional 
individuals whose existence itself forms the cultural greatness of the community, and whom 
Nietzsche describes as ‘higher types’. Now, there are many commentators who consider such an 
exceptional individual to be not ‘a higher type’, but rather the individual whom Nietzsche 
famously calls the ‘Übermensch’. However, I find this approach problematic, since it seems to 
me that the conception of ‘Übermensch’ is extremely underdeveloped by Nietzsche. Certainly, 
Nietzsche discusses the Übermensch repeatedly in Z. However, the fact is that not only does he 
hardly mention the Übermensch again in any of his later works, but also his discussion of the 
Übermensch in Z itself is pretty abstract and obscure. For instance, in Z he declares that the 
Übermensch is “the meaning of the earth” (Z: I, Prologue, 3). But then, he never really explains 
how exactly and in what sense the Übermensch will become ‘the meaning of earth’. And while 
making many hyperbolic and somewhat poetical remarks on the Übermensch, he also fails to 
tell us basic matters such as what kinds of physical culture the Übermensch is to possess, what 
he would actually do with what Nietzsche clearly conceives of as his abundant energy, and so 
on. Accordingly, my view is that Nietzsche never worked out the conception of Übermensch 
properly, and thus that even an exhaustive study of the Übermensch will not really issue in a 
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fruitful outcome as it will involve a great deal of guesswork on our part. Hence, I choose to 
identify those few exceptional individuals not with the ‘Übermenschen’ but with those whom 
Nietzsche calls ‘higher types’, since his remarks on ‘higher types’ are more extensively present 
throughout his mature works and less obscure: but, nevertheless, I think we could plausibly say 
that Nietzsche basically intended the Übermensch to be a sort of the ultimate type of ‘higher 
types’. 
One of the commentators who support an ‘aristocratic’ individualist reading is Appel. By 
understanding Nietzsche’s sole concern to be “the flourishing of those few whom he considers 
exemplary of the human species”, Appel argues that Nietzsche’s highest aim is to establish “a 
new, aristocratic political order in Europe in which the herdlike majority . . . are . . . under the 
control of a self-absorbed master caste whose only concern is for the cultivation of its own 
excellence”.3 A similar kind of reading is also provided by Lea. Lea argues that while 
anticipating positively the imminent catastrophe of bourgeois-Christian civilisation, Nietzsche 
aspired to “the formation of élite”, the creation of an “élite of philosopher-kings, recruited from 
all classes” that is capable of changing the world. And though Nietzsche was against 
nationalism and race-hatred, he ultimately came to embrace “the force of militarism” as the 
means of creating and maintaining the supreme type of man, and “even went so far as to oppose 
all attempts to arrest the advance of democracy and socialism . . . since a mass-man would 
thereby be created who, when the hour struck, would fall like ripe fruit into the hands of the 
military”. And Lea further claims that Nietzsche as “the new Goethe . . . would have his 
counterpart in a new Napoleon, who would succeed . . . in uniting Europe and ultimately the 
world . . . The new Napoleon . . . would lay the foundations of a super-State”.4 
                                                 
3 Appel (1999): pp. 1-2 
4 Lea (1993): pp. 295-299 
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Now, I think Lea is correct in some respects. For, while Nietzsche is generally very critical 
of democracy, it is true that he sometimes seemingly regards it as an essential precondition for 
the nurturing of ‘higher types’ of the future (see, e.g., BGE: 242). And it is also clear to me that 
Nietzsche’s individualist thinking does not in any way claim that individuals must be born into a 
certain social class to become ‘higher types’: I will discuss this in Chapter 4-A. However, I find 
Lea’s reading problematic, since not only does his argument for Nietzsche’s militarism rely too 
heavily upon the Nachlass to be plausible, but more fundamentally it is my view that, although 
Nietzsche often indicates his admiration for ‘war’, he never actually embraced any sort of 
militarism. 
Let me start clarifying my view. There are passages in Nietzsche’s works that seem to 
indicate his affirmative attitude towards war. For example, he in Z writes, “You say it is the 
good cause that hallows even war? I say unto you: it is the good war that hallows any cause. 
War and courage have accomplished more great things than love of the neighbor” (Z: I, 10). 
Now, this passage is open to several possible interpretations. For instance, we can read it 
literally and interpret that what Nietzsche values is indeed ‘war’ itself, and thus that he is a 
proper militarist. However, I think such approach cannot be correct, since it clearly ignores the 
rhetorical context of the passage. That is, it fails to recognise the possibility that Nietzsche is 
here simply trying to make a critical point against the danger of Christian ‘pity’ founded on 
Christian love of one’s neighbours and not actually endorsing ‘war’ itself. 
This leads us to another interpretation of the above passage, which is that we could instead 
suppose that, although Nietzsche does not affirm war itself, especially all the violence and blood 
accompanying war, he does affirm what an event like war brings out positively in us, namely 
‘courage’ in this case. This interpretation seems more plausible. For, if we read other seemingly 
positive remarks Nietzsche makes on war in their context properly, they also seem to indicate 
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similarly that what he actually values is not necessarily war itself, but the type of heroic spirit, 
creative power and strong will expressed typically in war – what he sometimes calls ‘masculine 
virtues’ –, which are ultimately capable of evolving a new culture (see, e.g., HAH: I, 444, 477 
& II, ii, 187). So, for instance, on this line of thought, it could be suggested that, while 
Nietzsche does not necessarily affirm or endorse all those atrocities Napoleon committed in war, 
he does value the scale of “a force majeure of genius and will . . . strong enough to create a 
unity out of Europe, a political and economic unity for the sake of a world government” found 
within the existence of Napoleon, which Napoleon typically expressed in war (see EH: CW, 2; 
also BGE: 208). Or to put it differently, what Nietzsche affirms is not necessarily the brutal and 
destructive aspect of Napoleon that is symbolised by all the atrocities he committed, but the 
creative and constructive aspect of Napoleon that is symbolised by his cultural achievements 
such as his establishment of the Napoleonic Code and his contribution towards the development 
of Egyptology. 
Or, by taking a similar line, we could also suppose that, when Nietzsche talks about war 
affirmatively, he is not referring to ‘militaristic’ war, but simply to ‘intellectual’ war where 
different ideologies conflict with each other. This interpretation also seems to be not entirely 
implausible. For, as we will see in later chapters, there is no doubt that Nietzsche is a thinker 
who deeply fears the stagnation of culture and thus attaches great importance to ‘creativity’. He 
clearly recognises the necessity of tension or conflicts between different ideas and values that 
would naturally stimulate people’s creativity to establish new ideas and values and consequently 
encourage the evolution of culture: one of the key points of his criticism of modernity – and of 
Christianity, as we will see – is that we moderns are facing the stagnation of culture by lacking 
in these very tensions (see, e.g., TI: V, 3). 
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However, in my view, while all these interpretations are plausible and substantially correct 
to a great extent, there still remains one other extremely plausible way to interpret all those 
seemingly affirmative remarks Nietzsche makes on war. That is, we can also regard those 
remarks as expressing a genuinely positive sentiment towards war, and interpret him as being in 
fact greatly attracted to war, even though he is not a militarist. For, if we look at his texts 
generally, they clearly seem to display an undeniable fascination for violent images: for instance, 
what we perceive from the way all those cruel punishments of the old Germany – such as 
“stoning” and “breaking on the wheel” – are discussed in GM is hardly a sense of condemnation 
or horror or scholarly calmness, but rather a sense of fascinated attention (see GM: II, 3). And 
there is also no doubt that, as a naturalist, Nietzsche is deeply fascinated by war where one’s 
natural instincts of cruelty and aggression are exposed and expressed in their purest form, in the 
healthiest way (see BGE: 259 & GM: II, 6).
5
 Nonetheless, surely, expressing such fascination 
for war does not in any straightforward sense make him a militarist, since there is, after all, 
really nothing so unusual about it. 
For instance, when Simone Weil, a Christian thinker, remarks that “war itself, especially as 
conducted in the old days, stirs man’s sense of beauty in a way that is vital and poignant”, it is 
quite clear that she is in no sense affirming war itself or valuing the way war brings out a sense 
of beauty in us.
6
 Rather, she is just stating pretty much what many of us think about war, 
namely war is ‘horrible’ and yet somehow ‘magnificent’. To give an example, I am not a 
militarist and never want to experience war. When I visit the Atomic Bomb Memorial Museum 
in Hiroshima, I am as all are totally horrified by all those exhibits that testify so vividly to how 
tragic and dreadful the reality of war can actually be. Yet, when I visit the Tokyo National 
                                                 
5 For a discussion on Nietzsche’s naturalism, see, e.g., Leiter (2002): pp. 3-29 
6 Weil (2009): p. 107 
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Museum and stand in front of all those old Japanese samurai swords and armour on display, or 
when I watch Akira Kurosawa’s films that portray bloody wars between samurai warriors, I, 
like many others, can reap intense pleasure from watching them and find them fascinatingly 
beautiful and magnificent. And this is evidently a sentiment that many share, given the 
canonical position Kurosawa occupies in the history of film. Despite knowing the reality of war 
to some degree, I can somehow admire war, especially old-style war. And this is surely a 
contradictory but fundamental aspect of human nature which many of us commonly share. This, 
indeed, must also be one of the reasons why war has always been a popular theme for paintings, 
novels and films. And in my view, Nietzsche, in his remarks on war, is doing exactly what Weil 
does. That is, Nietzsche, who often styles himself as a ‘psychologist’, is provoking us to 
recognise a basic psychological fact, namely, that, while being terrified at all those bloody 
atrocities accompanying war, we simultaneously cannot prevent ourselves from finding war 
itself awe-inspiringly beautiful, exciting and life-affirming in some way: there is something 
about war that naturally and almost forcibly drives our psychology to romanticise it. 
Of course, we could criticise Nietzsche for over-romanticising war. And in my view, we are 
right to do so, since his writings clearly display a certain naivety in this context: and in a few 
other contexts too, as we will see. And his over-romanticisation of war may be in a way the 
expression of a certain stupidity. Further, we could also argue that his writings in this context 
also display a certain irresponsibility, for the problem is that while Nietzsche and Weil may 
indeed share the same sentiment towards war, compared with Weil’s way of expressing it, the 
way – and the tone with which – Nietzsche expresses it can actually mislead people into 
believing that what is expressed here is the affirmation of war: this sort of irresponsibility is also 
strongly detectable in his treatments of other controversial issues such as ‘slavery’ and 
‘breeding’, as I will discuss in the next section. 
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But, be that as it may, it also seems to me important to recognise that there exists a huge gulf 
between Nietzsche’s understanding of war and ours. That is, it is an undeniable fact that the 
world and people’s general view of war have changed significantly over the course of history, 
even since Nietzsche’s time. As Staten puts it, “What we since yesterday have come to think of 
as outrage and atrocity is the normal fact of human history and has rarely interfered with the 
good conscience of its perpetrators, who could, as Nietzsche says, “emerge from a disgusting 
procession of murder, arson, rape, and torture, exhilarated and undisturbed of soul, as if it were 
no more than a students’ prank, convinced they have provide the poets with a lot more material 
for song and praise””.7 
In Nietzsche’s time, war was still very much a part of people’s life, in the sense that it was 
accepted more widely and glorified more publicly than today. And compared to us moderns 
who have access to live coverage of war through television and the internet, most people in 
Nietzsche’s time knew far less about what actually happens in the reality of war. Certainly, 
Nietzsche knew the reality of war to some degree, from his own experience of serving in the 
Franco-Prussian War as a medical orderly, by nursing injured soldiers. But, still, Nietzsche was 
a nineteenth-century German who did not experience the First and Second World Wars, and 
who never saw highly-technologised modern warfare. And in many and significant ways, it was 
precisely these World Wars that have radically and fundamentally changed many people’s 
political and moral views of war. And if Nietzsche knew the destructive power of modern 
weapons and the merciless way they are being used today – nuclear weapons, push-button 
warfare, what is essentially indiscriminate bombing –, he would probably be far more 
circumspect in what he might say about war and its potential glory. Accordingly, it seems to me 
crucial, for understanding Nietzsche, that when we read his rather hyperbolic remarks on war, 
                                                 
7 Staten (1990): p. 80, quoting GM: I, 11 
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we should also try to be generous enough to read them in the context of the time and the 
situation in which he actually lived. 
But, in any case, in my view, there is also enough evidence in his texts to suggest that 
Nietzsche was not a militarist. For instance, he remarks in HAH, “To disarm while being the 
best armed, out of an elevation of sensibility – that is the means to real peace, which must 
always rest on a disposition for peace . . . Better to perish than to hate and fear, and twofold 
better to perish than to make oneself hated and feared – this must one day become the supreme 
maxim of every individual state!” (HAH: II, ii, 284). While this very simplistic, unrealistic, 
over-optimistic view of peace typically demonstrates the occasional proclivity to naivety that 
his writings display in certain contexts, which I mentioned earlier, it also strongly suggests that 
Nietzsche was not a type of man who would or could embrace any sort of militarism in earnest. 
Indeed, as I will insist throughout this thesis, my view is that despite the critical stand against 
Christian ‘pity’ and ‘compassion’, as well as a liking for violent images, both of which his texts 
display, Nietzsche’s fundamental temperament was one of gentleness and sympathy. He indeed 
confesses himself to be extremely sensitive to others’ suffering: “I know . . . that I only need to 
expose myself to the sight of some genuine distress and I am lost. And if a suffering friend said 
to me, “Look, I am about to die; please promise me to die with me,” I should promise it; and the 
sight of a small mountain tribe fighting for its liberty would persuade me to offer it my hand and 
my life” (GS: 338).
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Section C: Nietzsche and ‘politics’ 
 
There is one other aspect of Lea’s reading that I find objectionable. And this objection also 
applies to Appel’s reading I mentioned in the previous section, which regards Nietzsche’s 
highest aim as the establishment of “a new, aristocratic political order in Europe”.1 That is, 
fundamentally, I find the type of ‘individualist’ reading provided by these commentators too 
deeply politicised to be plausible. 
Over the last few decades, the attempt to portray Nietzsche as a political thinker with a 
vision of future politics has become a popular theme among some commentators. For instance, 
Ansell-Pearson claims that “Nietzsche is a thinker preoccupied with the fate of politics in the 
modern world. One has only to take a glance at his wide-ranging concerns . . . to realize that 
Nietzsche is a ‘political’ thinker first and foremost”.2 By regarding Nietzsche as such, these 
commentators have also attempted to situate his thinking on politics in the context of modern 
political philosophy, to produce a systematic overview of his supposed ‘political philosophy’. 
And some of them have tried to demonstrate how Nietzsche’s political philosophy justifies the 




This is not a surprising phenomenon, given the fact that people who have been inspired by 
Nietzsche’s thinking include anarchists, Nazis, Socialists and Marxists:4 so, his thinking has 
been appropriated by various political groups for their own political ideology.
5
 However, I find 
                                                 
1 Appel (1999): pp. 1-2 
2 See Ansell-Pearson (1994): p. 2 
3 See, e.g., Warren (1988), Detwiler (1990) & Schutte (1986): Chapter 7 
4 See Aschheim (1994): p. 7 
5 For discussions on this matter, see Thomas (1983) & Strong (1996) 
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those commentators’ attempts problematic, for although I do not consider Nietzsche an 
anti-political thinker, it seems to me doubtful whether he possesses what can be properly 
described as a systematic political philosophy or theory that justifies certain political ideals. 
Indeed, my view is that he does not possess a political philosophy or theory as such, and thus 
that he cannot be classified as a proper political thinker, in the sense that Hobbes and Rawls are 
proper political thinkers whereas Kant and Heidegger are not. 
Let me start clarifying my view. One of the problems I have with those commentators who 
consider Nietzsche a political thinker is that their arguments often rely too heavily upon the 
Nachlass to be plausible.
6
 But more fundamentally, what I find objectionable is the way they 
often ignore the distinction between ‘politics’ and ‘communal life’. For instance, Strong claims, 
that, 
 
as the first essay in the Genealogy makes clear, moral systems and politics are codetermined. Since 
the very existence of moral categories depended on the desire to assert power over another group of 
people – and under slave morality to control and render them predictable – all morality is 
fundamentally a form of politics. It is possible to understand Nietzsche’s fulminations against 
modern politics in the same light as those against morality.
7 
 
Now, Nietzsche’s criticism of politics is in a sense connected with his criticism of morality. For 
instance, he criticises democrats and socialists by pointing out that what exists at the basis of 
their will and outcry for equality is their vengefulness against everything that has power, which 
is rooted in their “aggrieved conceit” and “repressed envy” (see Z: II, 7). And this kind of 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Detwiler (1990) & Schutte (1986) 
7 Strong (2000): p. 189 
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psychology is what he also recognises to exist behind the establishment of ‘slave morality’, 
typified by Christian morality. However, the problem with Strong’s claim is that he fails to 
recognise how people can be controlled without ‘politics’ or ‘morality’. That is, fundamentally, 
a group of people can assert power over another group simply by its physical force, by its brute 
strength. Moreover, Strong also fails to recognise that a phenomenon of people grouping 
together does not necessarily mean ‘politics’, that is, ‘a communal life’ does not automatically 
entail ‘a political life’. For it is surely the case that what could be properly described as ‘a 
political life’ can only come into existence if there first exist in a community not just ‘morality’ 
but also such elements as ‘laws’, ‘institutions’ and ‘economic principles’. For instance, my 
college is a community where people group together under a certain ethos or values or aims 
which they all share. Being situated in Great Britain, the college could be regarded as a part of 
British politics in a broad sense, since its existence and its actions possess certain political 
implications. But then, clearly, the college is not by itself ‘a political organisation’ and the 
college life is not ‘a political life’, for the reason that it lacks all the above-mentioned elements. 
And the fact is that Nietzsche never, in any part of his works, fully explain what exactly 
‘politics’ is, or what precisely constitutes the ‘political’. This, I think, gives us good reason to 
suspect that what Nietzsche discusses in his work is not really ‘politics’ but essentially 
something more like ‘communal life’. 
Another problem I have with those commentators is the way they tend to overestimate the 
significance of Nietzsche’s remarks on politics. In fact, this tendency is not something exclusive 
to those commentators. For instance, Staten, a commentator who does not necessarily 
consciously aim to portray Nietzsche as a political thinker, claims that Nietzsche’s “political 
statements are not just casual or ancillary remarks in Nietzsche’s text; they are intimately woven 
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into the texture of his thought in its entirety”.8 Now, it is easily understandable where Staten’s 
claim comes from, since Nietzsche does talk about ‘politics’ repeatedly. But what Staten, and all 
those commentators who regard Nietzsche as a political thinker, seem to ignore is the fact that 
unlike those thinkers who are widely recognised to be political thinkers proper, Nietzsche does 
not at all provide a detailed account of various political issues. That is, in Nietzsche’s works, 
there is a total absence of in-depth investigations into basic political conceptions and issues such 
as ‘labour’, ‘law’, ‘taxation’ and ‘citizenship’, which we find in the works of properly political 
thinkers. 
Likewise, although Nietzsche often expresses his negative attitude towards ‘democracy’, he 
never makes a serious attempt to criticise democracy thoroughly and systematically in the way 
properly political thinkers do. His criticism of democracy is clearly limited, since what he 
focuses on is not democracy as a whole, inclusive of its structures, institutions and operation, 
but merely a particular aspect of democracy. That is, what he criticises is chiefly the egalitarian 
aspect of democracy, its conviction in the intrinsic qualitative equality of individuals that is 
founded on the presupposition of the homogenous nature of all individuals and their interests, 
which, according to him, originated in the Christian ‘slave’ morality, specifically from its 
aspiration to be universalised. 
Nietzsche’s criticism of Christian ‘slave’ morality will be discussed later in the thesis. But, 
in brief, Nietzsche believes that people create or accept moralities because each of them 
“instinctively strives for an optimum of favorable conditions under which it can expend all its 
strength and achieve its maximal feeling of power” (GM: III, 7). And he also believes that such 
‘an optimum of favorable conditions’ varies from individual to individual, since he as a 
naturalist recognises the existence of naturally different ‘character-types’ among individuals: 
                                                 
8 Staten (1990): p. 78 
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each individual is born with different characteristics and temperaments, possessing different 
needs and interests. So, in his view, moralities as a means of maximising one’s feeling of power 
are something that should not be universalised: a morality that is beneficial for a certain 
‘character-type’ can be harmful to another ‘character-type’. On the basis of such view, his 
criticism of democracy as the logical consequence of Christian ‘slave’ morality focuses almost 
exclusively on the egalitarian aspect of democracy, its forceful qualitative equalisation of all 
individuals, which, he believes, is an impediment to the nurturing of ‘higher types’, and thus is 
one of the chief reasons for the decadence of contemporary ‘life’ and ‘culture’. Consequently, 
other aspects of democracy, for example, the negative effects democracy may have on 
‘economy’ – such as the means of production and the distribution of capital – and on ‘political 
life’ itself – such as administration and legislation – are largely ignored by him. 
This point I am making is actually recognised by some of those commentators who – more 
sensibly than others – try to portray Nietzsche as a political thinker. For instance, I think Warren 
is indeed right when he observes, 
 
Nietzsche views liberal democratic political culture as little more than a secularized development of 
Christian culture. Nietzsche was either unaware of or chose to ignore essential differences, such as 
those having to do with the rise of market economy and the development of bureaucratic 
organizations. While these developments certainly have dimensions related to Christian-moral 
culture, they are not reducible to them . . . Thus while Nietzsche’s approach may yield important 




                                                 
9 Warren (1988): pp. 213-214 
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It is clear that, unlike properly political thinkers, Nietzsche does not criticise democracy in the 
precise context of ‘politics’. Instead, he treats it in the much wider and vaguer context of ‘life’. 
As he claims, “the democratic movement is not only a form of the decay of political 
organization but a form of the decay, namely the diminution, of man, making him mediocre and 
lowering his value” (BGE: 203). 
But, in my view, even Warren is susceptible to the above-mentioned tendency to 
overestimate the significance of Nietzsche’s remarks on politics, and misreads the extent of 
actual political implications those remarks have: which leads us to one other problem I have 
with those commentators who consider Nietzsche a political thinker. That is, all those 
commentators commonly claim that Nietzsche justifies and endorses both the overthrow of 
democracy and the subsequent establishment of an authoritarian hierarchical society as his own 
political goal. So, for instance, Warren claims that Nietzsche “thought that societies should be 
ruled by superior individuals rather than democratically. . . . As a conservative Nietzsche was 
self-consciously political in the sense of desiring a hierarchical, ascriptive society in the 
future”.10 However, contrary to those commentators’ claim, it seems to me doubtful whether 
Nietzsche actually endorses any specific political goal. 
Certainly, Nietzsche criticises democracy, and makes many positive remarks on hierarchical 
societies, often by idealising the hierarchical society of ancient Greece. But, if these remarks are 
read faithfully in their rhetorical context, it seems to me clear that they are more often made 
simply as a means to illuminate negatives he finds in an egalitarian democratic society. That is, 
through these remarks, he is merely acknowledging that he considers a hierarchical society a 
better form of society than a democratic society for the promotion of culture, because, compared 
to the latter whose forceful qualitative equalisation of all individuals largely denies the 
                                                 
10 Warren (1988): p. 212 
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possibility of the existence of few strong ‘higher types’, the former at least respects the 
existence of natural qualitative inequalities, and thus provides more favourable conditions for 
the potential ‘higher types’ to show their potentiality. 
Moreover, in my view, even if Nietzsche was trying to justify a hierarchical society as his 
own political ideal, his justification is nothing like what could be properly classified as a 
justification provided by a political thinker. That is, compared with all those properly political 
thinkers whose justification of what they consider to be the best form of society are extensive 
and critical, examining a wide range of political and economical issues from various angles, 
Nietzsche’s justification of a hierarchical society is clearly limited and partial. His descriptions 
of the nature of hierarchical society, such as the relation between masters and slaves or the 
relation between a master and another master, are so extremely brief and obscure that it is hard 
to see how such a society is supposed to function in reality: I think Schutte is correct when she 
suggests that “Nietzsche’s authoritarian interpretation of an order of rank is an artificial and 
intellectually unacceptable doctrine based on a rigorously oversimplified view of reality”, and 
that “there is “a highly anti-critical streak” in Nietzsche’s entire political theory of the “order of 
rank” and the practical applications derived from it”.11 Indeed, just as with his over-optimist 
view of ‘peace’ I mentioned before, his discussion of politics is generally very simplistic and 
unrealistic, as well as too abstract and too generalised. Looking at the way he talks about 
politics, it seems as if he thinks that there are only two kinds of politics, namely one that leads 
to a ‘strong’ culture and the other that leads to a ‘weak’ culture. In fact, it might be reasonably 
said that the level of description of political issues he provides in his works is nothing like what 
we expect to find in the works of political thinkers but more like what we expect to find in the 
                                                 
11 Schutte (1986): pp. 184 & 186. Yet, despite this suggestion, Schutte still overestimates the significance of 
Nietzsche’s remarks on ‘politics’ and ends up claiming Nietzsche’s “political goals” to be the establishment of 
“highly authoritarian systems of government” and “the crushing of democracy” (see Schutte 1986: p. 161). 
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works of novelists, in the sense that he in his works seems to be dealing not with political 
‘reality’ but rather with political ‘idea’, just as, for instance, what Dickens focuses on in his 
novels is not really the ‘reality’ of London, but more like an ‘idea’ of London: I shall explain 
this point in Chapter 2-A. 
Of course, we cannot completely deny the possibility that Nietzsche might have secretly 
wished to re-establish a type of hierarchical society which resembles the ancient Greek polis. 
For, in my view, along with the occasional proclivity to naivety in certain contexts that I pointed 
out before, his writings also display susceptibility to a nostalgic mood from time to time. And in 
the light of both the critical attitude towards democracy and the admiration for ancient Greece 
that we find throughout his writings, it seems to me likely that he did long for the 
re-establishment of such a hierarchical society, especially when his texts display a nostalgic 
mood. But then, when the approach is more neutral, more ‘realistic’, he clearly seems to 
recognise that it is simply not possible for us moderns to return to such a hierarchical society. 
As he claims explicitly in TI, “a reversion, a return in any sense or degree is simply not 
possible”, including that to “a former measure of virtue” (TI: IX, 43). Indeed, while in his works 
he often positively talks about ‘master morality’, a life-affirming type of morality typically 
found among the aristocrats of ancient hierarchical societies, he also repeatedly makes it clear 
that what he truly wants us to accomplish is the establishment of new set of original – 
life-affirming – values through the ‘revaluation of all values’. Further, while at one point he 
claims that an aristocratic hierarchical society has always been and will always be an 
indispensable precondition for “[e]very enhancement of the type “man”” (see BGE: 257), which 
presumably includes the nurturing of ‘higher types’, he elsewhere seems to deny this by 
suggesting that historically the emergence of ‘great men’ is fundamentally “accidental” and has 
been rarely influenced by “the environment” or “the age” (see TI: IX, 44; also BGE: 274). 
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Nietzsche sometimes describes his philosophy as “a hammer” (see TI: Preface & XI). And 
he claims, “The last thing I should promise would be to “improve” mankind. No new idols are 
erected by me; let the old ones learn what feet of clay mean. Overthrowing idols (my word for 
“ideals”) – that comes closer to being part of my craft” (EH: Preface, 2). Now, this claim of his 
is problematic, since he, in one way or the other, clearly did try to ‘improve’ mankind and did 
try to erect new ‘ideals’, as we will see: and we could also wonder here, whether, if he were 
actually trying to justify the re-establishment of an old type of hierarchical society in the 
modern world, it would amount to erecting a new ‘political’ ideal. Nevertheless, it is true that 
Nietzsche did spend a great deal of time and energy trying to ‘overthrow’ various ideals, 
including ‘political’ ideals. But then, however much he may have been unhappy about 
contemporary politics, however much he may have disliked democracy, it seems to me clear 
that he was not seriously interested in a world revolution, by actually smashing down 
democracy. At best, he was only trying to undermine and make us question what he considers to 
be our fundamental erroneous beliefs in the values of certain political ideals. 
In fact, in my view, while Nietzsche is undoubtedly being genuine when he criticises 
democracy and praises a hierarchical society, there is still something technical and somewhat 
superficial and casual about his attitude towards ‘politics’. What I mean by this is that, at one 
level, Nietzsche’s examinations of political issues, including his criticism of democracy, are 
partial and limited, in the sense that they are conducted only to the extent where those political 
issues are relevant to his criticism of Christianity. At another level, it seems to me likely that, 
despite the harsh and aggressive tone of his criticism of democracy, Nietzsche’s worries in this 
area are less to be traced to problems with democracy than he likes to imagine, and that, like any 
denizen of a democratic system, he is a beneficiary of some of the significant goods it provides. 
Of course in his works he simply fails to acknowledge these goods or chooses to ignore them, 
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which, again, makes his criticism of democracy partial and limited. And in many ways, though 
he undoubtedly finds democracy objectionable and problematic in some respects, his hostility 
towards democracy bears all the hallmarks of personal frustration, a projection of his own 
dissatisfaction with himself, the sort of feeling of aggression which any reflective citizen of a 
democratic society is likely to experience at times and which conflates personal dissatisfaction 
with political critique – which is not to say, of course, that, at other times, these cannot be kept 
apart. 
This point I am trying to make might be better illustrated by citing another example. One 
notable element of Nietzsche’s works that disturbs us is what appears to be his affirmative 
attitude towards the necessity of ‘slavery’, which is first expressed in his early unpublished 
essay TGS: “we must learn to identify as a cruel-sounding truth the fact that slavery belongs to 
the essence of a culture” (TGS: p. 166). And even in his published works, he makes similar 
remarks on ‘slavery’. For instance, he claims in a section of BGE, 
 
Every enhancement of the type “man” has so far been the work of an aristocratic society – and it will 
be so again and again – a society that believes in the long ladder of an order of rank and differences 
in value between man and man, and that needs slavery in some sense or other. Without that pathos of 
distance which grows out of the ingrained difference between strata – when the ruling caste 
constantly looks afar and looks down upon subjects and instruments and just as constantly practices 
obedience and command, keeping down and keeping at a distance – that other, more mysterious 
pathos could not have grown either – the craving for an ever new widening of distances within the 
soul itself, the development of ever higher, rarer, more remote, further-stretching more 




Now, the question we ought to ask is what Nietzsche means by ‘distance’ and ‘slavery in some 
sense or other’ in this passage. Those commentators who consider Nietzsche a political thinker 
tend to interpret them in a socio-political sense: ‘distance’ as what is created by a particular 
socio-political structure, and thus ‘slavery’ as an economic arrangement.12 Certainly, the fact 
that Nietzsche in the same section of BGE describes the origin of aristocratic society as a “hard” 
truth and says that “one should not yield to humanitarian illusions” prompts us to think that 
those commentators are actually right (see BGE: 257). And there are also other factors in 
Nietzsche’s works that prompt us to think in this way. For instance, many of us are horrified by 
Nietzsche’s aristocratic individualist thinking in which the raison d’être of the masses is the 
production of few exceptional individuals, because such elitist thinking fails to conform to the 
fundamental belief in the equality of all individuals in their rights, dignity and worth, which we, 
the denizens of democratic societies, have become so accustomed to accepting as an unshakable 
norm. Coupled with this lack of egalitarian premise in Nietzsche’s thinking, many of us are also 
disturbed by language he employs to describe the social masses, such as ‘rabble’, ‘mob’ and 
sometimes even “the ill-constituted, dwarfed, atrophied, and poisoned” (GM: I, 11). These ways 
of speaking are in themselves abusive. Further, if we combine these abusive ways of speaking 
with Nietzsche’s talk of ‘cultivation’ (Züchtung) or ‘breeding’ (Züchtung) of a higher human 
race as a new powerful ruling caste and interpret them all together literally in socio-political, 
physical and biological sense (see BGE: 251, AC: 3 & EH: BT, 4),
13
 we are tempted to think 
that Nietzsche is also affirmatively talking about ‘eugenics’, which many of us now reject as an 
inhumane practice: so, for instance, Schutte, who seemingly interprets Nietzsche’s talks of 
                                                 
12 See Ansell-Pearson (1994): p. 4, Schutte (1986): pp. 162-169 & Warren (1988): p. 225 
13 As Kaufmann points out, the German term ‘Züchtung’, which he often translates as ‘cultivation’ or ‘breeding’, has 
both cultural and biological connotations. It suggests ‘breeding’ “both in the sense of education and of “breeding” 
animals” (Kaufmann 1974: p. 304). 
49 
 
‘cultivation’ literally in such sense, remarks that “it would be preferable to disregard this aspect 
of Nietzsche’s theory”.14 In this way, we might conclude that Nietzsche seems to be affirming 
‘eugenics’, so why not ‘slavery’ too. 
Traditionally, the most popular approach taken by commentators is to de-politicise all those 
questionable ideas and ways of speaking of Nietzsche’s, that is, to suppose that when Nietzsche 
affirmatively talks about ‘distance’, ‘slavery’ and ‘cultivation’, or when he uses abusive 
language such as ‘rabble’ and ‘ill-constituted’, he means them purely in ‘psychological’ or 
‘spiritual’ sense. And in my view, this kind of approach is correct to a great extent. For, as I will 
argue in Chapter 4-A, although in the context of his discussion about the origin of different 
types of morality the terms such as ‘the masters’ and ‘the slaves’ are used in socio-political 
sense, he elsewhere, in other contexts, generally intends those terms to apply to one’s 
psychological characteristics. And in his many positive discussions of ‘the masters’, what he 
places the greatest emphasis on is not the masters’ physical and political characteristics, but the 
masters’ psychological strength and health, their spiritual superiority over the slaves: in the 
same section of BGE quoted above, he explicitly says, “In the beginning, the noble caste was 
always the barbarian caste: their predominance did not lie mainly in physical strength but in 
strength of the soul” (BGE: 257). Likewise, there is also no doubt that Nietzsche generally uses 
abusive language such as ‘rabble’ and ‘the ill-constituted’ to describe one’s psychological or 
spiritual status, particularly what he perceives to be the shamefully ‘unhealthy’ condition of the 
spirit of modern men: so, at certain places, he uses such a term as “ill-constituted soul” (GM: I, 
12). 
Still, in my view, it is unlikely that Nietzsche never affirmatively used such terms as 
‘slavery’ and ‘cultivation’ in anything other than psychological or spiritual sense. For instance, 
                                                 
14 Schutte (1986): p. 161 
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when he says ‘slavery’ in the above-quoted passage of TGS, it is evidently clear that he means it 
literally in ‘socio-political’ sense and seriously regards it as ‘the essence of a culture’. Likewise, 
when he in BGE remarks that “Slavery is, as it seems, both in the cruder and in the more subtle 
sense, the indispensable means of spiritual discipline and cultivation” (BGE: 188), though he is 
certainly using the term ‘cultivation’ in spiritual sense, by ‘slavery . . . in the cruder . . . sense’ 
he surely must mean ‘slavery’ as an economic arrangement. 
So, does Nietzsche actually endorse ‘slavery’ in a socio-political sense? In the light of my 
earlier suggestion that we take Nietzsche at his word and read him as harbouring an extreme 
sensitivity to others’ suffering, not always explicitly acknowledged by him, it is difficult to 
imagine him ever endorsing slavery in earnest. Then how should we interpret his seemingly 
affirmative remarks on slavery? 
In one way, we could say that it is one thing to talk positively about slavery, but it is another 
actually to endorse slavery. And given that Nietzsche does not really possess any political ideal, 
and that his discussion of politics is founded on an ‘over-simplified view of reality’, it could be 
plausibly supposed that his affirmative remarks on ‘slavery’ have no actual political 
implications. 
In another way, we could also suppose that Nietzsche is simply indicating a brutal fact he 
has discovered through disinterested observation: namely, the prosperity of society and its 
culture always inevitably requires the sacrifice of many in some sense or in some way. And this 
also seems to be a plausible interpretation, since it is true that almost every ancient society with 
a great culture did possess slavery and their prosperity was probably helped by it to some 
degree: because there existed numerous slaves who were forced to sacrifice themselves to do all 
dirty work, there existed those few who were able to devote themselves solely to creativity. 
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Another interpretation is provided by Staten, who suggests that Nietzsche’s treatment of 
‘slavery’ is a form of self-preservation Nietzsche employs to cope with the spectacle of nihilistic 
history. According to Staten, Nietzsche, who “cannot bear his vision of the savagery and 
meaninglessness of history”, aspires to be the “most powerful and tremendous nature” (UM: II, 
1) who “would not be overwhelmed at all by the historical sense but could absorb all of the 
past”, who “could confront the overwhelming expanse of what has been and say yes to all of it”. 
But Nietzsche cannot accept either the Christian ‘teleological’ strategy that tries to “recuperate 
the suffering of history by projecting a divine plan that assigns it a reason now and a 
recompense later”, or Left liberalism’s ‘teleological’ strategy that packages the brute fact of 
suffering of history in “a new narrative, a moral narrative according to which all those lives 
ground up in the machine of history are assigned an intelligible role as victims of oppression 
and injustice”. For, these strategies are essentially founded on “a sense of shared suffering, 
Mitleid” – one can equally feel the pain other feels –, and since Nietzsche is “an extraordinarily, 
almost incredibly, sensitive substance”, if he opens himself to the sense of shared suffering, he 
would be overwhelmed by “an unbearable flood of suffering” that history throws at him. Hence, 
Staten interprets Nietzsche’s remarks on ‘slavery’ in TGS as Nietzsche’s own strategy to 
manage the painful reality of human history: “Nietzsche . . . does not “praise” slavery as an 
economic arrangement; he seizes upon it as a desperate expedient in his flight from the nihilistic 
despair at the spectacle of history”.15 
I find Staten’s interpretation plausible, as it harmonises with my reading of Nietzsche as one 
acutely sensitive to human suffering. Moreover, as we will see later, it is also clearly the case 
that Nietzsche throughout his life, but particularly in his mature years, increasing became 
acutely aware of the enormity of human suffering that constitutes human history. And he always 
                                                 
15 See Staten (1990): pp. 78-85 
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had a hostile attitude towards ‘moral’ interpretations of the existence of those human sufferings, 
as he always believed that ‘life’ – including those sufferings – is something that can never be 
justified satisfactorily in traditional ‘moral’ terms. In fact, this position of his was stiffened 
further in his mature years, as he came to insist increasingly that the Christian ‘moral’ and 
‘teleological’ justification of human existence as a whole, including its conception of a 
transcendent purpose of life founded on the idea of a perfect afterlife and all the Christian 
moralised conceptions such as those of ‘guilt’ and ‘sin’ that it imposes on people, is not just 
implausible but also unhealthy and life-denying. 
Furthermore, in my view, Staten also points out something important: namely “the tone of 
horrified fascination with which Nietzsche presents his observations [of the necessity of 
slavery]”.16 Indeed, while Nietzsche’s writings generally express a sense of horror at the 
enormity of suffering human history contains, they also sometimes display a tendency to try to 
grasp the dreadful spectacle of it as something thrilling and magnificent in some way. And in 
this context, as we will see in Chapter 4-A, Nietzsche is often inclined to affirm a certain brutal 
way of life that involves the exploitation and sacrifice of the weak, the sort of way of life led by 
Napoleon and Caesar, as a form of self-preservation, a means of coping with the existence of 
suffering and his sensitivity towards it. 
Earlier in this chapter, I pointed out that Nietzsche’s writings display an occasional 
proclivity to naivety in certain contexts, a liking for violent images, and occasional 
susceptibility to a nostalgic mood. And here, my suggestion is that, in dealing with those 
questionable issues such as his affirmative attitude towards slavery, these characteristics of his 
must be taken into account fully. For, in my view, one notable factor that sets Nietzsche apart 
from many other Western philosophers is the ‘personal’ nature of his writings: as Santaniello 
                                                 
16 Staten (1990): p. 83 
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puts it, “his writings are deeply personal and thus cannot be severed from history and his life 
experiences”.17 
Generally speaking, as Hamilton observes, many of the Western philosophers, particularly 
those academic philosophers who engage themselves in the pursuit of some sort of final ‘truth’, 
have traditionally striven to write “in an impersonal manner as if they were not individuals with 
specific concerns”. That is, they commonly strive to write “in an impersonal voice of reason or 
pure intellect . . . , a voice which is no particular person’s voice”. And they do so, largely 
because they suppose that the truth is something that “is revealed to an eye which is untainted 
by any personal concerns and is revealed in a voice which is fair to all competing views of the 
world and thus arrives at the one true account”.18 
However, Nietzsche in BGE criticises these traditional philosophers for being “not honest 
enough in their works”, since, he argues, what exists at the bottom of “their real opinions”, 
which they claim to be “truths” that are discovered through their reason or pure intellect alone, 
is actually “an assumption, a hunch, indeed a kind of “inspiration” – most often a desire of the 
heart that has been filtered and made abstract” (see BGE: 5). In fact, elsewhere in BGE, he 
claims, that “Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: 
namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir” 
(BGE: 6). 
If we are to take seriously these claims of his and apply them to his own philosophy, we 
could plausibly suggest that Nietzsche is a philosopher who, far from trying to become the 
universal ‘impersonal’ voice of reason, does not hesitate to write in his own ‘personal’ voice. 
That is, unlike those traditional philosophers, he recognises and acknowledges openly the fact 
                                                 
17 Santaniello (1994): p. 4 
18 See Hamilton (2001): p. 3. For writing this part, I have also widely referred to the whole ‘Introduction’ (pp. 1-14) 
of the same book. 
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that one’s views and beliefs are not just reached by one’s reason alone, but also inevitably 
rooted in and often significantly shaped by one’s own specific existence, which is filled with 
various ‘personal’ and – thus, inevitably, also to some degree – ‘socio-historical’ prejudice, 
interest, emotion, experience, circumstance, and so on. Hence, while Nietzsche no doubt 
attempts to present in his writings what he considers to be truthful views of matters by using his 
reason and intellect to a great extent, he does so not as “the impersonal mind of reason”, but “as 
someone in the thick of existence with his own concerns and interests”,19 that is, as an 
individual with his unique and often complicated personality, temperament and life experiences, 
who is very much living a unique life at a certain place in a certain age. As such, compared with 
those traditional philosophers’ writings, Nietzsche’s writings are often in nature more closely 
connected to his own individual characteristics: his philosophical views and thoughts are more 
deeply bound up and invested with his personal experiences, circumstances, needs, desires, 
moods, feelings, emotions, inclinations, tastes, senses and so on. 
Now, there are many commentators who fail to recognise or refuse to acknowledge the 
‘personal’ nature of Nietzsche’s writings – at least partly because Nietzsche sometimes appears 
to try to draw a line between himself and his writings (see GM: III, 4 & EH: Books, 1). One of 
such commentators is Nehamas. By referring to Nietzsche’s above-mentioned claim of “every 
great philosophy” being “the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and 
unconscious memoir” (BGE: 6), Nehamas criticises those who think that this claim “expresses a 
naive psychohistorical reductionism: that is, that Nietzsche believes that to understand what a 
philosophical view “really” means is to locate some specific events in its author’s life which, in 
some sense, explain why that author held that particular view”. And Nehamas continues, “An 
especially crude version of this approach, for example, would claim that Nietzsche came to his 
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famous view of the death of God because he always resented his father’s early death and the 
fact that he had no male authority figure to look up to while he was a child”.20 
Like Nehamas, I certainly reject any immoderate reductive approach that attributes the full 
significance of Nietzsche’s philosophical views solely to some specific biographical facts of his, 
since his philosophical views are clearly more than that: they are not something merely personal. 
Rather, in my view, Nietzsche’s writings, his philosophical views, are ‘personal’ precisely in the 
sense that they are born out of his experience of life under the impact of his self-reflection. That 
is, for instance, though Montaigne in his Essays constantly talks about himself, because he does 
so in a non-reductive way, he is also essentially talking about us, about certain features of 
human existence which he and we both commonly experience and recognise. Likewise, though 
Nietzsche’s writings are deeply founded on his own life experiences and thus clearly possess a 
personal existential dimension, he draws and reflects on his own life and experience in such a 
way that they appeal to general features of human life and illuminate the general human 
condition, so that his writings, his philosophical views, are ‘personal’ but not merely personal: 
they do apply and can appeal to us all. 
However, at the same time, there seems to me to be one other important factor that we have 
to keep in mind, which adds a further complication to the fraught business of reading and 
interpreting Nietzsche’s texts. That is to say, there are commentators who assume that what we 
find in Nietzsche’s works is the real ‘Nietzsche’. They assume that Nietzsche is all about what 
we read in his works, and that the philosophy he develops in his works, or more broadly, what 
he argues and remarks in his works, is the one and only true reflection both of who ‘Nietzsche’ 
as the individual really is and of what ‘Nietzsche’ really thinks and believes, and that it is only 
on this that we ought to focus. However, I think their assumption cannot be correct, since the 
                                                 
20 See Nehamas (1985): pp. 127-128 
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fact is that the ‘Nietzsche’ we find in his works is different from the ‘Nietzsche’ we find in his 
personal letters. For instance, one of the images of ‘Nietzsche’ presented by his works is a 
self-confident, hard and cold-hearted thinker, who speaks haughtily and takes a very critical 
stand against the Christian ‘pity’. But, on the other hand, one of the images of ‘Nietzsche’ 
presented by his personal letters is a gentle, sensitive and warm-hearted man, who is always 
very polite, kind and sympathetic to others and can be tormented by self-doubt.
21
 
So, clearly, we cannot regard the philosophy Nietzsche develops in his works as the one and 
only true reflection of the real ‘Nietzsche’, and in order to understand who the real ‘Nietzsche’ 
is, we must take both of these two different sets of images of him into consideration to some 
degree.
22
 And this means that we also cannot always take every claim Nietzsche makes in his 
works at its face value, interpreting it literally as what ‘Nietzsche’ really thinks and believes, i.e. 
as his all things considered opinion or truthful view of a matter. Indeed, Nietzsche says in BGE, 
“Every philosophy also conceals a philosophy; every opinion is also a hideout, every word also 
a mask” (BGE: 289). If we are to take seriously this claim of his and apply it to his own 
philosophy, we could reasonably suppose that there could well be cases where Nietzsche says 
something without really believing it, or he says something because he wants to believe it, or he 
is simply playing with an idea and trying it out in a certain mood. Or, to put it another way, it is 
possible that “There is much in his writing that is merely personal, having nothing to do with 
philosophy at all”.23 
Taking all these points into consideration, it seems to me very likely that Nietzsche believed 
in the necessity of ‘war’, or of ‘the order of castes’ and ‘slavery’ in a socio-political sense, or of 
‘cultivation’ in a biological sense, only when in a nostalgic mood. Or rather, it may be more 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Fraser (2002): p. 87 
22 For a discussion on this, see, e.g., Benson (2008): p. vii-xvi 
23 Danto (2005): p. 182 
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accurate to say that, in experimenting with these ideas without actually believing in them, 
Nietzsche expressed a kind of nostalgia, the nostalgia being, indeed, a sign that he was, in fact, 
experimenting with these ideas and did not, in some straightforward sense, simply accept them. 
As it is evident from both his published and unpublished works, Nietzsche was a very 
frustrated man, whose persistent illness forced him to endure throughout his mature years an 
extremely confined, constrained, inactive and solitary life. In the light of this fact, and also in 
the light of both the penchant for violent images and the very partial and limited nature of the 
criticism of democracy that we find in his texts, it seems to me plausible that his ideas of ‘war’, 
‘slavery’ and ‘cultivation’ in socio-political and biological sense, as well as his criticism of 
‘democracy’, were, to a certain extent, something that had deep roots in his personal condition, 
and constituted a stratagem to cope with that condition. 
And it also seems to me to be the case that, when susceptible to the charms of nostalgia, 
Nietzsche often became strangely swept away by ideas of ‘war’, ‘slavery’ and ‘cultivation’. 
Anat Pick, in her discussion of Werner Herzog’s films, describes GM as a “cinematic” book. 
She remarks, 
 
Of Herzog’s characters whose humanity is in some way contested, it is the slick brutality of Klaus 
Kinski that is most philosophically resonant, modeled as it seems to me with uncanny precision on 
Nietzsche’s “beast of prey” (das Raubthier) from The Genealogy of Morals (1887). The Genealogy is 
an anthropological fantasy on human evolution from its beginnings as amoral, joyous, and beastly to 
its subsequent domestication by a meek and degenerate priestly class. . . . Read today, not only is the 
Genealogy a remarkably cinematic text, but, in keeping with Herzog’s poetic license with regard to 
historical truths, also intensely speculative and fictional.
24 
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I find Pick’s remark insightful, because Nietzsche clearly seems to me to have possessed deeply 
‘cinematic’ imagination. As we typically see from the description of “the old German 
punishments” in GM – “tearing apart or trampling by horses . . , boiling of the criminal in oil or 
wine . . . , cutting flesh from the chest, and also the practice of smearing the wrongdoer with 
honey and leaving him in the blazing sun for the flies” (see GM: II, 3) –, or of the brutal and 
bestial ‘men of prey’ in GM – to whom “a disgusting procession of murder, arson, rape, torture” 
is a source of innocent exhilaration (see GM: I, 11) –, or of the ancient ‘Dionysian festivals’ in 
BT – whose effect of “intoxication” brings out in people the “horrible mixture of sensuality and 
cruelty” (see BT: 1-2) –, his texts have a generally deeply ‘visual’ quality that grips one’s 
imagination. And it seems to me very likely that his ‘cinematic’ imaginations of ‘war’, ‘slavery’ 
and ‘cultivation’ often swept him away. And once he was deeply gripped by their imaginative 
appeal, he became so blind to the actual reality of the content of these ideas that he often ended 
up affirming these ideas far more intensely than his philosophical position actually allows. 
And it is clear that Nietzsche’s writings in this context display a certain naivety: or, even 
more generally, in the context of ‘human suffering’ in general. For, as we will see, one of the 
notable personal characteristics of Nietzsche, which we can constantly detect in his texts, is his 
own desire for ‘power’ and ‘health’, his strong tendency to be fascinated by and fantasise about 
‘power’ and ‘health’: which is particularly clear from his admiration for those extremely 
powerful, active individuals such as Napoleon and Caesar. And partly because of this, the 
problem with Nietzsche is that, when gripped by nostalgia, he sees such things as ‘slavery’, ‘the 
order of castes’ and ‘war’ only from the perspective of ‘the masters’, of the conqueror, hardly 
ever from the perspective of the oppressed, of the victims, and thus what he sees is only their 
thrilling or heroic aspects, hardly ever their awful sides: which is exactly why, in his ‘cinematic’ 
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imaginations of them, he can be enthralled by their imaginative appeal. In this sense, his view of 
them was extremely unbalanced. 
Moreover, as I suggested before, Nietzsche’s writings in this context also show a certain 
irresponsibility. For the fact is that even though there indeed exist many complications 
surrounding his affirmative remarks on ‘war’, ‘slavery’ and ‘cultivation’ as I have illustrated, 
because of the way – and the tone with which – he makes these remarks, he does appear to be 
very strongly arguing for and endorsing the necessity of ‘war’, ‘slavery’ and ‘cultivation’ in 
socio-political and biological sense. And clearly, these affirmative remarks of his can potentially 
have harmful effects on readers who do not see all the complications. In her discussion of the 
way Nietzsche in EH uses an exaggerated boastfulness to eulogise himself, Margot Norris 
observes, 
 
He knows that his tone will repel his readers and abort any possibility of aggrandizing his 
philosophical reputation. But oblivious to the response of the “other,” he discharges his high animal 
spirits in the very flamboyance of his expression, in the exuberant childishness of the diction. 




I think this observation is equally applicable to Nietzsche’s affirmative remarks on ‘slavery’, 
‘war’ and ‘cultivation’. For it is clear that, when he is deeply absorbed by his ‘cinematic’ 
imagination of these ideas and becomes embroiled in an excited affirmation of them, he 
completely loses sight of his readers. In such state, he does not care about the impact his 
remarks have on someone else, and wrongly forgets the fact that these affirmative remarks of 
                                                 
25 Norris (1985): p. 74 
60 
 
his could well lend themselves to affirmations of certain evils and result in sufferings, if they are 
taken literally and seriously by those who do not know what kind of philosopher he is. 
And this also goes for Nietzsche’s use of abusive language such as ‘rabble’ and 
‘ill-constituted’. As many commentators have traditionally suggested, his uses of abusive 
language, along with his hyperbolic remarks, are no doubt his ‘style’ of writing, his unique way 
of provoking us.
26
 But then, it is also undeniable that Nietzsche’s use of such abusive language 
is largely irresponsible, since there is hardly any attempt whatsoever on his part to make sure 
that such language would not be misunderstood by hermeneutically naive readers. And this, I 
think, is very much the result of who ‘Nietzsche’ is. That is, despite his brilliance, Nietzsche 
sometimes falls prey to the charms of explosive rhetoric, becoming intoxicated by his own 
words. And this too seems to be very much a part of his ‘style’ that we must recognise in 




So, in conclusion, I have argued in this chapter that while Nietzsche’s thinking always was a 
mixture of communitarianism and individualistic thinking, it is individualistic thinking to which 
he ultimately attached far greater significance. Hence, in the end, while he continued to possess 
a concern for the flourishing of community generally, his highest value became the nurturing of 
‘higher types’. 
However, I have also argued, Nietzsche is not a ‘militaristic’ aristocratic individualist who 
aims to achieve the nurturing of ‘higher types’ by militaristic means. For, while he may be 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., Kaufmann (1974): p. 413 
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guilty of over-romanticising ‘war’, he was not a type of man who would or could embrace any 
sort of militarism in earnest. 
Further, I have argued, Nietzsche is also not a ‘political’ aristocratic individualist who 
strives to achieve the nurturing of ‘higher types’ by establishing a particular kind of 
socio-political structure. For, Nietzsche’s remarks on ‘politics’ are generally uncritical, limited, 
partial and abstract in nature, and do not add up to what could be properly classified as a 
political philosophy that justifies certain political ideals. 
My view is that Nietzsche is a philosopher whose concern lies with the general condition of 
every aspect of ‘life’, who takes interests in the condition of whole human affairs and holds 
strong opinions on almost everything: even on what one should eat and drink! Hence, what he 
provides in his works is not really a political account, but rather a socio-psychological or 
socio-cultural account of how the negative influence of Christianity has been spreading over 
various realms of human affairs, including ‘politics’. He makes comments in the context of ‘a 
species’ or ‘a people’, because he recognises how one is born as a member of a certain ethnic 
group, and how one’s way of life and outlook on life are necessarily shaped by it to some 
degree: “every people speaks its tongue of good and evil, which the neighbor does not 
understand. It has invented its own language of customs and rights” (Z: I, 11). Likewise, he 
talks about ‘politics’ chiefly because he recognises that we are all part of ‘politics’ in one way 
or the other and thus our well-being is inevitably affected by it to some degree. But, unlike 
properly political thinkers, he never really discusses political issues for the sake of politics. 
Rather, what he is really interested in is the ‘individual’ who creates a political system or enacts 
a political law, and not in its content: so, while he takes a keen interest in Napoleon as an 
‘individual’, he is indifferent to what the Napoleonic Code actually offers us. 
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Hence, the ‘individualist’ reading I attribute to Nietzsche is ‘un-militaristic’ and moderately 
‘political’. And crucially, it is also ‘religious’. In my view, Nietzsche’s highest goal was 
ultimately the nurturing of ‘higher types’, whose being and identity cannot be entirely separated 
from their ‘community’, ‘politics’, ‘history’, ‘morality’ and ‘religion’. And he strongly believed 
that the sickness of modernity, the on-going decadence of ‘life’ and ‘culture’, is chiefly caused 
by the dominance of the Christian conception of God, the Christian ‘monotheistic’ God who 
condemns certain intrinsic parts of life and imposes on people one universal ideal of 
life-denying nature. And my argument is that what Nietzsche truly regarded as the key to 
achieving his highest goal was what I call ‘the life-affirming type of gods’, a certain conception 
of gods symbolised by the Olympian gods of ancient Greece, who can help individuals to 






Nietzsche’s early religious thinking 
 
In this chapter, I investigate the nature of Nietzsche’s early religious thinking presented in 
BT. But firstly, in Section A, I discuss some significant interpretative issues concerning 
Nietzsche’s historical narratives and genealogical accounts which we typically find in BT and 
GM. I argue that Nietzsche’s historical narratives and genealogical accounts are essentially 
‘fictional’ narratives, which are created by Nietzsche as means to illustrate and illuminate his 
ideas. And, in BT, through his ‘imaginary’ history of how the ancient Greeks responded to their 
suffering and overcame their pessimistic outlook on life with their ‘art’ qua ‘religion’, what 
Nietzsche offers is his idea and instruction on how and with what kind of ‘religion’ we too 
could possibly respond to our own suffering and overcome our own pessimistic outlook on life. 
Then, through Section B and Section C, I examine the nature and effects of two types of 
‘life-affirming’ religion which Nietzsche proposes in BT as the two possible solutions to make 
our life possible, bearable and worth living, namely ‘the Apollinian type’ and ‘the Dionysian 
type’. As I discuss Nietzsche’s key ideas in this regard, notably his idea of ‘transfiguration’ and 
his idea of ‘an aesthetic justification’, I point out several fundamental problems concerning his 
arguments for these types of religion. And through this, I argue that not only do these types of 
religion actually fail to function in the way Nietzsche suggests, but also the forms of redemption 






Section A: The interpretive issue concerning Nietzsche’s historical narratives 
 
Now, some might object to my claim from the outset. They might argue that what Nietzsche 
presents in BT is not his early ‘religious’ thinking, but simply his ‘aesthetic’ thinking, since he 
himself claims that BT is a book which deals with “an aesthetic problem” (BT: Preface), 
intended to be a contribution towards “the science of aesthetics” (BT: 1). However, in my view, 
there are indeed good reasons why we can plausibly consider the ideas or outlook Nietzsche 
provides in this first published book of his to be fundamentally ‘religious’ in nature. 
Firstly, while BT certainly appears to be, at first glance, a book about the ancient Greek ‘art’, 
especially about pre-Socratic Greek tragedy, Nietzsche makes it clear in the book that ‘art’ and 
‘religion’ were placed in the same category among the ancient Greeks. For instance, he 
describes the origin of tragedy as “purely religious” (BT: 7), regards the key moment of its birth 
as “the most important moment in the history of Greek cult” (BT: 2), and calls the poet 
Sophocles “a religious thinker” (BT: 9): similarly, in his unpublished essay DW – written few 
years before the publication of BT –, he describes the worldview that appears in the Homeric 
epic as “a religion of life, not one of duty or asceticism or spirituality” (DW: p. 124). 
Secondly, though it is not my intention here to discuss what exactly ‘religion’ is or what 
precisely constitutes and defines the ‘religious’, Ninian Smart in his The World’s Religions in a 
helpful discussion famously proposes “the seven dimensions of religion which help to 
characterize religions as they exist in the world”, namely, “The Practical and Ritual Dimension”, 
“The Experiential and Emotional Dimension”, “The Narrative or Mythic Dimension”, “The 
Doctrinal and Philosophical Dimension”, “The Ethical and Legal Dimension”, “The Social and 
Institutional Dimension”, and “The Material Dimension”.1 And as we will see, some of these 
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standard dimensions of religion are clearly recognisable in the Greek art as Nietzsche presents it 
in BT. For instance, it clearly possesses, at least in a broad sense, ‘Practical and Ritual’, 
‘Experiential and Emotional’, ‘Narrative or Mythic’, and ‘Ethical and Legal’ dimensions, in the 
sense that it involves ‘acts of communal worship’ such as the attendance at tragedy, ‘a 
trance-like ecstatic state of intoxication’ that causes people to experience “a mystic feeling of 
oneness” (BT: 2), ‘myths’ as narratives about gods that are recited at the worship, and ‘a 
theodicy’ as an ethical admonition for people’s practical life that stems from the myths. 
And finally, BT was written under the influence of Schopenhauer, of whom Nietzsche at the 
time was a great devotee. And, as Young summarises, according to Schopenhauer’s account of 
religion which he provides in his The World as Will and Representation – the book which had a 
profound effect on the youthful Nietzsche (see, e.g., UM: III, 2) –, “a religion is something with 
four central and interconnected features: it provides a ‘solution’ to the problem of death, a 
solution to the problem of pain, and exposition and sanctioning of the morality of the 
community of believers, and finally, it is pervaded by a sense of mystery”.2 Now, by reason of 
my reading of the mature Nietzsche as a ‘religious’ aristocratic individualist, I will not be 
directing my attention to the ‘communal’ features of religion: throughout this thesis, my main 
interest will always be in finding out how, in Nietzsche’s view, religion – god[s] – affects 
‘individuals’, how it can help individuals to flourish and thus contribute towards the nurturing 
of ‘higher types’. But, as I will illustrate, the ability to deal with man’s suffering condition, to 
provide a ‘solution’ to the problem of pain and death – which Schopenhauer considers to be the 
most essential function of any authentic religion –, is clearly strongly recognisable in the Greek 
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art as Nietzsche presents it in BT.
3
 Indeed, in BT he ascribes an enormous amount of 
significance and value to ‘art’. What he sees and values most in ‘art’ is its ability to support and 
sustain our ‘life’. By recognising a strong link between ‘art’ and ‘life’, he interprets ‘art’ as “the 
highest task and the truly metaphysical activity of this life” (BT: Preface) that makes our own 
life “possible and worth living” (BT: 1): “the complement and consummation of existence, 
seducing one to a continuation of life” (BT: 3), as he also puts it. In the light of all these points, 
I think we could indeed plausibly suggest that what Nietzsche presents in BT is in many 
respects his early ‘religious’ thinking. 
But, before I start investigating the nature of Nietzsche’s early religious thinking, I shall first 
make my view clear on one interpretative issue concerning BT: namely to what extent we can 
trust Nietzsche’s historical narratives. And this issue, I think, is ultimately connected to and thus 
best discussed with another significant interpretative issue that has provoked a long-standing 
discussion among commentators: namely whether we should accept Nietzsche’s so-called 
‘genealogical accounts’ as factual historical narratives, and what are their actual purpose and 
value if they are not truthful. And my view on these issues is that Nietzsche’s historical 
narratives and genealogical accounts are not factual, but should be grasped as essentially 
‘fictional’ narratives that are created by Nietzsche as means to illustrate and illuminate his ideas. 
Let me start clarifying my view. BT is a book that examines the rise and fall of the ancient 
Greek ‘art’ qua ‘religion’ by dividing the history of ancient Greece into “four great periods of 
art” (BT: 4). But, as severe criticisms from the academic world on its first publication indicated, 
despite being the only book written by Nietzsche as a professional scholar of philology, it can 
hardly be classified as a properly philological work. For, not only does it indulge itself in a great 
                                                 
3 In regard to those ‘communal’ functions which Schopenhauer ascribes to any authentic religion, Young in his 
Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Religion has sufficiently examined and illustrated how Greek art as presented in BT 
actually fulfils them (see Young 2006: pp. 14-33). 
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deal of metaphysical discussion that exceeds the limits of philology, it also, as Tanner remarks, 
“meets no conceivable standards of rigour, let alone those that obtained in the study of the 
ancient Greeks”.4 
As such, some of the historical narratives Nietzsche provides in BT appear to lack 
something to be properly ‘factual’ narratives. For instance, he claims that the ancient Greeks 
were “so sensitive . . . so singularly capable of suffering”. They possessed “the keenest 
susceptibility to suffering”, which led to their pessimistic outlook on life that interprets their 
existence as something terrible and meaningless. And as proof of it, he cites the existence of 
their “folk wisdom” called “the wisdom of Silenus”, which claims that “What is best of all is 
utterly beyond your reach: not to be born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second best for you is 
– to die soon” (BT: 3). However, it is questionable whether he is right to infer the Greeks’ 
exceptional sensitivity to suffering merely from ‘the wisdom of Silenus’: for there seems to be 
no other historical proof of it – at least he does not mention any –, and such a folk wisdom alone 
is simply insufficient to endorse his claim. To cite another instance, according to him, the 
Greeks with their exceptional sensitivity to suffering were “in danger of longing for a 
Buddhistic negation of the will” (BT: 7). But, according to Silk and Stern, who have examined 
the credibility of BT from the classical perspective, there is actually “no evidence whatsoever 
that in their pessimistic travels the Greek were ever . . . close to a ‘Buddhistic negation of the 
will’”.5 
Throughout his mature works, Nietzsche also provides various historical narratives as a part 
of his investigations and arguments. Most notably, in GM, he presents historical narratives 
concerning the origins of morality, his ‘genealogical accounts’ of morality. Now, there are 
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passages of Nietzsche that prompt us to think that he intends his genealogical accounts to be 
‘factual’ historical narratives. For instance, he claims in the preface of GM, 
 
My desire, at any rate, was to point out to so sharp and disinterested an eye as his [Nietzsche’s friend 
Paul Rée, author of The Origins of the Moral Sensations, whom Nietzsche criticises for providing an 
implausible account of the origin of morality] a better direction in which to look, in the direction of 
an actual history of morality, and to warn him in time against gazing around haphazardly in the blue 
after the English fashion. For it must be obvious which color is a hundred times more vital for a 
genealogist of morals than blue: namely gray, that is, what is documented, what can actually be 
confirmed and has actually existed, in short the entire long hieroglyphic record, so hard to decipher, 
of the moral past of mankind! (GM: Preface, 7). 
 
However, despite such a claim, his genealogical accounts are, as ‘factual’ historical narratives, 
not at all satisfactory. For instance, although he repeatedly mentions characters such as ‘slaves’ 
and ‘masters’ in his genealogical accounts, he often refuses to tell us exactly of which specific 
historical period he is talking about. Moreover, just as in the historical narratives of BT, in his 
genealogical accounts he also fails to provide adequate historical evidence that is capable of 
endorsing his claims. 
Such obscurity and unscholarly approach has led some commentators to question whether 
Nietzsche actually intends his genealogical accounts to be factual. So, on the one hand, Simon 
May suggests that “Nietzsche’s genealogical accounts, of which that of the masters and slaves is 
a paradigm, are best taken as fictional”. But, May also argues, “this does not prevent them from 
being valuable as ways of getting us to think, even if hypothetically, about the functions of our 
actual ethical practices and their motivations by relating them to possible earlier or more 
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elementary practices and motivations in a manner which is free of the search for timeless 
‘groundings’”.6 On the other hand, Leiter argues that the absence of scholarly apparatus does 
not entail that Nietzsche’s GM is a useful fiction. Leiter suggests that while Nietzsche intends 
GM to present the facts about the multiple and complex origins of a certain type of morality, he 
eschewed a conventional scholarly format, because “the tone and trappings of a scholarly 
treatise would simply be an impediment” to his ultimate goal in the book, namely “to critique” a 
certain type of morality “in order to free nascent higher human beings from their false 
consciousness” about this certain type of morality, i.e. from their false belief that this certain 
type of morality is good for them. Leiter writes, “while the Genealogy purports to make true or 
false claims about the origins of . . . [a certain type of morality], it is manifestly not a 
conventional scholarly or scientific treatise, reflecting a “desire . . . for cold, pure, 
inconsequential knowledge” (U III: 6). Its aim is not to know the truth about . . . [the] origins [of 
this certain type of morality] for the sake of knowing that truth; rather, it is animated by the 
same profound normative commitment as all Nietzsche’s mature work: to revalue existing 
morality”.7 
I think May and Leiter both have got a point. I agree with May that Nietzsche’s genealogical 
accounts could still offer a means to discover functions of and motivations behind our ethics in 
general that have been unrecognised by us, even if these accounts were in themselves ‘fictions’. 
But then, since Nietzsche explicitly claims that what he aims to uncover in GM is the existence 
of “plain, harsh, ugly, repellent, unchristian, immoral truth” (GM: I, 1), it seems that not 
                                                 
6 See May S (1999): p. 52. Bernard Williams also takes an approach similar to May’s, by interpreting Nietzsche’s 
genealogy as essentially “a fictional story which represents a new reason for action as being developed in a simplified 
situation as a function of motives, reactions, psychological processes which we have reason to acknowledge already” 
(see Williams B 2000: p. 159). 
7 See Leiter (2002): pp. 176 & 180-181 
70 
 
everything about his genealogical accounts can be ‘fictional’. On the other hand, I agree with 
Leiter that one of the main tasks to which Nietzsche in his mature works devotes his energy is to 
undermine what he considers to be people’s fundamentally erroneous notions about a certain 
type of morality, specifically ‘slave morality’ typified by Christian morality, to urge people to 
question their unreserved adherence to its values, in order to promote the nurturing of ‘higher 
types’ who are capable of performing the ‘revaluation of all values’ (see, e.g., GM: Preface, 6). 
However, it seems to me that what Leiter overlooks here is the fact that Nietzsche can still 
achieve his goal of ‘criticising’ morality as well as making ‘true or factual claims’ about the 
origins of morality even in the form of ‘a fiction’. 
As I mentioned before, Nietzsche is a thinker who often style himself as a ‘psychologist’. In 
EH, he claims that “a psychologist without equal speaks from my writings” (EH: Books, 5), that 
the three essays constituting GM are “Three decisive preliminary studies by a psychologist for a 
revaluation of all values”, and that what he offered in those essays are the “truth” concerning 
“the birth of Christianity: the birth of Christianity out of the spirit of ressentiment”, “the 
psychology of the conscience” and “the first psychology of the priest” (see EH: GM): so, his 
concern in GM clearly lies with the ‘psychological’ origins of morality. And, interestingly, two 
individuals whom he often praises as great psychologists are Dostoyevsky and Stendhal (see 
BGE: 39, TI: IX, 45 & EH: CW, 3). Now, though these two novelists did draw inspiration from 
actual history as well as from their own personal experiences, their literary works are clearly in 
themselves ‘fictional’ narratives. Yet, it is also clear that even through their ‘fictional’ narratives 
these novelists do perfectly succeed in condemning certain moralities, certain political 
arrangements and certain social and moral evils. In fact, by using their gifted style, their 
‘fictional’ narratives often manage to urge the readers both to reflect on themselves and revise 
their views, including their fixed ideas on morality, in a much more effective and convincing 
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manner than some wearisome academic books can ever do. Moreover, though expressed in the 
form of ‘fictional’ narratives, many of those novelists’ brilliant insights into subtle human 
psychology – such as envy, vanity, vengeance and greed – are surely in themselves ‘true’ or 
‘factual’. Hence, technically, Nietzsche too can perfectly well criticise a certain type of morality 
and present the facts concerning the ‘psychological’ origins of morality in his genealogical 
accounts, even if these accounts are in themselves ‘fictions’. 
How, then, should we interpret Nietzsche’s genealogical accounts? In my view, his 
genealogical accounts clearly contain some ‘fictional’ elements: they have a touch of fantasy, “a 
mythic quality”.8 For instance, ‘the masters’ whom Nietzsche in GM portrays as “triumphant 
monsters” capable of emerging from hideous acts – such as murder, rape and torture – 
cheerfully and innocently, are so excessively bestial and cruel, that it is hard to imagine that 
such beings have actually existed ever or have existed as widely as he suggests (see GM: I, 11). 
But then, at the beginning of GM he criticises a group of English psychologists for presenting 
an implausible psychological account (see GM: I, 1-2), and in EH he emphasizes that what he 
revealed in GM were indeed ‘truths’ (see EH: GM). In the light of this, it also seems clear that 
Nietzsche does intend to make ‘factual’ claims about the ‘psychological’ origins of morality in 
his genealogical accounts. Moreover, since he presumably did use actual history for creating his 
genealogical accounts,
9
 and since he investigates and discusses the origins of morality in a 
socio-anthropological framework, his genealogical accounts also clearly seem to contain some 
historical and sociological facts. Therefore, my view is that his genealogical accounts are hybrid 
mixtures of real history, real sociology, real psychology and fiction. 
                                                 
8 Bergmann (1988): p. 29 
9 See Leiter (2002): p. 181 
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Likewise, I suggest that the historical narratives Nietzsche provides in BT should also be 
interpreted as such hybrid mixtures: mixtures of real Greek history, real psychology and fiction. 
For, despite all those faults of theirs mentioned earlier, there is no doubt that his historical 
narratives in BT do contain some accurate historical facts about ancient Greece. Yet, it is also 
clear that Nietzsche never intended his historical narratives in BT to be completely ‘factual’. For, 
after all, he was a young genius who was promoted to a professor of Classical Philology at the 
age of twenty-four, three years before the first publication of BT: surely, he must have had both 
the knowledge of ancient Greece and the scholarly ability that are sufficient to produce a 
rigorously ‘factual’ historical narrative. But, as we have just seen, technically, he can still make 
‘factual’ claims about human psychology in his historical narratives, even if these narratives 
contain some elements of ‘fiction’. And that clearly seems to be what he aimed to do in BT, as 
he remarks later in his life, while reflecting on BT, that the origin of Greek tragedy is “a 
difficult psychological question” (BT: ASC, 4), and that what he offered in BT was “a 
psychological analysis” of “the Dionysian phenomenon” as “one root of the whole Greek art” 
(EH: BT, 1). 
Why, then, did Nietzsche feel the need to introduce the ‘fictional’ elements into his 
historical narratives? Clearly, it is not as if he could not have presented psychological facts 
about the origin of Greek tragedy in the form of strictly ‘factual’ historical narratives. This leads 
me to suggest that what he aimed to present through his essentially ‘fictional’ historical 
narratives in BT was not just some specific psychological facts concerning the origin of Greek 
tragedy, such as why, how and under what kind of psychological conditions the Greeks created 
tragedy, but also some ‘universal’ and ‘timeless’ facts about human psychology, his own 
insights into certain ‘universal’ and ‘timeless’ psychological phenomena, such as how one’s 
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psychology would react once one realised the terrible nature and meaninglessness of one’s 
existence as symbolised by ‘the wisdom of Silenus’. 
But then, if that is indeed the case, why did Nietzsche choose to express such insights of his 
in the historical context, specifically in the context of the history of ancient Greece, and not in 
other contexts? My suggestion here is that it is probably for the same reason that many novelists 
have traditionally found ‘history’ suitable material to develop their fictional narratives to 
express and convey their views and ideas to people. 
Many novels are written against some historical backgrounds, written around and dealing 
with some historical events, say, the French revolution: Les Misérables by Victor Hugo, The 
Gods Will Have Blood by Anatole France, A Tale of Two Cities by Charles Dickens, to name 
but a few. Now, it is certainly possible for us to try to construct a coherent historical narrative 
out of these novels, try to check how accurate their storylines are to the actual historical event of 
the French revolution. Many scholars have certainly done this, so today we can find a plenty of 
such information in footnotes of the paperback edition of these novels. But then, most of us 
would surely agree that the historical accuracy of these novels is not really the point, and that 
the point is rather the psychological views or worldviews expressed in those novels. 
For instance, when we read Dickens’ novel Little Dorrit, not many of us would seriously ask 
whether there really existed the Marshalsea debtor’s prison and the Circumlocution Office. To 
be sure, for writing the novel, Dickens no doubt used actual history to some degree. And many 
of the places that appear in the novel actually existed or still exist. And the novel also strongly 
reflects the socio-political situation of Dickens’ time. But then, Dickens clearly never intended 
the novel to be a ‘factual’ historical narrative. What Dickens portrays in the novel is not the 
actual history of London, not the actual ‘reality’ of Victorian London, but rather an ‘imaginary’ 
history of London, an ‘idea’ of Victorian London. Rather than treating the actual history or 
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reality of London as it is, he used it both as a source of his inspiration and as a material to 
develop the novel as a fictional narrative, partly because he was familiar with it, partly because 
he presumably found ‘history’ to be something people can easily relate to – as many other 
novelists have done –, but also chiefly because what he intended to convey to people were much 
more than some facts about Victorian London. 
That is, at one level, Little Dorrit is in some way a socio-political satire, expressing Dickens’ 
views on certain socio-political issues that are peculiar to Victorian London, such as the 
absurdity of debtor’s prison and the then government’s incompetence. But, at another level, just 
as Dostoyevsky and Stendhal – whom Nietzsche admires as psychologists – do in their novels, 
what Dickens also presents in this novel are his insights into certain ‘universal’ and ‘timeless’ 
psychological phenomena, such as greed, vanity, guilt, self-deception, hypocrisy, the 
psychological effects of confinement, and so on, which are gained from his acute power of 
observation as well as from his own personal experiences: Dostoevsky’s admiration for Dickens 
was undoubtedly largely based on this aspect. At the same time, most importantly, just as many 
great novelists and poets do through their literary works, what Dickens also offers in this novel 
is a new worldview. By using the actual history of London as a material, by using clever plots, 
by working the strikingly original characters in ingenious ways, he creates an imaginary history 
of London in which his outlook such as on human existence, on morality and on suffering, as 
well as his ideas such as those of human liberation and of human redemption, are tactfully 
articulated and endorsed. And with this imaginary history, what Dickens truly wanted to do was 
not merely to entertain people, but to move people, to urge people to see themselves and the 
world from a different perspective in a certain new light, to change people’s sensitivity and 
attitude towards ‘life’. And for Nietzsche, I suggest, the history of ancient Greece was suitable 
material in the same kind of way to develop his fictional narratives to express his ideas, not only 
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because he was well acquainted with it, but also more crucially because the ancient Greeks 
always symbolised to him what he perceived to be the ideal ‘life-affirming’ life. 
That is, in my view, Nietzsche’s true aim in BT was not just to offer his insights into certain 
‘universal’ and ‘timeless’ psychological phenomena, but also to present his ideas of how we 
could respond to our own realisation of the terrible nature and meaninglessness of our existence. 
Indeed, he claims in HAH, “When we speak of the Greeks we involuntarily speak of today and 
yesterday: their familiar history is a polished mirror that always radiates something that is not in 
the mirror itself” (HAH: II, i, 218). And he also claims in EH, “what was really valuable in the 
essay [BT] was ignored. “Hellenism and Pessimism” would have been a less ambiguous title – 
suggesting the first instruction about how the Greeks got over their pessimism, how they 
overcame it” (EH: BT, 1). In the light of these claims, it could be plausibly suggested that 
Nietzsche intends his imaginary history of ancient Greece in BT – as well as in his other works 
– to function as ‘a polished mirror’ in which to look at ourselves, to assess the condition of our 
own ‘life’. At the same time, when he discusses how the ancient Greeks responded to their 
suffering and overcame their pessimism with their ‘art’ as ‘religion’, he is also instructing us 
concerning with what kind of ‘religion’ we could possibly respond to our own suffering and 
overcome our own pessimistic outlook on life.
10
 
This instructive aspect of Nietzsche’s fictional narratives is particularly apparent in his 
creation of ‘archetypes’. As Silk and Stern suggest, Nietzsche in BT possesses a fundamental 
desire for “an archetype: a single, symbolic figure who sums up the whole drift of a movement, 
a whole constellation of forms or ideas; a figure capable of symbolizing its origin and its 
essence alike”.11 So, for instance, even by going against historical facts sometimes, Nietzsche 
                                                 
10 See Young (2006): p. 15 
11 Silk & Stern (1983): p. 151 
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in BT intentionally transforms Homer into the archetype of Greek epic, Archilochus into the 
archetype of Greek lyric, Socrates into the archetype of rationalism and Wagner’s music into the 
archetype of the Dionysian music: in fact, such an inclination of his to transform individuals or 
objects into symbolic figures or models is also strongly present throughout most of his works, as 
I will suggest in the following chapters. Why the ‘archetypes’? He claims in EH, “A 
psychologist might still add that what I heard as a young man listening to Wagnerian music 
really had nothing to do with Wagner; that when I described Dionysian music I described what I 
had heard – that instinctively I had to transpose and transfigure everything into the new spirit 
that I carried in me” (EH: BT, 4). Such claim suggests that he considers the creation of 
archetypes an appropriate ‘instructive’ means to illustrate and express his ideas, or to illuminate 
those of his and others’ inner states which he takes to reveal typical psychological patterns in 
human beings. So, for instance, despite the historical fact that ancient Greece was “a 
multifarious collection of small states, each with its own propensities and peculiarities”,12 
Nietzsche throughout his life treats the ancient Greeks as a single people with a single culture. 
And by idealising the Greeks, he transforms them into the archetype of – what he perceives to 
be – the ideal ‘life-affirming’ life. And by setting this archetype over against what he considers 
to be the ‘life-denying’ decadent life symbolised by Christianity, he attempts to illustrate and 
illuminate his idea of ‘life-affirmation’ and his criticism of Christianity. 
And in my view, Nietzsche’s genealogical accounts should also be grasped as fictional 
narratives of such nature. That is, I think Leiter is wrong to assert that Nietzsche’s aim in GM is 
simply “critical not positive”.13 Certainly, as I suggested, one of Nietzsche’s aims in GM is to 
criticise a certain type of morality, to undermine people’s fundamental erroneous notions about 
                                                 
12 Silk & Stern (1983): p. 186 
13 See Leiter (2002): p. 167 
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a certain type of morality. And another aim is to reveal and present the facts concerning the 
‘psychological’ origins of morality. However, his genealogical accounts also seem to me to 
possess one other, much more positive aim. For, I agree with Tanner when he suggests that GM 
is “Nietzsche’s most sustained and profound attempt to make sense of suffering, and of how 
other people have tried to make sense of it”, and that its “astounding twists and turns . . . , 
occasionally issuing in downright contradiction, are the result of Nietzsche’s constant broodings 
on the variety of methods which people have developed for coping with it”.14 So, by examining 
how people have created and accepted moralities to try to obtain and maximise their feeling of 
power over suffering (see Chapter 1-C), what Nietzsche also presents in his genealogical 
accounts is his idea of how we could possibly respond to our own suffering, how we could 
justify and affirm our existence in the face of suffering. 
An interesting reading of GM is provided by Danto in this regard. Danto suggests that GM 
is “a medical book” written especially for “those who suffer from the diseases it addresses”. 
More concretely, it is a “therapeutic” type of book whose “intended reader is sick, if typically in 
ways unrecognized by him: one learns the nature of one’s illness as one reads the book”. And 
while showing the reader qua sufferer that “he is sick”, the book also allows the reader to be 
“treated as he reads, and a condition of therapeutic success is that he be kept continuously 
conscious of the disorder the book means to drive out”. And this disorder which Nietzsche qua 
therapist addresses and tries to help the readers cure themselves of are “interpretations of 
suffering which themselves generate suffering”: what Danto terms “intensional suffering” 
generated by “certain interpretative responses to the fact of extensional suffering”, which could 
be far worse than the extensional suffering itself.
15
 
                                                 
14 Tanner (2000): pp. 81-82 
15 See Danto (1994): pp. 40-43 
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I think Danto is right. As a young man, Nietzsche was a great devotee of Schopenhauer and 
thus accepted the plausibility of Schopenhauer’s pessimism that regards life as fundamentally 
meaningless and not worth living. And though he in his mature years separates himself from 
Schopenhauer’s pessimism, he nevertheless continues to believe that life will forever possess in 
its nature the terrible aspects characterised by unavoidable pain and suffering, and that there is 
nothing one can do to stop the suffering caused by such nature, i.e. ‘extensional suffering’. So, 
what he is concerned with is the way people interpret the existence of suffering, i.e. the cause of 
‘intensional suffering’. And in GM, his intended audience are those who interpret the existence 
of suffering in what he considers to be a wrong and unhealthy way, those who specifically get 
sick by employing Christian moralised conceptions such as of ‘guilt’, ‘bad conscience’ and 
‘punishment’.16 
However, I think Danto gets it wrong when he claims that the ‘interpretations of suffering’ 
which Nietzsche addresses and tries to help the readers cure themselves of are 
 
due, one and all, to bad philosophy, bad psychology, to religion – which in Nietzsche’s scheme does 
not have a good form so as to make “bad religion” nonredundant – and of course bad moral systems, 
such as the one which takes as its primary value-opposition the distinction between good and evil. 
All of these are in a way modalities of . . . “bad consciousness” . . . Any suffering due to false moral 
beliefs about ourselves is due to bad consciousness, when there is nothing bad about us except our 




                                                 
16 See Conway (1994): p. 320 
17 Danto (1994): p. 43 
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The ‘bad conscience’, or more specifically, the ‘bad conscience’ in its moral form, which can 
often make our experience of suffering far worse, is no doubt rooted in bad forms of philosophy, 
psychology and morality. But what Danto overlooks is the fact that Nietzsche recognises how 
the moral ‘bad conscience’ originates only from the ‘bad’ form of religion typified by 
Christianity, and how there actually exists a ‘good’ form of religion which does not yield moral 
‘bad conscience’. For instance, in GM, Nietzsche claims that there are “nobler uses for the 
invention of gods” than that of the Christian God, invented and used as a means to create and 
implant into people the Christian moralised conceptions of ‘guilt’, ‘bad conscience’ and 
‘punishment’: all of which generate and promote in men a strong feeling of self-condemnation 
and a deep-seated will to self-torture. And he affirmatively talks about how the ancient Greeks 
created and used their gods “precisely so as to ward off” the moral ‘bad conscience’, and how 
their gods also “took upon themselves, not the punishment but, what is nobler, the guilt” (see 
GM: II, 23). 
Now, the significance of those remarks will be discussed in Chapter 5. But, here, I suggest 
that what those remarks also demonstrate is that Nietzsche in GM is indeed not only aiming to 
criticise a certain type of morality and a certain related conception of God. By revealing how the 
acceptance of Christian morality and the related Christian conception of God make one 
psychologically unhealthy as well as life-denying – prevent one from flourishing –; by showing 
how those Christian moralised conceptions as a ‘wrong’ interpretation of the existence of 
suffering generate in one additional suffering; and further by telling us how the ancient Greeks 
qua ‘masters’ remained psychologically healthy and life-affirming through their morality and 
their gods, Nietzsche as ‘therapist’ is also urging us to assess the condition of our own morality 
and religion. And at the same time, Nietzsche as ‘educator’ is also implicitly instructing us 
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concerning with what type of morality and conception of gods we too could possibly become 
psychologically healthy and life-affirming. 
Furthermore, in my view, what Danto also overlooks is the fact that Nietzsche in GM was 
not addressing things merely from the standpoint of ‘a therapist’, but also from the standpoint of 
‘a sufferer’. As I argued in Chapter 1-C, one notable factor that sets Nietzsche apart from other 
Western philosophers is the ‘personal’ nature of his writings. In the light of this, if we indeed 
are to take seriously his claim in BGE that “every great philosophy” is “the personal confession 
of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir” (BGE: 6), we could also 
plausibly interpret GM as a ‘self-therapeutic’ book written especially for Nietzsche himself as 
‘sufferer’, in which he is confessing that he himself suffers from the Christian moralised 
conceptions of ‘guilt’, ‘bad conscience’ and ‘punishment’, and hence is trying to cure himself of 
his susceptibility to those conceptions as he writes the book: it is his personal attempt to find a 
way positively to interpret, justify and accept the fact of the existence of suffering, a way that 
would be healthier and more life-affirming than the traditional Christian way. 
Likewise, in my view, we could also plausibly interpret BT as such a ‘self-therapeutic’ book 
written especially for Nietzsche himself as ‘sufferer’. I agree with Staten when he suggests that 
“Nietzsche is speaking of himself in The Birth of Tragedy when he describes the “profound 
Hellene, uniquely susceptible to the tenderest and deepest suffering,” who “having looked 
boldly right into the terrible destructiveness of so-called world history as well as the cruelty of 
nature” is “in danger of longing for a Buddhistic negation of the will””.18 So, as Nietzsche 
himself confirms later in his life, what underlies BT is a “deeply personal” question (BT: ASC, 
1). In essence, the book represents his first personal attempt to cope with his sense of being 
assailed by suffering, his, and others’, to go beyond his own adherence to Schopenhauer’s 
                                                 
18 Staten (1990): p. 85, quoting BT: 7 
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pessimism, to rescue himself out of his own longing for a Buddhistic negation of the will. And 
what the ancient Greeks in the book symbolise is the very type of life, the very type of attitude 
towards life, that Nietzsche himself personally craves to acquire. 
Hence, the central theme of BT can be summarised as ‘how one is able to give a meaning 
and significance to one’s human existence and the world – and its history –, once one truly 
grasps the horrible truth that they are fundamentally characterised by nothing but unavoidable 
pain, and suffering’. And what Nietzsche tries to achieve in the book is to identify the best 
possible way positively to interpret and understand all the pain and suffering he sees around him, 
to justify and redeem all those terrible and absurd aspects of human existence and the world, so 
that he, and we, can overcome the pessimistic outlook on life. And as he finds the key to this in 
the realm of ‘art’ qua ‘religion’, he proposes two types of life-affirming religion as the possible 
solutions to make our life possible, bearable and worth living, namely the ‘Apollinian type’ of 
religion and the ‘Dionysian type’ of religion.
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Section B: The Apollinian type of religion 
 
Concerning the birth of the Apollinian type of religion in ancient Greece, Nietzsche in BT 
tells us how the Greeks were originally living under the “order of terror”. By being totally 
powerless against suffering, they interpreted their existence as utter pain. Their pessimism is 
symbolised by their mythic examples such as of “the wise Oedipus” who was compelled to 
suffer his “terrifying fate” for solving the riddle of the sphinx, as well as by the folk wisdom of 
Silenus which claims that “What is best of all is utterly beyond your reach: not to be born, not to 
be, to be nothing. But the second best for you is – to die soon”. Since they grasped the stern 
realities of life to the utmost through their exceptional sensitivity to suffering, the Greeks were 
obliged to create the world of the Olympians from “a most profound need”, in order to be able 
to bear their own existence, to ‘overcome’ or at least ‘veil’ such realities from their sight. And it 
was only “under the bright sunshine of such gods” that their existence became the subject of an 
obdurate attachment: something so truly “desirable in itself” that even one’s “lamentation itself 
becomes a song of praise”. In this way, the Greeks came to feel themselves worthy of living 
(see BT: 3). 
So, Nietzsche presents the Apollinian type of religion as what is established as a measure 
against “the terror and horror of existence” (BT: 3), as a way to overcome one’s pessimistic 
outlook on life. He claims that the relationship between the world of the Olympians and the 
wisdom of Silenus is that of “the rapturous vision of the tortured martyr to his suffering” (BT: 
3). By this, he seems to mean that the world of the Olympians was created under a psychology 
similar to that of a Christian martyr who is forced to imagine the Kingdom of God in order to 
ease the pain and suffering caused by torture. And in the case of the Greeks, given their 
exceptional sensitivity to suffering, their realisation of the terrible nature of life was enough to 
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drive them to imagine the realm of bright serene gods, in order to ease the pain involved in that 
very realisation. 
What, then, is the nature of the world of the Olympians? In Nietzsche’s view, it is 
essentially an artwork as “a metaphysical supplement of the reality of nature” (BT: 24), which is 
supplied by art as “the highest task and the truly metaphysical activity of this life” (BT: 
Preface), specifically by Apollinian art. Apollinian art represents the ‘image-making’ art forms 
that produce beautiful images with exceptional “clarity and firmness” (BT: 8). And the world of 
the Olympians was created when ‘the Apollinian’ as a natural artistic energy, which is by itself 
capable of producing such beautiful images, was mediated through Homer as the archetype of 
the Apollinian artist who typifies the outstanding artistic sensibility and creativity of the Greeks 
(see BT: 1-3). Compared to “the incompletely intelligible everyday world”, the world of the 
Olympians is an image world of beautiful illusion, in which “all forms speak to us; there is 
nothing unimportant or superfluous” (BT: 1). 
More crucially, Nietzsche claims, the world of the Olympians is “a transfiguring mirror” 
that portrays the Olympian gods living “the life of men” themselves, who are the “ideal picture” 
of Greeks’ own existence “surrounded with a higher glory” (see BT: 3). He writes, 
 
Whoever approaches these Olympians with another religion in his heart, searching among them for 
moral elevation, even for sanctity, for disincarnate spirituality, for charity and benevolence, will soon 
be forced to turn his back on them, discouraged and disappointed. For there is nothing here that 
suggests asceticism, spirituality, or duty. We hear nothing but the accents of an exuberant, triumphant 




This passage seemingly suggests that Nietzsche intends the world of the Olympians to be 
different from the Kingdom of God in nature: although he does not name Christianity as a target 
of his criticism in BT – this was made clear only when the second preface was added to the 
book –, he is seemingly trying to make a contrast between Christianity and the Apollinian type 
of religion. That is, what he is implying here seems to be that whereas the Kingdom of God is 
an imaginary world founded on a completely ‘non-human’ ideal that depicts only a perfectly 
‘good’ and pleasant afterlife, the world of the Olympians as ‘a transfiguring mirror’ is an 
imaginary world founded on a ‘human’ ideal, an idealisation of the actual world that depicts a 
“fantastic excess” of ‘human’ life (see BT: 3). It is an extraordinarily beautiful and magnificent 
spectacle of ‘the life of men’ which the gods themselves lead in an enviably brilliant fashion. So, 
compared with the Kingdom of God, what it depicts are not only ‘good’ and pleasant images, 
but also ‘evil’ and unpleasant images: the Homeric epic, the Iliad in particular, is indeed a story 
of war that contains many gruesome scenes. 
How exactly, then, does the world of the Olympians help people to overcome their 
pessimistic outlook on life? Nietzsche’s idea of the effect of the world of the Olympians can be 
summed up by the term ‘transfiguration’. As we have just seen, the ‘transfiguration’ is a kind of 
‘idealisation’ within the limits of human ideal. However, as to how such idealisation transforms 
one’s existence into the subject of an obdurate attachment, Nietzsche is not specific in his 
explanation. But there are few passages that can help us figure it out. 
Nietzsche claims, “So extraordinary is the power of the epic-Apollinian that before our eyes 
it transforms the most terrible things by the joy in mere appearance and in redemption through 
mere appearance” (BT: 12). And he also claims that “the redemption in illusion” can be truly 
attained only through the Apollinian as “the transfiguring genius of the principium 
individuationis” (BT: 16). So, in his view, ‘the Apollinian’ is not only a natural artistic energy, 
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but also the principium individuationis that represents an illusion as an appearance to people’s 
subjectivity. And the ‘redemption in illusion’ is a ‘pain-free’ contemplation of a beautiful 
appearance: the “consummate immersion in the beauty of mere appearance”, which he also 
terms “naïve” (BT: 3). When the Apollinian qua the principium individuationis represented the 
world of the Olympians as an individual appearance to the Greeks, the extraordinary beauty of 
this appearance ‘veiled’ the stern realities of life from their view, so that the Greeks were able to 
gaze into this ‘appearance’ through “a radiant floating in purest bliss, a serene contemplation 
beaming from wide-open eyes” (see BT: 3-4). In this way, the Greeks were able to deal with 
their realisation of the terrible nature of life and managed to overcome their pessimistic outlook 
on life. Hence, Nietzsche also describes ‘naïve’ as the “oneness of man with nature”, the 
reconciliation between the problematic essence of nature and one’s realisation of it, which can 
only be achieved by “the highest effect” of the Apollinian (see BT: 3). 
At first glance, it is not clear how the world of the Olympians, which is basically a mythical 
world described in the Homeric epic, could manage to ‘veil’ the stern realities of life from the 
Greeks’ view. For, despite being an Apollinian ‘image-making’ art form, compared with other 
Apollinian art forms such as painting and “sculpture” (BT: 1), the Homeric epic does not give 
people an instant access to visual images. However, Nietzsche elsewhere claims that the Greeks 
possessed incredible artistic abilities which make us moderns ashamed of ours. And he also 
claims that, given their incredible artistic abilities, the Greeks were presumably capable of 
having dreams with “a certain logic of line and contour, colors and groups, a certain pictorial 
sequence reminding us of their finest bas-reliefs” (see BT: 2). Moreover, Silk and Stern point 
out that in ancient Greece, “most Greek poetry was performed, rather than read privately, and a 
good deal of it was performed to music. More specifically, much poetry was sung . . . , or had 
once been sung . . . , and an important part of the rest was chanted or declaimed to the lyre, as 
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was the case with Homeric epic”.1 And Nietzsche presumably knows this historical fact, as he 
speaks of the Apollinian artist as “the psalmodizing artist” who sings with “his phantom 
harp-sound” (BT: 4). So, what he has in mind seems to be that when the Homeric epic was 
recited publicly at a religious festival, every Greek attending the festival could actually visualise 
and grasp the world of the Olympians as an individual beautiful image concretely and vividly. 
But then, a problem is that, as Nietzsche makes clear above, our much inferior artistic abilities 
do not allow us to do so. On this matter, he does not provide us with any solution. Perhaps, we 
could speculate, the youthful Nietzsche who had so much passion for art was hoping that his 
contemporaries – and probably himself too – would come to acquire such incredible artistic 
abilities, particularly through the appreciation of the values of Wagner’s music-drama. 
Be that as it may, another problem is that, even granting we came to possess such incredible 
artistic abilities, it is unclear how the contemplation of the world of the Olympians would 
actually be ‘pain-free’ as Nietzsche suggests. For, the fact is that, as we saw, being an 
idealisation of the actual world, the world of the Olympians contains many unpleasant and 
gruesome images which depict the terrible aspects of human life such as suffering and death: 
what the Greeks contemplated in this idealised actual world was “the whole divine comedy of 
life, including the inferno” (BT: 1). It is difficult to see how the nature of such images could 
make contemplation of them the ‘purest bliss’. However, Nietzsche argues that one of the 
peculiar characteristics of the artist, including the Greeks as Apollinian artists, is that 
“Whenever the truth is uncovered, the artist will always cling with rapt gaze to what still 
remains covering even after such uncovering” (BT: 15). By this, Nietzsche seems to be 
suggesting that even when the Greeks were confronted by one of those unpleasant images, 
because the image itself was extraordinarily beautiful, and because the Greeks always did have 
                                                 
1 Silk & Stern (1983): p. 137 
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“the sensation that it is mere appearance”, they still managed to focus all of their attention on 
obtaining pleasure from the beauty of its “figures” and “forms” (BT: 1).2 
Yet, we get a feeling that something else is still required to make the contemplation of the 
world of the Olympians the ‘purest bliss’. Certainly, it is possible even for us to look squarely at 
an unpleasant image and appreciate its exceptional beauty, as long as we are aware that it is 
‘mere appearance’. For instance, while we are contemplating ‘The Third of May, 1808: The 
Execution of the Defenders of Madrid’ by Goya, we can and do enjoy its exceptionally beautiful 
forms and colours. For, no matter how gruesome the image it portrays is, we know for sure that 
it is just a painting. But then, it is also clearly the case that through this contemplation, we also 
experience painful emotions, such as sympathy for the citizens of Madrid and rage against the 
soldiers of Napoleon’s army, irrespective of whether we actually know the historical 
background of the painting. Hence, it seems that unless we are somehow exempted from feeling 
those painful emotions, the contemplation cannot be regarded as the ‘purest bliss’. 
This leads me to suggest that the ‘Apollinian’ beauty of the world of the Olympians is not 
only extraordinarily beautiful but also contains an extra element which has a decisive effect on 
people’s perception, so that they can be enthralled completely even by the beauty of unpleasant 
images without feeling any painful emotion. And this element is, in my view, what Nietzsche 
implies by the ‘lies’ that the Apollinian beauty triggers in people: “here Apollo overcomes the 
suffering of the individual by the radiant glorification of the eternity of the phenomenon: here 
beauty triumphs over the suffering inherent in life; pain is obliterated by lies from the features 
of nature” (BT: 16). What, then, exactly is the nature of this ‘lies’? Unfortunately, Nietzsche 
does not make himself clear on this. But Young seems to me correct when he suggests it to be a 
kind of “censorship” of the “inner perspective”, which prohibits people from knowing “how it 
                                                 
2 See Young (2006): p. 18 
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feels to be on the inside of loss, injury and mortality” and thus makes terrible things such as 
suffering and death “bloodless and painless” in their perspective. By driving people to treat all 
death in an equally “objective” way, it allows them to evade – in Heideggerian language – “the 
‘mineness (Jemeinigkeit)’ of death” and ultimately gives them “an ‘inauthentic’ attitude to 
death”, in which their own death is transformed into “someone else’s problem” in their 
perspective.
3
 So, as long as such censorship tricks the Greeks’ inner perspective, the Greeks can 
obtain nothing but pleasure from every image of the world of the Olympians. In this way, the 
contemplation of the beauty of their transfigured existence becomes the ‘purest bliss’, pain-free. 
And Nietzsche believes that such contemplation was sufficient to convince the Greeks of “the 
eternal joy of existence” (BT: 17). 
So far, I have outlined the nature and effects of the Apollinian type of religion Nietzsche 
presents in BT. In his view, the Apollinian type of religion is a type of religion that redeems 
people by urging them to seek ‘the eternal joy of existence’ in the enduring aesthetic appearance 
of the illuminated ‘human life’ which the gods themselves lead in an enviably brilliant fashion. 
Hence, compared to Schopenhauer, who regards the appearance created by the principium 
individuationis as a cause of most of our suffering, Nietzsche does not see anything intrinsically 
wrong with it, provided we realise that it is nothing more than ‘mere appearance’: there is 
nothing wrong with the Greeks creating a beautiful illusionary world of the Olympians 
alongside this world, as long as they retain the sensation of its character being ‘illusion’. 
Now, Nietzsche recognises that there is one serious downside to the Apollinian type of 
religion. That is, by transforming one’s existence into the subject of an obdurate attachment, the 
Apollinian type also ends up leaving one’s own death exposed to “real pain” (see BT: 3). For, 
while its redemption actively makes death ‘someone else’s problem’ and thus ‘painless’ in one’s 
                                                 
3 Young (2006): p. 19 
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inner perspective, it completely fails to provide any real meaning or consolation for the 
inevitable arrival of one’s own death. 
To this downside, Nietzsche does not provide any solution. And in the light of the fact that 
his central aim in BT is to identify the best possible way positively to interpret and justify the 
terrible aspects of human existence, this failure to provide any real meaning to ‘death’ could 
well be one of the reasons why he placed in the book more significance on ‘tragedy’ as the 
Dionysian type of religion over the Apollinian type, as we will see.
4
 Nevertheless, it is still an 
undeniable fact that Nietzsche in BT valued the Apollinian type of religion as ‘life-affirming’, 
especially for the way it makes people crave their existence so intensely, and considered the 
Apollinian redemption to be effective enough to help people overcome their pessimistic outlook 
on life. 
However, in my view, besides this downside, the Apollinian type of religion also possesses 
more fundamental problems. That is, there are several fatal flaws in Nietzsche’s arguments for 
the Apollinian type generally. 
Firstly, it is difficult to see how Nietzsche’s idea of ‘transfiguration’ can actually transform 
our existence into something truly ‘desirable in itself’. Here, let me illustrate the problem by 
using ‘a film’ as a modern example of Apollinian art. Suppose I interpret my postgraduate life 
as utter pain and find it not worth living. Now, suppose also, a film about the life of 
postgraduates is made by a very creative director, using the finest actors: it is an idealised 
spectacle of the ‘actual’ postgraduate life, which beautiful characters lead in a brilliant manner 
despite experiencing many hardships.
5
 And what is remarkable about this film is that every 
                                                 
4 See Young (2006): p. 19 
5 I derive this idea from Young, who suggests “the Western” as “a modern instance of Apollonian art”, because, he 
argues, “death and destruction are all about, but what one focuses on is the cool courage and the sheer ‘style’ of its 
heroes” (Young 2006: p. 19). While I think Young’s suggestion is generally plausible, ‘the Western’, or any ‘film’ 
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image it depicts is fascinatingly beautiful, so that it provokes no painful emotion in the 
audiences. So, for me, the film works in the same way the world of the Olympians worked for 
the Greeks: as ‘a transfiguring mirror’ of my own life. When I go to a cinema and watch the 
film, what I obtain is the ‘purest bliss’. Despite the film projecting unpleasant images repeatedly, 
my mind is always focused on taking pleasure from the beauty and brilliance of the characters, 
which make postgraduate life appear extremely desirable. In this way, I come to perceive that 
despite numerous hardships, my postgraduate life is still worth living. 
However, here, the problem is that once I leave the cinema, it is only a matter of time before 
I rediscover how terrible my postgraduate life still is in reality. For, the fact is that the film has 
done nothing to change the actual state of my postgraduate life itself: as Schacht puts it, 
“Through Apollinian art, the world of ordinary experience is not actually transformed and its 
harshness eliminated”, and what we obtain is “only an altered state of mind”.6 The film gives 
me a new positive outlook on my postgraduate life, and I may be able to sustain it outside the 
cinema temporarily while I am still basking in the afterglow of the film. But I cannot sustain it 
on a long-term basis, since my mind will be again distressed frequently by what is still the harsh 
reality of the actual postgraduate life full of hardships, to the point where I reconfirm that my 
postgraduate life is indeed utter pain and thus not worth living: this is more so for the Greeks 
whose battling life is much harder and more unpredictable. The only way I can continue 
sustaining it seems to be to keep going to a cinema, to keep freeing my mind from reality by 
                                                                                                                                               
for that matter, is, of course, not a perfect example. For, just as in the case of the painting of Goya I discussed, the 
contemplation of a film is not always ‘pain-free’, as we are often made to feel painful emotions by a film, despite 
knowing that it is a film. Also, Young’s choice of ‘the Western’ seems problematic, since no matter how brilliantly 
the life of cowboys was portrayed, it could hardly be an idealisation of the actual life for most of us: whereas the 
Homeric epic such as the Iliad is a portrayal of a war-bound life, which the Greeks themselves were actually leading. 
It is on the basis of this point that I choose to use a film about ‘the postgraduate life’ for my example. 
6 Schacht (2001): pp. 196-197 
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constantly watching the film. But such life cannot be described as a proper ‘life’ in any sense. 
So, clearly, the Apollinian redemption does not function in the way Nietzsche suggests. What 
his idea of ‘transfiguration’ provides is only a ‘temporary’ and impractical solution that is 
insufficient to transform our existence into the subject of an obdurate attachment in reality. 
Another serious flaw in Nietzsche’s arguments for the Apollinian type of religion becomes 
apparent when he praises the Apollinian redemption for being “the only satisfactory theodicy” 
(BT: 3). According to him, the characteristics of the Apollinian beauty embodied in the 
Olympian gods were later converted into an ethical admonition for the Greeks’ practical life, 
which demands “the delimiting of the boundaries of the individual, measure in the Hellenic 
sense”, as well as “self-knowledge” to maintain such ‘measure’. And on the basis of this ethical 
admonition, the Greeks came to obtain a new perspective which regards dispositions of both 
“overweening pride” and “excess” as the root of evils. So, from this perspective, they 
re-interpreted their past symbolised by their pessimistic mythic examples, and understood that 
Oedipus had to suffer his terrifying fate “because of his excessive wisdom” (see BT: 4). 
However, it is difficult to see how such a justification of the existence of worldly evils could 
ever be ‘the only satisfactory theodicy’. Certainly, the Greeks can give a reason to all those 
misfortunes and calamities they had suffered in the past from this new perspective generated 
from the ethical admonition of such. In this manner, they may indeed be able to feel the 
existence of past worldly evils being justified to them. But what about the existence of present 
and future evils which they inevitably face and will face? Maintaining the ‘measure’ may help 
them to avoid experiencing some artificial misfortunes. But it is clearly not sufficient for them 
to avoid all misfortune, especially natural calamities, since the actual world is still as terrible in 
its essence as ever despite the ‘transfiguration’. Now, it is possible that the Greeks might have 
believed and accepted that even all those natural calamities too are caused by their own fault of 
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not maintaining the ‘measure’ properly. But then, even if that was the case, it is still difficult to 
see how such justification of evils could actually contribute towards transforming one’s 
existence into ‘the subject of an obdurate attachment’, because, to most of us, the type of ‘life’ 
that can still be hard and horrible despite complying perfectly with the ethical admonition one 
has been given does not at all appear to be something truly ‘desirable in itself’. And we moderns, 
who know far too well that most of natural calamities happen irrespective of whether we 
actually respect our limits, are hardly convinced or satisfied by such a theodicy. 
Nietzsche seemingly wants to argue that compared with Christian redemption that provides 
a consolation in the idea of a perfectly ‘good’ and tranquil afterlife which is founded on a 
completely non-human ideal, the Apollinian redemption founded on a human ideal is distinctly 
more ‘life-affirming’ and thus a better solution to the everlasting problem which every human 
being faces concerning his existence. But, from what we have seen, it is difficult to see how 
what is essentially a ‘temporary’ psychological transformation that is incapable of either 
changing the condition of the actual world fundamentally or justifying the existence of worldly 
evils thoroughly could become a solution at all. In fact, even at a glance, Christian redemption 
seems to be a more effective and thus better solution. Just like the Apollinian redemption, 
Christian redemption too is essentially a psychological transformation incapable of changing the 
condition of the actual world. But it does seem to manage to make both the terrible nature of 
present life and the inevitable arrival of death meaningful and thus bearable, by giving people a 
transcendent purpose to life through the conception of the Kingdom of God. Though there are 
many ways to interpret what exactly the nature of this transcendent purpose is and how it 
functions, one could plausibly suggest, for instance, that Christian redemption manages to 
justify the existence of worldly evils by converting human suffering into some kind of ordeal 
God gives to His beloved children for the growth of their soul, so that they can be in the end 
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accepted into the Kingdom of God, where all the suffering they experience in this life will be 
compensated. 
Now, Nietzsche later in his life explicitly criticises such a teleological ‘otherworldly’ 
justification of human existence that prescribes a transcendent purpose as ‘life-denying’. And 
though he himself does not make it clear in BT, we can presume that his positive valuation of 
the Apollinian redemption is partly grounded on the fact that, unlike Christian redemption, it 
does not resort to a transcendent purpose. But then, we can see how this very refusal to provide 
a transcendent purpose undoubtedly makes the Apollinian redemption less effective than 
Christian redemption. In fact, it could also be suggested that, in certain respects, the 
transcendent purpose Christian redemption prescribes actually makes Christian redemption 
itself more life-affirming than the Apollinian redemption. Christian redemption might be 
deemed to be life-denying on account of the fact that it treats this present life as a means to the 
end called the Kingdom of God, rather than as the ultimate end, as ‘the subject of an obdurate 
attachment’. However, unlike the Apollinian redemption, Christian redemption does at least 
make people aware that death is a real thing, not ‘someone else’s problem’. ‘Death’ is a part of, 
if not the most significant part of, our life. And whereas the Apollinian redemption drives 
people to turn their back from this most significant part, Christian redemption manages to allow 
the faithful to face up to it directly with a great hope. 
Furthermore, it is also questionable whether Nietzsche is right to establish the comparison 
between the Kingdom of God and the world of the Olympians in the way he does. For, what he 
seemingly fails to notice is the fact that there is a clear difference between the suffering of a 
tortured martyr and that of the Greeks. That is, as far as the way Nietzsche presents the Greeks 
in BT is concerned, though the Greeks had exceptional sensitivity to suffering, they did not 
seem to possess any strong conviction which drives them to think and expect that they ought to 
94 
 
be exempt from suffering, and that their existence cannot and should not be utter pain. On the 
other hand, the martyr must go through his suffering while possessing strong faith in the 
omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence of God. Now, it is possible that this faith of 
his could actually allay his suffering and make it more bearable to him. But then, there seems to 
be equally a good chance that his faith itself can actually become an extra burden. As his faith is 
shaken by torture, he could experience an unwelcome doubt – “No worst, there is none. . . . 
Comforter, where, where is your comforting? Mary, mother of us, where is your relief?”, as 
Gerard Manley Hopkins poignantly expresses in one of his poems –,7 which would make the 
suffering more difficult to accept and more difficult to bear. Accordingly, the suffering the 
martyr experiences could well become harsher in nature, in contrast to that of the Greeks who 
simply had no choice but to accept the suffering as a fact of life. 
And finally, we could also question whether the way Nietzsche interprets the Homeric epic 
is really a correct one. In BT, Nietzsche is basically suggesting that by listening to the recital of 
Homeric epic such as the Iliad, and by visualising and grasping it as a world of extraordinarily 
beautiful images, the Greeks were so moved and touched that they thought of their life as 
‘fundamentally terrible and yet actually magnificent, brilliant and thus bearable’.8 Now, it 
seems that Nietzsche is at least right on something. For, even today, when we read the Iliad, 
despite the fact that we – because of our much inferior artistic abilities – cannot visualise it in 
the same manner as the Greeks did, we can still be impressed and touched by the way Homer 
portrays human life and suffering in his marvellous style. No matter how gruesome the story is 
in itself, we can nevertheless ultimately be struck with not horror but pure awe. Nonetheless, 
                                                 
7 Hopkins (1985): p. 61 
8 See Young (2006): p. 18 
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this is only one possibility since, clearly, there are also different ways of interpreting the Iliad, 
which actually suggest that Nietzsche’s positive interpretation is mistaken. 
For instance, Weil in one of her essays presents an interpretation of the Iliad which is far 
less positive than Nietzsche’s interpretation. Weil argues that the true subject of the Iliad is the 
uncontrollable “force” which reigns over every human being independently and unconditionally. 
It is what constantly modifies every human spirit, ultimately capable of transforming man into 
“a thing in the most literal sense” even while he is still alive. Everyone, whether he is the hero 
or the slave, the strong or the weak, is equally subject to this relentless violent power of ‘force’ 




So, according to Weil’s interpretation, what the Iliad ceaselessly represents is not a 
magnificent spectacle of ‘the life of men’ which the gods themselves lead in an enviably 
brilliant fashion as Nietzsche suggests, but rather a bitter spectacle of how men are constantly 
humiliated, defeated and made into “a corpse” by the merciless violent ‘force’, which is offered 
to us without any intervention of “comforting fiction” or “consoling prospect of immortality”: a 
plain expression of human suffering and misery.
10
 In contrast to Nietzsche’s suggestion, Weil is 
suggesting that by reading the Iliad, we are only made to recognise that our human life is not 
‘terrible and yet magnificent and brilliant’, but simply ‘terrible’ through and through: we come 
to see that there is basically no redemptive quality in it at all as the wisdom of Silenus claims. If 
this is indeed the case, then, surely, no ‘transfiguration’ effect can take place in the way 
Nietzsche suggests.
                                                 
9 See Weil (2005): pp. 183ff 
10 See Weil (2005): pp. 183-184 
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Section C: The Dionysian type of religion 
 
Let us examine another type of life-affirming religion Nietzsche also presents in BT. 
According to him, the Dionysian type of religion originated from the “Dionysian festivals” 
whose existence can be demonstrated throughout the ancient world (see BT: 2). In ancient 
Greece, the Dionysian festival was the worship of Dionysus by “the satiric chorus” (BT: 7), a 
group of communal singers. And the core of worship was the “dithyramb” (BT: 2), which 
belongs to Dionysian art as “the nonimagistic . . . art of music” (BT: 1). But it must be noted 
that ‘music’ is not an exclusive art form of Dionysian art. For, Apollinian art, despite being the 
art of ‘image-making’, also possesses its own kind of music. The difference is that, whereas 
Apollinian music is a self-restrained type of music that is composed of “merely suggestive” 
tones characteristic of “the cithara”, Dionysian music is an uninhibited, rapturous type of music 
that involves “the entire symbolism of the body”, such as singing and dancing (see BT: 2). And 
crucially, what Dionysian music does is to generate a state of “intoxication” (BT: 1). 
Whereas ‘the Apollinian’ stands for the principium individuationis, ‘the Dionysian’ as a 
natural artistic energy manifested in Dionysian music is what causes “the destruction of the 
principium individuationis” (BT: 2). So, in the Dionysian festival, what the chorus experienced 
was the loss of their subjectivity to the point of “complete self-forgetfulness” (BT: 1). And 
through this, they were then driven into what Nietzsche calls ‘the Dionysian state’, an 
intoxicated state where they are seized by “a mystic feeling of oneness” (BT: 2), which is 
accompanied by “the blissful ecstasy” (BT: 1) that annihilates “the ordinary bounds and limits 
of existence” and casts “all personal experiences of the past” into “oblivion” (BT: 7). As they 
were made to feel as if they had risen above their everyday reality and had overcome every 
boundary that separates themselves and other things, each of them felt himself “not only united, 
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reconciled, and fused with his neighbor, but as one with him”, while joyfully feeling himself to 
be “on the way toward flying into the air, dancing” (BT: 1). 
As we will see, fundamentally Nietzsche values this mystic feeling of oneness produced by 
dis-individuation. So, at a glance, there is no reason for him to reject the Dionysian festival. But 
he does. For, he claims, the Dionysian festival would also bring out in people the “horrible 
mixture of sensuality and cruelty” that destroys “all family life and its venerable traditions”, as 
was indeed the case in the Dionysian festivals of the barbarians (see BT: 2). By this, he seems to 
be suggesting that the dis-individuation one experiences in the Dionysian festivals is 
‘unrestricted’ in nature. The principium individuationis is the principle that creates boundaries 
and limits by giving us individuality. So, under the unrestricted dis-individuation where we 
completely overcome individuality and consider ourselves to be not bounded or limited in any 
way, there will be nothing to stop us from expressing our natural instincts of cruelty and 
aggression in their purest form.
1
 
Further, Nietzsche claims, such unrestricted dis-individuation could also result “in 
indifference to, indeed, in hostility to, the political instincts”, since the principium 
individuationis is also the principle that “forms states”. Here, the idea seems to be that a state is 
formed when individuation creates a group of individuals who distinguish themselves from ‘the 
others’, and that the state can be maintained only when these individuals continuously affirm 
their subjectivity as members of a particular state, which provides them with both “patriotic 
instincts” and a “manly desire to fight” to continue confronting ‘the others’ in order to protect 
their own state (see BT: 21).
2
 So, under the unrestricted dis-individuation where the complete 
                                                 
1 Looking at his unpublished essay HC, which was written in the same year BT was published, it seems clear that 
Nietzsche was already embracing a naturalistic view that regards our essence as natural aggressive instincts (see HC: 
pp. 174-175). 
2 See Strong (1996): p. 123 & Young (2006): p. 22 
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loss of subjectivity causes people to be totally seized by the mystic feeling of oneness, they 
would find the notion of a socio-political life disgustingly needless. 
As I suggested before, in BT, Nietzsche’s highest value is the flourishing of community. 
Hence, for him, those consequences of the unrestricted dis-individuation are problematic. 
Accordingly, he recognises a need for the degree of the dis-individuation to be moderated, to 
the extent where people can experience the mystic feeling of oneness safely without suffering 
those problematic consequences. And in his view, this need was fulfilled perfectly in 
pre-Socratic Greek tragedy as the Dionysian type of religion, thanks to the mediation of ‘the 
Apollinian’. 
Nietzsche argues that Greek tragedy was indeed developed from the Dionysian festival as 
the worship of Dionysus by the satiric chorus: “originally only chorus and nothing but chorus” 
(BT: 7). But this pinnacle of Greek art qua Greek religion is also the ultimate outcome of “the 
Apollinian and Dionysian duality” that promotes “the continuous development of art”. Here, the 
idea is that when those two natural artistic energies finally achieve a synthetic unification after 
ceaseless productive conflicts, they create something far greater than anything which could be 
created by either of them alone, namely tragedy as “an equally Dionysian and Apollinian form 
of art” (BT: 1). 
Realistically, tragedy is “the dramatic dithyramb” (BT: 4), a theatrical “drama” based on a 
lyrical poem which is created as the result of Dionysian music being mediated by Apollinian 
symbolism, that is, the chorus being mediated by a “stage” and “masked” actors (see BT: 8). 
And at one level, it is this Apollinian symbolism that moderates the degree of the 
dis-individuation, by providing some ‘individuality’ in the shape of ‘individual’ characters 
played by the actors: the contemplation of individual characters cannot be realised without the 
effect of the individuation. But Nietzsche also insists that it is ‘music’ that should be regarded as 
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“the womb” (BT: 8) of tragedy, and that tragedy can never survive without “the spirit of music” 
(BT: 16): so, it is the power of Dionysian music that plays the leading part in tragedy, and thus 
we can emphasize tragedy as the ‘Dionysian’ type of religion, despite the Apollinian elements it 
contains. Indeed, according to him, in ancient Greece, with the establishment of tragedy, the 
chorus began performing before the public audience in theatres. In a theatre, the audience were 
physically separated from the chorus by their seats. But, owing to the unique construction of 
Greek theatres, they were able to identify themselves with the chorus. Hence, there was “no 
opposition between public and chorus”, and all the participants of tragedy were “merely a great 
sublime chorus” (BT: 8) who experienced the mystic feeling of oneness safely through the 
moderated dis-individuation: “this is the most immediate effect of the Dionysian tragedy, that 
the state and society and, quite generally, the gulfs between man and man give way to an 
overwhelming feeling of unity leading back to the very heart of nature” (BT: 7). 
Now, Nietzsche’s argument concerning the effects of tragedy as the Dionysian type of 
religion rests on three key premises. Firstly, in BT he advocates what he later comes to term “an 
artists’ metaphysics” (BT: ASC, 2), a metaphysical assumption that what truly exists beyond the 
world of individuality is “the primordial unity” as “the universal will”, which creates and plays 
with the world perpetually as “the sole author and spectator” in order to constantly redeem its 
essence filled with the eternal suffering and contradiction (see BT: 4-5 & 17). Secondly, he 
considers Dionysian ‘music’ to be “an immediate copy of the will itself”, i.e. of ‘the primordial 
unity’, which “complements everything physical in the world and every phenomenon by 
representing what is metaphysical’ (BT: 16). And thirdly, he believes that there exists an eternal, 




On these premises, Nietzsche argues that the participants of tragedy were also enabled by 
the power of Dionysian music to have brief access to this eternal truth about the real nature of 
the world. 
 
We are really for a brief moment primordial being itself, feeling its raging desire for existence and 
joy in existence; the struggle, the pain, the destruction of phenomena, now appear necessary to us, in 
view of the excess of countless forms of existence which force and push one another into life, in view 
of the exuberant fertility of the universal will (BT: 17). 
 
As the dis-individuation drives our consciousness into the most primal reality, we catch a 
glimpse of the existence of the primordial unity as the “world-artist” (BT: 1), which acts as an 
inexhaustible, imperishable world-shaping force behind our everyday world of individuality. 
And as we acquire its perspective momentarily, we realise how this world-artist eternally 
conducts itself like “a playing child that places stones here and there and builds sand hills only 
to overthrow them again” (BT: 24): it creates and destroys the world of individuality 
delightfully but also aimlessly. As the result, what we come to acquire intuitively is the clearest 
insight into the truth about “the eternal nature of things” (BT: 7), which Nietzsche terms 
‘Dionysian wisdom’, namely “all that comes into being must be ready for a sorrowful end” (BT: 
17). 
Now, Nietzsche claims that if we were to recognise Dionysian wisdom directly, it would be 
unbearable (see BT: 21). For, Dionysian wisdom is fundamentally an “insight into the horrible 
truth” about the ultimate nature of us as ‘individual’ beings, the clearest insight into the terrible 
nature of human existence that substantiates the validity of the wisdom of Silenus. Once we are 
released from ‘the Dionysian state’ – from the world-artist’s perspective – and everyday reality 
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re-enters our consciousness, the burden of the direct recognition of such insight will make us 
realise that we as ‘individual’ beings can “not change anything in the eternal nature of things” 
but only prepare ourselves for our unavoidable sorrowful end. And this realisation will prompt 
us to see in everyday reality “only the horror or absurdity of existence” and subsequently kill 
“any motive for action”. As the result, we will be necessarily driven into “an ascetic, 
will-negating mood”, in which we come to be “nauseated” by the whole notion of existing (see 
BT: 7). 
But Nietzsche argues that such situation is prevented from happening in tragedy, thanks to 
the mediation of “the Apollinian power”, which provides “the veiling during the performance of 
the tragedy of the real Dionysian effect” (BT: 21). To avoid our motive for action being 
completely killed by the direct recognition of Dionysian wisdom, we need “illusions of the 
beauty of mere appearance that at every moment make life worth living at all and prompt the 
desire to live on in order to experience the next moment” by being confronted by “a veil of 
beauty” (BT: 25). And that is what we get in tragedy, when the Apollinian power of 
‘transfiguration’ qua ‘image-making’ causes the image-less music to discharge itself in “an 
Apollinian world of images” (BT: 8), awakening in us the illusionary world of “the tragic myth” 
and “the tragic hero”, which protects us from “the immediate unity with Dionysian music” and 
thus from the direct recognition of Dionysian wisdom by interposing itself between us and 
Dionysian music (see BT: 21 & 24). 
Nietzsche claims that because of our identification with the chorus, what we truly gaze on in 
tragedy is ‘the tragic myth’ discharged out of music. Being an Apollinian world of images, the 
tragic myth is fundamentally “a dream apparition and to that extent epic in nature” (BT: 8). It is 
a “visible” world of exceptionally beautiful images with the Apollinian ‘clarity and firmness’, 
which, to some degree, shares with the world of the Olympians “the complete pleasure in mere 
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appearance and in seeing” (BT: 24): so, just like the Olympian gods, the tragic hero is a 
transfigured reflection of ourselves, of our human existence. Yet, he insists that it ultimately 
does not produce the Apollinian ‘redemption in illusion’ achieved through serene, pain-free 
contemplation (see BT: 8 & 22). 
For, firstly, since the tragic myth is awoken in us while we are surrendering our 
individuality, we “become completely absorbed in the activities and sufferings of the chief 
characters” and “feel breathless pity and fear” (BT: 12). That is, whereas we treat the Olympian 
gods with the sensation of their being ‘mere appearance’, the tragic heroes are “different 
projections” of ourselves, “the objectification” of us in ‘the Dionysian state’: so we feel and 
share with the tragic heroes their sufferings and painful emotions (see BT: 5 & 8). And secondly, 
the tragic myth is also in nature “a symbolic dream image” (BT: 5). Despite possessing the 
Apollinian beauty that strongly attracts our gaze, it also seems to “wish just as much to reveal 
something as to conceal something”. It makes us feel as if it is hiding deeper symbolic meanings 
behind it so that we want to pull it aside like a curtain to uncover them. Accordingly, although 
we take a pleasure from the contemplation of the beautiful tragic hero, we are ultimately urged 
to negate this pleasure and find “a still higher satisfaction” in “his annihilation” (see BT: 22 & 
24). 
Why do we find the higher satisfaction? This is because while we shudder at “the sufferings 
which will befall the hero”, what we obtain from his annihilation is a premonition of “a higher, 
much more overpowering joy” (BT: 22). Being discharged from music as ‘an immediate copy 
of the will itself’, the tragic myth and the tragic hero are “symbols of the most universal facts, of 
which only music can speak so directly” (BT: 21). It functions as “a vehicle of Dionysian 
wisdom” (BT: 10), in that the ‘intuitive’ and what is per se ‘fatal’ wisdom has been visualised 
and conceptualised by the Apollinian power into symbolic, beautiful and thus bearable images 
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(see BT: 5 & 16): “a symbolization of Dionysian wisdom through Apollinian artifices” (BT: 22), 
as Nietzsche puts it. So, in the tragic myth, the annihilation of the tragic hero is a symbolic, 
beautiful instance of the inevitability of the annihilation of individual beings, i.e. the 
unavoidable sorrowful end of human existence, by which we recognise Dionysian wisdom 
indirectly and thus safely to the utmost limit where we do not lose our motive for action. 
And as we are protected from the unbearable burden of Dionysian wisdom, what is then 
revealed to us metaphorically through the annihilation of the tragic hero is the existence of ‘a 
higher, much more overpowering joy’ which the primordial unity eternally takes from its 
exuberant fertility. 
 
We are pierced by the maddening sting of these pains just when we have become, as it were, one 
with the infinite primordial joy in existence, and when we anticipate, in Dionysian ecstasy, the 
indestructibility and eternity of this joy. In spite of fear and pity, we are the happy living beings, not 
as individuals, but as the one living being, with whose creative joy we are united (BT: 17). 
 
As we contemplate the annihilation of the tragic hero, we recognise conceptually that no matter 
how tragic his annihilation may be, he is a mere appearance for the primordial unity as the 
primal ‘life’ existing forever behind the principium individuationis, and that his annihilation 
does not stop it from eternally taking the ‘higher joy’ through the playful construction and 
demolition of appearances (see BT: 5 & 16). And at the very moment of this recognition, as we 
are surrendering our individuality, we too are able momentarily to experience this eternal 
‘higher joy’ existing behind individuality. Hence, in tragedy, despite being forced to recognise 
the terrible nature of human existence, we are left with “The metaphysical comfort . . . that life 
is at the bottom of things, despite all the changes of appearances, indestructibly powerful and 
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pleasurable”, which enables us to return to our everyday reality not with the nauseating despair 
but with an enhanced vitality (see BT: 7). 
And from all these, Nietzsche argues, what the Dionysian type of religion gives us is a new 
outlook on human existence and the world, that “it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that 
existence and the world are eternally justified” (BT: 5). Now, as many commentators 
acknowledge, this formulation of his is ambiguous and open to various interpretations. But, 
what he means by it seems to me to be as follows. We come to understand that we are, just like 
the tragic hero, mere appearances the world-artist as the universal will creates. Our existence, 
along with all those sufferings and contradictions found in the world, constitute “part of an 
artistic game that the will in the eternal amplitude of its pleasure plays with itself” (BT: 24), and 
thus that what we grasp as ‘our’ world does not intrinsically exist “for our betterment or 
education” (BT: 5). So, ultimately, “we have our highest dignity in our significance as works of 
art” (BT: 5): our existence and the world are only justified as ‘an artwork’ the world-artist 
creates, as an object of the ‘higher joy’ of the world-artist. And Nietzsche believes that such 
outlook is sufficient to make the whole notion of existing bearable and thus help us endure life 
more positively than ever before. 
So far, I have outlined the nature and effects of the Dionysian type of religion Nietzsche 
presents in BT. In his view, as opposed to the Apollinian type that justifies our existence by 
positioning us as “an artist” who creates a word of pleasurable appearance, the Dionysian type 
justifies our existence by positioning us as “a work of art” created by the world-artist (see BT: 
1). In contrast to the Apollinian type whose redemption is founded on the individuation, the 
Dionysian type regards the individuation as “the primal cause of evil” and transforms the 
overcoming of the individuation into the source of supreme joy (see BT: 10). Compared with 
the Apollinian type that transfigures our human life in the world of appearance, what the 
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Dionysian type transfigures is ‘Dionysian wisdom’, and consequently ‘the eternal life’ beyond 
the world of appearance (see BT: 24 & 25). Hence, whereas the Apollinian type convinces us to 
seek “the eternal joy of existence” in the enduring aesthetic appearance of the illuminated 
‘human life’, the Dionysian type redeems people by seducing them to seek this delight “not in 
phenomena, but behind them” (BT: 17). 
Now, while Nietzsche’s account of the Dionysian type of religion is more extensive and 
detailed than that of the Apollinian type, it nevertheless contains many obscurities. But the most 
problematic aspect of his account of the Dionysian type, which is most relevant to this thesis, 
seems to me to lie with his talk of the primordial unity, and his related idea of ‘an aesthetic 
justification of human existence and the world’. 
In my view, the most natural approach to Nietzsche’s talk of the primordial unity and his 
related idea of an aesthetic justification is to interpret them literally, that is, to interpret them as 
something purely ‘metaphysical’. So, according to this interpretation, Nietzsche really believes 
that there exists a conscious metaphysical entity as the ‘world-artist’, and that the Dionysian 
type of religion lets us identify with this world-artist momentarily. So, Nietzsche’s idea of an 
aesthetic justification claims that our existence and the world are eternally justified only as a 
beautiful artwork this world-artist contemplates delightfully for itself. That is, through the 
momentary identification with the world-artist, we recognise intuitively that we must exist and 
suffer purely for the sake of the ‘higher joy’ of the world-artist which perpetually plays with our 
existence recklessly with no care for our concerns, and that there is nothing we can do about it. 
But, at the same time, we ourselves experience and realise how happy this world-artist is. 
Consequently, the Dionysian type convinces us that we must take delight in being an artwork 
created by the world-artist, ought to be proud of being an object of the world-artist’s ‘higher 
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joy’: it seduces us to think of our existence filled with pain and death as something beautiful, 
wonderful and thus bearable. 
So, on this line of interpretation, Nietzsche recognises two redemptive effects in the 
‘identification’ with the world-artist. And he seemingly thinks that they are superior to those of 
the Apollinian ‘transfiguration’. Firstly, as opposed to the Apollinian ‘transfiguration’ that is 
fundamentally all about deception – ‘lies’ – which ‘veils’ the terrible nature of human existence 
from our sight, Dionysian identification allows us to recognise the truth about the terrible nature 
of human existence while making it possible for us to bear it. And secondly, compared with the 
Apollinian ‘transfiguration’ in which ‘death’ is continued to be portrayed negatively owing to 
its failure to provide any real meaning or consolation for it, the Dionysian ‘identification’ 
enables us to respond to it more positively by causing us to regard it as a necessary source of the 
world-artist’s ‘higher joy’. 
Now, in BT Nietzsche values the Dionysian type of religion over the Apollinian type: he 
practically presents the Dionysian type as the ideal ‘life-affirming’ type of religion. And it is 
understandable why. For, when he was writing BT, he was very much a Wagnerian, trying to 
promote the significance of his master’s music-drama as “the rebirth of tragedy” (BT: 20). 
Moreover, though in his mature works he increasingly came to take sometimes equivocal but 
usually sceptical views of ‘the truth’, in BT he clearly valued the discovery of the intuitive 
‘truth’ itself highly. Furthermore, as I argued, his aim in BT is to identify the best possible way 
positively to interpret and justify all those terrible aspects of human existence characterised by 
‘pain’ and ‘death’. 
However, I think that Nietzsche’s arguments for the Dionysian type of religion, especially 
his valuation of its being the ideal type of religion, are problematic. For, firstly, his notion of the 
world-artist which consciously plays with our existence in the manner of a cheerful innocent 
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child is so metaphysically extravagant, that it just seems implausible and unacceptable. Being a 
devotee of Schopenhauer at the time, he undoubtedly developed his artists’ metaphysics on the 
basis of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics. He clearly intended the world-artist to be what 
corresponds to Schopenhauer’s ‘Will’. Yet, the fact is that, while he relies heavily upon 
Schopenhauer throughout BT, this notion of the childlike world-artist hardly makes any sense 
even in the context of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics: for Schopenhauer never regards ‘the Will’ 
as a ‘conscious’ entity. And the situation is not helped by the fact that he provides no argument 
as to how and why what is essentially ‘the Will’ could or should be conscious. 
Now, we could avoid facing this problem, if we instead interpret Nietzsche’s talk of the 
world-artist as something ‘metaphorical’, and regard ‘the Dionysian state’ to be more like a 
‘psychological’ state rather than a purely ‘metaphysical’ state. So, on this interpretation, there 
exists no world-artist, and the Dionysian redemption does not let us identity with such a 
metaphysical entity. Instead, the most significant feature of the Dionysian redemption is ‘a 
mystic feeling of oneness’ we experience through the dis-individuation. As we saw, it is an 
overwhelming sense of unity in which each of us feels himself as ‘one’ with the others. By 
breaking “all the rigid, hostile barriers that necessity, caprice, or “impudent convention” have 
fixed between man and man” (BT: 1), it transforms every one of us from “the willing individual 
that furthers his own egoistic ends” into “the subject” which is “released from his individual 
will” (BT 5). Consequently, what it creates is a scene of “universal harmony”, whereby we as 
completely un-egoist beings universally identify with others’ subjectivities and profoundly feel 
their joys and sufferings (see BT: 1). Hence, on this line of thought, what the Dionysian 
redemption generates in us seems to be a form of ‘altruism’, an ‘altruistic empathy’ with others’ 
suffering, invoked by our completely un-egoistic state. 
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This, I think, is not an implausible interpretation. For, as I suggested, BT is in some respect 
a fictional narrative through which Nietzsche presents his insights into certain psychological 
phenomena. Moreover, as I also suggested, in BT he creates ‘archetypes’ as an ‘instructive’ 
means to illustrate and express his ideas. And as he confirms in the second preface of BT, his 
claim of the aesthetic justification is meant to express his hostile attitude towards ‘moral’ 
interpretations of the world, in particular, to establish an opposition between his ‘aesthetic’ 
justification and the Christian ‘moral’ interpretation (see BT: ASC, 5) And though he in his 
mature years came to abandon his youthful ‘artists’ metaphysics’, he still continued to maintain 
his hostile attitude against ‘moral’ interpretations of the world throughout his life. And in the 
second preface of BT, as well as reaffirming that the world-artist is “an entirely reckless and 
amoral artist-god”, he also remarks, “you can call this whole artists’ metaphysics arbitrary, idle, 
fantastic; what matters is that it betrays a spirit who will one day fight at any risk whatever the 
moral interpretation and significance of existence” (BT: ASC, 5). In the light of these, we could 
reasonably suggest that the world-artist is essentially an ‘archetype’ Nietzsche creates to 
complement his hostile attitude towards the Christian ‘moral’ interpretation, and that what is 
important for him is not the existence of such a metaphysical entity, but the nature expressed in 
it, which opposes itself to that of the Christian ‘moral’ God. 
Furthermore, it is also true that one can actually find one’s own existence to be justified 
‘aesthetically’, i.e. by seeing one’s own life as ‘an artwork’ or ‘a part of an artwork’ and finding 
it to be bearable, even without relying upon the existence of the world-artist. For instance, it is 
possible for one to feel one’s own life to be a remarkably adventurous tale, not ‘despite’ but 
‘because’ of all those pain and suffering it contains: they are not the ‘objection’ but the very 
‘testimony’ to the remarkableness of one’s own life. And while such outlook is irreducibly 
‘first-personal’, meaning that not everybody is suited to such kind of outlook and nobody can 
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expect us to adopt, or demand that we adopt, such kind of outlook, it seems to be in itself a 
life-affirming outlook capable of helping some of us to find our own existence to be justified to 
us without resorting to any transcendent conception or purpose.
3
 
However, the fatal flaw in this ‘metaphorical’ and ‘psychological’ interpretation is that it is 
difficult to see how this ‘altruistic empathy’ with others can help us overcome our pessimistic 
worldview: in fact, it would seem to make our suffering only worse. For, however much I come 
to care for others’ well-being as I care for my own, it will not in any way change the 
fundamental nature of human existence that is largely characterised by suffering. As Young 
remarks in his Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art, “if human life is in general a confrontation with 
horror and absurdity, then it remains so notwithstanding my solidarity with the numerous other 
individuals who find themselves in the same predicament”.4 Moreover, by identifying with 
others’ subjectivities, and by feeling their suffering as if it is my own, my understanding of the 
terribleness of human existence will be only likely to deepen. And this will only further 
substantiate the validity of the wisdom of Silenus and make human existence appear more 
unbearable than ever before. Rather than helping anyone to cope with the reality of his own or 
others’ suffering, the Dionysian redemption, according to this interpretation, actually causes 
him to suffer more from this. 
So, we are back with the purely ‘metaphysical’ interpretation. However, another problem 
with this ‘metaphysical’ interpretation is that even if we accept Nietzsche’s metaphysical notion 
of the ‘world-artist’, it is still hard to see how adopting it could actually make our existence 
bearable. On this interpretation, Nietzsche gives us the impression that knowing the truth about 
the terrible nature of human existence even partially is more redemptive than not knowing at all. 
                                                 
3 I owe this insight to Christopher Hamilton’s unpublished working paper “The world as an aesthetic phenomenon: 
some Nietzschean reflections”, which he has kindly allowed me to read. 
4 Young (1993): p. 53 
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That is, as the terrible nature of human existence is made partially intelligible to us, we come to 
know why we are suffering, and this intelligibility makes our existence more bearable. So, 
presumably under this impression, Keith M. May suggests that what Nietzsche meant by his 
idea of an aesthetic justification is that “existence is partially rescued from its cruelty and 
wantonness by our imaginative grasp of it. If we call existence ‘cruel’ we thereby help to make 
its pain endurable, for we have defined and qualified them”.5 In other words, May is suggesting 
that if we say ‘life is terrible’, life essentially becomes ‘controllable’ to us in a sense. However, 
I think May’s suggestion cannot be entirely correct. For, while it is certainly true that we often 
find the vagueness surrounding the ‘unintelligible’, i.e. the struggle to articulate an exact reason 
why something is bothering us or what exactly it is that is bothering us, difficult to deal with, 
and that making it ‘intelligible’ may indeed be better in certain contexts, there are also surely 
many situations in our life where just leaving something as ‘unintelligible’ can actually turn out 
to be making it easier to deal with. As Hamilton puts it, “there is . . . something misleading 
about what May says. This is because it overlooks the fact that applying a moral predicate or set 
of moral predicates to something can make it (seem?) worse than it would be were it merely 
unintelligible. Perplexed by someone’s treatment of me I gradually come to see it as barbaric or 
brutal, and this makes it harder to cope with than had I merely seen it as unintelligible”.6 
Now, as I mentioned, Nietzsche confirms in his second preface of BT that his claim of the 
aesthetic justification is meant to express his hostile attitude towards ‘moral’ interpretations of 
the world, in particular, to establish an opposition between his ‘aesthetic’ justification and the 
Christian ‘moral’ interpretation (see BT: ASC, 5). But, it must be noted that in BT he regards 
every outlook that prescribes meaning to human existence as an aesthetic outlook: an 
                                                 
5 May K. M (1990): p. 12 
6 I am again grateful to Christopher Hamilton for allowing me to read his earlier-mentioned unpublished working 
paper, from which the quote comes. 
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aesthetically constructed ‘illusion’ to conceal the terrible nature of the world, a ‘stimulant’ that 
drives a man to continue existing despite the terrible nature of human existence (see BT: 15 & 
18). Moreover, at this early stage of his life, he does not reveal exactly what he means by 
‘morality’ or which aspects of ‘morality’ he is hostile to. Nevertheless, as I mentioned in 
Chapter 1-C, Nietzsche was always acutely aware of the enormous amount of human suffering 
that makes up human history, and he always held a hostile attitude to ‘moral’ interpretations of 
the existence of those human sufferings, as he continuously believed that ‘life’ was something 
that can never be justified satisfactorily in traditional ‘moral’ terms. And in BT, he clearly 
considered his ‘aesthetic’ justification to be the best possible way to give a meaning and 
significance to human existence and the world, positively to interpret and justify the existence 
of all human suffering in the healthiest and most life-affirming way. 
And on the line of interpretation we are following, Nietzsche’s aesthetic justification is 
basically claiming that the world is like a massive arena where humans fight each other, a sort 
of dreadful magnificent spectacle or “a perpetual entertainment” which the childlike world-artist 
constantly organises and watches from a ringside seat as “the sole author and spectator” (BT: 5). 
And for a brief moment, the Dionysian type of religion enables us to be this sole spectator 
himself. And as we delightfully watch from the ringside seat how humans continuously fight, 
agonise and die beautifully one after another, we the sole spectator think to ourselves that ‘all 
this pain and all those deaths humans suffer are clearly necessary for pleasing me constantly. 
These things are indeed justified as an indispensable part of my entertainment’. 
So, the crucial fact is that in the Dionysian redemption, human existence is justified not to 
us humans, but only to the world-artist with whom we can sometimes identify momentarily. As 
Young claims, “There is no suggestion here at all that humans find or can find their life to be 
pleasurable or justified. To suggest otherwise would be to suggest that because a concentration 
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camp “justifies” itself to its sadistic (or perhaps merely playfully mad) commandant as a 
pleasurable “entertainment” (BT 6), so too must the inmates find it justified”.7  But, on 
Nietzsche’s view, what is important is for us momentarily to see our human suffering not from 
‘within’ but from ‘the outside’, as if ‘pain’ and ‘death’ were not our own, something that did not 
belong to us intrinsically. And he seemingly believes that such experience is sufficient 
ultimately to lead us to regard all pain and death we suffer in ordinary reality to be bearable, as 
we come to think that they are justified at least to the world-artist. 
However, here, the problem is that it is doubtful whether such an experience of tragedy can 
actually be transported into ordinary reality in the way Nietzsche seemingly suggests. For, as 
Gardner suggests, 
 
There is . . . no ground for thinking that reasons for action can be extracted from the experience of 
tragedy. The perspective of tragedy is of course necessarily connected with the practical perspective 
– tragedy is the contemplation of a doing, the object of practical consciousness – but it does not 
apprehend its object in a practical mode. Like aesthetic consciousness in general, tragedy provides a 
point of view apart from theoretical and practical consciousness: we arrive at the perspective of 
tragedy by, as it were, adopting the practical perspective and then exporting its object, namely, life 
presented as a domain for practical reason, to a contemplative context. So though tragedy may allow 
us, as spectators, to ‘see’ beyond morality, it does not take us, as agents, beyond morality. This is 
part of the reason why we need to repeat the experience: the perspective opened up by tragedy is one 
that we, as beings with lives to lead, cannot occupy; tragic knowledge of what is valuable about life 
cannot be preserved intact within life itself.
8 
                                                 
7 Young (1993): p. 52 
8 Gardner (2006): p. 240 
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To put it simply, the new ‘non-moral aesthetic’ outlook on life which tragedy as the Dionysian 
type of religion provides certainly makes sense inside a theatre. But this does not mean that it 
also makes sense in our ordinarily reality, and that we can actually apply it to our everyday 
world outside the theatre and act upon it. For, for instance, whereas ‘morality’ may not matter in 
tragedy, it clearly does matter in our ordinary reality: in the world outside the theatre, we simply 
cannot completely suspend and let go of ‘morality’ in the way we can inside the theatre while 
watching tragedy. Indeed, this whole experience of tragedy, including the new ‘non-moral 
aesthetic’ outlook on life obtained through the Dionysian ‘metaphysical comfort’, is what can 
only be produced under extraordinary conditions. So, it is very likely that in order to sustain this 
new outlook in the ordinary world, we must forever be seeking out the tragic theatre, which is 
an action that can hardly be described as ‘life-affirming’: just as in the case of the Apollinian 
redemption, this makes the Dionysian redemption less effective than Christian redemption. 
Further, another problem is that even if the experience of tragedy can actually be transported 
into our ordinary reality and the new ‘non-moral aesthetic’ outlook on life can actually make 
sense outside the theatre, even if we can actually apply such outlook to our everyday world, 
sustain it and act upon it, the Dionysian redemption founded on such outlook just does not at all 
seem to be a proper and acceptable redemption. As I suggested before, BT can be – in a sense – 
read as a ‘self-therapeutic’ book written especially for Nietzsche himself, his first personal 
attempt to cope with his acute consciousness of human suffering. And clearly, he personally 
considers ‘non-moral aesthetics’ to be the ‘only’ adequate solution to those terrible aspects of 
human existence and the world: by claiming “it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that 
existence and the world are eternally justified” (BT: 5), he is refusing to engage himself and find 
a justification in ‘morality’. And presumably he is also urging that we will also adopt his idea of 
the aesthetic justification and make a move from ‘morality’ to ‘aesthetic’ with him. However, 
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the fact is that, even supposing that making such a move is actually possible as Nietzsche 
seemingly thinks, many of us are reluctant to make this move, to take up his aesthetic 
justification, because, not only does he – at least at this early stage of his life – provide no real 
argument as to why we should do so, but also there just seem to be good reasons for us not to do 
so. 
To begin with, many of us feel that the way Nietzsche’s aesthetic justification approaches 
human suffering, the way it portrays human suffering as ‘entertaining’ and ‘pleasurable’, is so 
unspeakably cruel that it is hard to see how it can ever be a proper justification. Certainly, one is 
free to see one’s own suffering as ‘entertaining to someone’. It may be a sort of outlook that 
some people in extreme situations can and must adopt. For instance, it is probable that some of 
gladiators of ancient Rome had to think to themselves, in order to bear their uniquely suffering 
existence, that ‘my suffering is a part of spectacle. I fight, bleed and get killed to entertain the 
Roman emperor’. And while such a kind of outlook on one’s suffering is irreducibly 
‘first-personal’, this way of taking someone else’s perspective to see one’s own suffering seems 
to be in itself admirable in some sense and might even make the individual stronger. However, 
Nietzsche’s aesthetic justification is clearly not the same kind of outlook those gladiators 
probably had, for what he is proposing here is an outlook that applies not exclusively to one’s 
own suffering but to human suffering in general. 
It is true that a child often finds burning ants under a magnifying glass ‘entertaining’ and 
‘pleasurable’, because, among many possible reasons, it is just ‘a game’ to him: the suffering of 
ants is nothing to him, because he is ‘the sole author and spectator’ of this game. However, no 
matter how happy he is, it is clearly nothing short of cruel. And, in the context of Nietzsche’s 
aesthetic justification, it is we humans who are the ants. Certainly, one may be all right as long 
as one takes the viewpoint of the Roman emperor, watching a spectacle joyfully from a ringside 
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seat. But what about the feeling and suffering of those who have to suffer at the centre stage, as 
a part of the spectacle? For one thing, surely we cannot and should never see others’ suffering as 
‘entertaining’ or ‘pleasurable’ under any circumstance: such an approach to human suffering in 
general wrongly neglects the basic fact that there are indeed many people suffering right now. 
And for another, surely any proper ‘redemption’ should always, and before everything, make 
human suffering justified to those who themselves are suffering, not to the one who causes it. 
In Chapter 1-C, I mentioned how his writings sometimes display a certain naivety in the 
context of ‘human suffering’ in general. I suggested that the problem with Nietzsche is that, he 
sometimes slips into seeing things such as ‘slavery’ and ‘war’ only from the perspective of ‘the 
masters’, of the conqueror, and not from the perspective of the oppressed, of the victims, and 
thus that what he sees is only their thrilling or heroic aspects, not their awful sides. And, here, 
such occasional proclivity to naivety is apparent. For the outlook on human suffering 
Nietzsche’s aesthetic justification provides is, to the end, a view taken from ‘a ringside seat’. It 
seems as if he mistakenly thinks that he himself will always be a spectator sitting on a ringside 
seat, delightfully watching a spectacle, when the fact is that he can never become the spectator 
without first being the one who has to suffer at the centre stage, as a part of the spectacle.
9
 
Because of this, not only does he wrongly fail to detect cruelty in his aesthetic justification, but 
also in his aesthetic justification he seemingly sees human suffering as something much grander 
than it actually is. So, while he may indeed be aware of the enormity of human suffering in 
general, he is actually refusing to take it seriously, refusing to take into consideration seriously 
‘the real weight of human suffering’. While his aesthetic justification claims to be dealing with 
human suffering, it is not really dealing with human suffering, since it does not grasp the reality 
                                                 
9 See Tanner (2000): p. 35 
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of that with which it claims to be dealing: the solution to human suffering it claims to provide is 
not real but spurious, or rather it actually provides no solution. 
Further, the crucial fact is that when Nietzsche was writing BT, he was in no sense seriously 
suffering: he was actually living one of the happiest periods of his life. It may be no coincidence 
that the impression we get is that his aesthetic justification fails to show adequate respect for 
those who are actually suffering right now, that it betrays a sense of someone who has not 
grasped what it is like really to suffer. Only later in his mature years, when he himself started 
experiencing through his illness what it is really like to suffer, did he discover and recognise in 
a devastating manner how most actual human sufferings are not at all as ‘grand’ or ‘sublime’ or 
‘magnificent’ or ‘beautiful’ as he imagined in BT, but rather simply ‘horrible’, ‘nasty’, ‘painful’, 
‘miserable’ and ‘ugly’.10 
And finally, the fact is that, whatever Nietzsche says, it seems impossible to relinquish a 
sense of the importance of morality as something worth holding to over ‘aesthetics’. Some of us 
may agree with Nietzsche that ‘moral’ interpretations of the world are in some way inadequate 
and life-denying. And perhaps it is actually true, as Nietzsche postulates, that our essence 
consists of natural instincts of cruelty and aggression, and thus that, by nature, we are cruel 
creatures who take pleasure in others’ suffering as cheerfully and innocently. But then, when we 
are faced with appalling human sufferings caused by heinous atrocities, the last thing we want 
to do is to find them justified ‘aesthetically’ as something ‘entertaining’ or ‘pleasurable’, by 
giving them some ‘non-moral’ meanings. Indeed, whatever we think of old-style war, what the 
twentieth century has surely taught us is that we could never give any ‘aesthetic’ meaning to the 
horror of Auschwitz or Hiroshima. So, instead, while we may try to reconcile ourselves to these 
sufferings and atrocities in some way, what we also really want to do is explicitly to condemn, 
                                                 
10 See Tanner (2000): pp. 77-78 
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and continue condemning, these atrocities as ‘evils’, in order to make sure that similar kinds of 




So, in conclusion, I have argued in this chapter that Nietzsche’s historical narratives and 
genealogical accounts are essentially ‘fictional’ narratives, through which Nietzsche aims to 
present not just his insights into certain ‘universal’ and ‘timeless’ psychological phenomena, but 
also his ideas on how we could justify and affirm our existence in the face of suffering. And in 
BT, through his essentially ‘imaginary’ history of ancient Greece, what Nietzsche presents are 
his ideas of two types of life-affirming religion, which can possibly make our life bearable and 
help us overcome our pessimistic outlook on life. 
However, I have also argued that Nietzsche’s ideas of the Apollinian type of religion and the 
Dionysian type of religion are problematic. The chief problem with the Apollinian type is that 
not only does it fail to provide any real meaning to one’s ‘death’, but also its ‘transfiguration’ 
cannot actually transform one’s existence into something truly ‘desirable in itself’. On the other 
hand, the chief problem with the Dionysian type is that though the Dionysian redemption does 
provide a meaning to one’s death, the way it justifies human suffering in general ‘aesthetically’ 
as something ‘entertaining’ and ‘pleasurable’ is so unspeakably cruel, that it cannot be deemed 
to be a proper and acceptable redemption. 
Now, it is not clear that to what extent Nietzsche later in his life actually came to recognise 
those problems. In any case, the fact is that much of his early religious thinking does not feature 
in his mature works. This is, of course, largely because of his abandonment of religious 
                                                 
11 See Comte-Sponville (1997): pp. 26-28; also pp. 21-45 
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communitarianism and his subsequent acceptance of the nurturing of ‘higher types’ as his 
highest value. But, as I will explore in the next chapter, there are also a few other key significant 
changes in his philosophy as a whole, which also caused his positive religious thinking to 
change its shape and nature in his mature works. However, this does not mean that his early 
religious thinking has no relevance at all to his mature positive religious thinking. For, as we 
will see, throughout his mature works he clearly continues to maintain and develop some of the 







In the next two chapters, I examine the conception that constitutes the very backbone of the 
mature Nietzsche’s thinking as a whole, namely ‘higher types’. And in the process, I also 
examine other key conceptions that have strong relevance to the nature of ‘higher types’, 
namely ‘nobility’ and ‘life-affirmation’. These examinations are important for this thesis, since 
my argument is that Nietzsche’s highest goal was ultimately the nurturing of ‘higher types’, and 
that what he truly regarded as the key to achieving this highest goal of his was what I call ‘the 
life-affirming type of gods’, a certain conception of gods symbolised by the Olympian gods of 
ancient Greece. So, in order to understand how exactly, and in what ways, Nietzsche considers 
the life-affirming gods to contribute towards the nurturing of higher types, we first need to 
establish what and who exactly is ‘a higher type’, what exactly makes an individual such a type. 
In this chapter, I provide a general discussion on how we should approach and interpret 
‘higher types’ as a conception. In Section A, as I outline how Nietzsche’s thinking as a whole 
changed from the early period, I suggest that his conception of ‘higher types’ is essentially an 
ultimate representation of his idea of ‘human greatness’ capable of creating cultural greatness 
and new ‘life-affirming’ values, all of which is strongly connected with his life-long concern for 
‘suffering’. Then, through Section B and Section C, as I discuss the approach Brian Leiter in his 
Nietzsche on Morality takes towards ‘higher types’ as a typical example of what I consider to be 
a problematic and often mistaken type of approach towards ‘higher types’, I argue that though 
Nietzsche in his works often talks about Goethe, Beethoven and Napoleon in connection with 
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his conception of ‘higher types’, these historical figures are not ‘examples’ of higher types, and 

























Section A: How we should interpret ‘higher types’ as a conception 
 
As we have seen, Nietzsche’s thinking in the early ‘romantic’ period was largely 
characterised by the influence of both Schopenhauer and Wagner. Being a devotee of 
Schopenhauer, he accepted the plausibility of Schopenhauer’s pessimism that regards life as 
fundamentally meaningless and not worth living. At the same time, he was appalled by the 
critical cultural state of contemporary Germany. Accordingly, while accepting the truth of 
Schopenhauer’s pessimism, his highest concern and goal was to go beyond his adherence to 
Schopenhauer’s pessimism, as well as to be in the vanguard of a German cultural revival 
through the establishment of a German cultural unity. And, being a Wagnerian, he believed that 
the best possible way to achieve this lay with Wagner’s music-drama, which he considered to be 
a modern embodiment of pre-Socratic Greek tragedy as a ‘communal’ religion. 
Now, the crucial event that led Nietzsche to the middle ‘positivist’ period was his attendance 
at the Bayreuth festival in 1876. Despite his high expectation for the festival being the key to 
the flourishing of the German community, he was made to realise there that Wagner’s 
music-drama was nothing like a new ‘communal’ religion, which could establish the cultural 
unity of Germany by uniting Germans under common values of a life-affirming nature. As he 
was surrounded by the audience largely composed of “cultural philistines” (UM: I, 2), whom he 
despised as the embodiment of everything wrong about contemporary German culture, he felt 
painfully how his “hope for a renovation and purification of the German spirit” (BT: 20) 
through Wagner’s music-drama was actually a “hasty” hope (see BT: ASC, 6). And it was this 
disappointment that led him to separate himself increasingly from the romanticism embodied by 
Wagner as well as from Schopenhauer’s philosophy, by causing him to see both of them as ‘sick’ 
and ‘decadent’ (see HAH: II, Preface, 2 & GS: 370). 
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This separation caused two significant changes in the shape and nature of Nietzsche’s 
thinking. Firstly, as I argued in Chapter 1-A, he eventually abandoned religious 
communitarianism, giving up the idea of the regeneration of Germany through the creation of a 
new ‘communal’ religious festival. Instead, from the middle period onwards, what came to 
constitute the very backbone of his philosophy most decisively was the ‘aristocratic 
individualistic’ thinking, in which the flourishing of community presupposes the flourishing of 
few exceptional individuals whose existence itself forms and shapes the cultural greatness of 
community. More precisely, my view is that he always possessed both communitarianism and 
individualistic thinking. And while he gave priority to the former in the early period, he began 
attaching far greater significance to the latter from the middle period onwards. So, in the end, 
while he continued to possess a concern for the flourishing of the community generally, his 
highest value became the nurturing of those few exceptional individuals, whom he calls ‘higher 
types’. 
And secondly, from the middle period onwards, Nietzsche began displaying a persistent 
desire to conquer his former self as a disciple of both Wagner’s romanticism and 
Schopenhauer’s pessimism (see EH: HAH, 1-4): such desire for self-renewal seems to be 
reflected particularly in a liking for the image of ‘snake’ shedding its own skin, which his works 
of the middle period display (see HAH: II, Preface, 2, D: 455 & 573 & GS: Prelude, 8). And as 
a part of his attempt to become his own master, or to become what he often terms ‘a free spirit’, 
i.e. “a spirit that has become free, that has again taken possession of itself” (EH: HAH, 1), he 
started developing his ‘life-affirming’ philosophy, which is intended to be the antipode of what 
he now perceived to be the ‘life-denying’ philosophy of Schopenhauer. 
That is to say, like Schopenhauer, Nietzsche’s attitude towards life in the early period was 
fundamentally ‘resignation’. Though his aim was to go beyond his adherence to Schopenhauer’s 
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pessimism, because he accepted the truth of that pessimism his early thinking was nevertheless 
what was developed from and founded on the denial of life. Accordingly, his idea of 
‘life-affirmation’, as he presented it in his early religious thinking, was rather limited, in the 
sense that it was only concerned with how to make life ‘bearable’. At the same time, what it 
proposed was an ‘indirect’ form of life-affirmation that relied on the mediation of a 
metaphysical third-party such as ‘the Olympian gods’ and ‘the world-artist’. However, from the 
middle period onwards, as he rejected what he now perceived to be the ‘life-denying’ pessimism 
of Schopenhauer, his idea of ‘life-affirmation’ became increasingly concerned with how not 
only to ‘bear’ but also willingly ‘embrace’ life as a whole, including its terrible aspects 
characterised by unavoidable pain and suffering. At the same time, as he now also rejected 
metaphysics, including that of Schopenhauer which underlay his early religious thinking, his 
idea of ‘life-affirmation’ also came to take more a ‘direct’ form that no longer relied on any 
metaphysical mediation. 
In this sense, it seems to me that, despite all the changes in the shape and nature of his 
thinking over the different periods, Nietzsche always maintained essentially the same chief 
concern. That is, on the one hand, from the middle period onwards, as he stopped being 
someone’s disciple, he instead began to act as ‘an educator’ of humanity, or at least of potential 
‘higher types’, openly and consciously in his works.1 Yet, on the other hand, he always 
remained in essence ‘a learner’, who continuously sought to identify the best possible way to 
justify and affirm our life in the face of suffering, sought to find out how we could give some 
positive value to suffering.  
Hence, I agree with Tanner when he suggests, “Nietzsche’s fundamental concern throughout 
his life was to plot the relationship between suffering and culture, or cultures. He categorizes 
                                                 
1 For an excellent discussion on Nietzsche as ‘an educator’, see Bertram (2009): passim, especially Chapter 18. 
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and grades cultures by the way in which they have coped with the omnipresence of suffering, 
and assesses moralities by the same criterion. . . . it was of primary ‘existential’ concern to him, 
because his life was suffering”.2 Indeed, one of the key factors that characterise the mature 
Nietzsche’s life is his continuous struggle against his persistent illness. Soon after his 
attendance of the Bayreuth festival, his health began deteriorating drastically. He started 
suffering from severe migraines, which forced him to adopt for the rest of his life a solitary 
nomadic life-style, travelling around Europe to search for a place that could best help him 
recover his health. And though it appears that he has always managed to maintain a remarkably 
stoical attitude towards his own suffering, such a personal situation is clearly reflected in his 
writings of his mature years, as they increasingly display an ardent yearning for ‘health’, both 
physical and psychological, as well as an obsession with ‘suffering’, which seems to be, 
ironically, in itself profoundly unhealthy in nature (see Chapter 1-C). 
And in my view, the mature Nietzsche’s ever-growing interest in the nurturing of potential 
‘higher types’, which ultimately became his highest concern and value, is an extension of such a 
concern, yearning and obsession. That is, I think Tanner correctly articulates something that 
Nietzsche believes: 
 
Correlative with this preoccupation with how one regards suffering is Nietzsche’s interest in 
greatness rather than goodness. For there is no greatness without a readiness and capacity to 
withstand, absorb, and use to best purpose an immense quantity of pain. Greatness, one might say to 
anticipate, involves putting pain to work; goodness involves attempting to eliminate it. All 
Nietzsche’s later works will be devoted to exploring this profound difference.3 
                                                 
2 Tanner (2000): p. 30 
3 Tanner (2000): p. 30 
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In other words, Nietzsche does think that there is a fundamental difference between greatness 
and goodness. However, it seems to me questionable whether Nietzsche is right to hold such 
understanding of the difference between ‘greatness’ and ‘goodness’. For, though his notion of 
‘greatness’ as the attitude and capability to use suffering for positive purposes seems to be in 
itself plausible, I think that there are clearly cases where ‘goodness’ too actually involves 
‘putting pain to work’ instead of just trying to eliminate it completely, where ‘goodness’ and 
‘greatness’ actually go together in acceptance of suffering. But, at any rate, as I suggested in 
Chapter 2-A, even after his separation from Schopenhauer’s pessimism, Nietzsche nonetheless 
continues to believe that life will forever possess in its nature the terrible aspects characterised 
by unavoidable pain and suffering, and that there is nothing one can do to stop or eliminate the 
suffering caused by such nature, i.e. ‘extensional suffering’. Accordingly, what he continues to 
be truly concerned with is the way people interpret the existence of suffering, how one can best 
deal with the cause of ‘intensional suffering’. And, from the middle period onwards, he 
increasing believes that, in order positively to interpret, justify and accept the existence of 
suffering in the healthiest and most life-affirming way, one must become, or at least regard 
oneself as, ‘great’, rather than ‘good’ in the traditional Christian ‘moral’ sense. For, even after 
abandoning his youthful idea of ‘an aesthetic justification of human existence and the world’, he 
still always maintains the hostile attitude against ‘moral’ interpretations of the world, as he 
continues to believe that ‘life’ is something that can never be justified satisfactorily in 
traditional ‘moral’ terms. In fact, this position of his becomes stiffened further in his late period, 
as he increasingly considers the Christian ‘moral’ justification of human existence, including the 
transcendent purpose of life founded on the idea of the perfect afterlife it provides, as well as all 
those Christian moralised conceptions of ‘guilt’, ‘bad conscience’ and ‘sin’ it imposes on people, 
to be life-denying, unhealthy and actually the major cause of ‘intensional suffering’. 
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And overall, in my view, it is in this context that Nietzsche in his mature works increasingly 
becomes less concerned with the existence of the ordinary masses but more keenly interested in 
the existence of a few selected peculiar and exceptional individuals, as he starts engaging 
himself in his life-long endeavour “to know of a new greatness of man, of a new untrodden way 
to his enhancement” (BGE: 212). That is, one of the things we commonly find in his mature 
texts is an intense fascination and admiration for a few selected peculiar and exceptional 
historical figures, whose extraordinary creativity have brought something new, beautiful and 
life-affirming to the world. And such fascination and admiration is a part of a larger enterprise 
that comes to dominate his later thinking as a whole. It is a part of his continuous endeavour to 
find out what exactly constitutes ‘greatness’ in us moderns, who are, in his view, becoming 
increasingly decadent and facing the imminent arrival of life-denying ‘nihilism’, a state where 
we only value shallow and banal things. 
And my suggestion is that Nietzsche’s conception of ‘higher types’ – whose nurturing is 
now his highest goal – should be interpreted as an outcome of such endeavour. It is essentially 
an ultimate representation of his idea of ‘human greatness’ capable of creating cultural greatness 
and new ‘life-affirming’ values in the face of the imminent arrival of life-denying ‘nihilism’, 
through which he also expresses his idea of ‘life-affirmation’, what he identifies as the best 
possible way positively to interpret, justify and accept the existence of suffering, in order to 
make ‘life’ as a whole truly embraceable.
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Section B: Nietzsche’s admiration for exceptional historical figures 
 
What, then, constitutes ‘greatness’ in us moderns? Being the highest object of his concern, it 
is something that Nietzsche discusses extensively. However, his discussions are often patchy 
and obscure, and he never gives us a single coherent account. Hence, naturally, there have been 
commentators who attempt to clarify and set out from all these discussions exactly which 
specific characteristics make an individual ‘great’ and ‘a higher type’. 
One of the commentators who take such an approach is Brian Leiter. According to Leiter, 
though Nietzsche often expresses admiration for people such as Napoleon and Caesar, it is 
“creative geniuses” like “Goethe, Beethoven, and (perhaps most importantly) Nietzsche himself” 
whom Nietzsche regards unequivocally as “paradigms” of higher types. And along with “great 
creativity”, Nietzsche’s works also “depict five distinctive, and closely related, characteristics of 
the higher type of human being”, namely, “solitary and deals with others only instrumentally”, 
“seeks burdens and responsibilities, as he is driven towards the completion of a unifying 
project”, “essentially healthy and resilient”, “affirms life, meaning that he is prepared to will 
the eternal return of his life” and “has a distinctive bearing towards others and especially 
towards himself: he has self-reverence”. Leiter then concludes, “Considered all together, it 
becomes clear why creative geniuses like Goethe, Beethoven, and Nietzsche himself should be 
the preferred examples of the higher human being: for the characteristics of the higher type are 
precisely those that lend themselves to artistic and creative work”.1 
Now, I think Leiter is correct in some respects. To begin with, ‘creativity’ is undoubtedly 
what Nietzsche values as the chief element of ‘human greatness’: “the great – that is, the 
creating” (Z: I, 12). And he also seemingly regards ‘creativity’ as a key element in making our 
                                                 
1 See Leiter (2002): pp. 115-122 
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‘life’ embraceable in the face of suffering: “Creation – that is the great redemption from 
suffering, and life’s growing light” (Z: II, 2). Moreover, it is true that, along with 
‘life-affirmation’ and ‘health’, which are his chief life-long concerns, Nietzsche often positively 
talks about those characteristics such as ‘solitariness’ and ‘self-reverence’ in relation to higher 
types. Furthermore, it is also true that Nietzsche greatly admires ‘creative geniuses’ such as 
Goethe and Beethoven, and discusses these historical figures in connection with higher types. In 
addition, there is indeed a passage in EH where Nietzsche appears to describe himself as a 
higher type, “a well-turned-out person” (EH: Wise, 2). 
However, I object to Leiter on several accounts. Firstly, I think Leiter is wrong to claim that 
higher types should preferably be ‘creative geniuses’ engaging in ‘artistic’ work. That is, it 
seems harsh to exclude Napoleon from the paradigms of higher types simply because he was not 
‘an artist’. Certainly, as Leiter points out, Nietzsche talks about gifted artists such as Goethe and 
Beethoven more frequently than about Napoleon, and his comments on these artists are 
“uniformly positive”.2 But then, many of us would surely agree that the idea that all higher 
types are artists “does seem [somewhat] ridiculous”.3 
Moreover, it also seems to me that Nietzsche values the creativity of Napoleon just as much 
as he values that of Goethe and Beethoven: he clearly regards Napoleon as a ‘creative genius’ 
and connects him to his conception of higher types, along with these two artists. For, as I 
suggested in Chapter 1-B, while he does not necessarily affirm or endorse the brutal and 
destructive aspect of Napoleon that is symbolised by all the atrocities Napoleon committed, he 
clearly greatly values and affirms the creative and constructive aspect of Napoleon that is 
symbolised by Napoleon’s cultural achievements such as the establishment of the Napoleonic 
                                                 
2 See Leiter (2002): p. 116, n. 4 
3 See Tanner (2000): p. 59. Tanner makes this point in regard to ‘Übermenschen’. 
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Code and the contribution made towards the development of Egyptology. Further, as I 
suggested in Chapter 1-C, while Nietzsche takes a keen interest in Napoleon as an ‘individual’ 
who enacts a political law, he is indifferent to what the Napoleonic Code actually offers us. This 
seemingly suggests that what truly matters to Nietzsche is not the content of Napoleon’s cultural 
or political achievements, but Napoleon’s creativity itself, or the scale of “a force majeure of 
genius and will . . . strong enough to create a unity out of Europe, a political and economic unity 
for the sake of a world government” found within the existence of Napoleon (EH: CW, 2). 
In the light of these, my view is that Nietzsche simply considers a higher type to be an 
extraordinarily creative individual with superior human greatness who can create cultural 
greatness and new life-affirming values, and that he does not care so much about what this 
individual’s occupation is or what type of work this individual engages in. And this view of 
mine can be substantiated by the fact that Nietzsche often refers to higher types as ‘philosophers 
of the future’, whom he describes as “commanders and legislators” who “create values” and 
“determine the Whither and For What of man” (see BGE: 211).4 And he argues that such a 
philosopher “has the conscience for the over-all development of man” and “will make use of 
religions for his project of cultivation and education, just as he will make use of whatever 
political and economic states are at hand” (BGE: 61). Such a description, again, seems to 
suggest that Nietzsche does not think that a higher type should be someone who engages in 
‘artistic’ work. 
Secondly, contrary to Leiter’s claim, it seems to me questionable whether those historical 
figures such as Goethe, Beethoven and Napoleon can really be examples of higher types in 
reality. Certainly, Nietzsche finds these historical figures particularly admirable and thus talks 
                                                 
4 Nietzsche’s comments on the nature of ‘philosophers of the future’ correspond with most of those five distinctive 
characteristics of ‘higher types’ which Leiter proposes (see BGE: 43-44, 61, 205 & 211-212). 
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about them in connection with ‘higher types’ as the ultimate representation of his idea of 
‘human greatness’. And there is clearly nothing wrong with this. For, surely, we all agree that 
certain people are simply and unquestionably ‘great’ and ‘admirable’. But, now, the question we 
ought to ask is exactly ‘in what sense’ Nietzsche claims that these historical figures are 
admirable. In other words, the issue I shall try to discuss here is whether Nietzsche finds 
Beethoven as an ‘individual’ admirable or whether he simply considers certain ‘characteristics’ 
of Beethoven to be admirable. For the fact is that every great man, no matter how exceptional he 
may be, still possesses some boring, trivial and unpleasant features and characteristics, and 
perform deeds which are far from admirable: just like all of us, being a human, even he would 
inevitably possess some bad and ugly habits, and would occasionally do foolish or despicable 
things. However, because we are naturally inclined to focus solely upon his exciting and 
exceptional features, characteristics and deeds, we often tend to forget this basic fact. 
For instance, Dostoevsky is someone whom many of us recognise as a great human being. 
When we read his novels, we are fascinated by his creativity and acute powers of observation, 
so that we find him ‘great’ and ‘admirable’: Nietzsche too thinks very highly of Dostoevsky, 
describing him as a “profound human being” (TI: IX, 45). But then, when we look through 
Dostoevsky’s personal letters to his second wife, what we discover there is a nervous and 
occasionally unreliable husband, who is rather miserably in love with his much younger wife, 
behaves towards her morbidly like a control freak, longs to make love to her constantly, and 
makes excuses for his gambling habits and begs her for remittance when he gambles away all 
his money on his journey. Clearly, these particular facets of his are doubtfully attractive and not 
obviously admirable. Yet, when we are reading his novels and dazzled by his brilliance, even 
those of us who are familiar with his personal letters tend to forget the existence of these less 
than admirable facets of his life. As such, we seem to end up thinking that we find him as an 
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‘individual’ admirable, when in reality, strictly speaking, we might be only admiring certain 
‘characteristics’ of his. 
Does Nietzsche also tend to forget this basic fact that even Goethe, Beethoven and Napoleon, 
whom he very much admires, inevitably possess some less than admirable features, 
characteristics and deeds? Presumably he does. For one thing, this sort of tendency is so 
deep-rooted among us, that it is hard to imagine anyone being capable of escaping from it 
completely. And for another, in the light of the proclivity to a certain naivety that his writings 
occasionally display in some contexts, which often results in over-zealous affirmations or 
careless over-romanticisation, it seems likely that Nietzsche is susceptible to this tendency as 
much as anyone else, if not more so. 
Indeed, in my view, there is a clear lack of authenticity in his discussions of those historical 
figures such as Beethoven and Napoleon. For, for instance, despite speaking highly of these 
historical figures, he actually never gives us any precise detailed account of what is so 
admirable about them. If he found them exceptionally ‘great’ and thus considered them to be 
examples of higher types, he could surely have provided few small anecdotes about them to 
help explain and endorse his position. But this is something he fails to do, and consequently his 
discussions of them remain obscure and unrealistic in nature. 
As such, it is a common practice among commentators to find anecdotes from independent 
biographical studies, in order to redeem Nietzsche’s discussions of the historical figures in 
question from their obscure and unrealistic nature. So, for instance, Leiter uses Beethoven by 
Maynard Solomon – which is widely recognised as the standard modern biography of 
Beethoven – to illustrate and argue that Beethoven actually possessed some of the five 
132 
 
distinctive characteristics of higher types which he – Leiter – proposes, and thus that Beethoven 
should indeed be regarded as an example of a higher type.
5
 
Now, I think there is nothing wrong with this practice itself. Moreover, as far as reading all 
the passages of Solomon’s book to which Leiter refers is concerned, it certainly appears to be 
the case that Beethoven did possess some of the five distinctive characteristics of higher types 
which Leiter proposes. However, what I find problematic is Leiter’s failure to acknowledge the 
fact that, by using the same book, we can also illustrate how Beethoven also possessed certain 
characteristics which Nietzsche would likely find less than admirable and thus reject. 
For instance, Solomon, in the same book of his, also provides an absorbing account of the 
tempestuous relationships between Beethoven, his sister-in-law and his nephew. According to 
Solomon, Beethoven’s brother Casper Carl died of tuberculosis in November 1815, leaving 
behind his wife Johanna and his nine-year-old son Karl. The last request the dying Casper Carl 
made was for Karl to be placed under a joint guardianship of Beethoven and Johanna upon his 
death. Yet, after Casper Carl’s death, Beethoven had moved to seize the exclusive guardianship 
of Karl, while he continually tried to exclude Johanna from any direct communication with Karl 
in an obsessive manner. This action of his provoked lengthy conflicts and legal battles between 
him and Johanna over Karl’s custody, through which he often took a very hostile attitude 
towards Johanna, frequently making acrimonious and unfounded accusations against her of 
being a vicious unworthy mother.
6
 And while showing eagerness to continue monopolising 
Karl’s custody, he was actually an erratic guardian, who held “ambivalent feelings” – of 
                                                 
5 See Leiter (2002): pp. 122-123 
6 See Solomon (2001): pp. 297, 302-303, 305 & 317 
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affection and hostility – toward his ward, often suffering from “anxieties at his proximity to his 
nephew”.7 Solomon writes, 
 
Beethoven’s attitude toward his young nephew was similarly riddled with contradictions. . . . His 
repeated protestations of love certainly were not matched by consistently benevolent behavior toward 
the boy. . . . In November [1816] he took the ten-year-old to task for laxness in his studies and 
punished him by a deliberate show of coldness: “We walked along together more seriously than usual. 
Timidly he pressed my hand but found no response” – this on the day preceding the first anniversary 
of the death of the boy’s father. . . . In subsequent years, when it became apparent to Beethoven that 
he had not succeeded in breaking the bond between mother and son, he used physical violence 
against Karl on more than one occasion.
8 
 
Eventually, being “torn between obedience toward his uncle and the desire to return to his 
mother”, “Karl attempted suicide in an ultimately successful effort to break away from the 
domination of his uncle, whose suffocating embrace had at last become unbearable”.9 
Now, it actually appears to be the case that Beethoven’s intention behind the appropriation 
of his nephew was fundamentally good.
10
 And we may be able to identify some reasonable 
explanations as to why Beethoven behaved in such an eccentrically crude way, as Solomon 
attempts to do from a psychological perspective.
11
 But, nevertheless, the image of Beethoven 
that arises from this family saga is clearly unpleasant and unattractive: it is simply not ‘great’ at 
                                                 
7 Solomon (2001): p. 317 
8 Solomon (2001): pp. 308-309 
9 Solomon (2001): pp. 297 & 313 
10 Solomon (2001): pp. 303-304 
11 See Solomon (2001): pp. 304-306, 315-316 & 325-328 
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all. All those characteristics Beethoven displayed in his attempt to deprive a mother of her son, 
as well as in his mistreatment of his nephew, which appear to be unjust and evidently had 
harmful effects on the boy, are clearly the kind of characteristics which Nietzsche would likely 
find less than admirable and thus wish to exclude from the nature of ‘higher types’. 
Of course, whether or to what extent Nietzsche knew this family saga is unclear. But the fact 
is that, whatever else is the case, Nietzsche in his works hardly ever makes any reference to 
those kinds of less than admirable characteristics of Beethoven: though he in the Nachlass does 
sometimes criticise Beethoven for being a ‘romantic’ (see, e.g., WP: 106, 838 & 842). And this 
seems to be the manner in which Nietzsche treats all the historical figures whom he finds 
admirable and thus connects to ‘higher types’. That is, he often focuses only on what he wants 
to see in them, and turns a blind eye to their features and characteristics which are unbecoming 
to ‘higher types’. This, I think, gives us good reason to suspect that what Nietzsche actually 
finds admirable is not exactly Goethe, Beethoven and Napoleon as ‘individuals’, but only their 
certain selected ‘characteristics’, and thus that these historical figures, as ‘individuals’, cannot 
really be examples of higher types in reality. 
But then, perhaps, we have so far approached Nietzsche’s conception of ‘higher types’ in a 
wrong manner: this leads us to another aspect of Leiter’s interpretation of ‘higher types’ that I 
find objectionable. That is, Leiter claims, while speaking of the five distinctive characteristics of 
higher types which he proposes, that “Taken together, they are plainly sufficient to make 
someone a higher type in Nietzsche’s view, though it is not obvious that any one of these is 
necessary, and various combinations often seem sufficient for explaining how Nietzsche speaks 
of higher human beings”.12 However, contrary to Leiter’s claim, it seems to me possible that 
what makes someone a higher types in Nietzsche’s view is not necessarily some combination of 
                                                 
12 Leiter (2002): p. 116 
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distinctive characteristics, because there actually seems to be a way of finding someone ‘great’ 
and ‘admirable’ not in terms of individual characteristics he possesses. 
For instance, F. R. Leavis in his essay Memories of Wittgenstein describes Wittgenstein – 
whom many of us consider ‘great’ – as follows. 
 
Wittgenstein . . . was a complete human being, subtle, self-critical and un-self-exalting. When, in 
characterizing him, one touches on traits that seem to entail adverse or limiting judgements, one is 
not intending to impute defects in his potential full humanity.
13 
 
By describing Wittgenstein as ‘a complete human being’ and as possessing ‘full humanity’, 
Leavis is clearly not talking about a combination of characteristics found in Wittgenstein, 
suggesting that Wittgenstein was entirely free of less than admirable characteristics and instead 
full of admirable characteristics: Leavis makes it clear in the essay that Wittgenstein possessed 
weaknesses and vices. Rather, as Hamilton points out, what Leavis is talking about, what Leavis 
considers exceptional, is “Wittgenstein’s spirit”, the whole of his inner life, the way he lived up 
to his humanity in a exemplary manner. And in Leavis’ view, not only Wittgenstein’s admirable 
characteristics such as his intellectual virtues, but many of his weaknesses and vices too are 
expressive of this exceptional spirit of his: they are all manifestations of his nature as ‘a 
complete human being’. This is why Leavis claims in the above passage that even those less 
than admirable characteristics of Wittgenstein, which entail adverse or limiting judgments, do 
not undermine his ‘full humanity’.14 
                                                 
13 Leavis (1982): p. 135 
14 See Hamilton (1998): pp. 329-330 
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I think Leavis’ way of understanding Wittgenstein’s ‘greatness’ makes us see that there is 
something superficial about Leiter’s approach to the conception of higher types. That is, what 
Leiter’s approach fails to address is something important, namely, the fact that a characteristic 
that is ‘admirable’ in a certain context could also equally be ‘less than admirable’ in different 
contexts. 
At one level, the problem with Leiter is that he does not really explain why those five 
distinctive characteristics of higher types he proposes are particularly admirable. As we saw 
earlier, one such distinctive characteristic is ‘solitary and deals with others only instrumentally’. 
Leiter suggests, “The great man approaches others instrumentally not only because of his 
fundamental proclivity for solitude, but because of another distinguishing characteristic: he is 
consumed by his work, his responsibilities, his projects”.15 Certainly, as Leiter points out, 
Nietzsche writes in BGE, “A human being who strives for something great considers everyone 
he meets on his way either as a means or as a delay and obstacle – or as a temporary resting 
place” (BGE: 273). But Leiter – and the same can be said of Nietzsche, for that matter – does 
not really explain what ‘deals with others only instrumentally’ actually means, or why and in 
what sense it is a particularly exceptional characteristic. For instance, does the great man 
willingly and pleasurably exploit others purely for his own end, as if they were slaves? Or, does 
he reluctantly use others for achieving a greater communal good or altruist end, while showing 
some respect to them, because he simply has no option but to do so? And if the former is the 
case, is it really so admirable? 
At another level, what Leiter fails to take into account is the fact that those five distinctive 
characteristics, or any characteristic for that matter, come to have different meaning and 
significance depending on the person who possesses it: specifically, for instance, depending on 
                                                 
15 Leiter (2002): p. 117 
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the role he plays in his life, and also depending on his individuality and sensibility. Certainly, 
there are some characteristics which can plausibly be thought of as admirable in any individual 
in any life circumstance, such as ‘courage’. But then, whereas ‘ruthlessness’ may be an 
admirable characteristic in a soldier fighting a battle, it would surely be manifested as a less 
than admirable characteristic in a nurse taking care of disabled children. Likewise, while my 
‘meticulous’ disposition might help me become exceptional as a philosopher in my academic 
life, this very disposition of mine could also equally make me become an abominably difficult 
and fastidious husband in my private life. Further, in a person with a certain individuality and 
sensibility, ‘self-reverence’ can be an honest self-recognition and self-appreciation of his talents 
and superiority, which could even lead to a genuine generosity towards the others. But then, in 
another person with a different individuality, ‘self-reverence’ can be nothing more than a 
bloated egoism or a shameless arrogance.
16
 
Indeed, if we were to understand and judge someone’s ‘greatness’ purely in terms of 
individual ‘characteristics’ in the manner we have done earlier, it would seem that we can never 
really admire someone as an ‘individual’: since, as I said, every one of us, being a human, 
inevitably possesses some boring, trivial and less than admirable features and characteristics, 
and we all also act stupidly, at least on occasion. But this just does not sound right, because we 
clearly do find certain historical figures great and admirable as ‘individuals’, even when we are 
                                                 
16 This is why Leavis, in his above-mentioned essay, describes what he considers to be Wittgenstein’s weaknesses 
and vices as follows: “The fact is that the disinterested regardlessness in which his genius manifested itself was, as a 
matter of habit, apt to be a disconcerting lack of consideration; his ‘single-mindedness’ an innocent egotism. I have 
been asked to agree that Wittgenstein was cruel, but I think that description misleading, and I emphasize the 
‘innocent’” (Leavis 1982: p. 137). As Hamilton suggests, “For Leavis, Wittgenstein’s egoism was not mere egoism 
but was transformed by his sense of it as expressive of Wittgenstein’s spirit. But no doubt Leavis would have thought 
that, in another man who did not possess the kind of admirable spirit of which Wittgenstein was possessed, the 
egoism in question would be cruel” (Hamilton 1998: p. 331). 
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perfectly aware of their unattractive weaknesses, and even when we are actually repelled by 
some of their unpleasant vices. And in part, what makes us admire someone like Dostoevsky as 
an ‘individual’, as a “profound human being” (TI: IX, 45), is surely the fact that, in him, not all 
but many of his less than admirable characteristics – such as his highly-strung and obsessive 
nature – contributed to, or became a part of, his whole greatness in some way, that he was not 
overwhelmed by them but instead somehow managed to incorporate them into his unique and 
exceptional individuality and sensibility, which are clearly detectable in his novels. 
In fact, Nietzsche clearly recognises and affirms this idea of one’s trivial and less than 
admirable facets and characteristics contributing towards one’s whole greatness. For instance, as 
we will see in Chapter 4-A, in this context, in GS he speaks of the necessity of giving ‘style’ to 
one’s character: “One thing is needful. – To “give style” to one’s character – a great and rare 
art! It is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then 
fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and even 
weaknesses delight the eye” (GS: 290). The basic idea is that we should become artist of our 
own life and try to make of ourselves artworks by giving a synthetic unity to our character: the 
ability which he values almost more than anything in his mature works and thus connects to his 
conception of higher types. Likewise, as we will also see, in the same context, in his mature 
works he increasingly attempts to give some positive value to all those egoistic characteristics 
and emotions such as greed, envy, vanity and lust, which Christianity condemns as ‘vices’. And 
while he never goes so far as to claim that those egoistic characteristics and emotions are simply 
in themselves ‘good’ and ‘admirable’, he clearly seems to regard them as essential to much that 
is good and valuable in life, as part of what can spur people on to human greatness that we all 
admire. And he is no doubt right on this, since, for instance, it is a well-known fact that many of 
the greatest artists were extremely self-obsessed, and that what often motivated them to produce 
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In the light of all these points, I think we could plausibly suggest that, contrary to Leiter’s 
claim, Nietzsche’s conception of ‘higher types’ is not just about some distinctive characteristics 
being added up in various ways. Certainly, Nietzsche greatly values and cares about certain 
individual characteristics such as ‘creativity’ and ‘life-affirmation’. And he undoubtedly 
ascribes these characteristics to higher types. But, at the same time, his conception of ‘higher 
types’ also crucially involves how all the individual pieces of one’s character, including those 
that are less than admirable, are placed and fitted together. That is, in Nietzsche’s view, higher 
types are not simply individuals with certain admirable characteristics, but they are also 
integrated individuals who possess a unique and exceptional individuality and sensibility, and in 
whom there ultimately exists an undeniable sense of unity. 
Those historical figures such as Goethe, Beethoven and Napoleon are surely exceptionally 
creative and life-affirming, as well as possessed of a ‘style’ of their own. So, can we conclude 
that they are examples of higher types after all? I think there is still some doubt. For, the 
problem is that, as I suggested, there is a clear lack of authenticity in Nietzsche’s discussions of 
these historical figures. In fact, it is evident that these historical figures are often idealised or 
mythologized in his writings to some degree.
18
 
In Chapter 2-A, I suggested that Nietzsche in his works frequently creates ‘archetypes’ as an 
‘instructive’ means to illustrate and express his ideas. In BT, even by going against historical 
facts sometimes, he intentionally transforms Homer into the archetype of Greek epic, 
Archilochus into the archetype of Greek lyric and Socrates into the archetype of rationalism. 
                                                 
17 See Hamilton (2009): p. 66 
18 See Tanner (2000): p. 76 
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Likewise, by idealising the ancient Greeks and their religion[s], he transforms them into the 
archetypes of – what he perceives to be – the ideal ‘life-affirming’ life and the ideal 
‘life-affirming’ religion[s], through which he instructs us concerning with what kind of ‘religion’ 
we could possibly overcome our pessimistic outlook on life. And such an inclination of his is 
strongly present throughout most of his works. Even after BT, he continues to idealise and use 
the Greeks as the archetype of the ideal ‘life-affirming’ life. And in many of his mature works, 
by setting this archetype over against what he considers to be the ‘life-denying’ decadent life 
symbolised by Christianity, he attempts to illustrate and illuminate his mature idea of 
‘life-affirmation’ and his criticism of Christianity. 
And in my view, as Tanner similarly suggests, most of the historical figures who appear in 
Nietzsche’s mature writings are also essentially ‘archetypes’: “almost all proper names in his 
texts stand not for individuals, but for movements, tendencies, ways of living”.19 For instance, 
in many of his mature works, Nietzsche repeatedly criticises David Strauss and Wagner. But he 
also remarks in EH, 
 
I never attack persons; I merely avail myself of the person as of a strong magnifying glass that allows 
one to make visible a general but creeping and elusive calamity. Thus I attacked David Strauss – 
more precisely, the success of a senile book with the “cultured” people in Germany: I caught this 
culture in the act. I thus attacked Wagner – more precisely, the falseness, the half-couth instincts of 
our “culture” which mistakes the subtle for the rich, and the late for the great (EH: Wise, 7). 
 
So, ‘David Strauss’ and ‘Wagner’ whom Nietzsche criticises in his works are not necessarily 
actual historical individuals. They are transformed by him into the symbolic embodiments of 
                                                 
19 Tanner (2000): pp. 24-25 
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what he perceives to be everything wrong about contemporary German culture, which he uses 
as a means to illustrate and illuminate his cultural criticisms (see EH: UM, 1-2).
20
 And likewise, 
my suggestion is that those exceptional historical figures such as Goethe, Beethoven and 
Napoleon, whom Nietzsche connects to his conception of ‘higher types’ in his works, are also 
not necessarily actual historical individuals. They are best interpreted as ‘archetypes’, who are 
purposely idealised by him to express his idea of ‘human greatness’, to represent certain 
characteristics which he values, admires and thus expects to find in higher types. In this sense, 
we cannot really consider Goethe, Beethoven and Napoleon as ‘actual historical individuals’ to 
be examples of higher types in reality.
                                                 
20 See Young (2006): pp. 34-35 
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Section C: Who are examples of ‘higher types’? 
 
Who are examples of higher types, if those historical figures such as Goethe, Beethoven and 
Napoleon are best interpreted as ‘archetypes’ representing certain characteristics of higher 
types? As my final objection against Leiter’s interpretation of higher types, I suggest that, 
despite talking extensively about higher types, Nietzsche in his works actually provides us with 
no concrete example of higher types. 
Considering the extensive and obscure nature of Nietzsche’s discussions of higher types, the 
approach that Leiter takes towards higher types, i.e. the attempt to set out from the discussions 
which specific characteristics make an individual ‘a higher type’, is certainly useful for 
understanding Nietzsche’s view of the nature of higher types. However, what I find problematic 
is the way Leiter seemingly presumes that Nietzsche possesses a fixed solid image of higher 
types and reveals their distinctive characteristics one by one from this image. For, my view is 
that Nietzsche never at any point fully succeeded in establishing a clear and consistent idea of 
what exactly constitutes ‘greatness’ in us moderns: his conception of ‘higher types’ is neither as 
solid nor as plausible as Leiter seemingly thinks. 
For instance, one of the key clues for understanding Nietzsche’s conception of ‘higher types’ 
lies with his conception of ‘nobility’, since he clearly regards higher types as people who are 
‘noble’: “today the concept of greatness entails being noble” (BGE: 212). Indeed, many of 
Nietzsche’s passages which Leiter quotes to support his interpretation of higher types are 
passages on ‘nobility’, and hence what Leiter proposes as the distinctive characteristics of 
higher types are also practically the distinctive characteristics of those whom Nietzsche 
considers to be ‘noble’.1 However, what Leiter wrongly overlooks is the fact that Nietzsche’s 
                                                 
1 See Leiter (2002): pp. 117 & 120-122 
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discussion of ‘nobility’ is also obscure and confusing. For, as I will discuss in Chapter 4, I agree 
with Hamilton that Nietzsche in his works actually presents – at least – two different 
conceptions of ‘nobility’ and ‘life-affirmation’, without clearly distinguishing one conception 
from another, and also without properly working out either conception.
2
 And in my view, this 
failure of Nietzsche’s to establish a clear plausible conception of ‘nobility’ inevitably 
contributes to the unstable and obscure nature of his conception of ‘higher types’ itself. 
Moreover, what Leiter also fails to address is the fact of how problematically extravagant 
and unrealistic Nietzsche’s conception of higher types really is. For instance, as I mentioned, 
Nietzsche often refers to higher types as ‘philosophers of the future’, whom he describes as 
“commanders and legislators” who “create values” and “determine the Whither and For What 
of man” (BGE: 211). And he claims that such a philosopher “has the conscience for the over-all 
development of man” and “will make use of religions for his project of cultivation and 
education, just as he will make use of whatever political and economic states are at hand” 
(BGE: 61). Now, these claims of his are interesting, since they indicate that, contrary to the 
popular view of his being anti-religious, Nietzsche actually seems to consider ‘religions’ to be 
an important social tool both with an educational function and with a socio-political function of 
controlling the masses. But, here, the problem is that his description of ‘philosophers of the 
future’ as a whole is so grand, that it is hard to see how anyone could actually live up to it: 
clearly, even Goethe, Beethoven and Nietzsche himself, whom Leiter regards as the preferred 
examples of higher types, never actually came close to being like the ‘philosophers of the future’ 
he describes. 
And we can make a similar observation on many of the other remarks Nietzsche makes on 
higher types. That is, those remarks are often exceedingly grand to the point where they are not 
                                                 
2 See Hamilton (2000): pp. 169-170 
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just highly improbable, but also seemingly tinged with the same sort of ‘mythic quality’ that we 
recognise in his genealogical accounts (see Chapter 2-A), which make his conception of ‘higher 
types’ something too unrealistic to be plausible. Even if we were to suppose that his conception 
of ‘higher types’ is a pure ‘ideal’ through and through, we would still feel that it is too 
extravagant and hardly achievable. 
It is evident that Nietzsche has some firm ideas as to what sort of characteristics he wishes 
to ascribe to higher types: for instance, as we saw, he wants them to be exceptionally ‘creative’, 
‘life-affirming’ and possessed of ‘style’ of their own. Why, then, does his conception of higher 
types end up being something not just unstable and obscure but also unrealistic and almost 
mythic? My view is that this is because, while his conception of higher types is indeed an 
ultimate representation of his idea of ‘human greatness’, it is also essentially a product of his 
various fantasies, a fluid compound made up of his ever-changing longings and desires for 
certain characteristics, many of which he himself could not acquire. That is, ‘higher types’ is 
one of those conceptions of his whose full significance cannot be grasped without giving some 
consideration to the ‘personal’ nature of his writings. 
Let me start clarifying my view. In Chapter 1-C, against those commentators who assume 
that what we find in Nietzsche’s works is the real ‘Nietzsche’, I argued that such an assumption 
is wrong, because the ‘Nietzsche’ we find in his works is different from the ‘Nietzsche’ we find 
in his personal letters. Hence, I suggested that, in order to understand who the real ‘Nietzsche’ 
is, we must take both of these two different sets of images of him into consideration to some 
degree, and that this also means that we cannot always take every claim Nietzsche makes in his 
works at its face value, interpreting it literally as what ‘Nietzsche’ really thinks and believes, i.e. 
as his all things considered opinion or his truthful view of a matter. 
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And in my view, it is precisely such a wrong assumption that causes Leiter wrongly to claim 
that Nietzsche himself is an example of higher types. Certainly, as Leiter also notices, there is a 
passage in EH where Nietzsche appears to describe himself as a higher type, “a well-turned-out 
person” (EH: Wise, 2). But it is clear to me that Nietzsche himself is not an example of a higher 
type. For one thing, the description of ‘a well-turned-out person’ in the passage is hardly what 
could plausibly be regarded as a truthful depiction of Nietzsche, as I shall illustrate shortly: 
likewise, Nietzsche also seems very far from having those five distinctive characteristics of 
‘higher types’ which Leiter proposes. And for another, what Leiter fails to recognise is the fact 
that not only in this particular passage but also throughout EH Nietzsche often presents a very 
misleading picture of himself purposely. 
In EH, which can be categorised as his autobiography written near the end of his career, 
Nietzsche eulogises himself in an audacious manner. As its chapter headings indicate, he tells us 
boastfully why he is ‘so wise’ and ‘so clever’, why he writes ‘such good books’, and why he is a 
man of ‘destiny’. Basically, he portrays his life as something wonderful and successful. 
However, we know today, from reliable biographical studies of Nietzsche,
3
 that his life was 
actually not as wonderful and successful as he portrays it to be. For instance, he had to abandon 
the life of a university professor, chiefly owing to his deteriorating health, but also because 
students were no longer attending his lectures because they had lost all interest in his teaching. 
He was rejected by Lou Salomé when he proposed to her: an experience by which he was 
deeply humiliated and hurt. Contrary to his claim in EH of having readers all around Europe 
(see EH: Books, 2), his works actually sold very poorly, as the public showed complete 
indifference to them. He had to endure constant torments from severe migraines throughout his 
mature years, as his health never stopped deteriorating. Basically, despite his undeniable 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Hollingdale (1999) & Kaufmann (1974): pp. 21-71 
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originality and brilliance, he was still a frustrated individual who had to experience various 
hardships, failures, rejections and disappointments, just like all of us. George Orwell remarks in 
one of his essays, whose subject for discussion is Salvador Dali’s autobiography, 
“Autobiography is only to be trusted when it reveals something disgraceful. A man who gives a 
good account of himself is probably lying, since any life when viewed from the inside is simply 
a series of defeats”.4 Clearly, in many and significant ways, Nietzsche’s life was ‘a series of 
defeats’, even from the outside. And in EH as his autobiography, where Nietzsche gives a very 
good account of himself, though many of the things he says are undoubtedly true, he is also 
clearly ‘lying’. 
If EH as Nietzsche’s autobiography cannot be really trusted for its honesty, how should we 
treat it? In the above-mentioned essay on Dali’s autobiography, Orwell also remarks, 
 
However, even the most flagrantly dishonest book . . . can without intending it give a true picture of 
its author. Dali’s recently published Life comes under this heading. Some of the incidents in it are 
flatly incredible, others have been rearranged and romanticized, and not merely the humiliation but 
the persistent ordinariness of everyday life has been cut out. . . . But as a record of fantasy . . . , it has 
great value. Here, then, are some of the episodes in Dali’s life, from his earliest years onward. Which 
of them are true and which are imaginary hardly matters: the point is that this is the kind of thing that 




At one level, I think that we could indeed plausibly read EH as Nietzsche’s ‘record of fantasy’, 
in which many of his longings and desires are revealed or expressed in an implicit manner. For 
                                                 
4 Orwell (2000a): p. 248 
5 Orwell (2000a): p. 248 
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instance, Nietzsche claims in the book that “my ancestors were Polish noblemen” (EH: Wise, 3). 
Now, it has been proved today through reliable biographical studies of Nietzsche that his claim 
is simply not true. But, on this line of thought, the falsity of the claim is in a sense not 
necessarily a serious issue, because what the claim valuably reveals to us is a special attraction 
that the idea of ‘being a descendant of Polish noblemen’ holds for Nietzsche. And it is indeed 
true that his writings often display a strong liking for the aristocracy in general, as we typically 
see from his many affirmative remarks on ‘masters’ as ‘the nobles’ of ancient hierarchical 
societies. 
Likewise, we could plausibly suppose that when Nietzsche in EH gives a description of ‘a 
well-turned-out person’, i.e. a higher type, and claims that he has just described himself, he has 
in fact described not himself as he actually is, but the kind of person he ‘would have liked to’ 
become and still wants to become. Certainly, some of the things stated in the description might 
possibly apply to Nietzsche himself to some degree. But then, when he claims in the description 
that ‘a well-turned-out person’ like him is someone who “comes to terms with himself, with 
others; he knows how to forget” (EH: Wise, 2), he clearly seems to present a very misleading 
picture of himself. For, for instance, if he had ever really managed to come to terms with 
Wagner, particularly over their separation, he would probably not have kept criticising Wagner 
obsessively to the very end of his career as he did in reality. Moreover, if he had been really 
capable of coming to term with himself, he would surely not have had to misrepresent his life in 
the book in the way he did in the first place. So, rather, by claiming such, he is actually 
indicating that he wants to become able to ‘come to terms with himself and with others’. 
In fact, it seems to me that EH as a whole is deeply characterised by such a desire or longing 
to ‘come to terms with himself and with others’. Between the preface and the first chapter of the 
book, Nietzsche writes, 
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On this perfect day, when everything is ripening and not only the grape turns brown, the eye of the 
sun just fell upon my life: I looked back, I looked forward, and never saw so many and such good 
things at once . . . How could I fail to be grateful to my whole life? – and so I tell my life to myself 
(EH: p. 221). 
 
It is presumably Nietzsche himself who knows more than anyone that his life has been in many 
and significant ways ‘a series of defeats’: as he reflects on his life, he must have realised how it 
had not all gone in the way he would have liked. But, as the passage indicates, through the 
process of writing EH, he wants to perceive his life to be something wonderful, filled with ‘so 
many and such good things’: he clearly does not wish to become bitter or have regrets about his 
life for what it has been and for what it is. In this sense, at another level, I think that we could 
also plausibly read EH as Nietzsche’s ultimate attempt at ‘self-justification’, in which his 
self-glorification – or, even self-mythologization – is in part a result of his attempt to come to 




So, for instance, in EH, Nietzsche positively talks about his persistent illness. He claims that 
all the special abilities of his are products of the painful days of his intense illness (see EH: Wise, 
1). He also claims that, for “a typically healthy person” like him, “being sick can even become 
an energetic stimulus for life, for living more” (EH: Wise, 2). Now, his claims may be truthful in 
some respects. It is indeed likely that many of his insights into various matters were gained from 
what he calls “the perspective of the sick” (EH: Wise, 1), and that what helped him to overcome 
his adherence to Schopenhauer’s pessimism and kept motivating him to develop his own 
                                                 
6 Of course, there is no doubt that Nietzsche’s self-mythologization in EH is also aimed at others, to promote himself 
as a significant man. 
149 
 
‘life-affirming’ philosophy was partly his struggle against his illness, his “will to health, to life” 
(see EH: Wise, 2; also EH: HAH, 4). But then, as many of his personal letters typically indicate, 
his illness was clearly far more wretched and burdensome to him in reality. Despite his 
remarkably stoical attitude towards his own suffering, and despite his life-long attempt to 
embrace his life entirely, it is still natural to presume that he never actually wanted to become 
tormented by the persistent illness if he did not have to. In the light of a strong desire for 
‘health’, both physical and psychological, which his writings often express, we could plausibly 
presume that he always hated his illness fundamentally and never actually stopped wanting his 
health to recover. 
In fact, it seems likely that even at this point of writing EH, Nietzsche would gladly, or at 
least would be very much tempted to, exchange his life tormented with the illness for a similar 
life without the illness. However, as we will see in Chapter 4-C, this sort of ‘fantasy’ is 
precisely what one of his mature ideas of life-affirmation rejects as pointless and life-denying. 
So, in EH, as he makes his ultimate attempt not to fall for such a sort of fantasy, he desperately 
tries to reinterpret the reality of his illness and portray it positively, in order to make himself 
believe that even his illness has been after all something valuable and useful to him. To put it 
another way, as the years of his nomadic life-style to try to regain his health had never borne 
fruit, at this particular point of his life he recognises more firmly than ever that his persistent 
illness is, and will forever be, an inevitable terrible aspect of his life, and that there is nothing he 
can do to stop or eliminate the unavoidable suffering caused by it, i.e. ‘extensional suffering’. 
So, in this – what could plausibly be read as – ultimate ‘self-therapeutic’ book written especially 
for him as ‘a sufferer’, he tries interpret positively, to justify and to accept the existence of this 
unavoidable ‘extensional suffering’ of his in what he has so far discovered to be the most 
healthy and life-affirming way, in order at least to free himself of any ‘intensional suffering’: 
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namely, by trying to convince himself that he has ultimately acquired – what he understands as 
– ‘greatness’ as the attitude and capability to use suffering for positive purposes (see Chapter 
2-A & 3-A). And, in this way, by not giving negativity to his illness, by not transforming it into 
an objection to his life, he who cannot get his physical health back is at least trying to regain 
and protect his psychological health. 
Such an attempt of Nietzsche’s to protect his psychological health can also be seen in 
another example, which is more directly connected with the main theme of this thesis. Nietzsche 
claims in EH, 
 
I have never reflected on questions that are none – I have not wasted myself. Really religious 
difficulties, for example, I don’t know from experience. It has escaped me altogether in what way I 
was supposed to be “sinful.” Likewise, I lack any reliable criterion for recognizing the bite of 
conscience: according to what one hears about it, the bite of conscience does not seem respectable to 
me. I do not want to leave an action in the lurch afterward; I should prefer to exclude the bad result, 
the consequences, from the question of value as a matter of principle. . . . “God,” “immorality of the 
soul,” “redemption,” “beyond” – without exception, concepts to which I never devoted any attention, 
or time; not even as a child (EH: Clever, 1). 
 
Now, this claim is simply untruthful, because Nietzsche clearly has spent most of his life 
thinking about these religious difficulties and conceptions in one way or another. Elsewhere in 
the book, he declares that “I only attack things when every personal quarrel is excluded, when 
any background of bad experiences is lacking. . . . When I wage war against Christianity I am 
entitled to this because I have never experienced misfortunes and frustrations from that quarter” 
(EH: Wise, 7). But, again, such a declaration cannot be truthful, because Christian moralised 
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conceptions such as of ‘guilt’ and ‘bad conscience’ are precisely what he has always considered 
to be a wrong and unhealthy interpretation of the fact of ‘extensional suffering’, by which he 
himself has been often tormented. 
Why does Nietzsche feel the need to go to all the trouble of presenting himself so 
misleadingly on this matter? Hamilton seems to me to get the matter right when he suggests, 
 
Nietzsche represents himself in our passage [the above-quoted passage of EH: Clever, 1] as someone, 
above all, as self-contained: firstly, in his claim never to have wasted or squandered himself, 
secondly in his suggestion that the consequence of an action are to be ignored. In both cases, we are 
dealing with a longing to conserve energy, to retain order and control in a world, in a personality, 
both of which resist order and control. This is not, I think, or not only a kind of neurotic desire to 
order experience. It is, rather, or perhaps at the same time, the expression of horror at a dreadful 
sense of loss – not loss of this or that, but loss as such, at the fact that life is loss, that to live is to be 




Nietzsche’s life-long confrontation with those religious issues such as ‘God’ and ‘guilt’ is no 
doubt a part of his continuous attempt to cope with his illness and to keep himself free of 
‘intensional suffering’, in order to protect his psychological health. But, at this late stage of his 
life, in writing EH, he now recognises how this life-long confrontation of his, and also, more 
generally, his life-long obsession with ‘suffering’ in general, have actually been profoundly 
‘unhealthy’ and ironically undermined his psychological health all this time. After claiming his 
indifference to those religious issues, in the book in question he also declares that he is actually 
                                                 
7 I am grateful to Christopher Hamilton for allowing me to read his unpublished conference paper “Nietzsche and 
Religious Melancholy”, from which the quote comes, and to which I have also widely referred for writing this part. 
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“much more interested in a question on which the “salvation of humanity” depends far more 
than on any theologians’ curio: the question of nutrition”, and that his real concern has always 
lain with issues such as what one should eat and drink, which city or town is the best place to 
live in, and so on (see EH: Clever, 1-2). Yet, he also remarks lamentably, “My experiences in 
this matter are as bad as possible; I am amazed how late I heard this question . . . Indeed, till I 
reached a very mature age I always ate badly: morally speaking, “impersonally”, “selflessly,” 
“altruistically” – for the benefit of cooks and other fellow Christians” (EH: Clever, 1). So, 
clearly, he considers his life-long reflection on those religious issues to be ‘self-waste’: he feels 
that, rather than wasting himself by spending a vast amount of time consuming and digesting 
those unhealthy kinds of thought as he did, he should have instead devoted himself more to 
those truly important questions and issues, engaged himself solely in healthy kinds of thought 
which could enrich his life. In this sense, he is deeply afflicted with a sense of loss. 
It is not just EH in which we see this sense of loss. Most of Nietzsche’s other mature 
writings also often express profound fear of being afflicted with a sense of loss, or more 
specifically, what Hamilton above describes as ‘horror at a dreadful sense of loss – not loss of 
this or that, but loss as such, at the fact that life is loss, that to live is to be assailed by a sense of 
loss that can never be made good’. So, as we will see in Chapter 4, one of the things to which 
Nietzsche in his mature years increasing devotes himself is an attempt to reduce and minimize 
self-waste, or even to eliminate any self-waste: what Tanner describes as Nietzsche’s 
“programme for showing that nothing in one’s past should be regretted, that there need be no 
waste”.8 Yet, of course, life is something that is fundamentally characterised by compromises 
in many and various ways. No matter how hard one tries, there will still inevitably be in one’s 
                                                 
8 Tanner (2000): p. 5   
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life some forms of waste or errors which simply cannot be made good: one will forever be 
haunted by a dreadful sense of unredeemable loss in one way or another. 
However, this fact of existence is something which Nietzsche often refuses to acknowledge 
or accept throughout his life: as Hamilton puts it, “What he could not accept was that there were 
parts of his life that were simply through and through forms of mistake: of waste or pointless 
activity”.9 Hence, even at the point of writing EH near the end of his career, he still claims, 
“even the blunders of life have their own meaning and value – the occasional side roads and 
wrong roads, the delays, “modesties,” seriousness wasted on tasks that are remote from the task” 
(EH: Clever, 9). And certainly, throughout the book, he tries his best to find in many of the 
blunders of his life ‘their own meaning and value’, so that they would not become 
unredeemable losses. Yet, it is evident that, when it comes to his life-long confrontation with 
those religious issues, he simply struggles. For, he can clearly see that it has “darkened his 
horizon to no avail”,10 and that it is a loss which he simply cannot make good or for which he 
cannot make up. But, at this late stage of his life, as he makes his ultimate attempt to come to 
terms with his life as a whole, the last thing he wants to do is to become resentful of it, to 
become regretful of the wasted time and lost opportunities. So, he tries to pretend and make 
himself believe that he has never really wasted himself with those unhealthy religious issues, in 
order ultimately to protect his psychological health, as well as to bring some sort of closure and 
move on with his life. 
In my view, those elements we identify in EH, namely, ‘fantasy’, ‘self-justification’ and ‘the 
protection of psychological health’, are also equally extensively present in Nietzsche’s 
                                                 
9 Hamilton (2009): p. 81 
10 See Hamilton (2009): p. 107 
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discussions of ‘higher types’. And they are crucial for understanding his conception of higher 
types. 
That is to say, as I have emphasized, one notable factor that sets Nietzsche apart from other 
Western philosophers is the ‘personal’ nature of his writings: compared with the traditional 
philosophers’ writings, Nietzsche’s writings – his views and beliefs in general – are often in 
nature more closely connected to his own individual characteristics, more deeply bound up and 
invested with his personal experiences, circumstances, needs, desires, moods, feelings, emotions, 
inclinations, tastes, senses and so on. In the light of this, if we indeed are to take seriously his 
claim of that “every great philosophy” is “the personal confession of its author and a kind of 
involuntary and unconscious memoir” (BGE: 6), we could plausibly suppose that what is 
expressed in his conception of higher types is not simply his idea of ‘human greatness’, and that 
many of the characteristics which he ascribes to higher types via the various ‘archetypes’ such 
as Goethe and Napoleon are not just what he as ‘a philosopher’ values and recognises to be 
necessary for us modern to become ‘great’, but also what he as ‘a unique individual living a 
unique life’ values, desires and fantasises about possessing. 
Further, it also seems to me that, along with this element of ‘fantasy’, Nietzsche’s 
conception of higher types also contains an element of ‘self-justification’, in the sense that some 
of the characteristics he ascribes to higher types are also what he himself possesses and wishes 
to glorify. For instance, he often positively discusses ‘solitude’ in connection with higher types 
(see, e.g., BGE: 26 & 212). By ‘solitude’, he certainly does not simply mean physical solitude. 
For the most part, what he places the most emphasis on is the importance of psychological 
solitude, the importance of having the ability to be “always in his own company, whether he 
associates with books, human beings, or landscapes” (EH: Wise, 2), i.e. the ability to establish 
and possess one’s own – independent – standard of value-judgement. And this is clearly a 
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characteristic which he ascribes to higher types, as we will see. But then, if we are to take into 
account the ‘personal’ nature of his writings, we could also reasonably suppose that when he 
ascribes ‘solitude’ to higher types, what he also has in mind is his own enforced solitude. That is, 
it is also a characteristic which Nietzsche both as a lonely sick wanderer who clearly suffers 
from a serious deficiency of human warmth against his will, and as an unpopular philosopher 
who is no doubt frustrated by the unexpected indifference of the world towards his works, wants 
to glorify, so that he can positively interpret, justify and accept his own ‘solitude’ in order to 
protect his psychological health.
11
 
But if what I have just suggested is indeed correct, that is, if Nietzsche’s conception of 
higher types is indeed not only an ultimate representation of his idea of ‘human greatness’ but 
also essentially a product of his personal fantasies, why does it still end up being something so 
unstable and obscure? I think that, in order fully to explain the instability and obscurity 
surrounding the nature of higher types, the disposition of Nietzsche as ‘a unique individual’ 
must be taken into consideration to some degree. That is, in my view, Nietzsche’s failure to 
establish a single solid conception of ‘higher types’, which is capable of spelling out the exact 
nature of higher types properly, is largely to do with the fact that his own longings for certain 
characteristics often change, because of his ever-changing moods. 
There is no doubt that the fascination and admiration for a few selected peculiar and 
exceptional historical figures that we find in Nietzsche’s writings is a part of his continuous 
endeavour to figure out what exactly constitutes ‘greatness’ in us moderns. But, in the light of 
                                                 
11 In this respect, I greatly sympathize with Appel’s interpretation of ‘higher types’ as Nietzsche’s “strategy to fulfill 
the psychic need for comradeship [which] involves the creation of a fantasy world populated by idealised friends” 
(Appel 1999: p. 104). For Nietzsche’s mature texts clearly express terrible deprivation of human warmth and 
friendships: he desperately craves someone with whom he can share his ideas and the joys of life (see, e.g., BGE: 
From High Mountains, pp. 240-245). 
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what I have suggested, these historical figures are also clearly subjects of his ‘personal’ 
fascination and admiration: though they are idealised or mythologized in his texts, they 
basically represent types of being with certain distinctive characteristics whom Nietzsche as ‘a 
unique individual’ is attracted to. And, given the fact that Nietzsche famously speaks of his love 
of ‘masks’, it is highly likely that he actually often fantasized being these historical figures, 
often played and “experimented” with these “fantasy identities”.12 But, now, what strikes us 
most is how broad the range of these fantasy identities is: it includes Goethe, Beethoven, 
Napoleon, Wagner, Socrates and Jesus. They are certainly all exceptionally creative, and some 
of them are clearly life-affirming: the characteristics which Nietzsche as ‘a philosopher’ values 
and ascribes to higher types. In this sense, his fascination and admiration for these historical 
figures is not aimless or groundless. But, still, many of these historical figures are so different 
from each other, that we cannot help feeling that there is a certain lack of clear direction and 
self-control in his admiration and fascination. 
Robert Nozick remarks that, compared with “Aristotle’s Ethics, Marcus Aurelius’ 
Mediations, Montaigne’s Essays, and the essays of Samuel Johnson”, which are “books that set 
out what a mature person can believe – someone fully grown up”, Nietzsche’s writings are “less 
evidently grown-up ones”.13 And I think there is indeed something not ‘fully grown up’ about 
the admiration and fascination for those historical figures which we find in Nietzsche’s writings. 
In some way, it almost resembles that of a child, who today wants to be a pirate, the next day a 
cowboy, or fantasises about being both a professional footballer and an astronaut at the same 
time. A child certainly has his reasons for wanting to be each of these various characters. But a 
child is fundamentally impressionable, and his fascination is predominantly impulsive, not 
                                                 
12 See Fraser (2002): p. 97  
13 Nozick (2006): p. 15 
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something founded on a careful consideration. According to the mood of the moment, a child 
can easily and instantly be fascinated by certain characters purely for the sake of their appeals, 
without ever really thinking about whether he can actually become like them or how being them 
will affect him. So, a child suddenly loses interest in them as soon as their appeals fade. 
In Chapter 1-C, I talked about how Nietzsche possesses deeply ‘cinematic’ imagination, and 
how his ‘cinematic’ imaginations of ‘war’, ‘slavery’ and ‘cultivation’ often get better of him to 
the extent where he becomes embroiled in an excited affirmation of these ideas. And here, I 
think, we can make a similar observation in regard to his admiration and fascination for those 
historical figures. That is, depending on his mood, as soon as he sees in those historical figures 
certain distinctive characteristics which are particularly interesting or attractive to him, he 
becomes so deeply gripped by their imaginative appeals, that he can no longer clear-sightedly 
see them for what they actually are. In his ‘cinematic’ imaginations of his being those historical 
figures, he cannot clear-sightedly see what it would actually be like to possess those 
characteristics, what being like those historical figures would actually involve, and whether he 
would really be able to or really wish to be like those historical figures in reality. So, he often 
ends up admiring them without at all considering about the full potential implications this 
admiration would have for both himself and his philosophy as a whole. But, when his mood 
changes and he decides to give some careful thought to those characteristics, he often comes to 
realise that many of them are not exactly what he truly longs for, or something that he can 
actually whole-heartedly affirm and endorse both ‘philosophically’ and ‘personally’: we see this 
most typically in Nietzsche’s attitude towards Napoleon, as I will illustrate in the next chapter. 
And it seems to me that, by longing for many different characteristics and yet being unable to 
commit himself to most of them in his ever-changing moods, Nietzsche was in the end 
beginning to lose sight of exactly what he really valued and truly longed for. But, nonetheless, 
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he still continued to pack many different ideas into the conception of ‘higher types’, so that it 





So, in conclusion, I have argued in this chapter that the mature Nietzsche’s conception of 
‘higher types’, whose nurturing is his highest concern, is an outcome of his continuous 
endeavour to find out what exactly constitutes ‘greatness’ in us moderns. It is essentially an 
ultimate representation of his idea of ‘human greatness’ capable of creating cultural greatness 
and new ‘life-affirming’ values in the face of the imminent arrival of life-denying ‘nihilism’, 
through which he also expresses his idea of ‘life-affirmation’, what he identifies as the best 
possible way positively to interpret, justify and accept the existence of suffering, in order to 
make ‘life’ as a whole embraceable. 
And I have also argued that those exceptional historical figures such as Goethe, Beethoven 
and Napoleon, whom Nietzsche connects to his conception of higher types in his works, are not 
examples of higher types, but rather ‘archetypes’ who are purposely idealised by him to 
represent certain characteristics which he values and thus expects to find in higher types. But 
then, in Nietzsche’s view, higher types are not simply individuals with certain admirable 
characteristics. Crucially, they are also integrated individuals who possess a unique and 
exceptional individuality and sensibility, and in whom there ultimately exists an undeniable 
sense of unity. 
Further, I have argued that while Nietzsche in EH describes himself as a higher type, he is 
not an example of such a type. In fact, Nietzsche in his works provides us with no concrete 
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example of higher types, because his conception of ‘higher types’ is neither as solid nor as 
plausible as some commentators believe. Many of the characteristics which he ascribes to higher 
types are not just what he as ‘a philosopher’ values and recognises to be necessary for us 
modern to become ‘great’, but also what he as ‘a unique individual living a unique life’ values 
and longs to possess. But his longings for certain characteristics often change, because of his 
ever-changing moods. So, ultimately, he fails to establish a single solid conception of ‘higher 
types’, fails to establish a clear and consistent idea of what exactly constitutes ‘greatness’ in us 
moderns. 
Accordingly, my view is that even if Nietzsche intends to provide an example of a higher 
type, he in fact cannot give us any concrete example of such a type. And though we certainly 
can understand the nature of higher types to a certain extent from all the relevant comments he 
makes, his conception of higher types should also be grasped as essentially a product of his 
various personal fantasies, a fluid compound made up of his ever-changing personal longings 





‘Nobility’ and ‘Life-affirmation’ 
 
As I suggested in Chapter 3, Nietzsche’s conception of ‘higher types’ is closely connected 
with his conception of ‘nobility’ and his idea of ‘life-affirmation’. However, his discussions of 
them are often confusing and obscure. In fact, I agree with Hamilton when he suggests that 
Nietzsche in his works presents – at least – two different conceptions of ‘nobility’ and 
‘life-affirmation’, which Hamilton terms a “worldly” and an “inward” conception, without 
clearly distinguishing one conception from another, and also without properly working out 
either conception.
1
 Accordingly, in this chapter, I investigate these two different conceptions in 
order to clarify the nature of ‘higher types’ further. 
In Section A, as I examine Nietzsche’s ‘worldly’ conception of nobility, I argue that his 
writings display a strong tension between the desire to endorse what I call the worldly nobles’ 
way of life, a certain brutal way of life, that, for example, led by people like Napoleon, and the 
recognition that such a way of life is just not possible in the modern world and also in itself 
hollow. Then, in Section B, I examine Nietzsche’s idea of ‘worldly’ life-affirmation, which is 
expressed by his doctrine of ‘the eternal recurrence’. After discussing some interpretive issues 
concerning ‘the eternal recurrence’, I illustrate several significant problems of the ‘worldly’ 
life-affirmation. In particular, I point out how the ‘worldly’ life-affirmation can actually become 
life-denying in certain contexts, and also argue that what one can affirm in the worldly sense is 
only one’s own life, not ‘life’ in general. Then, in Section C, I examine Nietzsche’s ‘inward’ 
conception of nobility and life-affirmation, and illustrate how it differs from his ‘worldly’ 
                                                 
1 See Hamilton (2000): pp. 169-170 
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conception. And I argue that although Nietzsche’s ‘inward’ conception of nobility and 
life-affirmation can help us see the possibility of a notion of the inward life-affirmation that 
involves not only an affirmation of one’s own life but also an affirmation of ‘life’ in general, 
such notion of the inward affirmation of ‘life’ is something of which we cannot make proper 






















Section A: Nobility in a ‘worldly’ sense 
 
Nietzsche presents a ‘worldly’ conception of nobility primarily through his genealogical 
account of ‘master morality’, which is the first of “two basic types” of morality he claims to 
have discovered among “the many subtler and coarser moralities which have so far been 
prevalent on earth, or still are prevalent” (BGE: 260): the second is ‘slave morality’, typified by 
Christian morality. In this context, people who possess worldly nobility, “the worldly nobles”,2 
are portrayed as people of the ruling class who exist typically in the ancient hierarchical 
societies, such as of pre-Socratic Greece. 
According to Nietzsche, the worldly nobles are the knightly-aristocratic type of men with a 
powerful physicality, a strong soul and an overflowing health, who enjoy vigorous activities. 
They are high-minded individuals, who are exaltedly conscious and proud of these attributes of 
theirs as well as their high social standing (see GM: I, 2 & 7). The essence of their soul is a 
certain type of “egoism”, namely the “unshakable faith that to a being such as “we are” other 
beings must be subordinate by nature and have to sacrifice themselves”, which they accept 
“without any question mark, also without any feeling that it might contain hardness, constraint, 
or caprice, rather as something that may be founded in the primordial law of things”, as if “it is 
justice itself” (BGE: 265). In this manner, they regard themselves as the “meaning and highest 
justification” of their societies, by believing that “society must not exist for society’s sake but 
only as the foundation and scaffolding on which” the noble type of being like themselves “is 
able to raise itself to its higher task and to a higher state of being”. Hence, they accept “with a 
good conscience the sacrifice of untold human beings who . . . must be reduced and lowered to 
incomplete human beings, to slaves, to instruments” for their sake (see BGE: 258). 
                                                 
2 See Hamilton (2000): p. 170. I will continue borrowing the term ‘the worldly nobles’ hereafter. 
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Nietzsche argues that among the worldly nobles, whom he also calls ‘the masters’, the moral 
discrimination of values originates from “the exalted, proud states of the soul” of theirs, from 
their delightful consciousness of their difference from the ruled (see BGE: 260). Such 
consciousness is what Nietzsche calls the “pathos of distance”, namely “the protracted and 
domineering fundamental total feeling on the part of a higher ruling order in relation to a lower 
order”, in which the noble men of the higher ruling order feel “themselves and their actions as 
good, that is, of the first rank, in contradistinction to all the low, low-minded, common and 
plebeian” (see GM: I, 2). Hence, in their ‘master morality’, the primal value ‘good’ is conceived 
by the nobles “spontaneously” out of themselves, and it represents everything they possess and 
are proud of, such as their distinctive attributes and their social standing as the rulers (see GM: I, 
11). And it is only after the positive basic concept ‘good’ is created in such a way that the 
negative concept ‘bad’ is then established by the nobles in the light of their sense of their own 
goodness, as the “opposite” of everything they uniquely possess and are proud of, “only so as to 
affirm” themselves “more gratefully and triumphantly” (see GM: I, 10). Hence, ‘bad’ is merely 
an afterthought, “a contrasting shade” (GM: I, 11), and it represents anything that is alien to 
their noble attributes as well as anyone who is not noble, i.e. the ignoble ruled, whom they find 
“contemptible” (see BGE: 260). 
So, the worldly nobles are self-affirmative individuals who do not need to “persuade 
themselves, deceive themselves,” that they are happy, since their absolute self-reverence itself 
makes them feel themselves to be happy (see GM: I, 10). They are active value-creators, who 
regard themselves as a standard, and who spontaneously posit their own values and ascribe them 
to themselves from their urge to honour themselves. Hence, their master morality is 
“self-glorification” (BGE: 260), an expression of their active self-affirmation, which has 
nothing to do with the “viewpoint of utility” (GM: I, 2). 
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According to Nietzsche, this worldly nobles’ urge to honour themselves is also reflected in 
their ‘actions’: “moral designations were everywhere first applied to human beings and only 
later, derivatively, to actions” (BGE: 260). Towards the other worldly nobles who possess equal 
rights and privileges to its own, the noble soul shows “the same sureness of modesty and 
delicate reverence that characterize its relation with itself”. By exchanging honours and rights 
with the other nobles mutually, “it honors itself in them and in the rights it cedes to them” (see 
BGE: 265). And through such association, the nobles reconfirm and celebrate their sense of 
being ‘good’ to one another. But, on the other hand, against the ignoble ruled, they feel 
themselves to be allowed to “behave as one pleases or “as the heart desires,” and in any case 
“beyond good and evil”” (see BGE: 260). 
Now, what does ‘beyond good and evil’ mean? Although this phrase appears repeatedly in 
his works, it is actually ambiguous, since Nietzsche seems to use it in several different ways, 
often without explaining exactly what he means by it. For instance, at several places, he 
suggests that being ‘beyond good and evil’ is about being “no longer . . . under the spell and 
delusion of morality” (BGE: 56), about leaving “the illusion of moral judgement beneath 
himself” (TI: VII, 1). At different places, he seemingly intends ‘beyond good and evil’ to mean 
“beyond one’s time”, a state in which we “overcome” our time in ourselves and gain “a freedom” 
from “the sum of the imperious value judgements that have become part of our flesh and blood” 
(see GS: 380). But, elsewhere, he seemingly equates ‘beyond good and evil’ with the Hindu and 
Buddhistic type of “the supreme state, redemption itself, total hypnotization and repose at last 
achieved” as an “entry and return into the ground of things, . . . liberation from all illusions, . . . 
release from all purpose, all desire, all action” (GM: III, 17). Hence, this phrase clearly has 




Nevertheless, here, we could plausibly suppose that, in this context of the way the worldly 
nobles behave, this phrase is intended to mean ‘not beyond the realm of master morality with 
the value-distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’, but beyond the realm of slave morality with the 
value-distinction between ‘good’ and ‘evil’’. For, though he at one point equates ‘beyond good 
and evil’ with “unmorally, extra-morally” (HAH: I, Preface, 1), he claims elsewhere that “At 
least this [‘beyond good and evil’] does not mean “Beyond Good and Bad.”” (GM: I, 17). 
Hence, what he suggests here is that the worldly nobles consider themselves to be free to behave 
against the ignoble ruled as they please, in a manner that conforms to the norms of their ‘master 
morality’ but varies from the norms of ‘slave morality’, such as those of Christian morality. But 
it must be added that they are not aware of the fact that they behave in such manner. For, 
according to Nietzsche’s account, at the time of the proto-worldly nobles, slave morality is not 
yet established by ‘the slaves’ as the ignoble ruled. Moreover, even after slave morality is 
established, not only do the worldly nobles hardly know its nature, but they also refuse to know 
it (see GM: I, 10). 
So, in this context, Nietzsche talks about how the worldly nobles can “emerge from a 
disgusting procession of murder, arson, rape, torture, exhilarated and undisturbed of soul, as if it 
were no more than a students’ prank” (GM: I, 11). In his view, they can engage in these hideous 
acts innocently, not simply because of their strength, but, more crucially, because they are not 
subject to the Christian moralised conceptions such as of ‘sin’ and ‘punishment’, which have 
traditionally contributed toward preventing people from committing these hideous acts. To the 
nobles who accept unquestioningly the sacrifice of the ignoble ruled as if “it is justice itself”, 
these hideous acts against the ignoble ruled are part of their privileges as the rulers, which they 
delightfully exercise as ‘good’ actions from the “pathos of distance” (see BGE: 258 & 265). 
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In the same context, Nietzsche also claims that “the noble human being, too, helps the 
unfortunate, but not, or almost not, from pity, but prompted more by an urge begotten by excess 
of power”. In his view, even when the worldly nobles help or pity the ignoble ruled, they still do 
so ‘beyond good and evil’, since they do not consider the act of helping or pitying to be 
‘morally required’ as it is understood in the Christian moral sense. Instead, among the nobles 
who bear no relation to the Christian moralised conceptions such as of ‘love of one’s 
neighbours’, the act of pitying is something that done out of “the feeling of fullness, of power 
that seeks to overflow, the happiness of high tension, the consciousness of wealth that would 
give and bestow”, which exist in the foreground of their ‘master morality’ as “self-glorification” 
(see BGE: 260). 
Nietzsche also argues that the worldly nobles are unintelligent individuals who lack inner 
depths, as their “inner world” is “thin as if it were stretched between two membranes” (GM: II, 
16). And because of this lack, whenever they feel an impulse – such as an impulse ‘to harm 
someone’ –, they cannot stop themselves from translating it into an action immediately, by 
using their mighty strength and energy. Nietzsche insists that among the strong type of men like 
the nobles, there is in fact no “being” – no ‘self’ – behind their actions: there exists behind them 
no such thing as “a neutral substratum”, which is “free to express strength or not to do so” (see 
GM: I, 13). Moreover, Nietzsche adds that the strong type of men like the nobles are also by 
nature ‘forgetful’, “incapable of taking one’s enemies, one’s accidents, even one’s misdeeds 
seriously for very long”, because of their mighty strength and energy (see GM: I, 10). 
To that effect, Nietzsche describes the worldly nobles as “men of prey” who possess 
“unbroken strength of will and lust for power” (BGE: 257). They are essentially barbarous, bold, 
reckless and fearless, as they can always express their natural instincts of cruelty and aggression 
freely, fully and delightfully, whenever they feel like it, with total disregard for their own safety 
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and interests. Hence, they are imprudent and uncalculating individuals who live “in trust and 
openness” with themselves (see GM: I, 10-11). 
In this context, Nietzsche suggests that the worldly nobles are virtually free from 
experiencing ‘ressentiment’. Ressentiment is Nietzsche’s term for a reactive, painful 
psychological state that comprises such emotions as hatred, malice, vengefulness, envy and 
mean-spiritedness, which arises from the repression and subsequence frustration of one’s 
instincts, impulses and desires. For instance, one may experience ressentiment when one desires 
to carry out revenge against someone but this desire is frustrated for some reason, such as for 
one’s physical incompetence. Accordingly, in the case of the worldly nobles, they should have 
no relation to such a painful psychological state, since every impulse of theirs can always 
expend itself as soon as it appears: “Ressentiment itself, if it should appear in the noble man, 
consummates and exhausts itself in an immediate reaction, and therefore does not poison: on the 
other hand, it fails to appear at all on countless occasions on which it inevitably appears in the 
weak and impotent” (see GM: I, 10). 
So far, I have outlined the nature of the worldly nobles Nietzsche presents in his works. 
Now, the issue we ought to discuss is how this ‘worldly’ conception of nobility should be 
understood in relation to his conception of ‘higher types’. For, as I indicated before, one of the 
key clues for understanding his conception of ‘higher types’ lies with his conception of 
‘nobility’, since he regards higher types as people who are ‘noble’. Hence, it seems reasonable 
to presume that, in Nietzsche’s view, one possible way of becoming a ‘higher type’ is to gain 
worldly nobility. The question, then, is how we can gain this nobility. For instance, does 
Nietzsche suggest that, in order to gain worldly nobility, we must go back to being exactly like 
the worldly nobles he describes? I do not think he is. Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, let 
us suppose that ‘worldly’ nobility is all about the exact return to the worldly nobles. 
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It seems that there are two fundamental problems with this interpretation. Firstly, the 
worldly nobles, whom Nietzsche portrays as “triumphant monsters” capable of emerging from 
hideous acts cheerfully and innocently, are so excessively bestial and cruel, that it is hard to 
imagine that such beings have actually existed ever or have existed as widely as he suggests (see 
GM: I, 11). And in fact, notwithstanding the extensive description of the worldly nobles we find 
in Nietzsche’s works, I agree with Hamilton that Nietzsche actually gives no concrete example 
of the worldly nobles he describes at all. That is, although Nietzsche claims that examples of the 
worldly nobles include “the Roman, Arabian, Germanic, Japanese nobility, the Homeric heroes, 
[and] the Scandinavian Vikings” (GM: I, 11), these figures do not actually fit his description of 
the worldly nobles.
3
 For instance, the Homeric heroes are certainly strong, healthy, energetic 
and fundamentally barbarous. Yet, as Simon May remarks, “It is questionable whether . . . the 
Homeric heroes . . . bear much resemblance to his unreflecting ‘nobles’, with their forgetfulness 
of insults and inability to take enemies, accidents, or misdeeds seriously”.4 Indeed, as Hamilton 
observes, even Achilles is nothing like the unreflecting worldly nobles who simply act on their 
impulses and thus do not get poisoned by ressentiment, since throughout the greater part of the 
Iliad he is actually a frustrated figure, who is deeply tormented with ressentiment by 
continuously experiencing the unfulfilled pettiest desires for revenge: just because Agamemnon 
has stolen his mistress who is his booty from the Trojan War, Achilles gets the sulks, refuses to 
take part in the battle against Trojans, and instead cunningly keeps plotting ways to wreak 




                                                 
3 See Hamilton (2000): p. 174 
4 May S (1999): p. 52 
5 See Hamilton (2000): pp. 174-175 
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And secondly, even if we suppose that the worldly nobles Nietzsche describes really existed, 
it is hard to see how we moderns could ever go back to being exactly like them. Over the course 
of history, mankind has acquired such inner depths, that we are now extremely reflecting, 
prudent and clever creatures. And it is an absurd demand, if Nietzsche is asking us suddenly to 




So, Nietzsche’s ‘worldly’ conception of nobility is implausible in some key respects. 
However, this implausibility might be redeemed if we were to suppose instead, as I have done 
in the thesis, that Nietzsche’s genealogical accounts are essentially ‘fictional’ narratives, and 
that the worldly nobles as ‘the masters’ and other related figures such as ‘the slaves’ of his 
genealogical accounts are not necessarily historical individuals who actually existed in specific 
historical periods, but essentially ‘archetypes’, which Nietzsche creates as an ‘instructive’ 
means to illustrate and express his ideas, or to illuminate those of his and others’ inner states 
which he takes to reveal typical psychological patterns in human beings. More precisely, my 
suggestion is that, along with those historical figures such as Goethe and Napoleon, the worldly 
nobles should also be interpreted as one of the ‘archetypes’ who are purposely idealised or 
glamorised by him to represent certain characteristics which he values and thus expects to find 
in ‘higher types’. Then, on this basis, we could suggest that, in Nietzsche’s view, what enables 
us to gain ‘worldly’ nobility is not the exact return to the worldly nobles, but rather the 
acquisition of the characteristics which are symbolised by them. 
However, this does not rule out the possibility that, while Nietzsche does not endorse the 
exact return to the worldly nobles, he still urges us to imitate them closely in some way or other. 
What I mean by this is that it is possible that the characteristics symbolised by the worldly 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Ridley (1998): p. 133 
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nobles as ‘an archetype’, which Nietzsche urges us to acquire for the purpose of gaining worldly 
nobility, are pretty much all those characteristics which we can easily detect from his 
description of the worldly nobles, such as a powerful physicality, an overflowing health, 
high-mindedness, a brutal nature, high social standing and so forth, with the exception of some 
characteristics such as the lack of inner depths. If this is the case, it seems that what Nietzsche 
endorses is, ultimately, something like the emergence of individuals resembling Machiavelli’s 
virtuoso ‘princes’, powerful rulers qua men of virtù, who always think and act essentially as a 
warrior, and who are – when necessary – willing and able to act cruelly, ruthlessly and 




This kind of interpretation actually seems plausible. For, despite the problems mentioned 
earlier, there is no doubt that Nietzsche’s writings display a strong fascination for the worldly 
nobles and their way of life. For instance, let us consider Napoleon, whom Nietzsche 
undeniably admires and associates with ‘higher types’: as I said, Napoleon is one of the 
‘archetypes’ who are idealised by Nietzsche to represent certain characteristics which he expects 
to find in ‘higher types’.8 Even without idealising him, we could plausibly say that Napoleon 
came close to being a modern embodiment of the worldly nobles’ way of life, resembling the 
worldly nobles not in every respect but in many key respects. Just like the worldly nobles, he 
was admirably strong and healthy both in body and soul, an extremely active and energetic man. 
And though he was far from unintelligent or imprudent – he was in fact very intellectual, clever, 
cunning and cultured –, he was essentially a ‘man of prey’ with an “unbroken strength of will 
                                                 
7 See Machiavelli (1988): Chapter XIV – XVIII. There are commentators who take a view similar to this. See, e.g., 
Löwith (1991): pp. 261-262 
8 For writing the rest of this section, I have widely referred to and drawn many ideas from Hamilton (2001), 
especially Chapter 2-3, 7 & 10. 
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and lust for power” (BGE: 257), and was capable of being very bold, reckless, fearless and 
brutal when the occasion demanded. He was a high-minded, self-conceited ruler who revelled in 
his privilege and claimed great honours. With a firm faith in his abilities and superiority over 
the masses, he presumably saw his society largely as “the foundation and scaffolding on which” 
he could build and leave his own great legacy, and he certainly accepted “with a good 
conscience the sacrifice of untold human beings who . . . must be reduced and lowered to 
incomplete human beings, to slaves, to instruments” for the sake of his own worldly power and 
glory (see BGE: 258 & 265). 
Indeed, just like the worldly nobles, Napoleon was capable of standing and behaving 
‘beyond good and evil’. During his life, he made his way to power and prestige by committing 
many atrocities, murdering a countless number of people, including women and children.
9
 
Whether or to what extent Napoleon took delight in committing those atrocities is unclear. But 
what is clear is that Napoleon definitely committed them with “undisturbed of soul” (see GM: I, 
11). His conscience was hardly ever troubled by them, and he certainly never lost sleep over 
them.
10
 It is evident that his moral sensitivity was far less developed as compared with that of 
many of us. Hence, compared to us, he was much more capable of seeing and valuing the world 
in terms of ‘strength and weakness’ as the worldly nobles do, instead of in terms of ‘good and 
evil’ or ‘right and wrong’ as we generally do. And just like the worldly nobles, he was clearly 
free from the Christian moralised conceptions such as of ‘guilt’, ‘bad conscience’ and ‘sin’. So, 
he was able to commit those atrocities as a part of his privilege as a ruler, as what was simply 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Bruce (1995): p. 248 
10 According to Cronin, who is a leading biographer of Napoleon, one of the most revealing things about Napoleon 
was his “ability to sleep at will” under any situation, “even when guns were thundering a few yards away”. On this 
unique ability, Cronin remarks, “It presupposes great calm. Though his senses were sharp, and he felt things keenly, 
Napoleon seldom worried, and was hardly ever seriously ruffled” (see Cronin 1986: pp. 227-228). 
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necessary to secure and maintain his power and prestige, with a clear conscience. All things 
considered, compared to the most of us, he was clearly far less prone to painful psychological 
states such as ressentiment. 
As I said, Nietzsche’s writings display an undeniable admiration for the worldly nobles and 
Napoleon. What, then, are the characteristics common to them, which he values and admires? 
There are many possible characteristics we could think of. But let us begin with the obvious: 
‘creativity’. It is a characteristic which Nietzsche values as the chief element of ‘human 
greatness’, and undoubtedly attributes to the worldly nobles, as well as to Napoleon, who 
exerted a huge influence on Europe politically and culturally. Yet, it cannot be ‘creativity’ per 
se. For, despite being critical of the slaves throughout his works, he suggests that, in 
establishing their ‘slave morality’, the slaves are as much creative as the worldly nobles. 
Concerning the origin of slave morality, Nietzsche claims, “The slave revolt in morality 
begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of 
natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an 
imaginary revenge” (GM: I, 10). Being oppressed by the masters as the worldly nobles, the 
slaves seek to avenge themselves on their oppressors. But the slaves are physically weak, and 
thus do not possess sufficient power actually to carry out a physical revenge as ‘the true reaction’ 
against the oppression. And as their hatred and vengefulness against the masters continue to be 
repressed by their own physical impotence, they eventually experience ressentiment. And slave 
morality first comes into being, when the slaves are prompted by their ressentiment to 
compensate for their failure in the physical revenge with ‘an imaginary revenge’, namely with 
an establishment of new values that would place them above their oppressors. 
However, being “the violated, oppressed, suffering, unfree, who are uncertain of themselves 
and weary” (BGE: 260), the slaves cannot create their own values ‘spontaneously’ out of 
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themselves as the worldly nobles can. Hence, they invert the masters’ valuations out of their 
ressentiment, in order to establish new values which would devalue the masters. So, they first 
design the concept ‘evil’ as the primal value of their slave morality, and it represents what 
harms them, “precisely the “good man” of the other morality, precisely the noble, powerful man, 
the ruler, but dyed in another color, interpreted in another fashion, seen in another way by the 
venomous eye of ressentiment” (see GM: I, 11). From this, they then define the concept ‘good’ 
as the negation of ‘evil’, and it represents what is unlike the masters, namely the slaves 
themselves (see GM: I, 10). And by conceiving new values in this way, the slaves deceive 
themselves and convince themselves of their goodness and their superiority over the masters: 
instead of a physical action, they in imagination gratify their vengefulness with “a radical 
revaluation of their enemies’ values”, which Nietzsche describes as “an act of the most spiritual 
revenge” (see GM: I, 7). Hence, whereas the way the worldly nobles create their values is active, 
the slaves’ value-designation is reactive in nature (see GM: I, 10). 
And Nietzsche argues that it was precisely because it was in such a way that the powerless 
slaves conceived values that “man first became an interesting animal . . . did the human soul in 
a higher sense acquire depth” (GM: I, 6). “Human history would be altogether too stupid a thing 
without the spirit that the impotent have introduced into it” (GM: I, 7), he comments. That is, 
being under the oppression all the time from which they cannot escape, the slaves are at first 
constantly prevented from expressing their instincts freely. What happens when one’s instincts 
are forcibly repressed? Nietzsche argues that all instincts which can no longer find any proper 
outlet in the external world inevitably turn backward on their possessor: “All instincts that do 
not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward – this is what I call the internalization of man”. 
And it is through this ‘internalization’ that a man first acquires some depths in his inner world 
and subsequently develops the so-called “soul”, i.e. ‘conscience’ (see GM: II, 16; see also EH: 
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GM). So, compared with the unintelligent worldly nobles, the slaves, who constantly acquire 
inner depths through the ‘internalization’, are much “cleverer”, prudent and calculating 
individuals (see GM: I, 10). 
In this regard, Nietzsche seems to value the slaves over the worldly nobles. By lacking inner 
depths, the worldly nobles bear “only a very limited variety of drives within”.11 Hence, the way 
they actively approach and evaluate life is boringly simple. Such an unrefined active creativity 
founded on inner shallowness, which is capable of producing only a very limited set of values, 
is something far removed from what we regard as human greatness. By comparison, the way the 
slaves reactively inquire and evaluate the causes of their suffering in a vigorous manner is much 
more complex and interesting.
12
 Such a profound reactive creativity founded on inner depths 
and a wide variety of drives seem to possess more potentialities for establishing new vast and 
multifarious values and thus for producing new forms of human greatness – “pregnant with a 
future” (GM: II, 16), as Nietzsche says. And this latter way of conceiving values could also be 
seen as more relevant to us moderns, since what the slaves have achieved, ‘a radical revaluation 
of their enemies’ values’, is practically what Nietzsche urges us to do, namely the creation of 
new set of original values by ‘a revaluation of all values’. 
But then, Napoleon was far from unintelligent. And Nietzsche is predominantly critical of 
the slaves and of slave morality throughout his works. He clearly considers this type of morality, 
typified by Christian morality, to be specially ‘life-denying’. He believes that such ‘life-denying’ 
morality is a harmful obstacle to the flourishing of higher types, and that its triumph over the 
last two millennia or so is the chief cause of the decadence of contemporary ‘life’ and ‘culture’. 
                                                 
11 Richardson (1996): p. 68 
12 See Tanner (2000): pp. 82-83 
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Taking all these points into consideration, we could plausibly suggest that what Nietzsche 
values and attributes to both the worldly nobles and Napoleon as ‘archetypes’, and thus to 
higher types, is not the active creativity founded on inner shallowness, but rather the active 
creativity founded on ‘life-affirmation’ that is capable of creating one’s own values 
spontaneously, which he regards as “the characteristic right of masters” (see BGE: 261). In 
other words, one of the key reasons why Nietzsche is attracted to them is that they both have 
‘style’ of their own, which he increasingly values almost more than anything in his mature 
works. He writes in GS, 
 
One thing is needful. – To “give style” to one’s character – a great and rare art! It is practiced by 
those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them into an artistic 
plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye. Here a 
large mass of second nature has been added; there a piece of original nature has been removed – both 
times through long practice and daily work at it. Here the ugly that could not be removed is 
concealed; there it has been reinterpreted and made sublime. Much that is vague and resisted shaping 
has been saved and exploited for distant views; it is meant to beckon toward the far and 
immeasurable. In the end, when the work is finished, it becomes evident how the constraint of a 
single taste governed and formed everything large and small. Whether this taste was good or bad is 
less important than one might suppose, if only it was a single taste! . . . one thing is needful: that a 
human should attain satisfaction with himself, whether it be by means of this or that poetry and art; 
only then is a human being at all tolerable to behold (GS: 290). 
 
What Nietzsche proposes in this passage is that we should become artists of our own life – or 
“the poets of our life” (GS: 299) –, trying to make of ourselves artworks (see HAH: II, i, 174). 
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And leaving aside many problems we could identify in this passage, such as how exactly one is 
to judge what counts as strengthens and weaknesses in one’s character, the basic idea here is 
that “nothing in what one is should be wasted”, which is undoubtedly connected with the mature 
Nietzsche’s persistent desire and programme for showing that ‘nothing in one’s past should be 
regretted or treated as waste’ (see Chapter 3-C).13 
In this regard, the worldly nobles seem to fit the bill, not in every respect but in a key 
respect. For, although they are unreflecting individuals, they are nevertheless active 
value-creators with absolute self-reverence, who regard themselves as a standard, and who 
spontaneously posit their own values and ascribe them to themselves from their urge to honour 
themselves. They are extremely life-affirming individuals – since, what they affirm is not just 
themselves, but also their surrounding world, ‘life’ as a whole, which allows them to maintain 
and enjoy their sense of their own goodness –,14 who affirm even their inner shallowness as a 
part of their whole goodness: though without much ‘long practice and daily work’, they attain 
complete satisfaction with themselves. Hence, we could say that they are ultimately possessors 
of their own ‘style’, capable of giving a synthetic unity to their character. 
Now, for many commentators, especially those who strive to interpret Nietzsche’s 
philosophy as something compatible with today’s liberal and humane moral perspective, the 
chief cause for concern about Nietzsche’s notion of giving ‘style’ to one’s character is the fact 
that Nietzsche writes, ‘Whether this taste was good or bad is less important than one might 
suppose, if only it was a single taste!’. For, as some commentators point out,15 this passage 
indicates that what really interests Nietzsche is not the content of one’s character, but rather the 
way all the individual pieces of one’s character fit together in a purely formal sense. It means 
                                                 
13 See Hamilton (2001): p. 49; also Tanner (2000): pp. 5 & 45-46 
14 See Richardson (1996): p. 56 
15 See Hamilton (2001): pp. 49-50 & Tanner (2000): pp. 51-52 
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that even someone whom many consider to be a morally corrupt person with an absolutely 
abominable character could still be regarded by Nietzsche as having ‘style’. And this is an 
unpleasant possibility that make those commentators particularly uneasy. So, for instance, to 
avoid facing this predicament, Nehamas claims, “It is not clear to me whether a consistently and 
irredeemably vicious person does actually have a character; the sort of agent Aristotle describes 
as ‘bestial’ probably does not. In some way there is something inherently praiseworthy in 
having character or style that prevents extreme cases of vice from being praised even in 
Nietzsche’s formal sense”. 16  But Nehamas’ claim cannot be a correct interpretation of 
Nietzsche’s view. For I agree with Hamilton that “Nietzsche did think that a person could have 
style and yet be far from being morally praiseworthy in any modern sense”.17 
Indeed, throughout his mature works, Nietzsche also positively talks about several other 
historical figures who could be, along with Napoleon, regarded as powerful ‘men of prey’ – the 
‘good men’ in master morality –, such as Caesar and Cesare Borgia (see BGE: 197 & 200). 
Certainly, in the eyes of the victims of their oppression, these historical figures were merely 
vicious criminals: as Nietzsche says, “We would be the last to deny that anyone who met these 
‘good men’ only as enemies would know them only as evil enemies.” (GM: I, 16). Yet, the fact 
is that, for many of us moderns as mere third-party spectators, and for Nietzsche, who 
sometimes affects to “take a kind of god’s-eye view of the world” and seems to be “wearied by 
‘mass man’” in the belief that “a collection of extremely similar people would be as boring and 
superfluous as one of extremely similar works of art”,18 these historical ‘men of prey’ are 
irresistibly unique and interesting. In their extraordinary grandness both in body and soul and 
their exceptional capacity for achievement and so forth, they are unmistakably magnificent and 
                                                 
16 Nehamas (1985): p. 193 
17 Hamilton (2001): p. 50 
18 Tanner (2000): p. 95 
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impressive in so many ways that even today many of us find them fascinating and admirable. 
Looking at the way they single-mindedly navigated themselves through life and created 
themselves, we could plausibly says that each of them was an integrated life-affirming 
individual with an undeniable ‘style’, in whom a unified single taste ultimately prevailed. 
So, does Nietzsche urge us to emulate those historical ‘men of prey’ to lead the worldly 
nobles’ way of life as they did? Does he suggest that, in order to gain worldly nobility and 
become higher types, we must become brutal to such an extent that we can commit atrocities 
without feeling the pricks of conscience? As on many issues, he refuses to make his position 
completely clear on this. And it seems to me that his attitude is in fact genuinely equivocal. For, 
in my view, his writings clearly display a strong tension between the desire to endorse the 
worldly nobles’ way of life and the recognition that such a way of life is just not possible in the 
modern world and also in itself hollow. 
Let me start clarifying my view. There are at least two basic problems if Nietzsche is urging 
us to emulate those historical ‘men of prey’. The first problem is that one of the reasons why 
those men were able to lead the worldly nobles’ way of life as successfully as they did is that 
they possessed all the physical, psychological and social characteristics which make them 
perfectly fit for such way of life. But the reality is that only a handful of people could possibly 
possess such characteristics: besides, if everyone possessed such characteristics and started 
behaving like Napoleon, the whole social world would soon collapse. Certainly, if we consider 
Nietzsche’s insistence on ‘selectivity’,19 this may not be a problem. Nietzsche could be simply 
thinking that anyone who is destined not to be blessed with those characteristics has no chance 
of gaining worldly nobility. 
                                                 
19 For instance, in his mature years, Nietzsche often insists upon the selectivity of his works: how they choose their 
readers, how they can truly be understood only by a few selected readers (see AC: Preface & EH: Preface, 3-4). 
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But then, the second problem is that, while Nietzsche suggests that historically the 
emergence of great men is fundamentally “accidental” and has been rarely influenced by “the 
environment” or “the age” (see TI: IX, 44), there is no doubt that those historical ‘men of prey’ 
were able to give style to their character and flourish in the way they did, not simply because of 
the characteristics they possessed, but also crucially because they were placed in certain 
favourable socio-political conditions for it. Indeed, even if we possess the same set of 
characteristics as theirs, it is still highly unlikely that we will be able to flourish in the modern 
world in the same way as they did, where socio-political conditions are totally different from 
theirs. 
In fact, Nietzsche seems to be aware of this problem, since he writes, “The criminal type is 
the type of the strong human being under unfavourable circumstances: a strong human being 
made sick. . . . His virtues are ostracized by society . . . It is society, our tame, mediocre, 
emasculated society, in which a natural human being, who comes from the mountains or from 
the adventures of the sea necessarily degenerates into a criminal” (TI: IX, 45). So, in his view, 
there exists in the modern world almost no favourable condition for powerful ‘men of prey’ to 
flourish through the worldly nobles’ way of life. It seems, then, that for us to flourish in such 
way, we require some change in socio-political conditions, possibly a return to the old type of 
hierarchical society which those historical ‘men of prey’ had. However, as I argued in Chapter 
1-C, this is an idea Nietzsche ultimately dismisses. 
Now, one way we could avoid facing these problems is to suppose instead that what 
Nietzsche really values in the worldly nobles and the historical ‘men of prey’ is their 
‘psychological’ or ‘spiritual’ characteristics. And this is a popular, and seemingly plausible, 
approach taken by many commentators. For, in his discussion of the worldly nobles, Nietzsche 
often places greater emphasis on their psychological strength than on their physical strength (see 
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BGE: 257). And his notions of ‘strength’ and ‘health’, which he values and associates with 
‘higher types’, are predominantly psychological in nature: they are, for instance, ‘strength’ in 
the sense of “How much truth does a spirit endure, how much truth does it dare” (EH: Preface, 
4), ‘health’ in the sense of “instinctively cho[osing] the right means against wretched states” 
(EH: Wise, 2). Moreover, while he regards the strict distinction between social classes as what 
originally enables the worldly nobles to possess the “pathos of distance”, and to develop their 
moral discrimination of values (see BGE: 257), he also talks about how, in their master morality, 
a basic concept denoting political superiority always necessarily resolves itself into a concept 
denoting superiority of soul, ‘good’ in the sense of “nobility of soul”, which is a “typical 
character trait” of the worldly nobles: consequently, its value-distinction, the antithesis between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’, eventually develops into something that no longer refers to social standing. 
And he insists that it is such “typical character traits”, “nobility of soul”, that concerns him and 
us (see GM: I, 4-6). 
So, though the terms ‘the masters’ and ‘the slaves’ apply to actual social classes in the 
context of his discussion about the origin of different types of morality, Nietzsche also generally 
intends them to apply to one’s psychological characteristics, or, as Simon May puts it, “manners 
of thought and being, exemplifiable across a broad range of human activities”.20 This means 
that, in Nietzsche’s view, someone belonging to ‘the masters’ in socio-political sense could well 
be ‘the slaves’ in psychological sense.21 Hence, for instance, Nietzsche describes ‘the priests’, 
another ‘archetype’, as people who are members of high social standing and yet weak and 
unhealthy both in body and soul: despite being ‘noble’ in socio-political sense, they are not 
                                                 
20 May S (1999): p. 51; see, also, Richardson (1996): pp. 52-58 
21 See Leiter (2002): p. 201 & Strong (2000): p. 239 
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worldly nobles, since they lack the ‘nobility of soul’ Nietzsche ascribes to worldly nobility (see 
GM: I, 6-7). 
So, according to this interpretation, what Nietzsche urges us to do is not to emulate the 
historical ‘men of prey’, but to acquire the psychological characteristics symbolised by them 
and the worldly nobles alike, and that one can gain worldly nobility even if one lacks the 
physical and social characteristics these archetypes symbolise. From this, we could further 
suggest that one also does not need to have the same socio-political conditions as the historical 
‘men of prey’ had, nor become as brutal as they were. 
That is, in the context of his discussion of worldly nobility, the psychological characteristics 
Nietzsche values and ascribes to the worldly nobles and the historical ‘men of prey’, and thus to 
‘higher types’, clearly include a life-affirming nature and psychological health, which are 
composed of such characteristics as absolute ‘self-reverence’, freedom from ‘ressentiment’, and 
the ability to stand ‘beyond good and evil’ in the sense of being free from Christian moralised 
conceptions such as of ‘guilt’, ‘bad conscience’ and ‘punishment’, which he considers to be a 
wrong interpretation of suffering. Certainly, it may be true that being a powerful aristocrat in the 
old type of hierarchical society as these ‘men of prey’ were does make it easier for one to 
acquire these characteristics. And it is true that these ‘men of prey’ were able to remain far less 
prone to ressentiment than most of us because of their brutality, of their ability to express their 
aggressive instincts relatively freely, and that all those atrocities they committed were in a sense 
an expression of their ‘self-reverence’, of their state of being ‘beyond good and evil’ in the 
above-mentioned sense. But then, there is no reason why one cannot equally become 
life-affirming and lead a virtually ressentiment-free life by being an ordinary member of a 
modern democratic society: for instance, one’s self-reverence and attitude towards suffering are 
not ultimately determined by one’s social position or wealth or privilege. And one can certainly 
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achieve this without becoming brutal or committing an atrocity. For, as Ridley suggests, “there 
is no conceptual connection between the adoption of a style of valuation which affirms life for 
what it is, including the suffering in it, and the desire to increase the amount of suffering that 
the world contains (and hence that needs affirming). You could say yes to life, that is, without 
being then obliged by any logical consideration to go out and burn something down”.22 
This point can be substantiated by the fact that although Nietzsche often declares himself an 
‘immoralist’, he never actually encourages people to act immorally. For instance, in D, he 
explicitly writes, “It goes without saying that I do not deny – unless I am a fool – that many 
actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, or that many called moral ought to be 
done and encouraged – but I think the one should be encouraged and the other avoided for other 
reasons than hitherto” (D: 103). So, though he fails to tell us what exactly are the ‘many actions 
called immoral’, it is nevertheless clear that he does not in any way actively urge us to become 
brutal and inflict suffering on others. 
If anything, Nietzsche is ‘an immoralist’ only towards certain types of morality, as he at no 
point rejects ‘morality’ per se or denies the existence of values and virtues: he is actually 
horrified by the imminent arrival of nihilism where no value and virtue impresses people 
anymore. So, for instance, elsewhere in D, he endorses what he calls ‘the four cardinal virtues’: 
“The good four. – Honest towards ourselves and whoever else is a friend to us; brave towards 
the enemy; magnanimous towards the defeated; polite – always: this is what the four cardinal 
virtues want us to be” (D: 556). Moreover, although he is critical of the virtues the slave 
morality cherishes, he does not necessarily criticise them per se. As Ridley suggests, “it is the 
attitude behind them that he deplores, not (always) the virtues themselves”.23 So, for instance, 
                                                 
22 Ridley (1998): p. 129 
23 Ridley (1998): p. 130 
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he is critical of the Christian notion of ‘pity’, partly because he sees it as a dishonest expression 
of one’s weakness and impotence, which is founded on one’s inability to affirm life as it is. But 
he sees nothing wrong with the worldly nobles pitying the unfortunate ‘beyond good and evil’, 
since their ‘pity’ is an honest expression of their strength and power, founded on their 
self-reverence and life-affirmation. Indeed, Nietzsche explicitly emphasizes that nobility is not 
about one’s “actions”, but rather about one’s “faith”, one’s self-reverence (see BGE: 287). 
Moreover, if we take account of the fact that Nietzsche intends his genealogical accounts to 
function as ‘a polished mirror’ in which to assess the condition of our life (see Chapter 2-A), we 
could suggest that, by portraying the worldly nobles as unimaginably bestial and cruel, he is 
simply trying to illustrate his view of the fact that our natural aggressive instincts are deeply 
repressed by our highly-civilised social life, and to make us recognise that the lack of freedom 
from the constraints of modern society causes us to become poisoned by ressentiment far more 
gravely than we realise. 
Furthermore, Nietzsche’s glamorization of the ‘men of prey’ could also be interpreted as a 
part of his attempt to show how, contrary to Christianity that tries to impose a single ‘moral’ 
way of life upon us, there could possibly exist many different, more ‘human’ ways of 
flourishing. For, although the worldly nobles’ way of life is clearly morally un-praiseworthy and 
un-virtuous from the Christian perspective, there is no doubt that Napoleon – in one way or 
another – did flourish through this way of life. 
At the same time, Nietzsche’s fascination with the ‘men of prey’ could equally be seen as a 
part of his attempt to give some positive value to all those egoistic characteristics and emotions 
such as greed, pride, envy, vanity and lust, which Christianity condemns as ‘vices’. For he says 
at one point that the impulse “to have an ideal of one’s own”, “to posit his own ideal and to 
derive from it his own law, joy, and rights”, which we identify in the ‘men of prey’, is 
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essentially “a very undistinguished impulse, related to stubbornness, disobedience, and envy” 
(GS: 143). And while he never goes so far as to claim that those egoistic characteristics and 
emotions are simply in themselves ‘good’ and ‘admirable’ and should be encouraged, he clearly 
regards them not simply as an inevitable and permanent feature of life, but also as essential to 
much that is good and valuable in life. And indeed, there is no doubt that those egoistic 
characteristics and emotions, though unpleasant in themselves and often painful to experience, 
did play an essential role in Napoleon’s relentless pursuit of worldly glory and thus in his great 
achievements, which many of us can unhesitatingly admire, and that had he not possessed and 
experienced them he simply could not have flourished in the way he did. 
Yet, it is also clear to me from his writings that Nietzsche is often tempted to affirm and 
endorse the worldly nobles’ way of life: he seriously contemplates the idea of emulating the 
brutal ‘men of prey’. And I think there are three chief reasons for this. 
Firstly, while it seems indeed correct to suggest that what Nietzsche truly values is the 
psychological characteristics of the ‘men of prey’, we cannot ignore his valuation of their 
physical and social characteristics, when we take account of the ‘personal’ nature of his 
writings. As I argued, many of the characteristics symbolised by the various archetypes whom 
Nietzsche relates to ‘higher types’ are not simply what he as ‘a philosopher’ values in 
connection with his idea of ‘human greatness’, but also what he as ‘a unique individual’ values, 
desires and fantasies about possessing. In this sense, for Nietzsche, who himself suffers from 
and wants to overcome the Christian moralised conceptions such as of ‘guilt’ and ‘sin’, the 
psychological health which the ‘men of prey’ symbolise is clearly an object of avid desire. But, 
on the other hand, for Nietzsche as a man of weak constitution with persistent illness, the 
overflowing physical strength and health which these archetypes symbolise is also clearly 
something that holds special appeal to him. And likewise, in the light of the strong liking for the 
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aristocracy which his writings often display, we could also suppose that the high social standing 
which these archetypes symbolise is also an object of his fantasy. 
Secondly, as I argued in Chapter 1-B, Nietzsche’s texts display an undeniable fascination for 
violent images. And, as a naturalist, Nietzsche is undoubtedly deeply fascinated by the way the 
‘men of prey’ expose through atrocities their natural aggressive instincts in their purest form. 
Moreover, if we take account of the fact that Nietzsche often expresses a kind of deeply 
personal frustration in his writings and suffered persistent illness which forced him to endure 
throughout his mature years an extremely confined, constrained and inactive life, it seems 
plausible to suppose that he was also sometimes irrepressibly drawn to this whole free, active 
and brutal worldly nobles’ way of life as a kind of compensatory thought. And one could also 
suggest that such a compensation is also reflected in his fascination with ‘intoxication’, which 
he continues to maintain even after the abandonment of his youthful idea of the Dionysian type 
of religion. 
And finally, what Nietzsche sees in the worldly nobles’ way of life is a possible way of 
overcoming his exceptional sensitivity to human life as a scene of suffering. As I have argued, 
even after his rejection of Schopenhauer’s pessimism, he continues to believe that life will 
forever possess in its nature the terrible aspects characterised by unavoidable pain and suffering. 
Despite abandoning his youthful idea of the Dionysian type of religion, he still recognises the 
plausibility of ‘Dionysian wisdom’, i.e. the truth about the terrible nature of human life, and 
continues to believe that the direct recognition of such wisdom, or the sight of the world as it, is 
simply unbearable, and thus that we must somehow conceal from ourselves the terrible nature of 
existence as we would otherwise perish (see HAH: I, 33). And many of his mature works can be, 
in many respects, plausibly read as ‘self-therapeutic’ books written especially for Nietzsche 
himself as ‘a sufferer’, as his personal attempts to identify the best possible way positively to 
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interpret, justify and accept the fact of the existence of suffering. And his fascination and 
admiration for those historical figures such as Beethoven and Napoleon is a part of such attempt 
of his to cope with not just his own suffering but also his awareness of others’ suffering, to 
make ‘life’ as a whole embraceable (see Chapter 2-A, 3-A & 3-C). 
And Nietzsche clearly believes that those brutal ‘men of prey’ hold a possible solution to 
this awareness. For, what he recognises in these characters is a remarkable hardness that makes 
them not flinch at anything, even at the sight of others’ suffering. And he finds this 
characteristic extremely appealing, since he sometime thinks, or tries to make himself believe, 
that others’ suffering is something he can actually affirm by being able to bear the sight of it. 
That is, depending on his mood, he is sometimes tempted to suggest that being completely 
indifferent to the sufferings of others, or, even finding them ‘entertaining’ or ‘pleasurable’ or 
‘beautiful’, is the same as affirming those sufferings: I shall discuss this in the next section. 
So, when overwhelmed by the sight of the meaningless surfeit of human suffering, 
Nietzsche longs to become or fantasises about being like those brutal ‘men of prey’, whose 
remarkable hardness enables them to inflict suffering on others and bear the sight of it, or to 
bear the sight of someone inflicting suffering on others, with absolute equanimity, or even with 
innocent exhilaration and delight.
24
 And there is no doubt that both his criticism of pity and 
contempt for his fellow human beings that we often find in his works are also part of such 
attempt, to overcome his susceptibility to pity for others: “my humanity does not consist in 
                                                 
24 Staten makes a similar observation, writing that “Without the cruel hero, Nietzsche would have to shut himself off 
entirely from the perception of a universe of suffering that he would not be able to bear. He needs the cruel hero 
precisely so that he can receive back into himself, absorb and endure the greatest quantity of sympathetic perception 
of suffering, and in fact experience it as the ultimate pleasure, the ‘feeling above all feelings.’” (Quoted in Ridley 
1998: p. 139). 
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feeling with men how they are, but in enduring that I feel with them. My humanity is a constant 
self-overcoming” (EH: Wise, 8). 
But then, the problem for Nietzsche is that he was never really capable of committing 
himself to the worldly nobles’ way of life. One is certainly free to experiment with any belief in 
one’s head. But to endorse the legitimacy of a belief one eventually has to test that belief in 
reality. Moreover, it is one thing to fantasise about being like Napoleon, but it is another 
actually to become like Napoleon. And Nietzsche himself is clearly incapable of becoming like 
Napoleon, as he is simply by nature far too weak and far too gentle to lead the worldly nobles’ 
way of life. Certainly, he could steel himself to certain acts of violence, just as Raskolnikoff did: 
the protagonist of Dostoevsky’s novel Crime and Punishment, a man of weak constitution, who 
similarly fantasised about being like Napoleon, and actually tried to act like Napoleon by 
committing murder. But it is obvious that Nietzsche would inevitably go to meet the same fate 
as Raskolnikoff, who was, unlike Napoleon, consequently tormented day and night by the stings 
of his conscience for the murders he committed. For what Nietzsche and Raskolnikoff share is 
not only a make-up almost completely opposite to that of Napoleon’s, which prohibits them 
from acting like Napoleon satisfactorily, but also a moral sensitivity that is much more highly 
developed than that of Napoleon, which makes them recognise ultimately how hollow and 
abominable the worldly nobles’ way of life actually is. 
Indeed, normally, Nietzsche recognises that the worldly nobles’ way of life is not only 
something that cannot be led successfully in the modern world, but also something he cannot 
endorse wholeheartedly. So, at one point, he describes Napoleon as “the most isolated and 
late-born man”, i.e. a worldly noble, who appeared in the wrong time at the wrong place, and 
claims that “in him the problem of the noble ideal as such made flesh [was apparent] – one 
might well ponder what kind of problem it is: Napoleon, this synthesis of the inhuman and 
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superhuman” (GM: I, 16). The worldly nobles’ way of life is problematic, because, while he 
sees in the worldly nobles and Napoleon many characteristics that he values and wishes to 
attribute to ‘higher types’ – ‘superhuman’ characteristics –, he cannot whole-heartedly affirm 
their brutality, their inhuman side. As I said, he never actively urges people to become brutal 
and inflict suffering on others. And it is clear that, fundamentally, he does not want to 
encourage a situation where the majority of people have to suffer for the sake of few brutal 
‘men of prey’. 
In fact, as I suggested in Chapter 2-C, Nietzsche in his mature years also recognises, as he 
himself now experiences through his illness what it is really like to suffer, that the way his 
youthful idea of an ‘aesthetic’ justification portrays human suffering as ‘entertaining’ or 
‘beautiful’ only makes things worse. And on this recognition, he often seems to resolve never to 
pursue such a type of approach to human suffering any further. So, he writes, “No image of 
torture. – I want to proceed as Raphael did and never paint another image of torture. There are 
enough sublime things so that one does not have to look for the sublime where it dwells in 
sisterly association with cruelty; and my ambition also could never find satisfaction if I became 
a sublime assistant at torture” (GS: 313). 
Yet, this resolution is something he can only stick to for short periods of time. For, as I 
suggested in Chapter 3-C, depending on his mood, in his ‘cinematic’ imagination of his being 
one of the ‘men of prey’ who could bear or even appreciate the dreadful spectacle of human 
suffering, he becomes so deeply gripped by its imaginative appeal, that he can no longer 
clear-sightedly recognise all those problems and thus often ends up admiring and affirming the 
worldly nobles’ way of life far more intensely than he ought, without giving careful thought to 
how endorsing it will affect him and his philosophy as a whole. 
189 
 
In such moment of excited affirmation, Nietzsche simply becomes convinced that he is 
actually capable of leading a worldly nobles’ way of life. But, by doing so, he makes the same 
mistake he has made in his youthful idea of the ‘aesthetic’ justification. That is, he mistakenly 
thinks that he can and will become one of the ‘men of prey’ who inflict suffering on others or 
watch someone inflicting suffering on others, so that he himself will never be bothered by 
others’ suffering, while forgetting to consider the possibility that he could actually – and, 
realistically, would most likely – end up being one who has to suffer under the ‘men of prey’ – 
one who has to be a part of the spectacle. 
In this manner, I suggest, Nietzsche is trapped in and tormented by a dilemma that is caused 
by his strong inner tension between his urge to affirm and endorse the worldly nobles’ way of 
life and his recognition of the impossibility of leading the worldly nobles’ way of life in the 
modern world as well as the hollowness of such way of life itself. Certainly, throughout his 
mature works, he attempts to explore various different ways to cope with a suffocating sense of 
pity that overwhelms him at the sight of suffering humanity. Yet, he never seems to manage to 
find anything that satisfies him. Indeed, as we will see, because of his stubborn commitment to 
complete life-affirmation as well as his fundamental contempt for fellow human beings, his 
options are always very limited.
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Section B: Life-affirmation in a ‘worldly’ sense 
 
As I suggested before, compared with the youthful Nietzsche’s idea of life-affirmation that 
only tries to ‘bear’ life through the mediation of a metaphysical third-party, what the mature 
Nietzsche proposes is a more direct form of life-affirmation that tries to ‘embrace’ life 
completely without resorting to any metaphysical mediation. And this new idea of 
life-affirmation, which he connects to the ‘worldly’ conception of nobility, what we may call the 
‘worldly’ life-affirmation, is expressed by him through his doctrine of ‘the eternal recurrence’. 
He introduces this doctrine in GS, in the shape of a proclamation by “a demon”. 
 
What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to 
you: “This life as you now live it and have lived it, your will have to live once more and innumerable 
times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every though and 
sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same 
succession and sequence – even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this 
moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and 
you with it, speck of dust!” Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the 
demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have 
answered him: “You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine.” If this thought gained 
possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in each and 
everything, “Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?” would lie upon your 
actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to 




So, the basic idea of the eternal recurrence is that everything recurs eternally in exactly the same 
way and order in which it happens now. 
Now, there was a time when the eternal recurrence was traditionally interpreted as 
Nietzsche’s ‘cosmological’ theory. And the basic idea of this theory, of what we may call ‘the 
recurrence cosmology’,1 is that not only does everything really recur eternally, but it has also 
already existed and repeated itself an infinite number of times before in exactly the same way 
and order (see Z: III, 2, 2 & III, 13, 2). However, like the majority of recent commentators, I 
find the ‘cosmological’ interpretation questionable, since ‘the recurrence cosmology’ is clearly 
too underdeveloped to be regarded as a cosmology proper. Nietzsche’s discussion of what 
appears to be the recurrence cosmology in his published works is generally abstract and obscure. 
Further, as some commentators have demonstrated, the proofs of the truth of the recurrence 
cosmology which he appears to give in the Nachlass are far from logically coherent or 
convincing.
2
 In fact, his cosmology also seems to be something that is incompatible with the 
dominant position he displays throughout his mature published works, namely the rejection of 
‘metaphysics’. For, as Clark points out, those proofs he gives in the Nachlass are what appeal 
almost exclusively to ‘metaphysical’ premises, “a priori considerations regarding the nature of 
time, force, necessity, and probability”.3 
Hence, I interpret the eternal recurrence simply as a ‘metaphor’ – a purely hypothetical 
situation – Nietzsche uses primarily to articulate the nature of his idea of worldly 
life-affirmation, what he sometimes calls the “highest formula of affirmation that is at all 
attainable” (EH: Z, 1). More precisely, my view is that, as many recent commentators argue, his 
idea of worldly life-affirmation expressed through the eternal recurrence should be regarded as 
                                                 
1 I am borrowing this term from Clark (1990). 
2 See, e.g., Danto (2005): pp. 186-191, Simmel (1991): pp. 170ff, Soll (1980): pp. 326ff & Magnus (1978): pp. 75-98 
3 See Clark (1990): p. 247 
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something that is independent of the recurrence cosmology, in the sense that it does not 
presuppose or appeal for its validity to the truth or plausibility of the cosmology: so that even if 
everything does not really recur eternally, his idea of the worldly life-affirmation will neither 
disintegrate nor lose its practical significance and value. 
This interpretation seems indeed plausible. For, looking at the above-quoted passage of GS, 
there is nothing to suggest that the talk of everything recurring is more than a simple matter of 
‘what if’. And looking at his published works collectively, it is evident that Nietzsche more 
often discusses the eternal recurrence in the context of ‘life-affirmation’, especially in the 
context of a campaign against the imminent arrival of ‘life-denying’ nihilism. And crucially, as 
many commentators point out, apart from those proofs in the Nachlass, Nietzsche makes no 
serious or sustained attempt to demonstrate the truth of the recurrence cosmology in any of his 
published works. 
Accordingly, Soll, who describes the demon’s proclamation of the eternal recurrence as “a 
thought experiment”, seems right when he suggests that such absence of any sustained attempt 
in the published works indicates that Nietzsche’s primary concern is not the “truth or theoretical 
content” of the recurrence cosmology, but rather “the psychological consequences of this 
cosmological theory, in the human import of this world hypothesis”, i.e. “people’s attitudes and 
reaction to this theory”. 4  In this sense, as some commentators suggest, Nietzsche also 
seemingly intends the eternal recurrence to function as a ‘test’ of one’s life-affirmation. By 
hearing the demon’s proclamation of the recurrence of one’s life, whether one’s reaction is 
gnashing of teeth in despair or elatedly finding the proclamation divine would indicate how 
negative or affirmative one’s attitude towards one’s life is.5 
                                                 
4 See Soll (1980): pp. 322-323 
5 See Clark (1990): pp. 251-252 & Reginster (2008): p. 202 
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However, I do not entirely agree with Soll’s interpretation, since what he actually claims is 
that Nietzsche’s focus lies on the effect the eternal recurrence would or should have upon those 
who consider it to be “probable” or at least “possible”. According to Soll, in Nietzsche’s view, 
accepting the doctrine of the eternal recurrence would cause our psychology to “be profoundly 
affected”. But such acceptance does not necessarily entail “a belief in the doctrine’s truth”. 
Instead, considering the eternal recurrence as “probable” or even as “a mere possibility” could 
involve important profound psychological consequences, which are at the centre of his interest 
in the eternal recurrence. And one of the psychological consequences Nietzsche intends the 
eternal recurrence to have is “to increase our sense of the significance of the choices we make”, 
“enhancing the import of our decisions and actions”.6 
I find Soll’s interpretation problematic. Firstly, while Soll is suggesting that Nietzsche 
intends a belief in the ‘possibility’ of the eternal recurrence to be what would ultimately cause 
our attitude towards life to change into the more affirmative attitude that he proposes, this does 
not seem correct. Certainly, as Soll points out, there is a passage in the Nachlass where 
Nietzsche claims that even the consideration of the eternal recurrence as ‘a mere possibility’ is 
sufficient to affect and transform us profoundly.
7
 And it is true that, in principle, one would be 
more likely to put Nietzsche’s idea of worldly life-affirmation expressed by the eternal 
recurrence into practice if one considered the eternal recurrence to be at least ‘possible’. 
However, in the light of Nietzsche’s criticism of the Christian ‘teleological’ attitude towards life, 
this manner of driving us to adopt his idea of worldly life-affirmation from a belief in the ‘mere 
possibility’ of the eternal recurrence, from a fear that we might possibly have to repeat the same 
pains and failures eternally, does not seem Nietzschean, as it resembles the way Christianity 
                                                 
6 See Soll (1980): pp. 322-25, 332-333 & 342 
7 See Soll (1980) pp. 324-325 
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urges people to adopt its teaching through the possible threat of Hell. Moreover, this manner 
also problematically makes Nietzsche’s idea of the worldly life-affirmation dependent on the 
recurrence cosmology, since what provides the motivation for us to adopt his idea here is, 
ultimately, the possible truth of the cosmology. 
Secondly, even if we grant that such an approach is compatible with Nietzsche’s position, it 
seems unlikely that the ‘mere possibility’ of the eternal recurrence alone would actually provide 
sufficient motivation for adopting Nietzsche’s idea of worldly life-affirmation. At one level, the 
problem is that, while Soll might be in a sense correct to insist that considering the eternal 
recurrence to be ‘probable’ or even ‘possible’ could involve important profound psychological 
consequences – I will expand on this shortly –, he does not explain what he means by ‘possible’. 
That is, he does not specify whether ‘a mere possibility’ is supposed to be 70% possible or 51% 
or 25% or 1%. And this is a critical failure, for the fact is that, generally speaking, a sheer 
thought of ‘possibility’ alone is unlikely to transform people unless the ‘possibility’ is 
reasonably high. For instance, almost everyone agree that smoking can possibly cause fatal lung 
cancer. I know that if I keep smoking, it could possibly kill me. But if I think that the chance of 
my getting fatal lung cancer from smoking is only 1% possible, it simply will not make me stop 
smoking. 
Further, Soll also fails to address the fact that ‘probable’ and ‘possible’ are two different 
things. For instance, there must be a reasonable number of people who find the existence of Hell 
‘possible’, just as they see no reason why the existence of unicorns should not be ‘possible’. Yet, 
it seems to be the case that most of them will never be persuaded to convert to Christianity by 
such ‘possibility’ alone, because, above all, they also simply find the existence of Hell itself 
highly ‘improbable’. That is, in reality, ‘a mere possibility’ of high ‘improbability’ alone does 
not seem sufficient to cause people to change their attitude. And given that the eternal 
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recurrence is also equally as ‘possible’ and yet highly ‘improbable’ an idea as the existence of 
Hell or unicorns, it is indeed unlikely that its ‘mere possibility’ alone can actually drive people 
into adopting Nietzsche’s idea of worldly life-affirmation.8 
In fact, as many commentators, including Soll himself, recognise, the eternal recurrence 
would turn out to be a matter of indifference even if it were true.
9
 That is, if the recurrence of 
my life is true, I have already led the same life I now lead an infinite number of times before, 
and will lead the same life an infinite number of times more. And this entails that each cycle of 
my recurring life must be completely identical: there must be no qualitative or quantitative 
differences. So, at any given cycle of my recurring life, I can have no memories of the previous 
cycles. And this means that there is also no accumulation of sufferings and joys from one cycle 
to another. That is, given the absence of memory links between cycles, the successive cycles I 
will lead are not essentially continuous with this present cycle and thus cannot be really 
regarded as ‘mine’ in the relevant sense. And since it is not really ‘me’ who will repeat the same 
sufferings and joys over again in the successive cycles, the recurrence of my life cannot be 
perceived to increase infinitely the amount of suffering and joy in my life. And this seems to 
make the prospect of the recurrence of one’s life a matter of indifference, which prevents it from 
functioning as ‘a test’ of one’s life-affirmation. 
Now, Soll claims that this problem does not undermine the plausibility of his own 
suggestion: he maintains that, despite this problem, his suggestion is the correct interpretation of 
Nietzsche’s view. And he instead considers this problem to be a reason to reject Nietzsche’s 
view itself, i.e. the view which he attributes to Nietzsche. And while he suggests that the only 
possible solution is to presuppose the presence of memory links between cycles, to construe the 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Clark (1990): p. 249 




successive cycles I will lead as a continuation of this present cycle and thus allow an 
accumulation of sufferings from one cycle to another, he rejects such a construal as 
“inappropriate”.10 
I agree with Soll that, given that the demon’s proclamation of the eternal recurrence is 
supposed to provoke violent reactions, the problem in question appears to be Nietzsche’s 
oversight.
11
 And it also seems that the only adequate solution is indeed to presuppose the 
presence of memory links between cycles. However, I do not consider such presupposition to be 
‘inappropriate’. For, in my view, the tone and manner in which Nietzsche presents the eternal 
recurrence through the demon’s proclamation actually suggest that the eternal recurrence is 
something that we ought to grasp uncritically. 
That is, we become aware of the problem in question only when we start concerning 
ourselves with the truth or plausibility of the eternal recurrence seriously. However, purely 
taken as a metaphor Nietzsche uses to articulate the nature of his idea of worldly life-affirmation, 
we hardly ever seem really to analyse critically whether the eternal recurrence is true or 
plausible. Indeed, reading for the first time the passage on how the demon’s proclamation 
causes gnashing of teeth, most of us would presuppose the presence of memory links between 
cycles. By doing so, we are certainly misconstruing what the eternal recurrence would actually 
involve. Yet, this misconstruing does not at all seem to cause us also to misconstrue the nature 
of Nietzsche’s idea of the worldly life-affirmation itself. 
Further, as Clark similarly suggests,
12
 it seems possible that whether one takes the eternal 
recurrence critically or uncritically is a part of the ‘test’ of one’s life-affirmation. Faced with the 
question ‘would you desire to live exactly the same life you now lead over and over again?’, the 
                                                 
10 Soll (1980): pp. 340-341 
11 But, see Reginster (2008): p. 212 
12 See Clark (1990): pp. 266-270 
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chances are, most of us would – at least initially – react to it uncritically, presuppose the 
presence of memory links between cycles, and give an answer on this supposition. By doing so, 
we are misconstruing what the eternal recurrence would actually involve. Yet, this surely does 
not prevent our answers from revealing our true attitudes towards our lives, provided that we 
have answered the question honestly. On the other hand, faced with the same question, one 
might instead scrutinise critically its truth and plausibility, come to recognise the problem that 
makes the recurrence of one’s life a matter of indifference, and thus refuse to answer the 
question. But such a refusal seems already an indication of one’s negative attitude towards one’s 
life, since it would effectively amount to answering the question in the negative. 
And finally, it seems to me that, for one’s psychology to be profoundly affected, one might 
not even need to consider the eternal recurrence ‘probable’ or ‘possible’. For instance, I 
consider the eternal recurrence completely impossible and improbable. Yet, when I interpret the 
eternal recurrence uncritically in the way suggested above, and imagine my own life recurring 
eternally, this imagination, even though I am convinced that what is being imagined here is 
completely impossible and improbable, still seems to have some profound effects on my 
psychology, since the sheer thought of my going through over and over again every one of my 
painful and unpleasant past experiences does cause me great distress, and further it also seems 
to give me a new perspective on my past, as well as on my present and future – I shall expand 
this later. 
Certainly, how ‘profoundly’ one would be affected by this kind of imagination depends on 
one’s temperament. And, perhaps, there might be some who have led an extremely pleasant life 
and do not mind the idea of their individual lives recurring. Yet, surely, even their psychology 
must be affected in some significant ways when they imagine the recurrence of not just their 
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own lives but the universe as a whole, in particular, of every human suffering the world history 
contains. 
This point is expressed by Kundera in his novel The Unbearable Lightness of Being. 
 
If the French Revolution were to recur eternally, French historians would be less proud of 
Robespierre. But because they deal with something that will not return, the bloody years of the 
Revolution have turned into mere words, theories, and discussions, have become lighter than feathers, 
frightening no one. There is an infinite difference between a Robespierre who occurs only once in 
history and a Robespierre who eternally returns, chopping off French heads. Let us therefore agree 
that the idea of eternal return implies a perspective from which things appear other than as we know 
them: they appear without the mitigating circumstance of their transitory nature. This mitigating 
circumstance prevents us from coming to a verdict. For how can we condemn something that is 





We are still deeply horrified by such events as Auschwitz and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. 
Yet, presumably, just as today we are not seriously bothered by the persecutions of Christians in 
ancient Rome, there will eventually come a time when these event become a part of history by 
which one does not feel burdened or before which one feels no real terror: they become ‘lighter 
than feathers’. And this is possible only because of ‘the mitigating circumstance of their 
transitory nature’, of the fact that they are ‘something that will not return’, ‘something that is 
ephemeral, in transit’, which ‘occurs only once’ and will not repeat itself infinitely. 
Kleist clearly seems to have this in mind when he writes in one of his letters, 
                                                 
13 Kundera (1985): pp. 3-4 
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What is evil? Absolutely evil? . . . – Tell me, who in this world has really done something evil? 
Something which would be evil for all eternity – ? And whatever we hear of the story of Nero, and 
Attila, and Cartouche, of the Huns and the crusades and the Spanish Inquisition this planet 
nonetheless rolls peacefully through space, spring follows spring and human being live, enjoy 
themselves and die as before . . . .
14 
 
In this world of ours where everything happens only once and nothing will ever return, there 
essentially exists no such thing as ‘evil for all eternity’, ‘absolutely evil’. But when we imagine 
a world where nothing is ‘ephemeral, in transit’, where Auschwitz and the Hiroshima recur 
infinitely many times, these events come to have a completely different meaning to us, as they 
change their nature dramatically, transforming themselves into something that never becomes 
‘lighter than feathers’. In this imaginative world of eternal recurrence, we are confronted by 
‘absolutely evil’, which is “a terrifying prospect”.15 
Again, how profoundly one would be distressed by such speculation depends on one’s 
temperament. And, after all, a product of the imagination is just that, part of the imagination, 
and Camus may have a point when he writes, “But what are a hundred million deaths? When 
one has served in a war, one hardly knows what a dead man is, after a while. And since a dead 
man has no substance unless one has actually seen him dead, a hundred million corpses 
broadcast through history are no more than a puff of smoke in the imagination”.16 Even so, it 
still seems that, unless one is a heartless brute, for anyone who prepares to engage in such 
reflection in earnest, this confrontation with ‘absolutely evil’, no matter how speculative it is, is 
capable of placing “the greatest weight” (GS: 341) upon his decisions and actions, as it 
                                                 
14 Quoted from Hamilton (2001): pp. 94-95 
15 See Kundera (1985): p. 4 
16 Camus (1960): p. 92 
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dramatically deepens his view of ‘evil’ and ‘human suffering’ in this life, as well as of the 
potential implication and significance of the choices he makes in relation to these two. 
Nietzsche clearly recognises this type of potential transformative effect that the eternal 
recurrence would have, since he says, “If this thought gained possession of you, it would change 
you as you are or perhaps crush you” (GS: 341). And as we will see, adopting his idea of 
worldly life-affirmation does seem to involve taking our choices more seriously. However, it is 
one thing to be made to feel one’s sense of the significance of one’s own choices increased, but 
it is another actually to take one’s own choices more seriously, and it seems doubtful that this 
increased sense alone could actually provide sufficient motivation for one to adopt Nietzsche’s 
idea of worldly life-affirmation. Nietzsche says, ‘if this thought gained possession of you’. And 
while he does not tell us what exactly he means by it, we could say that for an idea really to get 
hold of you to the extent that ‘it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you’, you must 
be truly captured by and absorbed in that idea. But the problem is that most of us would feel that 
this idea of the eternal recurrence, especially the standard it sets for life-affirmation, is so 
exaggerated and high that it cannot possibly ‘gain possession of’ us: further, it is also the case 
that, in reality, ‘what should change us’ or ‘what ought to change us’ does not always 
necessarily change us. Hence, again, my view is that the eternal recurrence should be interpreted 
simply as a ‘metaphor’ Nietzsche uses primarily to articulate the nature of his idea of worldly 
life-affirmation. 
Let us examine the nature of Nietzsche’s idea of worldly life-affirmation. Looking at the 
passage of GS quoted earlier, it is clear that, according to this idea, one is only considered to be 
affirming one’s life fully and genuinely if one could and would desire to live exactly the same 
life one now leads over and over again. So, what he proposes is an unconditional overall type of 
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life-affirmation, through which one wills and affirms every aspect of one’s life, including the 
terrible aspect characterised by misfortunes, failures, mistakes, sufferings, and so on. 
Although Nietzsche in his works does not really connect the eternal recurrence to his 
conception of worldly nobility in any explicit or direct manner, he clearly attributes the ability 
to perform this unconditional overall type of life-affirmation to the worldly nobles, especially 
those of ancient Greece.
17
 And in this context, this type of life-affirmation is often described by 
him as ‘the Dionysian’ attitude towards life, which he in TI defines as “Saying Yes to life even 
in its strangest and hardest problems, the will to life rejoicing over its own inexhaustibility even 
in the very sacrifice of its highest types”, “an overflowing feeling of life and strength, where 
even pain still has the effect of a stimulus” (TI: X, 5). So, according to his idea of worldly 
life-affirmation, one must be able to not just ‘bear’ but also willingly ‘embrace’ one’s suffering 
as a ‘stimulus to life’, as the proof of the meaningfulness of one’s life. In this sense, Nietzsche 
intends his idea of worldly life-affirmation to be “the opposite ideal” against the ‘life-denying’ 
pessimism embodied by Schopenhauer’s philosophy, which regards all those pains and 
sufferings in life as the proof of the fundamental meaninglessness and worthlessness of life (see 
BGE: 56). 
Nietzsche also clearly sets out his idea of the worldly life-affirmation in opposition to 
Christianity, as a counter-ideal to the Christian ‘ascetic’ ideal.18 As opposed to the Christian 
‘transcendent’ teleological justification of human existence, in which this life is devalued as a 
means to the ultimate ‘otherworldly’ end, what Nietzsche proposes is a ‘non-transcendent’ type 
of life-affirmation that affirms this life purely as an end, without relying on any ‘metaphysical’ 
concept or ideal. Moreover, compared to the Christian ‘moral’ view of life, in which certain 
                                                 
17 See Hamilton (2000): p. 172 
18 See, e.g., Clark (1990): pp. 252ff 
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aspects of life are condemned as ‘vices’, what Nietzsche proposes is indeed an ‘overall’ type of 
life-affirmation that tries to justify every aspect of life as something valuable and affirmable 
(see WP: 1050). 
Nietzsche also discusses the worldly life-affirmation in terms of ‘redemption’. 
 
To redeem those who lived in the past and to recreate all ‘it was’ into a ‘thus I willed it’ – that alone 
should I call redemption. . . . ‘It was’ – that is the name of the will’s gnashing of teeth and most 
secret melancholy. Powerless against what has been done, he is an angry spectator of all that is past. 
The will cannot will backwards; and that he cannot break time and time’s covetousness, that is the 
will’s loneliest melancholy. . . . That time does not run backwards, that is his wrath; ‘that which was’ 
is the name of the stone he cannot move (Z: II, 20; see also EH: Z, 8). 
 
Now, the problem with this passage is that Nietzsche does not explain what he means by ‘it 
was’. That is, he does not specify whose ‘past’ is in question here: whether it is my own, or that 
of all those people I personally know and knew, or of every human being who has ever existed. 
But supposing he means ‘one’s own past’, it is clear that what the worldly life-affirmation is 
intended to redeem is one’s inability to change one’s own past.19 If I am unhappy with my 
present situation, I can will the situation to become different, for instance, by creating an image 
of the pleasant future towards which I can strive. What about my own past, then? Whenever I 
reflect upon all those painful misfortunes and regrettable mistakes I have experienced and made 
so far, I naturally wish my past to be different. Yet, however much I will to change my past, my 
willing is totally ‘powerless’ against what has already happened. And as I will my past to be 
different, I am in a sense denying my past. And this powerlessness of mine to change my past, 
                                                 
19 For writing this part, I have referred to Clark (1990): pp. 257- 260 & 275 
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against my desire to do so, also generates in me ‘melancholy’, a suffering in the shape of 
ressentiment towards my past. 
According to Nietzsche, in response to this ‘melancholy’, various redemptions were 
invented. But, to get rid of the ‘melancholy’, what these inventors traditionally did was to wreak 
“revenge” on life. Unable to affirm or change their past, hence, out of their “wrath” – their 
ressentiment – against the irreversible nature of ‘time’, they devalued this life characterised by 
‘time’ as a whole by interpreting it as “a punishment”. And through such interpretation, they 
attained a sense of power over the irreversible nature of ‘time’ and their past as the perceived 
source of their powerlessness and suffering, which consequently enabled them to overcome 
their ‘melancholy’ caused by their inability to change their past (see Z: II, 20): as we saw in the 
previous section, this kind of psychology, this way of compensating one’s powerlessness, is 
what Nietzsche also recognises to exist behind the establishment of ‘slave morality’. 
In contrast to those forms of redemption, what the worldly life-affirmation is intended to 
achieve is a “reconciliation with time” (Z: II, 20), an overcoming of the ‘melancholy’ without 
wreaking ‘revenge’ on this life characterised by ‘time’. If I become able to affirm all my past 
experiences, including those that were and still are painful to me, to the extent of wanting them 
to recur eternally, if I become able to transform every unpleasant ‘it was’ into ‘thus willed it’, I 
will have no need to feel the hopeless desire to change my past. And although I will still be 
practically powerless to change my past, this will no longer generate in me the ‘melancholy’, 
since I will now cease to perceive the irreversible nature of ‘time’ and my past as a source of my 
powerlessness and suffering. 
Earlier, I discussed how imagining the uncritical model of the eternal recurrence of one’s 
life, even without believing in its possibility and plausibility, have potential transformative 
effects. And here, such imagination could have a positive part to play in this psychological or 
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spiritual ‘therapeutic’ transformation, by making me see my past in a new different light. I often 
regret what I have done and wish my past to be different. But if I imagine the recurrence of my 
life where I must repeat over and over again exactly the same regrettable mistakes I have made, 
this imaginative act will make me recognise as clearly as possible that what I have done is done 
and there is absolutely nothing I can do about those past mistakes, and that to keep regretting 
them and wishing to rectify them is not just pointless but also only makes my sufferings worse, 
undermining my psychological health. And this recognition, this new perspective on my past, 
could potentially liberate me from the torments both of self-remorse I feel towards my past and 
of my hopeless desire to change my past, enabling me to recover my psychological health by 
achieving ‘reconciliation’ with my past. 
Further, this act of imagination may also have a potentiality to redeem my future. By 
re-living my past imaginatively, I may come to realise how awful were some of the ways in 
which I led my life. And this sheer thought of how awful they were would give me a new 
positive attitude towards my future, making me determine to try to live differently from now on 
in order not to let myself make the same mistakes again. In this sense, as many commentators 
suggest, the eternal recurrence could also function as an imperative for one’s future action: 
‘Live your life in such a manner that you would be willing to live over and over again’. And if 
we were to follow this faithfully, it might prevent us from making mistakes that could become 
causes of self-remorse and ressentiment.
20
 
So far, I have outlined the nature of the ‘worldly’ life-affirmation that Nietzsche connects to 
his ‘worldly’ conception of nobility. Now, in the previous section, I suggested that Nietzsche in 
his works actually gives no concrete example of the worldly nobles he describes at all: although 
he claims that examples of the worldly nobles include “the Roman, Arabian, Germanic, 
                                                 
20 See Danto (2005): p. 194 & Magnus (1978): pp. 73, 111-113 & 142ff 
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Japanese nobility, the Homeric heroes, [and] the Scandinavian Vikings” (GM: I, 11), these 
figures do not actually bear much resemblance to the worldly nobles, whom he describes as 
completely unreflective individuals who simply act on their impulses and do not get poisoned 
by ressentiment. Here, we seem to encounter the same problem, since it is also doubtful that 
these figures can be regarded as being capable of affirming their lives in the ‘worldly’ sense as 
Nietzsche considers them to be. For instance, as we saw, even Achilles is far from being noble 
in the worldly sense, since throughout the greater part of the Iliad he is a frustrated figure, who 
gets the sulks and becomes deeply tormented with ressentiment. In such a frustrated state, 
Achilles also does not at all appear to be an affirmer of life in the worldly sense. Indeed, as 
Hamilton observes, “When Patroclus is killed and Achilles wreaks his revenge on Hector by 
dragging his body around behind his chariot it is evident that he is doing everything but 
showing that he would be willing to have his life back again as it has been”.21 
And this also seems to hold true for all those other historical figures whom Nietzsche 
connects to his conception of ‘higher types’, such as Goethe, Beethoven and Napoleon. For 
instance, let us consider Beethoven, whose great suffering in his life was his deafness. 
According to Solomon, contrary to the popular conception that Beethoven suddenly became 
deaf, Beethoven’s hearing actually deteriorated progressively and unevenly over a long period 
of time, starting from about 1796. And around the years 1800 and 1801, Beethoven became 
severely anxious about his deteriorating hearing, which caused him great suffering and 
anguish.
22
 Yet, these several years of crisis and anxiety he endured were also “years of 
extremely high productivity and creative accomplishment”. On this basis, Solomon remarks, 
                                                 
21 Hamilton (2000): p. 180 
22 See Solomon (2001): pp. 146-154 & 158-159 
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“One begins to suspect that Beethoven’s crisis and his extraordinary creativity were somehow 
related, and even that the former may have been the necessary precondition of the latter”.23 
Now, as far as the reading of this account goes, it appears to be the case that Beethoven was 
ultimately capable of seeing his suffering as ‘a stimulus’. At a certain point, Beethoven 
somehow managed to “come to terms with his deafness”.24 And by this acceptance, his 
deafness was no longer the same to him. His deafness became more than mere suffering to him, 
and he managed to turn it to account, as something that continuously drove him to new creations. 
In other words, Beethoven clearly seems to have possessed what Nietzsche calls “the great 
health” (GS: 382), psychological ‘health’ in the sense of “instinctively cho[osing] the right 
means against wretched states” (EH: Wise, 2): a characteristic which Nietzsche ascribes to 
‘higher types’. 25  In this respect, Solomon’s remark seems plausible. For, in many and 
significant ways, Beethoven’s greatness was clearly achieved through, or because of, his 
misfortunes and sufferings. It was his acceptance of his deafness that significantly constituted a 
crucial part of what makes his music great, and, ironically, had he not become deaf, he would 
probably not have been able to produce such profound music that moves its listeners so deeply. 
However, this does not mean that Beethoven would desire to live over again exactly the 
same life he has led. For the fact is that it is one thing to be able to accept and use one’s 
suffering as ‘a stimulus’, but it is another to desire one’s suffering to recur eternally. Certainly, 
it is probably true to say that Beethoven saw some value in his deafness and, as Solomon 
remarks, “[u]ltimately . . . turned all his defeats into victories”.26 But then, it still seems wrong 
to suggest that Beethoven actually preferred a life with deafness to a life without deafness. For, 
                                                 
23 Solomon (2001): p. 149 
24 See Solomon (2001): pp. 161-162 
25 See Leiter (2002): p. 123 
26 Solomon (2001): pp. 161-162 
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undoubtedly, despite his remarkably positive attitude towards his sufferings, Beethoven was 
nevertheless tormented by his deafness in one way or another throughout his life,
27
 and never 
actually wanted to become deaf if he did not have to. And in all likelihood, given the choice, 
Beethoven would always have chosen a life without deafness to recur, because, surely, it is 
simply human nature to want to reduce one’s own sufferings or at least not to will any more 
suffering than one already has: also, generally speaking, one would not willingly choose to be 
deaf, even if it meant that one could become a music genius like Beethoven. 
Now, this failure of Nietzsche’s to mention anyone capable of affirming life in the worldly 
sense might be defensible. As I argued before, the worldly nobles and those historical figures 
such as Beethoven and Napoleon who appear in Nietzsche’s writings are fundamentally 
‘archetypes’, who are idealised to symbolise certain characteristics which he values and thus 
expects to find in ‘higher types’. And there seems to be no doubt that this ability to affirm life in 
the worldly sense is one of such distinctive characteristics Nietzsche attributes to ‘higher 
types’.28 He clearly seems to have ‘higher types’ in mind when he speaks of the worldly 
life-affirmation being “the ideal of the most high-spirited, alive, and world-affirming human 
being who has not only come to terms and learned to get along with whatever was and is, but 
who wants to have what was and is repeated into all eternity, shouting insatiably da capo – not 
only to himself but to the whole play and spectacle . . .” (BGE: 56). Moreover, he sometimes 
describes ‘higher types’ as ‘the philosophers of future’, and also often insists that the 
‘Übermensch’ – whom he presumably intends to be a sort of the ultimate type of ‘higher types’ 
– has never existed before. On these bases, we could suppose that people who possess the 
                                                 
27 See Solomon (2001): pp. 159, 296 & 348-349 
28 See, e.g., Leiter (2002): pp. 119-120 & Thiele (1990): p. 197 
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ability to affirm life in the worldly sense are still yet to come, and thus that Nietzsche cannot 
provide any concrete examples of affirmers of life in the worldly sense. 
However, even if so, there still seem to be several problems concerning the nature of the 
worldly life-affirmation itself. Firstly, we could question whether the worldly life-affirmation is 
really the “highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable” (EH: Z, 1) as Nietzsche claims 
it to be. At one level, the problem with this idea of an unconditional overall type of 
life-affirmation is that it could come dangerously close to being an unconditional overall type of 
resignation, since, as Tanner remarks, “there is not an easily specifiable difference between 
affirmation and resignation – or rather, one can say that their modality differs but it is hard to 
know in practice what that comes to”.29 For instance, suppose I am imprisoned for life on a 
false charge by a cruel twist of fate, and must learn to cope with the life in prison. Now, if I 
were to affirm everything unconditionally as Nietzsche’s idea of the worldly life-affirmation 
suggests, it seems that I should just affirm my fate of being falsely imprisoned, simply accept 
that there is nothing I can do to change it, and willingly love the life in prison. But is this really 
the most life-affirming attitude? Certainly, this attitude might make the life in prison eventually 
bearable and ultimately embraceable, helping me come to terms with my fate and to not feel 
ressentiment towards it. But then, from a different angle, it could equally be seen as nothing 
more than just giving up without fighting.
30
 
The question that ought to be asked is; why should I willingly love life in prison if I find it 
to be purely horrible and hollow? Adorno seems right when he criticises just such unconditional 
affirmation as life-denying, by arguing that “Love of stone walls and barred windows is the last 
                                                 
29 Tanner (2000): p. 79 
30 This is the impression we get when Nietzsche speaks of “Russian fatalism” as a cure for anyone who is in a state 
of ressentiment (see EH: Wise, 6). 
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resort of someone who sees and has nothing else to love”.31 And surely, confronted by the fate 
of being falsely imprisoned, it is more natural for me to hate my fate and seek for it to be 
different, especially when there may be still room to change its course. Indeed, here, instead of 
adopting the attitude of ‘just accepting my fate’ which the worldly life-affirmation appears to 
encourage, I could adopt a different attitude, namely, an attitude of ‘accepting my fate and also 
trying to change it’. While accepting the reality of my false imprisonment without bitterness, I 
could still perfectly well refuse to love the terrible life in prison, and try to find a way to escape 
from it, or at least to find a way to make it less tormenting for me. And this attitude clearly 
seems far more life-affirming than just staring affectionately at the barren stone walls around 
me. 
To be sure, Nietzsche may not be saying that we should just love anything we face even if it 
is as horrible as the life in prison, since, as I mentioned earlier, according to his idea of worldly 
life-affirmation, we are to affirm our pain and suffering as “a stimulus” (TI: X, 5). However, 
even so, it still seems that the difference between ‘just accepting’ and ‘accepting and also trying 
to change’ is something which Nietzsche does not address fully and clearly. For, to begin with, 
it is not clear exactly how and in what sense Nietzsche intends our suffering to become ‘a 
stimulus’. Throughout his works, he makes similar remarks: “for a typically healthy person . . . , 
being sick can even become an energetic stimulus for life, for living more” (EH: Wise, 2), “The 
poison of which weaker natures perish strengthens the strong – nor do they call it poison” (GS: 
19), “What does not destroy me, makes me stronger” (TI: I, 8). And while all these passages are 
manifestations both of his life-long concern to give some positive value to suffering and of his 
notion of ‘greatness’ as the attitude and ability to use suffering for positive purposes, they are 
nevertheless very vague, and he never really explains what he means by ‘living more’ or 
                                                 
31 Adorno (2005): p. 98 
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‘stronger’. Listening to Beethoven’s piano sonatas, we could certainly say that Beethoven 
managed to use his deafness as a stimulus for ‘living more’, as what drives him further to new 
creations. Likewise, reading a biography of Martin Luther King or Mahatma Gandhi, we could 
say that they managed to use their suffering under oppression positively as a stimulus, as what 
made them ‘stronger’. But these observations are, in a sense, pretty much made with hindsight. 
And from what Nietzsche says alone, it is hard to know, at least in advance, exactly what ‘living 
more’ or becoming ‘stronger’ would mean for a person who is tormented by, say, the life in 
prison. 
And more fundamentally, whatever Nietzsche meant by ‘a stimulus’, as some commentators 
observe,
32
 his idea of worldly life-affirmation does not tell us what specific actions we ought to 
take. We saw earlier how the eternal recurrence might function as an imperative for one’s 
action: ‘Live your life in such a manner that you would be willing to live over and over again’. 
But this imperative is so broad, that even if we were to follow it we would not know exactly 
what to do in a given situation. What Nietzsche’s idea tells us is only that we ought simply to 
change our attitude, into an unconditional Yes-saying attitude, in order not to deny or feel 
ressentiment toward anything we face or find. And this seems to mean that it does not really 
matter whether I ‘just accept my fate’ or I ‘accept my fate and also try to change it’, as long as 
that consequently makes me free from ressentiment. 
At another level, the possible life-denying nature of the worldly life-affirmation is brought 
into relief by the remarks Reginster makes in his response to Soll’s interpretation of the eternal 
recurrence which I examined earlier. 
 
                                                 
32 See Tanner (2000): pp. 79-80 & 100-101 & Magnus (1988): pp. 170-173 
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Soll does not explain why . . . we should take seriously all of our choices, or at least more of them 
than we would if we did not contemplate the prospect of the eternal recurrence. Why, in other words, 
should we contemplate this prospect in the first place in making our choices? And why may I not 
allow myself the indulgence of some unconsidered, hasty choices?
33 
 
As I said, the eternal recurrence might function as ‘an imperative’ for one’s action. Suppose I 
take up this imperative. Thereupon, with each and every singly action I am about to perform, I 
will always be careful and ask myself first, ‘Is this really an action I can desire to repeat 
eternally?’. Now, such an utterly cautious way of acting might help me avoid making some 
potentially regrettable mistakes and thus consequently keep me relatively free from ressentiment. 
But then, it seems questionable whether this manner of being constantly conscious and fearful 
of possible consequences of my every action to such an extreme would really amount to a 
genuine love of life. 
It is important for us to take our choices seriously and act carefully, for our own sake as well 
as for the sake of others. But, in the final analysis, unpredictability is an inevitable aspect of life 
about which we can do nothing. To predict correctly and grasp every possible direct and indirect 
consequence of our every choice is beyond our ability, and against our will we are bound to 
make numerous mistakes, no matter how careful we are. But then, much as this unpredictability 
can make our lives miserable, it is also what makes our lives exciting and wonderful: we are 
often made to realise how what we initially thought as mistakes can turn out to be correct 
decisions, can bring many unexpected joys and pleasures to us and others in the end. In this 
sense, we could say that the essence of living is that we sometimes appreciate this inevitable 
aspect of life and allow ourselves ‘the indulgence of some unconsidered, hasty choices’, and 
                                                 
33 Reginster (2008): p. 212 
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that being constantly conscious and fearful of possible consequences of our every action to 
excess is simply pointless as well as life-denying. 
We can make the same point in another way. As I suggested in Chapter 3-C, one of the 
things that Nietzsche’s mature writings often display is profound fear of being afflicted with a 
dreadful sense of unredeemable loss. And clearly, the eternal recurrence as ‘an imperative’ is a 
countermeasure against such sense of loss, a manifestation of the desire to ‘live without waste’: 
by planning everything to be perfect in advance, one removes all potential mistakes and failures 
from one’s life, thereby minimizing or eliminating any ‘self-waste’. But then, life is something 
fundamentally hostile to us, in the sense that it is deeply characterised by unpredictability, 
contingency and chance. Many aspects of our lives are simply beyond our control. No matter 
how carefully we plan in advance to limit the impact of life, we will still make regrettable 
mistakes and experience unredeemable losses that will forever haunt us. And it is not just the 
hostile nature of life. While we try our hardest to learn from our past mistakes and mistaken 
forms of behaviours and not to repeat them, the chances are that most of us will not be able to 
avoid making the exact same mistakes, because doing such is simply our human nature. In this 
sense, we could say that a genuine love of life is about, at least in part, just getting on with our 
lives, by accepting that doing things which we will forever regret is unavoidable part of what 
life is and of what we humans are, and that the obsessive idea of not try to make any mistakes, 
wanting one’s life to be perfect, is not only pointless but also anti-life and anti-human: as 
Orwell remarks, though in a slightly different context, “The essence of being human is that one 
does not seek perfection, that one is sometimes willing to commit sins for the sake of 
loyalty . . . , and that one is prepared in the end to be defeated and broken up by life, which is 
the inevitable price of fastening one’s love upon other human individuals”.34 
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This point also leads us to the second problem, which is whether Nietzsche’s idea of worldly 
life-affirmation is really compatible with his conception of ‘higher types’. I have argued that, as 
a conception, the ‘higher types’ are an ultimate representation of Nietzsche’s idea of ‘human 
greatness’. However, the utterly cautious way of acting that the eternal recurrence seemingly 
promotes is clearly not just life-denying and anti-human but also very timid, boring and 
uninspiring. Indeed, for instance, the reason why many of us find someone like Casanova 
irresistibly fascinating is because he lived his life audaciously with no plan, with no concern or 
fear for the possible consequences of his actions: he willingly opened himself to life, and fully 
appreciated the present moment. As Zweig remarks, “Courage that is the keynote of Casanova’s 
art of life; that is his gift of gifts. He does not try to ensure against disaster, but fearlessly risks 
his life. Among the thousands whose motto is ‘safety first’, here is one who hazards all, and 
takes every chance. . . . Thus does his life become diversified, fantastical, kaleidoscopic, as 
hardly another in many centuries”.35 
Certainly, it is questionable whether Nietzsche would connect Casanova to ‘higher types’: 
while he may find the way Casanova exposed his sexual instincts fascinating, he may not highly 
value Casanova’s cultural achievements. But then, we could still argue that ‘human greatness’ 
as Nietzsche understands it does necessarily involve the indulgence of some unconsidered, hasty 
choices from time to time. Nietzsche cherishes ‘creativity’ as the chief element of human 
greatness, as a distinctive characteristic of higher types. And the fact is that, historically, many 
of the remarkable creations and achievements were often achieved only because there existed 
people who were brave enough to take risks without hesitation, to act on the spur of the moment 
without being afraid of possible failures and mistakes: as the old cliché goes, every failure is a 
stepping stone to success, to greatness, to new creations. 
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Now, it is possible that Nietzsche does not actually intend the eternal recurrence to be ‘an 
imperative’ for one’s future action and thus does not endorse the cautious way of acting in 
question. For, while his writings express the fear of being afflicted with a dreadful sense of 
unredeemable loss, he also often praises ‘the squandering spirit’, the individuals who ‘squander’ 
the energies of their spirit carelessly, who do not approach their life in a mercenary spirit with a 
prudent concern and a petty obsession for the balancing up of good and bad in their life, but 
embrace their life even if it has not gone just as they wished (see, e.g., GS: 202, TI: IX, 37 & 
WP: 77).
36
 So, it is possible that what he is really concerned with is the worldly affirmation of 
one’s past and present. 
However, even if this is the case, it seems that the compatibility between his idea of worldly 
life-affirmation and his conception of ‘higher types’ is still open to question. In the previous 
section, I suggested that one of the characteristics Nietzsche attributes to the worldly nobles and 
thus to ‘higher types’ is the active creativity founded on ‘life-affirmation’ that is capable of 
creating one’s own values spontaneously, specifically, the ability to possess a ‘style’ of one’s 
own, the ability to attain complete satisfaction with oneself and give a synthetic unity to one’s 
character.
37
 And the basic idea of his notion of ‘style’, his proposal to make of ourselves 
artworks, is that ‘nothing in what one is should be wasted’: which is, of course, another 
countermeasure against that sense of loss which afflicts his writings. And this whole attitude of 
treating nothing as waste is clearly a core element in his idea of worldly life-affirmation. 
                                                 
36 See Hamilton (2000): p. 182 
37 In Chapter 3-B, I spoke of ‘the ability of having ‘style’ of one’s own’, not as one of the distinctive characteristics 
of higher types, but as the overall quality of higher types. While I still do maintain this view, here, and through the 
rest of this thesis, purely for the matter of convenience, I will be describing and treating this ability to give ‘style’ to 
one’s character as one of the distinctive characteristics of higher types. 
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However, this attempt to attain complete satisfaction with oneself, the exertions to waste 
nothing, to keep one’s experiences within one’s control and make full use of them, is an 
extremely tiresome and tormenting struggle, in that one must constantly apply inner pressure on 
oneself. In many ways, such a struggle seems to be a lost cause that could only become 
life-denying and unhealthy. However much we try to live without waste, we are likely to be 
always haunted by a sense of waste as we feel that we could still get much more out of our lives. 
And however much we keep trying to create and make ourselves into a ‘great’ and ‘beautiful’ 
artwork with which we can be completely satisfied as if artists who keep adding touches to their 
works, we are bound eventually to feel shattered and prostrate ourselves before the un-closable 
chasm between our personal boundless ideals – or desires – and our own limited capacity. 
In fact, as Simon May similarly suggests,
38
 the ability to attain complete satisfaction with 
oneself, the ability to affirm everything about one’s life to the extent of wanting it to recur 
eternally, does not seem to be a necessary prerequisite for the ability to create cultural greatness 
and the new ‘life-affirming’ values that Nietzsche ascribes to the higher types. For instance, as I 
argued, Beethoven’s creative greatness was in many and significant ways achieved through, and 
constituted by his – eventual – acceptance of his deafness. But this does not mean that he 
affirmed his deafness in the sense of wanting it to recur eternally. Nor is it likely that he ever 
affirmed everything about his life. Yet, this apparently did not prevent Beethoven from being a 
creative genius, from his music being beautiful and life-affirming. In fact, it could plausibly be 
argued that all those exceptionally creative historical figures whom Nietzsche admires were able 
to bring something new and beautiful to the world, partly because they were not so well 
satisfied with their life: it was their dissatisfaction, their desire and will to change themselves 
and their surrounding world – which was presumably often founded on their egoistic 
                                                 
38 May S (1999): pp. 119-120 
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characteristics and emotions such as greed, envy and lust – that crucially motivated them to 
achieve remarkable things. 
The third and final problem of the nature of the worldly life-affirmation is expressed by 
Staten in the following passage. 
 
For each of us to redeem our own relation to our personal past and to the past in general might turn 
us away from nihilism, give us strength, makes us affirmers of life. But as regards the past in general 
this affirmation has not been thought through very seriously or in any detail, either by Nietzsche or 
by those of his interpreters who blithely tell us that “the eternal recurrence signifies my ability to 
want my life and the whole world [emphasis added] to be repeated just as they are.” Here the world 
appears a spectacle, an awful spectacle perhaps, but still something judged only in relation to the 
spectator who unilaterally affirms or denies it. But what about the inwardness of this world, the 
subjectivity of each experiencing being which is itself an absolute origin of the world? Might there 
not be such a thing as terror so overwhelming that the sufferer cannot or will not affirm it, and in that 
case who can affirm it on his or her behalf?
39 
 
In other words, the question is that whether it is actually possible for one to affirm in the 
worldly sense not just one’s own life but ‘life’ in general – life simpliciter or life überhaupt –, 
including all those human sufferings the entire world history contains. 
Nietzsche sometimes clearly thinks that it is possible. In the previous section, I discussed 
Nietzsche’s admiration for the worldly nobles and historical ‘men of prey’ who led the worldly 
nobles’ way of life. And I argued that one of the reasons why Nietzsche is tempted to affirm the 
worldly nobles’ way of life is that he sees in their way of life a possible way of overcoming his 
                                                 
39 Staten (1990): pp. 75-76, quoting Nehamas (1985): p. 191 
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horror of human suffering. What he recognises in these brutal ‘men of prey’ is a remarkable 
hardness that makes them unaffected by anything the stern reality of the world throws at them, 
even the sight of others’ suffering. And he finds this characteristic extremely appealing, since he 
sometimes thinks that others’ suffering is something he can actually affirm by being able to bear, 
or even appreciate, the sight of it. Depending on his mood, he is tempted to suggest that being 
completely indifferent to the sufferings of others is the same as affirming those sufferings. 
This is largely owing to the fact that, even after abandoning his youthful idea of an 
‘aesthetic’ justification, i.e. human existence and all the suffering in the world being justified as 
an object of the world-artist’s ‘higher joy’, he continues maintaining his hostile attitude against 
‘moral’ interpretation of the world (see Chapter 3-A), so that he is still sometimes tempted to 
adopt an aesthetic view on human suffering. While he increasingly becomes acutely aware of 
and is generally horrified by the enormity of human suffering that constitutes human history, he 
continues in certain moods to display a tendency to see human suffering in general as “an 
aesthetic phenomenon”, as a sort of dreadful magnificent spectacle, trying to convince himself 
that suffering, including others’ suffering, is in some sense ‘thrilling’ or ‘pleasurable’ or even 
‘good’, which makes the suffering itself justifiable, or at least appear justified, and ultimately 
transforms ‘life’ as a whole into something beautiful, wonderful and thus “bearable” in one’s 
perspective (see GS: 107). 
However, Nietzsche seems mistaken here. For I agree with Hamilton that being completely 
indifferent to the sufferings of others, or even finding them ‘magnificent’ or ‘pleasurable’, is not 
the same as affirming those sufferings. At one point in GM, Nietzsche attempts to give the 
impression that the fact that the worldly nobles, who affirm themselves and their action entirely, 
are not at all concerned about, and even feel delight at, the slaves’ sufferings means that they are 
also affirming those sufferings. Comparing the worldly nobles to ‘birds of prey’ and the slaves 
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to ‘lambs’, Nietzsche seemingly claims that the former affirm the latter, because they enjoy 
eating them: “we don’t dislike them at all, these good little lambs; we even love them: nothing is 
more tasty than a tender lamb” (GM: I, 13). But his claim cannot be correct, since the worldly 
nobles’ indifference to, or their delight at, the slaves’ sufferings can just as readily be thought of 
as a denial of the slaves’ sufferings as an affirmation of them.40 
Of course, one is free to adopt an aesthetic view on one’s own existence. I am free to see my 
individual life, including my own sufferings that it contains, aesthetically as an artwork or a part 
of an artwork, as something ‘magnificent’ or ‘beautiful’: which is basically what Nietzsche 
proposes through his notion of ‘style’. And I am also within my rights to bear and affirm my 
own sufferings through this perspective. 
However, it is doubtful whether I am also within my rights to see and affirm others’ 
suffering through this same perspective. For this perspective is first and foremost irreducibly 
first-personal, and applying such an irreducibly first-person perspective of mine to others’ 
suffering clearly seems to cause me to ignore second-person perspectives (see Chapter 2-C). As 
Nietzsche himself often emphasizes, every form of suffering can have different meanings and 
effects for different individuals. And hence, by seeing and affirming others’ suffering in the 
same way I do my own sufferings, I seem to be failing to understand and respect what Staten 
calls ‘the inwardness of this world’, how the others themselves actually see and feel about their 
own sufferings from their own unique perspectives. 
Furthermore, even if it were possible to affirm ‘life’ in general in the worldly sense, and 
even if one were within one’s rights to do so, we could still wonder why one should affirm it in 
this particular sense. It is clear that, as in the case of his youthful idea of the ‘aesthetic’ 
justification, what Nietzsche is basically urging us to do through his idea of the worldly 
                                                 
40 See Hamilton (2000): pp. 188-189 
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life-affirmation is to make a move from the ‘moral’ viewpoint to the viewpoint ‘beyond good 
and evil’ symbolised by the worldly nobles,41 to the viewpoint beyond the slave morality 
typified by the Christian morality, which seemingly amounts to an ‘non-moral aesthetic’ 
viewpoint in practice. But then, many of us are reluctant to try to affirm all those human 
sufferings in the ‘worldly’ sense by giving them some ‘non-moral’ meaning. For, as I argued in 
Chapter 2-C, any type of outlook that regards human suffering in general as ‘thrilling’ or 
‘pleasurable’ or ‘good’ is unspeakably cruel, especially in terms of its failure to take into 
consideration seriously the real weight of human suffering. And likewise, such an outlook 
becomes particularly irresponsible when it is adopted by those of us who have always been 
fortunate enough to be a mere spectator in ‘a ringside seat’, living happily and peacefully 
without ever experiencing for ourselves what it is really like to suffer. Moreover, there are 
surely certain human sufferings which are so purely awful and terrible, certain atrocities that are 
so completely devoid of any beauty, such as Auschwitz, that not only can we never possibly 
give any aesthetic meaning to them, but also we should never affirm them in the sense of 
wanting them to recur eternally.
                                                 
41 See, e.g., Clark (1990): pp. 285-286 
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Section C: Nobility and Life-affirmation in an ‘inward’ sense 
 
Let us examine another conception of nobility and life-affirmation Nietzsche also presents in 
his works, which Hamilton terms an “inward” conception.1 A key difference between the 
worldly conception of nobility and the inward conception of nobility is that whereas the worldly 
nobles are individuals with no inner depths who lead a virtually ressentiment-free life, the 
nobles in an inward sense are possessors of some inner depths who experience painful 
psychological states such as ressentiment. To understand this difference, we must focus on 
Nietzsche’s account of how the pre-moral conceptions of the ‘bad conscience’ and ‘guilt’ 
originate and how these conceptions later become moral in their nature. 
In Chapter 4-A, I discussed Nietzsche’s emphasis on the ‘cleverness’ of the slaves. In his 
view, when one’s instincts are repressed and can no longer find any suitable outlet in the 
external world, they turn back to their possessor. And it is through this ‘internalization’ that a 
man first acquires some depths in his inner world and develops the so-called ‘soul’, i.e. 
‘conscience’. So, the powerless slaves, who – at first – cannot express their instincts freely 
under the oppression of the powerful worldly nobles and thus acquire inner depths through 
‘internalization’, are clever, prudent and calculating individuals (see GM: I, 10 & II, 16; also 
EH: GM). 
However, according to Nietzsche, any fixed communal life also inevitably involves the 
‘internalization’. Within a fixed community, one is compelled by social straitjackets to control 
one’s aggressive instincts, or else the community would disintegrate. And in Nietzsche’s view, 
it was the ‘internalization’ caused by the establishment of fixed communities that first gave rise 
to the ‘bad conscience’ in its pre-moral form. As a community develops, its members are 
                                                 
1 See Hamilton (2000) 
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increasingly forced to repress their aggressive instincts. And when these instincts continue to be 
denied external discharge, they will start discharging themselves internally. In this way, man 
begins to experience the pre-moral bad conscience (see GM: II, 16 & EH: GM).
2
 
Nietzsche argues that what one also experiences as a member of a community is a sense of 
‘guilt’ in its pre-moral form. According to him, pre-moral ‘guilt’ originally arose from “the 
contractual relationship between creditor and debtor” in “the fundamental forms of buying, 
selling, barter, trade and traffic”. In this relation, as a means of providing security for the 
creditor, the debtor makes a contract with the creditor and pledges that, in the case of a failure to 
repay the debt, the creditor may confiscate some other possessions of the debtor or the creditor 
may “inflict every kind of indignity and torture upon the body of the debtor”. Hence, even if the 
debtor fails to repay, the creditor can still compensate his loss with the pleasure of inflicting 
suffering on the debtor: this is possible because, “To see others suffer does one good, to make 
others suffer even more: this is a hard saying but an ancient, mighty, human, all-too-human 
principle”. And man experiences pre-moral guilt when he breaks the contract as the debtor. 
Further, this also leads to the idea that there can be an equivalence between suffering and guilt 
(see GM: II, 4-6). 
Nietzsche claims that such a contractual relationship between debtor and creditor was later 
interpreted further into “the relationship between the present generation and its ancestors”. In 
this relation, the present generation of a tribe believes that “it is only through the sacrifices and 
accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribe exists”, and that the prosperity of the tribe 
depends upon the ancestors who continue existing as “powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new 
advantages and new strength”. With such a conviction, the present generation feels itself in debt 
                                                 
2 This view of Nietzsche’s on the repressed instincts has today become the standard view, partly thanks to Freud who 
popularised it in his Civilization and Its Discontents (see Freud 1991: pp. 315ff). 
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to the ancestors, and at the same time also feels that it “has to pay them back with sacrifices and 
accomplishments”. And this sense of “guilty indebtedness” towards the ancestors, which largely 
depends upon “fear” of the ancestors and their power, does not vanish but instead increases as 
the tribe itself thrives. And when such pre-moral guilty indebtedness increases to a certain level, 
those ancestors are ultimately “transfigured” into “gods” in the present generation’s perspective 
(see GM: II, 19-20). 
The conceptions of the bad conscience and guilt which originate in the above-discussed 
ways are pre-moral in their nature. But now, according to Nietzsche, at a certain point in history, 
there occurred what he calls the “pushing back” of the conception of guilt into the bad 
conscience, the process which he explicitly refers to as a “moralization” (see GM: II, 21). Being 
caused by the forcible repression of one’s aggressive instincts, the pre-moral bad conscience is 
a “will to self-tormenting”, an expression of self-cruelty (see GM: II, 22). Though it has a 
positive aspect, namely as what has given man inner depths and the capacities for self-reflection 
and self-formation, it is still a suffering that involves painful feelings of intense frustration and 
torment (see GM: II, 16 & 18-19). And the ‘pushing back’ of guilt into the bad conscience 
happens when people, who are subject to a pre-moral guilt, interpret those feelings of 
frustration and torment generated by the pre-moral bad conscience as the “punishment” of god, 
specifically of a specific type of God typified by “the Christian God”.3 They believe that the 
                                                 
3 Nietzsche’s remarks on the ‘moralization’ of ‘guilt’ and ‘bad conscience’ are often confusing. Hence, there exist 
many various interpretations of the ‘moralization’. However, these interpretations can be roughly categorised into 
two groups. Firstly, there are those commentators, such as Risse (2001), who understands that the ‘moralization’ 
occurs only through the impact of Christianity. And secondly, there are those commentators, such as Ridley (1998), 
who understand that Christianity plays no role in the ‘moralization’. I agree with the former group. My view is that 
the ‘moralization’ only happens when the pre-moral conceptions of guilt and the bad conscience are connected to not 
just any conception of god(s), but specifically to a specific conception of God, typified by the Christian conception of 
God whom Nietzsche describes as “the maximum god attained so far” (GM: II, 20). 
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reason why they are suffering, feeling frustrated and tormented, is because they are guilty before 
God, i.e. having unpaid debts to God. And it is through such interpretation of suffering that the 
conceptions of the bad conscience and guilt become moral in their nature (see GM: II, 20-22). 
What exactly, according to Nietzsche, are guilt and the bad conscience in their moral form? 
As Hamilton summarises, moral guilt and the moral bad conscience are “forms of suffering 
which provide meaning to the subject’s life and are thus desired by the subject for this very 
reason”.4 To see how this is so, we must focus on a character called ‘the ascetic priest’, whom 
Nietzsche here introduces as the instigator of the ‘moralization’. The nature of the priest will be 
discussed in Chapter 5-A. But, to give a brief account concerning the role of the priest in the 
‘moralization’, Nietzsche argues that “if one wanted to express the value of the priestly 
existence in the briefest formula it would be: the priest alters the direction of ressentiment” 
(GM: III, 15). 
In Nietzsche’s view, whenever one experiences suffering, one commonly thinks that 
someone or other must be to blame for it, and this kind of reasoning generates in one 
‘ressentiment’: Nietzsche’s term for a reactive, painful psychological state that comprises such 
feelings as hatred, malice, vengefulness, envy and mean-spiritedness, which he considers to be 
characteristic of slave morality. And from such reasoning, every sufferer seeks someone to 
blame for his suffering, a “guilty agent” who is responsible for his suffering. But another reason 
why sufferers seek the ‘guilty agent’ is that they naturally desire relief from their suffering, and 
that the most effective means of deadening their suffering is “an orgy of feeling”, that is, a 
venting of their ressentiment upon some living thing on some pretext or other, either actually or 
in effigy: such venting can drive their suffering out of their consciousness at least momentarily. 
And in fact, until they find the ‘guilty agent’, their ressentiment constantly accumulates, which 
                                                 
4 Hamilton (2000): p. 177 
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would cause them to suffer more (see GM: III, 15, 19 & 20). So, it is owing to this that 
Nietzsche insists that the real problem concerning suffering is not suffering per se, but the 
“meaninglessness” of suffering. Suffering becomes particularly unbearable when people cannot 
figure out why they suffer, because unless they identify whom to blame for their suffering, 
which is one possible way of giving meaning to their suffering, they cannot discharge their 
ressentiment and thus cannot win relief from their suffering. And when their suffering remains 
meaningless and unrelieved, it would become too unbearable and ultimately drive them into 
“suicidal nihilism” (see GM: II, 7 & III, 28). 
According to Nietzsche, the ascetic priest persuades such ressentiment-afflicted people, who 
suffer from the feelings of frustration and torment generated by the pre-moral bad conscience 
and seek a ‘guilty agent’, that nobody but they themselves are responsible for their own 
suffering: they alone are to blame for their being frustrated and tormented (see GM: III, 15). 
More concretely, the priest first invents a whole range of Christian theological conceptions, 
such as “eternal punishment”, “original sin”, and “God” as the creditor who “makes payment to 
himself” on behalf of mankind as his debtor “out of love” (GM: II, 21). And then, with these 
conceptions in his hand, the priest explains to those tormented and frustrated people, who are 
already familiar with a pre-moral guilty indebtedness towards the ancestors qua gods, that they 
are being eternally punished by God, which is purely the result of their being intrinsically 
‘guilty’ before God, as well as of their having “the irredeemable debt” to God who “sacrifices 
himself for the guilt of mankind”: their total inadequacy before God, or in Christian terms their 
“sin”, is the only cause of their suffering (see GM: II, 20-21 & III, 20). And through such 
persuasion, the priest gives these sufferers an easily accessible ‘guilty agent’ upon whom to vent 
their ressentiment, namely the sufferers themselves: the priest urges them to discharge their 
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ressentiment inwardly instead of outwardly, thereby altering the direction of ressentiment (see 
GM: III, 15). 
As Nietzsche describes the “genius” of the priest as “the alleviation of suffering” (GM: III, 
17), the priest, by producing ‘an orgy of feeling’ in such way, does allow people to find their 
suffering bearable, and also stops their ressentiment from accumulating to the point of suicidal 
nihilism. Yet Nietzsche argues that this priestly interpretation of suffering, by which the bad 
conscience and guilt are moralized, does not truly help the sufferers: in fact, he sees it as a 
wrong and unhealthy interpretation of suffering that undermines people’s psychological health 
(see GM: III, 17 & 20). For, while alleviating their suffering temporarily, the priestly 
interpretation also causes them to experience “deeper, more inward, more poisonous, more 
life-destructive suffering”, in the shape of the moral bad conscience and moral guilt (see GM: 
III, 28). Here, by making the sufferers themselves the object of their ressentiment, the priest is 
deepening the hold of ressentiment in the sufferers. At the same time, the priest is exploiting 
and transforming their pre-moral guilty indebtedness towards the ancestors qua gods, which is a 
mere sense of reverence and appreciation for a god that can be expressed by such things as the 
offerings of sacrifices, into a profound, relentless sense of inadequacy before God, which – 
unlike the former – promotes a strong feeling of self-condemnation. And further, the priest is 
also intensifying their bad conscience as will to self-torture, causing it to take root more firmly 
in the sufferers. And this combination of the deepened ressentiment, the relentless sense of 
moral guilt and the intensified moral bad consciousness generates in the sufferers an additional, 
much more persistent and life-harming ‘intensional’ suffering (see GM: II, 20-22, III, 20 & 28). 
Hence, Nietzsche says that the priest “stills the pain of the wound [as] he at the same time 
infects the wound” (GM: III, 15). Yet, since this additional suffering is not meaningless, it is not 
only bearable but also desirable for the sufferers: in fact, it is so desirable that they come to take 
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pleasure in experiencing it (see GM: III, 11). And in Nietzsche’s view, this is something that 
can only be life-denying. 
Now, in Chapter 4-A, we saw how Nietzsche describes the worldly nobles as barbarous 
‘men of prey’ with no inner depths who lead a virtually ressentiment-free life. The worldly 
nobles can always express their natural aggressive instincts freely and fully. Hence, they are 
practically free from experiencing the ‘internalization’, which makes them unintelligent, as well 
as forgetful in the sense of being “incapable of taking one’s enemies, one’s accidents, even 
one’s misdeeds seriously for very long” (GM: I, 10). At the same time, because of this lack of 
inner depths, whenever they feel an impulse, they cannot stop themselves from translating it 
into an action immediately with total disregard for their own safety and interests, which makes 
them bold, reckless, imprudent and uncalculating. And all these characteristics of theirs allow 
them to be virtually free of ressentiment. And looking at such a description, we could 
reasonably presume that Nietzsche also considers the worldly nobles to be immune from the bad 
conscience and guilt. 
But now, one of the key factors that make Nietzsche’s idea of ‘nobility’ perplexing is that, 
along with this conception of the nobles who are inwardly empty, Nietzsche also seemingly 
presents in his works a different conception of the nobles, the nobles who possess some inner 
depths. That is, if we carefully examine Nietzsche’s discussion on the origins of pre-moral 
conception of guilt, it actually appears that Nietzsche intends the nobles to experience pre-moral 
guilt. For instance, regarding the contractual relationship between creditor and debtor from 
which pre-moral guilt originates, Nietzsche claims that it is “the oldest and most primitive 
personal relationship” (GM: II, 8), the relationship which is present “everywhere and from early 
times” (GM: II, 5). Moreover, as we saw, Nietzsche claims that such a contractual relationship 
later generates the sense of guilty indebtedness towards the ancestors, and that this sense 
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increases as a community itself thrives. When we consider these claims with the facts that 
Nietzsche portrays the nobles as men of the ruling class belonging to prosperous communities, 
and that he talks about how the nobles display profound reverence and obedience towards their 
ancestors (see BGE: 260, GM: I, 11 & HAH: I, 96), we could plausibly suggest that the nobles 
are subject to the ever-increasing pre-moral ‘guilt’.5 
And secondly, Nietzsche also sometimes appears to suggest that even the nobles cannot 
always express their instincts and impulses freely and thus become subject to the pre-moral bad 
conscience. For instance, in BGE, he talks about how the nobles mutually exchange reverences 
and rights among each other in their communities, and how such mutual relation involves 
“refinement and self-limitation” (see BGE: 265). To that effect, he describes the noble man as 
someone “who has power over himself, who knows how to speak and be silent, who delights in 
being severe and hard with himself and respects all severity and hardness” (BGE: 260). 
Moreover, in GM, when discussing how the nobles engage in hideous acts outside their own 
community, Nietzsche describes such rampaging nobles as “not much better than uncaged 
beasts of prey”, and remarks that “There they savour a freedom from all social constraints, they 
compensate themselves in the wilderness for the tension engendered by protracted confinement 
and enclosure within the peace of society, they go back to the innocent conscience of the beast 
of prey” (see GM: I, 11). From all these remarks, it seems clear that Nietzsche intends the 
nobles to be subject to the pre-moral ‘bad conscience’ at least inside their communities. That is, 
though it was originally “not in them that the “bad conscience” developed” (GM: II, 17), the 
                                                 
5 But it must be noted that the pre-moral ‘guilt’ the nobles feel towards their ancestors and gods is actually not the 
one based on ‘fear’ of which Nietzsche spoke earlier. For, as we will see in Chapter 5-A, according to Nietzsche, 
among the nobles, in their relation to god[s], ‘fear’ was replaced by “piety” (GM: 19). This, however, does not affect 
the point I am making, since Nietzsche makes it clear that the nobles experience an enormous sense of indebtedness 
towards their ancestors and gods, in proportion to the prosperity of their communities. 
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nobles nevertheless came to experience the pre-moral bad conscience at a certain point in time, 
as even they had eventually, against their will, to submit themselves to various social 
straitjackets and learn to constrain their instincts and impulses (see GM: III, 9). 
So Nietzsche clearly presents a conception of the nobles who are not inwardly empty. For, 
as we saw, if those nobles do experience pre-moral guilt and the pre-moral bad conscience, it 
means that they must possess some inner depths. 
What about guilt and the bad conscience in their moral form, then? As we saw, the 
‘moralization’ of guilt and the bad conscience happens when people, who are subject to a 
pre-moral guilt, interpret the feeling of frustration and torment generated by the pre-moral bad 
conscience as the punishment of the Christian God. This means that, in principle, the nobles we 
are discussing could well become subject to moral guilt and the moral bad conscience. 
Nietzsche at no point claims explicitly that the nobles experience moral guilt and the moral 
bad conscience. However, looking at his texts, we have reason to believe that they do. 
Firstly, although Nietzsche claims that “Ressentiment itself, if it should appear in the noble 
man, consummates and exhausts itself in an immediate reaction, and therefore does not poison” 
(GM, I, 10), such a claim clearly does not apply to the nobles in question. For one thing, the 
nobles who submit themselves to social straitjackets cannot always express their instincts freely 
and fully or translate their impulses into actions immediately. And as some of their instincts and 
impulses and desires must be frustrated and remain unfulfilled for the sake of the stability of 
their communities, they are likely to experience ressentiment. Certainly, it is possible that their 
frustrations might not become, as it were, intense enough to develop into ressentiment at first. 
For, as we saw, the nobles can compensate their frustrations by engaging in hideous acts outside 
their own community. So, it could be suggested that even if the nobles experience ressentiment 





 However, Nietzsche also talks about how the nobles, who have been in a constant 
fight with their neighbours, would eventually come to face a situation where “there are no 
longer any enemies among one’s neighbours” (see BGE: 262; also GM: II, 16). Such a remark 
suggests that, through the eventual lack of external enemies, the nobles would ultimately 
become unable to release their frustrations by going outside. And this implies that they would 
come to be afflicted with ressentiment, and would also come to acquire greater inner depths that 
would be sufficient enough to drive them to start evaluating their unpleasant conditions and 
seeking a ‘guilty agent’. 
Secondly, according to Nietzsche, the ‘men of ressentiment’, by that he means people whose 
psychological – spiritual – traits are predominantly slavish, are far “cleverer” than the nobles: 
unlike the nobles, they are prudent and calculating individuals (see GM: I, 10; also Chapter 4-A). 
And, as we will see in Chapter 5-A, such ‘men of ressentiment’ include not just ‘the slaves’ but 
also ‘the priests’. Moreover, in GM Nietzsche talks about how the priest “has ruined psychical 
health” (GM: III, 22), how “everything healthy necessarily grows sick” in the presence of the 
priest (GM: III, 15). In the light of these, it seems plausible to suggest that the highly clever and 
calculating priest finds no difficulty in persuading the nobles, who are afflicted with 
ressentiment and seeking a ‘guilty agent’, to blame themselves for their frustrations, and that the 
nobles ultimately fall victim to the unhealthy priestly interpretation of suffering.
7
 
And finally, as we saw in Chapter 4-A, although Nietzsche claims that examples of the 
nobles include “the Roman, Arabian, Germanic, Japanese nobility, the Homeric heroes, [and] 
the Scandinavian Vikings” (GM: I, 11), these figures do not bear much resemblance to the 
worldly nobles who lead a virtually ressentiment-free life. For even Achilles gets poisoned by 
                                                 
6 See Ridley (1998): p. 22 
7 See Hamilton (2000): p. 180 & Leiter (2002): p. 218 
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ressentiment as he experiences the unfulfilled pettiest desires for revenge and indulges himself 
in self-pity. Yet, Nietzsche considers Achilles to be noble. 
If we take all those points into consideration, we could plausibly conclude that Nietzsche is 
suggesting that the nobles do experience moral guilt and the moral bad conscience, as well as 
those painful psychological states such as ressentiment. In other words, Nietzsche is actually 
suggesting that, along with the worldly conception of nobility that is marked by the complete 
freedom from the types of feelings characteristic of slave morality, such as ressentiment, 
vengefulness, envy, mean-spiritedness, self-pity and guilt, there is also a form of nobility which 
is not exclusive of these slavish types of feelings.
8
 
How are we to understand this conception of nobility of Nietzsche’s, and his related idea of 
life-affirmation, which Hamilton calls the ‘inward’ conception of nobility and life-affirmation? 
Let me first outline Hamilton’s interpretation of it, and then I shall expand it in my fashion. 
In Hamilton’s view, the seeds of the inward conception of nobility and life-affirmation are 
found in Achilles. We saw earlier in this chapter how Achilles is neither noble nor an affirmer 
of life in the worldly sense. Throughout the greater part of the Iliad, he is deeply tormented with 
ressentiment as he experiences the unfulfilled pettiest desire for revenge and indulges himself in 
self-pity, all because Agamemnon has stolen his booty from the Trojan War. And when he 
wreaks his revenge on Hector for Patroclus’ death, by dragging Hector’s body around behind 
his chariot, he does not at all appear to be affirming his life in the sense of wanting to have his 
life back again as it has been: he is clearly feeling profound regret at what has happened. Yet, 
Hamilton suggests, there is a point at which Achilles shows his true nobility and life-affirmation. 
It happens towards the end of the Iliad where he finally starts to emerge from his self-absorption 
when Priam comes to ransom his son’s – Hector’s – body. As he is moved by Priam’s plight, he 
                                                 
8 See Hamilton (2000): p. 180 
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starts to overcome his ressentiment and becomes capable of being more reconciled to 
Agamemnon’s ill-treatment of him and Patroclus’ death than at any other point in the Iliad. And 
it is here in “the ability to overcome the elements of slavish morality in oneself”, as displayed 
by this particular Achilles who conquers his vengefulness, envy and self-pity and finally starts 
to accept his past, that we can find the inward conception of nobility and life-affirmation: a 
notion of nobility and life-affirmation “which is true to Nietzsche’s aims but which breaks with 
these notions in a purely worldly sense”. In other words, there can be “a nobility and an 
affirmation which is consistent with the patterns of moral emotions Nietzsche so deeply dislikes 
when we see that these emotions are overcome by the person who experiences them”.9 
As we saw in the previous section, according to Nietzsche’s idea of worldly life-affirmation, 
one is only considered to be affirming one’s life genuinely if one could and would desire to live 
exactly the same life one now leads over again. But now, compared with this, Hamilton 
suggests, someone who affirms his life in the inward sense “would not, if offered the 
opportunity, want his life to recur with all its pain and suffering in preference to a similar life in 
which there was less pain and suffering”. Yet, for all that, this ‘inward’ life-affirmer genuinely 
affirms his life, since his affirmation of life, the love of life he possesses, is one that “does not 
involve his weighing up the good and bad in it to arrive at an overall conception of, or balanced 
judgement on, its worth”. Such love of life is what is developed from a particular attitude one 
commonly holds towards one’s past. Many people can usually cherish their individual past and 
find it to be something important to them even when it has contained some pain, suffering and 
disappointment, because of “the sheer fact of its being their past”: to each of them, his past is “a 
unique possession, something which he has truly to call his own in a world where everything 
else either is or readily seems merely common property – or, at any rate, could easily become 
                                                 
9 See Hamilton (2000): pp. 180-181 
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so”. And this love of life, which underlies Nietzsche’s ‘inward’ conception of nobility and 
life-affirmation, is a result of such an affection and warmth one feels towards one’s past both 
being deepened and being extended to one’s present, so that one can affirm all of one’s past 




Hamilton suggests that, when faced with the question ‘would you like your life over again 
with all of its pain and suffering or with less pain and suffering?’, the inward life-affirmer with 
this love of life will undoubtedly and happily says that, if he had the chance, he would prefer 
having his life over again with fewer pains and sufferings or even without them at all. But what 
demonstrates his affirmation of his life, what attests to the genuineness of his love of life in 
spite of this preference of his, will be his ability to dismiss such a possibility of his having his 
life over again with less pain and suffering as “idle fantasy”. He will recognise his inability to 
change his past as clearly as humanly possible, and on this recognition he will not waste his 
time in wishing things had been otherwise or having regrets about them. Instead, he will seek to 
get on with his life as it is, with its past as it is, and try his best to turn that past to account in the 
present and for the future. And as to his present sufferings, while he will seek to avoid them or 
to extricate himself from them, if that comes to nothing, he will then seek to draw on his 
spiritual resources to accept them with as little resentment and bitterness as he can.
11
 
So, the inward conception of nobility is “an understanding of nobility according to which we 
find someone noble if he can affirm or love life without becoming bitter and resentful even if 
things do not go for him in a worldly sense in the way he wants”.12 And it is precisely such a 
“quality of his spirit” in his response to misfortunes and sorrows, the spirit of his acceptance of 
                                                 
10 See Hamilton (2000): pp. 181-183 
11 See Hamilton (2000): pp. 183-184 
12 Hamilton (2000): p. 186 
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his past and present sufferings with “an equanimity or, to use Nietzsche’s term, a freedom of 
spirit”, that makes his love of life “not a balancing up of good and ill in it in order to come to a 
judicious or balanced judgement on its worth”.13 
Now, traditionally, this ‘inward’ conception of nobility and life-affirmation has been often 
unnoticed or unaddressed by commentators. Presumably, this is owing to the fact that Nietzsche 
rarely emphasises it in an explicit manner in his works, as he does not clearly distinguish it from 
the worldly conception of nobility. However, Hamilton’s interpretation of it seems to me correct 
on several grounds. 
To begin with, this ‘inward’ conception of nobility and life-affirmation is clearly true to 
Nietzsche’s aims. For instance, the inward life-affirmer’s attempt to turn his past pains and 
sufferings to account in the present and for the future is compatible both with Nietzsche’s 
concern to give some positive value to suffering and with his notion of ‘greatness’ as the 
attitude and ability to use suffering for positive purposes. Moreover, ‘the ability to overcome the 
elements of slavish morality in oneself’ that characterises the inward life-affirmation is also 
compatible with Nietzsche’s concerns for the individual psychological ‘health’, especially in 
relation to the way people interpret the existence of suffering: as I have suggested, one of 
Nietzsche’s aims is to make us realise how our psychological health is undermined by our 
acceptance of a wrong interpretation of the existence of suffering, namely the Christian moral 
justification of human existence – the priestly interpretation of suffering – that includes the 
Christian moralised conceptions such as ‘guilt’. And as I indicated in Chapter 3-C, this ability is 
clearly what Nietzsche himself sought to acquire. Indeed, in EH, Nietzsche tells us that the 
reason why he knows so much about ressentiment, and why he is so hostile to it, is because he 
                                                 
13 See Hamilton (2000): pp. 183-184 
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had been himself subject to it, owing to his persistent illness. And he emphasizes how seriously 
his philosophy has pursued “the fight against vengefulness and rancor” (see EH: Wise, 6). 
Likewise, as I also suggested in Chapter 3-C, the love of life that does not involve the 
weighing up of good and bad in it to arrive at a balanced judgement on its worth, which 
underlies the inward conception of life-affirmation, is also something Nietzsche himself aspired 
to acquire. His life was full of pains, misfortunes and disappointments. In many ways, his life 
was a failure in a worldly sense. So, throughout his mature life, he sought to affirm and be 
grateful to his whole life in a way that is not dependent upon how well things have gone in it on 
balance in a worldly sense. In this context, he talks about his ‘amor fati’, his desire to love 
everything in his life – even all those ‘bad’ things in it – equally as what was ‘necessary’ (see 
EH: Clever, 10 & CW, 4). And also in this connection, he often admires ‘the squandering spirit’, 
the individuals who ‘squander’ the energies of their spirit carelessly, who do not approach their 
life in a mercenary spirit with a prudent concern and a petty obsession for the balancing up of 
good and bad in their life, but embrace their life even if it has not gone just as they wished (see, 
e.g., GS: 202, TI: IX, 37 & WP: 77).
14
 Indeed, for him, such a mercenary attitude to life can 
only evince a smallness of spirit:
15
 as he remarks in TI, “If we possess our why of life we can 
put up with almost any how; man does not strive after happiness” (TI; I, 12). 
Furthermore, as Hamilton points out, we can also see how Nietzsche is working with this 
inward conception of life-affirmation from his treatments of certain historical figures in his 
works. For instance, while criticising Christianity as life-denying, Nietzsche often shows 
positive attitude towards Jesus: he effectively separates Jesus from what he perceives to be the 
life-denying ‘historical’ Christianity created by Saint Paul. In fact, Nietzsche regards Jesus as an 
                                                 
14 See Hamilton (2000): p. 182 
15 See Hamilton (2000): p. 184 
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affirmer of life: “To negate is the very thing that is impossible for him” (AC: 32). He claims that 
Jesus, through his teachings, abolished the whole traditional Jewish doctrine composed of 
moralized conceptions such as ‘guilt’, ‘sin’ and ‘punishment’ (see AC: 26, 33 & 41). And he 
also suggests that what Jesus exhibited through his death on the cross was “the freedom, the 
superiority over any feeling of ressentiment” (see AC: 40): what he recognises in Jesus is a way 
of getting rid of or overcoming ressentiment that is different from the one found in the ‘men of 
prey’ such as Napoleon. From such remarks, it is clear that Nietzsche is working with the idea 
of life-affirmation characterised by ‘the ability to overcome the elements of slavish morality in 
oneself’.16 
It also seems to me that this inward conception of nobility and life-affirmation is in itself 
plausible. Here, let me quote the opening passage of Hermann Hesse’s novel Gertrude, written 
in the style of monologue narrated by the protagonist Kuhn, which can help us deepen our 
understanding of this particular conception. Hesse’s narrator in Gertrude remarks, 
 
When I consider my life objectively, it does not seem particularly happy. Yet I cannot really call it 
unhappy, despite all my mistakes. After all, it is quite foolish to talk about happiness and 
unhappiness, for it seems to me that I would not exchange the unhappiest days of my life for all the 
happy ones. When a person has arrived at a stage in life when he accepts the inevitable with 
equanimity, when he has tasted good and bad to the full, and has carved out for himself alongside his 
external life, an inner, more real and not fortuitous existence, then it seems my life has not been 
empty and worthless. Even if my external destiny has unfolded itself as it does with everyone, 
                                                 
16 See Hamilton (2000): pp. 180-181 
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inevitably and as decreed by the gods, my inner life has been my own work, with its joys and 




In my view, this passage captures the spirit of Nietzsche’s inward conception of nobility and 
life-affirmation very eloquently: which is not surprising, since Hesse was profoundly influenced 
by Nietzsche.
18
 For instance, the inward life-affirmer would agree on how ‘quite foolish’ it is in 
the end to keep obsessing about the balance of amounts of happiness and unhappiness in one’s 
life. For, as we saw, he is a possessor of the love of life which does not depend upon the 
weighing up of good and ill in it to come to a balanced judgement on its worth. So, because of 
this love of life, he would recognise this whole way of looking at ‘life’ in terms of happiness 
and unhappiness to be a shallow, superficial and wrong perspective on life that is dishonest to 
phenomenology of ‘life’. 
Likewise, while wishing that his life had contained fewer pains and sufferings, the inward 
life-affirmer would be able to say in earnest that ‘I would not exchange the unhappiest days of 
my life for all the happy ones’. For, as I discussed, it is common that even when one’s life does 
not ‘seem particularly happy’, one can still cherish it and find it to be not ‘empty and worthless’, 
because of the sheer fact of its being one’s ‘own work’. 
Moreover, as we also saw, the inward life-affirmer is someone capable of dismissing such a 
possibility of his having his life over again with fewer or no ‘unhappiest days’ as a pointless 
fantasy. Through his life-experiences, he clear-sightedly recognises how ‘bad’ – pains, mistakes, 
failures and disappointments – constitutes an inevitable part of his life much more so than ‘good’ 
– pleasures and joys – does. As he ‘has tasted good and bad to the full’, he is mostly likely to be 
                                                 
17 Hesse (1974): p. 5 
18 For a discussion on Nietzsche’s influence on Hesse, see Reichert (1975): pp. 88-116. 
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aware of the fact that one’s ‘external life’ hardly ever goes in the way one wants or expects, and 
thus that what truly matters is the quality of one’s ‘inner life’ which one carves out for oneself: 
he is presumably someone who would find an notion of ‘a pain-free life’ odd and silly, and 
would agree with Orwell that “Most people get a fair amount of fun out of their lives, but on 
balance life is suffering, and only the very young or the very foolish imagine otherwise”.19 So, 
on this recognition, while preferring his life to have contained less suffering, he ‘accepts the 
inevitable with equanimity’, and affirms even that suffering with as little resentment and 
bitterness as he can. 
Furthermore, in my view, the reason the inward life-affirmer ‘would not exchange the 
unhappiest days of my life for all the happy’ is because he does not know, or rather he can no 
longer really tell, exactly which are ‘the unhappiest days’ of his life and which are ‘the happy 
ones’. It is a common phenomenon that, as one gets older, one no longer really knows whether 
one is happy or unhappy. When one is young, one feels that one knows exactly what ‘happiness’ 
and ‘a success’ are. But, once one ‘has tasted good and bad to the full’, the whole idea of what 
count as ‘happiness’ and ‘unhappiness’ or as ‘success’ and ‘failure’ becomes increasingly 
blurred and opaque to one. This is partly because one’s standard of or criteria for ‘happiness’ 
and ‘success’, one’s conception of ‘unhappiness’ and ‘failure’, constantly changes as one goes 
through life, just as one’s understanding of moral ideas does:20 it is often the case that getting 
what one wants does not make one happy, since “one does not understand the meaning of what 
is wanted until one gets it; and when one gets it, its meaning usually turns out to be quite other 
than expected” – for instance, it is only when one actually acquires material wealth, which one 
has always wanted, after many years of struggle, that one realises the emptiness and 
                                                 
19 Orwell (2000c): p. 412 
20 See, e.g., Murdoch (1985): p. 29 
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unimportance of worldly goods.
21
 And the inward life-affirmer is someone who, after tasting 
himself ‘good and bad to the full’, clear-sightedly recognises the fluidity and somewhat 
fraudulent nature of the concepts of ‘happiness’ and ‘success’, ‘unhappiness’ and ‘failure’, or 
more generally, the temporal nature of one’s understanding of what is of value or significance in 
life. 
There is clearly something admirable, noble and healthy about the person who can view and 
affirm his life in this ‘inward’ way. And, needless to say, a part of the admirableness lies in the 
fact that it is far from easy to possess this kind of attitude towards life. But, compared with the 
worldly life-affirmation, it does not appear to be a humanly unachievable ideal, for there were 
individuals who actually managed to affirm their life in such ‘inward’ way. 
One of those individuals is, as Hamilton suggests, Montaigne, whose great suffering in his 
life was his illness: late in his life, he suffered from a ‘stone’ which caused “dreadful internal 
pain and the retention of urine accompanied by paroxysms”.22 During the discussion of his 
illness in his last essay ‘On experience’, Montaigne remarks, 
 
It is unfair to moan because what can happen to any has happened to one . . . We must learn to suffer 
whatever we cannot avoid. Our life is composed, like the harmony of the world, of discords as well 
as of different tones, sweet and harsh, sharp and flat, soft and loud. If a musician liked only some of 
them, what could he sing? He has got to know how to use all of them and blend them together. So too 
must we with good and ill, which are of one substance with our life. . . . I so order my soul that it can 
contemplate both pain and pleasure with eyes equally restrained . . . doing so with eyes equally 
                                                 
21 See Hamilton (2009): p. 65 
22 Montaigne (2003): p. xlvi, n. 42 
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steady, yet looking merrily at one and soberly at the other and, in so far as it can contribute anything, 
being as keen to snuff out the one as to stretch out the other.
23 
 
As Hamilton observes, “the central way in which Montaigne’ love of life expressed itself was in 
the quality of his spirit in his response to both pleasures and pains, to both joys and sorrows”.24 
Montaigne, of course, never actually wanted to suffer from his illness if he did not have to, and 
in all likelihood, if his life were to recur again, he would prefer it without that illness: for, as I 
suggested before, it is simply human nature to want to reduce one’s own sufferings or at least 
not to will any more suffering than one already has. But what demonstrates his affirmation of 
his life, what attests to the genuineness of his love of life and nobility, is the fact that he never 
allowed himself to be lost in empty fantasy about the possibility of having such a pain-free life: 
he remained to the end in touch with reality. Instead of wasting his time in entertaining such 
self-consoling fantasy, which blinds one to reality, he recognised and accepted his pains and 
sufferings as an inevitable part of his life with equanimity, without becoming bitter or resentful, 
just as he did his pleasures and joys.
25
 
Indeed, Montaigne was someone who knew how to be grateful to his life, to the whole 
process of life. And in particular, the way he responded to his pains and sorrows was not only 
admirable and noble, but also healthy. His response was admirable, since it is extraordinarily 
difficult for one to give up the fantasy of one’s having one’s life over again with less pain and 
suffering – we are particularly prone to this sort of fantasy in our misfortune, but also it is 
simply human nature always to desire more and imagine something better, to fail to remain 
                                                 
23 Montaigne (2003): pp. 1236-1237 & 1262 
24 Hamilton (2000): p. 185 
25 See Hamilton (2001): pp. 62-63; also Hamilton (1998): p. 323 
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satisfied with, or appreciate, the value of that which we already possess.
26
 And his response was 
healthy, because many of us, when faced with suffering or misfortune, tend to become 
sentimental and willingly indulge ourselves in such feelings as self-pity. In a way, we almost 
come to enjoy our suffering and misfortune, in the sense of taking pleasure in feeling sorry for 
ourselves. And in most cases, this whole emotional self-indulgence actually prolongs and 
worsens our experience of suffering and misfortune. 
As we saw, in Nietzsche’s view, most of us, when faced with suffering, commonly think 
that someone or other must be to blame for our suffering, and thus we seek a ‘guilty agent’ who 
is responsible for our suffering. This kind of reasoning, which underlies the Christian 
interpretation of suffering, is unhealthy, because it makes us become afflicted with ressentiment 
and other related feelings such as vengefulness, envy and mean-spiritedness, all of which 
Nietzsche considers to be characteristic of slave morality. Montaigne, on the other hand, clearly 
achieved freedom from such unhealthy reasoning, and did not seek someone or something to 
blame for his illness. Though he, in the face of his illness, presumably was not always entirely 
immune to ressentiment and struggled with all those slavish feelings from time to time, he 
ultimately managed to overcome them in his response to the illness. In the end, there was “an 
extraordinary strength” in Montaigne, and he was “possessed of that which Nietzsche called a 
free spirit”.27 What Montaigne showed through his experience of illness is “the great health” 
(GS: 382), psychological ‘health’ in the sense of “instinctively cho[osing] the right means 
against wretched states” (EH: Wise, 2): a characteristic which Nietzsche values and ascribes to 
‘higher types’. 
                                                 
26 See Hamilton (2000): p. 184; see also Hamilton (1998): pp. 320-322 
27 See Hamilton (2000): p. 185 
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As Hamilton points out, Montaigne was able to respond to his sufferings in such a 
remarkably admirable and healthy way “because there was much else in his life which gave him 
spiritual nourishment or sustenance”. And the need of this sustenance in order to affirm life is 
clearly recognised by Nietzsche, as in GS he speaks of it in terms of experiencing ‘a tremendous 
moment’ which would cause one to wish the recurrence of one’s life for the sake of that 
moment (see GS: 341; also Z: IV, 19 ).
28
 Hesse seems to be also aware of such need, as his 
narrator in Gertrude remarks, 
 
Man’s life seems to me like a long, weary night that would be intolerable if there were not 
occasionally flashes of light, the sudden brightness of which is so comforting and wonderful, that the 
moments of their appearance cancel out and justify the years of darkness. The gloom, the comfortless 
darkness, lies in the inevitable course of our daily lives. Why does one repeatedly rise in the morning, 
eat, drink, and go to bed again? The child, the savage, the healthy young person does not suffer as a 
result of this cycle of repeated activities. If a man does not think too much, he rejoices at rising in the 
morning, and at eating and drinking. . . . But if he ceases to take things for granted, he seeks eagerly 
and hopefully during the course of the day for moments of real life, the radiance of which makes him 
rejoice and obliterates the awareness of time and all thoughts on the meaning and purpose of 
everything. One can call these moments creative, because they seem to give a feeling of union with 
the creator, and while they last, one is sensible of everything being necessary, even what is seemingly 
fortuitous. . . . Perhaps it is the excessive radiance of these moments that makes everything else 
appear so dark, perhaps it is the feeling of liberation, the enchanting lightness and the suspended bliss 
that make the rest of life seem so difficult, demanding and oppressive. . . . if there is a state of bliss 
and a paradise, it must be an uninterrupted sequence of such moments, and if this state of bliss can 
                                                 
28 See Hamilton (2000): p. 186 
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attained through suffering and dwelling in pain, then no sorrow or pain can be so great that one 
should attempt to escape from it.
29 
 
This passage, especially the attitude towards pain and suffering it depicts, is typically 
Nietzschean. But, here, what separates Montaigne and Nietzsche from Hesse’s narrator is that 
Montaigne and Nietzsche both recognised how ‘the inevitable course of our lives’ does not have 
to be ‘the gloom, the comfortless darkness’, how this ‘cycle of repeated activities’ such as 
‘eating and drinking’ can also potentially bring the comforting enriching ‘radiance’ to our lives. 
As Hamilton suggests, 
 
Montaigne sought to show in his final essay – indeed, throughout The Essays – how, by attending to 
them properly, the most banal and quotidian of activities – eating, drinking, shitting, dressing, 
moving, breathing and so on – can provide (some of) the spiritual sustenance which allows us to 
affirm even our misfortunes and sufferings through accepting them in a spirit of equanimity. We see 
Montaigne’s freedom of spirit as much as in his response to pleasure – and in his willingness to find 
pleasure where he could – as in his response to misfortune.30 
 
And, as we saw before, Nietzsche too always recognised the importance of attending properly to 
what he calls “these small things – nutrition, place, climate, recreation”, of being able to take 
pleasure and find solace in these “little things” as “the basic concerns of life itself”, which could 
significantly grace one’s life: one of his criticisms of modernity and Christianity is that they 
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make light of or even despise these ‘small things’ (see EH: Clever, 10; also HAH: II, ii, 5-6, D: 
553, GS: 7, TI: I, 33 & Chapter 3-C). 
In the previous section, I discussed the distinction between an attitude of ‘just accepting my 
fate’ and an attitude of ‘accepting my fate and also trying to change it’. And I argued that the 
attitude of ‘just accepting my fate’, which Nietzsche’s idea of worldly life-affirmation 
seemingly encourages, can actually become life-denying, and that the attitude of ‘accepting my 
fate and also trying to change it’ is more life-affirming. Here, we could suggest that what the 
life-affirmation in the inward sense encourages is the attitude of ‘accepting my fate and also 
trying to change it’. For, as Hamilton remarks,  
 
this affirmation of life [in the ‘inward’ sense] is wholly consistent with the attempt on the part of the 
affirmer of life in the relevant sense to seek to change the world in the light of his desires, needs and 
so on. For the point is rather that this kind of affirmation involves one’s not becoming bitter if one’s 
will proves unable to shape the world in this way. Further, this kind of affirmation is quite consistent 
with making very heavy demands on life itself. There is nothing in this kind of affirmation which 




When faced with his illness, Montaigne did not ‘just accept’ it. He undoubtedly tried everything 
he could to cure or at least ease his illness, and never stopped longing to be free of it. And there 
must have been a moment where he was genuinely close to sinking into despair from the pain. 
But, as we have seen, the reason none of these prevent him from being noble and a life-affirmer 
in the inward sense is that, even though his attempt to extricate himself from the illness 
effectively came to nothing, not only did he always clear-sightedly recognise and ultimately 
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manage to accept the reality of it as it was, but also, in the process, his spirit always essentially 
remained intact, hardly ever tainted by bitterness or resentment or self-pity. 
Now, in the previous section, we examined Staten’s objection in regard to the difference 
between an affirmation of one’s own life and an affirmation of ‘life’ in general. And I suggested 
that Nietzsche seemingly considers it to be possible for one to affirm in the worldly sense not 
just one’s own life but ‘life’ in general, including all the human sufferings it contains. For 
Nietzsche is sometimes tempted to suggest that being indifferent to the sufferings of others is 
the same as an affirmation of those sufferings. However, I also argued that his suggestion is 
mistaken, since being completely indifferent to the sufferings of others is not the same as 
affirming those sufferings. How about this inward conception of life-affirmation we have been 
discussing? Is it possible for one to affirm in the inward sense not just one’s own life but ‘life’ 
in general? Can we ever make sense of such a notion of life-affirmation? 
Hamilton suggests that we can. As we have seen, what characterises someone who affirms 
his life in the inward sense is his love of his life which does not depend upon the weighing up of 
good and ill in it to come to a balanced judgement on its worth. And because of this, it is not 
inconsistent of him to prefer his life to have contained fewer pains and sufferings, even as he 
affirms it with those pains and suffering. Now, if such an inward affirmer is to affirm ‘life’ in 
general in the inward sense, he will likewise “not view others and their deeds on the model of 
weighing up what is good and bad in them in order to arrive at a balanced judgement on their 
value”. Hence this will allow the inward affirmer to condemn others for their shoddy behaviour 
or to seek to bring about the cessation of their sufferings, even as he affirms their lives. That is, 
this will, for instance, allow him to affirm the lives of both the criminals and their victims in a 
way which has “nothing to do with actually affirming the very actions that they commit or the 
very sufferings that they undergo”. And this would be not just an affirmation of his own life, but 
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also “an affirmation of the inwardness of others – an affirmation of the world on behalf of 
others”.32 
According to Hamilton, what fundamentally underlies such an inward affirmation of ‘life’ is 
the thought that “one shares a common lot with others”. That is, an inward affirmer of ‘life’ will 
recognise that “however mean, squalid, petty or even evil a person’s life is, it is still a life with a 
meaning, even if that meaning is elusive to the person whose life it is”, and through this 
recognition he will also think that “the fact that it is a life with meaning gives the person in 
question a dignity or value independent of e.g. the vileness of his actions”: or, in the case of 
those who are suffering, an inward affirmer will think that they have a dignity or value 
independent of their afflicted condition – what he affirms is not this afflicted condition of theirs 
per se. For, in affirming such a life of a person, what this inward affirmer is doing is expressing 
his sense that the meaning of his own life is illuminated by the meaning of this person’s life, and 
thus that he is also “implicated” in this person’s life. So, in this way, while the inward affirmer 
would condemn any vile actions or deeds of the other, he will also think “that he shares with the 
other a joint responsibility for humanity; that it is only by luck or grace that he has not 
committed the deeds that the other has committed; and that he is therefore in some way enmired 
in the guilt in which the other is enmired”.33 
As Hamilton suggests, such sense of sharing a common lot or a joint responsibility with 
others for humanity is clearly manifested by Primo Levi, who was a victim of Auschwitz, in his 
comments about Nazis. 
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33 See Hamilton (2000): p. 190 
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the just among us [victims of Auschwitz], neither more nor less numerous than in any other human 
group, felt remorse, shame and pain for the misdeeds that others and not they had committed, and in 
which they felt involved, because they sensed that what had happened around them in their presence, 
and in them, was irrevocable. It would never again be able to be cleansed; it would prove that man, 
the human species – we, in short – were potentially able to construct an infinite enormity of pain; and 
that pain is only force that is created from nothing, without cost and without effort.
34 
 
Even though Levi certainly thought that Nazis’ deeds were vile and should never go unpunished, 
he still recognised their lives as lives with a meaning, by which the meaning of his own life was 
illuminated. Hence, he considered Nazis to have dignity or worth independent of these vile 
deeds of theirs, and at the same time also considered himself to be jointly responsible, and to 
share a common lot, with them for humanity: thoughts, both of which enabled him to remain 
free of hatred for Nazis. And it was this freedom from hatred that enabled him to affirm the 
Nazis “in a way that had nothing to do with approving of their actions and everything to do with 
wanting punishment for them with a concern for justice of the purest form, utterly free from 
feelings of revenge”.35 
So, if what we have just discussed is correct, it seems that we can make sense of a notion of 
the inward life-affirmation that involves not only an affirmation of one’s own life but also an 
affirmation of ‘life’ in general. But then, the problem is that, as Hamilton points out, such 
notion of the inward affirmation of ‘life’ is something of which we cannot make proper sense 
within the terms of Nietzsche’s philosophy, since there is simply no room in his philosophy for 
the idea that each individual human being possesses a unique dignity or worth independent of 
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35 See Hamilton (2000): pp. 191-192 
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his deeds. Indeed, as I suggested before, there are many remarks Nietzsche makes on the masses 
which indicate that he does not recognise any intrinsic value or worth in them. Further, what his 
mature writings increasingly display is a profound sense of responsive ‘disgust’ towards the 
masses. In this sense, he clearly does not believe that the meaning of his life could be 
illuminated by the lives of the masses, or that he shares a common lot or a common 






So, in conclusion, I have argued in this chapter that Nietzsche presents two different 
conceptions of ‘nobility’ and ‘life-affirmation’, a ‘worldly’ and an ‘inward’ conception, without 
clearly distinguishing one conception from another, and also without properly working out 
either conception. I have argued that Nietzsche’s ‘worldly’ conception of nobility is implausible, 
because of his inability to give a concrete example of the worldly nobles, coupled with our 
inability to go back to being exactly like them. And though we could redeem this implausibility 
by interpreting the worldly nobles as ‘an archetype’, his ‘worldly’ conception of nobility is still 
problematic, since the way of life symbolised by the worldly nobles is not only impossible to 
lead successfully in the modern world, but also in itself hollow. 
And I have also argued that Nietzsche’s idea of ‘worldly’ life-affirmation is also implausible. 
For, firstly, the worldly life-affirmation as an unconditional overall type of life-affirmation can 
become life-denying in certain contexts. Secondly, what one can affirm in the worldly sense is 
only one’s own life, not ‘life’ in general, including others’ suffering. And thirdly, even it were 
                                                 
36 See Hamilton (2000): p. 192 
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possible to affirm others’ suffering in the worldly sense, there would clearly be certain human 
sufferings which we should never affirm in the worldly sense. 
Further, I have argued that while Nietzsche’s ‘inward’ conception of nobility and 
life-affirmation helps us see the possibility of a notion of the inward life-affirmation that 
involves not only an affirmation of one’s own life but also an affirmation of ‘life’ in general, 
such a notion of the inward affirmation of ‘life’ is something of which we cannot make proper 
sense within the terms of Nietzsche’s philosophy. For, there is no room in his philosophy for the 
idea that each individual human being possesses a unique dignity or worth independent of his 
deeds, which is crucial to that notion. In this sense, Nietzsche’s ‘inward’ conception of nobility 
and life-affirmation ultimately remains implausible. 
As I suggested before, there is no doubt that this failure of Nietzsche’s to establish a clearly 
plausible conception of ‘nobility’ and ‘life-affirmation’ contributes greatly to the obscure nature 
of his conception of ‘higher types’. Nevertheless, it seems to me that our examination of those 
two different conceptions of ‘nobility’ and ‘life-affirmation’ has helped us identify what could 
plausibly be regarded as two key characteristics – which are essentially interrelated – that make 
people ‘noble’ and subsequently ‘higher types’ in Nietzsche’s view. Firstly, ‘life-affirmation’ 
especially in the sense of a freedom from slave morality, more specifically, in the sense of 
overcoming the elements of slave morality in oneself. And secondly, ‘creativity’ especially in 
the sense of giving ‘style’ to one’s character. With these two key characteristics of ‘higher types’ 





Nietzsche’s mature positive religious thinking 
 
In this chapter, I investigate the nature of Nietzsche’s mature positive religious thinking. In 
Section A, as I illustrate how Nietzsche’s mature positive religious thinking focuses on ‘the 
life-affirming type of gods’, I examine his idea of the nature and effects of these gods, with 
reference to his criticism of the Christian conception of God. I argue that, against the 
background of his criticism of the Christian God who condemns certain intrinsic parts of our life, 
what Nietzsche in his mature works increasingly recognises and values is the way the 
life-affirming gods deify “all things, whether good or evil” (BT: 3). And I also argue that, 
against the background of his criticism of the Christian ‘monotheistic’ God who forces on 
people one universal norm of life-denying nature, what Nietzsche in his mature works 
recognises and emphasizes in relation to the life-affirming gods is the value of ‘polytheism’. 
And in the process, I also discuss a significant interpretative issue concerning Nietzsche’s 
attacks on Christianity. I suggest that the core of his criticism of Christianity lies with the ‘value’ 
or ‘effects’ of the Christian beliefs, not with their ‘truth’. 
Then, in Section B, I present and argue for my view of how Nietzsche considers the 
life-affirming type of gods to contribute towards the nurturing of ‘higher types’. As I discuss 
Julian Young’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s mature positive religious thinking, I suggest that 
Nietzsche does not aim to recreate a Greek religion or a new religious myth. Rather, I argue, 
what Nietzsche wishes to offer through his continual positive valuation of ‘the life-affirming 
type of gods’ is a particular religious perspective on ‘life’. More concretely, through his 
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Section A: Nietzsche’s continual positive valuation of ‘the life-affirming type of gods’ 
 
Many commentators acknowledge the presence of ‘religious communitarianism’ in BT, 
which argues that modernity can be redeemed from the decadence only through the rebirth of 
pre-Socratic Greek tragedy as a ‘communal’ religious festival promised by Wagner’s 
music-drama. However, such thinking has been traditionally regarded as something exclusive to 
Nietzsche in the early period. The consensus has been that Nietzsche eventually abandoned his 
religious communitarianism, and that he became an atheist, anti-religious. Against this fixed 
idea, Young claims that Nietzsche “never was” an atheist, never was anti-religious, for 
“Nietzsche in fact never abandoned his religious communitarianism”. Hence, Young argues, 
“Though atheistic with respect to the Christian God, Nietzsche, I hold, ought to be regarded as a 
religious reformer rather than an enemy of religion”.1 
As I will argue, I agree with Young that Nietzsche always was a profoundly religious 
thinker. However, as I suggested in Chapter 1-A, Young seems wrong to claim that Nietzsche 
always maintained his religious communitarianism. For, on this point, I agree with many 
commentators that Nietzsche ultimately abandoned the religious communitarianism, and 
embraced instead the ‘aristocratic individualistic’ thinking which is primarily concerned with 
the flourishing of few exceptional individuals whose existence itself forms the cultural greatness 
of community. And as I also suggested, with this crucial change, his positive religious thinking 
also changed its shape and nature. After abandoning religious communitarianism, Nietzsche 
became a ‘religious’ aristocratic individualist, who sets the nurturing of ‘higher types’ as his 
highest goal and attempts to find the way to achieve it in a certain conception of ‘gods’ 
symbolised by the Olympian gods of ancient Greece. In other words, contrary to Young’s view, 
                                                 
1 See Young (2006): p. 2 
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the real positive aspects of the mature Nietzsche’s philosophy of religion lie not in the 
‘communal’ life-affirming religion that contributes towards the flourishing of ‘community’, but 
in ‘the life-affirming type of gods’ who can contribute towards the nurturing of ‘higher types’. 
And the aim of this chapter is to argue for this view of mine fully. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, Nietzsche’s early religious thinking was characterised by his idea 
of two types of life-affirming religion, the Apollinian type and the Dionysian type, which he 
proposed as two possible solutions to make our life bearable. Now, much of his early religious 
thinking does not feature in his mature works. But, as I discussed in Chapter 3-A, this is not 
only because of his abandonment of religious communitarianism. Equally crucially, after his 
separation from Wagnerianism which marks the end of his early period, he began rejecting 
metaphysics, including that of Schopenhauer which extensively underlay his early religious 
thinking. Further, as he tried to free himself from what he now perceived to be the ‘life-denying’ 
pessimism of Schopenhauer, he began developing his ideas of life-affirmation, which tries to 
‘embrace’ life as a whole completely without resorting to any metaphysical mediation: which I 
examined in Chapter 4. And with these changes, his positive religious thinking came to take on 
a different shape and nature in his mature works. 
However, this does not mean that his early religious thinking has no relevance to his mature 
positive religious thinking. Indeed, as if being true to his own programme for showing that 
nothing in one’s past should be treated as waste, he continues to maintain and develop some of 
the key elements of his early positive religious thinking. One such element is the idea of the 
life-affirming type of gods as “a transfiguring mirror”, which he originally presented in his 
discussion of the Apollinian type in BT (see BT: 3). For instance, in HAH written at the 




The un-Hellenic in Christianity. – The Greeks did not see the Homeric gods as set above them as 
masters, or themselves set beneath the gods as servants, as the Jews did. They saw as it were only the 
reflection of the most successful exemplars of their own caste, that is to say an ideal, not an 
anti-thesis of their own nature. They felt inter-related with them . . . Man thinks of himself as noble 
when he bestows upon himself such gods, and places himself in a relation to them such as exists 
between the lower aristocracy and the higher . . . . Where the Olympian gods failed to dominate, 
Greek life too was gloomier and more filled with anxiety (HAH: I, 114). 
 
With his rejection of metaphysics, he has abandoned his youthful idea of the Apollinian 
‘redemption in illusion’, i.e. a contemplation of the world of the Olympians as an extraordinary 
beautiful appearance attained through the principium individuationis: in fact, throughout his 
mature works, he hardly ever speaks of the world of the Olympians as an image world of 
beautiful illusion. But, as the passage shows, he continues to maintain the idea that the 
Olympian gods as the life-affirming gods are the “ideal picture” of the ancient Greeks’ own 
existence, the gods founded on a human ideal, the gods who live “the life of men” themselves 
(see BT: 3). And he continues to suggest that the life-affirming gods were essential to the 
flourishing of the Greeks as the archetype of the ideal ‘life-affirming’ life. 
However, there is also a significant change to his view of the life-affirming type of gods as 
‘a transfiguring mirror’. For instance, in AC written near the end of his career, he remarks, 
 
A people that still believes in itself retains its own god. In him it reveres the conditions which let it 
prevail, its virtues: it projects its pleasure in itself, its feeling of power, into a being to whom one may 
offer thanks. Whoever is rich wants to give of his riches; a proud people needs a god: it wants to 
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sacrifice. Under such conditions, religion is a form of thankfulness. Being thankful for himself, man 
needs a god (AC: 16). 
 
By ‘a people that still believes in itself’, Nietzsche clearly means the worldly nobles such as the 
ancient Greeks. As we saw in Chapter 2-A, Nietzsche in BT argued that what drove the Greeks 
to establish their religions was their ‘life-denying’ pessimistic worldview, which interpreted 
their existence as utter pain. Being exceptionally sensitive to and totally powerless against 
suffering, they were “in danger of longing for a Buddhistic negation of the will”. So, they 
needed to create their life-affirming gods in order to ‘bear’ their existence (see BT: 3 & 7). 
However, in the second preface of BT – added to the book fourteen years after its first 
publication –, Nietzsche now claims that what drove the Greeks to establish their religions was 
not the life-denying ‘pessimism of weakness’, so to speak, but rather their “pessimism of 
strength”, their “intellectual predilection for the hard, gruesome, evil, problematic aspect of 
existence, prompted by well-being, by overflowing health, by the fullness of existence” (BT: 
ASC, 1). In other words, he now suggests that the Greeks were already the life-affirming 
worldly nobles who not only can ‘bear’ but also can willingly ‘embrace’ their suffering, when 
they “needed” and created their “art” qua religion (see BT: ASC, 1).2 And with this change, he 
also now suggests in his mature works that the life-affirming gods were created not in response 
                                                 
2 In BT, Nietzsche speaks as if only the Apollinian type, i.e. the world of the Olympians, was created by the Greeks 
from “a most profound need” (BT: 3), namely, in response to their pessimistic outlook on life: since, remember, he 
does not explain why they needed the Dionysian type, i.e. tragedy, apart from mentioning that it originated in the 
Dionysian festivals. But, in the light of the context of the book, which I discussed in Chapter 2-A, we could plausibly 
suggest that the Dionysian type too was created from the same profound need. Now, here in the second preface of the 
book, Nietzsche appears to speak as if only tragedy were created from the ‘pessimism of strength’. However, looking 
at the above passage of AC, as well as all the remarks he makes on the life-affirming gods to which I will refer 
hereafter, it is clear that he also considers the Olympian gods to be created from the fullness of existence. 
255 
 
to one’s powerlessness against “the terror and horror of existence” (BT: 3), not as a means to 
overcome one’s ‘life-denying’ pessimistic worldview, but rather in response to one’s “joy, 
strength, overflowing health, overgreat fullness” (BT: ASC, 4), as a means to celebrate their 
superior power and their life-affirmation further. So, in his view, just like master morality, the 
life-affirming gods are essentially ‘self-glorification’, an honest expression of the noble’s active 
self-affirmation (see TI: X, 3). 
This point is also emphasized in Nietzsche’s account of the origin of the Christian God. 
Nietzsche remarks in AC, 
 
Originally, especially at the time of the kings, Israel also stood in the right, that is, the natural, 
relationship to all things. Its Yahweh was the expression of a consciousness of power, of joy in 
oneself, of hope for oneself: through him victory and welfare were expected; through him nature was 
trusted to give what the people needed – above all, rain. Yahweh is the god of Israel and therefore the 
god of justice: the logic of every people that is in power and has a good conscience. In the festival 
cult these two sides of the self-affirmation of a people find expression: they are grateful for the great 
destinies which raised them to the top; they are grateful in relation to the annual cycle of the seasons 
and to all good fortune in stock farming and agriculture (AC: 25). 
 
So, in Nietzsche’s view, the ancient Israelites during the period of the Kingdom were the 
worldly nobles, for whom religion was indeed ‘a form of thankfulness’. They were the powerful, 
high-minded, life-affirming individuals who were exaltedly conscious of their distinctive 
attributes which placed them above others. Hence, they possessed their ‘own god’, Yahweh as a 
life-affirming god, who was a projection of such exalted consciousness of theirs, “an expression 
of the self-confidence of the people” (AC: 25). Yahweh the god of Israel was ‘the god of 
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justice’, because he represented their “egoism” as the essence of their noble soul, namely the 
“unshakable faith that to a being such as “we are” other beings must be subordinate by nature 
and have to sacrifice themselves”, which they accepted unquestioningly as if “it is justice itself” 
(see BGE: 265). In the same manner as the ancient Greeks needed the Olympian gods, the 
ancient Israelites created Yahweh purely for the purpose of self-glorification, in order to express 
the joy they felt towards themselves as well as their surrounding world that had allowed them to 
prevail and maintain their sense of their own goodness.
3
 
Indeed, Nietzsche elsewhere insists that, traditionally, religion, or the relationship between 
god[s] and people, were – and still are – characterised by ‘fear’. At the beginning, gods 
originated from people’s fear towards unpredictable, uncontrollable nature (see HAH: I, 111). 
Later, gods also originated from people’s fear towards their ancestors and their power (see GM: 
II, 19-20; also Chapter 4-C). But, among the worldly nobles such as the ancient Greeks and the 
ancient Israelites, in their relationship to their life-affirming god[s] as their self-glorification, 
this ‘fear’ was replaced by “piety” (see GM: 19): what characterises their “religiosity” is “the 
enormous abundance of gratitude” towards nature and life (see BGE: 49).4 And, in Nietzsche’s 
view, this is how the relationship between a people and god[s] should be. 
However, according to Nietzsche, this state of affairs where the ‘right’ relationship between 
the Israelites and Yahweh had been preserved was later “done away with in melancholy fashion: 
anarchy within, the Assyrian without”. Through internal and external conflicts, the Israelites as 
                                                 
3 Nietzsche’s positive view of the ancient Israelites is also illustrated by the fact that, while he is critical of the New 
Testament (see AC: 46), he often speaks favourably of the Old Testament. He suggests that the latter contains “great 
human beings, heroic landscape, and something of the very rarest quality in the world, the incomparable naïveté of 
the strong heart” (GM: III, 22; also HAH: I, 475 & BGE: 52). For a discussion of Nietzsche’s positive attitude 
towards Judaism in general, see Santaniello (1994). For discussions on Nietzsche’s positive valuation of the ancient 
Israelites and their Yahweh, see Golomb (2000) & Murphy (2001). 
4 See Young (2006): pp. 152-154 
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powerful rulers were demoted to the powerless ruled and lost their nobility. And while they – 
even after such state of affairs disappeared – still continued expecting their victory and welfare 
through Yahweh as in the old days, and hoped that they would be restored to their old position 
through Yahweh, their hopes were never fulfilled. And to those Israelites who could no longer 
regain their nobility but had to remain dissatisfied with themselves as the powerless ruled, and 
who thus could no longer be grateful for their situation, Yahweh as the symbol of their 
life-affirmation became useless: “The old god was no longer able to do what he once could do. 
They should have let him go”. Yet, they did not relinquish Yahweh. Instead, they retained him 
by changing his nature. And this altered conception of Yahweh is the Christian conception of 
God (see AC: 25). 
Nietzsche considers this rise of the Christian God to be a part of ‘the slave revolt in 
morality’. However, his discussion of it, most of which we find in GM, is often confusing. For 
instance, one of the chief puzzles concerns who really conducted the slave revolt, since whereas 
Nietzsche at certain places appears to portray the slave revolt as what happened among ‘the 
slaves’, he elsewhere appears to regard ‘the priests’ as its true ringleaders. Now, different 
commentators have attempted to solve this puzzle in various ways. The most typical approach, 
especially among those commentators who are concerned with the reconstruction of GM as a 
coherent historical narrative, is to interpret the slave revolt as a two-stage process conducted 
separately by ‘the slaves’ and ‘the priests’.5 But, my suggestion is that we could plausibly avoid 
facing this puzzle if we recognise and focus on the fact that, as ‘archetypes’, both ‘the slaves’ 
and ‘the priests’ symbolise a similar type of being, in particular, similar kind of psychological 
characteristics. 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Ridley (1998) 
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That is, as I have argued, Nietzsche’s historical narratives and genealogical accounts are 
essentially ‘fictional’ narratives, and all the characters who appear in these narratives, such as 
‘the masters’, ‘the slaves’ and ‘the priests’, are essentially ‘archetypes’ that Nietzsche creates as 
an ‘instructive’ means to illuminate those of his and others’ inner states which he takes to reveal 
typical psychological patterns in human beings. So, although Nietzsche presumably believes 
that Christian morality and the Christian conception of God were established among ‘the Jews’ 
– among the Israelites who had lost worldly nobility –, his aim is not to provide a factual 
historical account of it. Instead, just as he does with the history of ancient Greece, he uses the 
actual history of Israel as both a source of inspiration and material to develop his own imaginary 
history of Israel. And through this essentially fictional narrative, what he intends to offer are his 
insights into certain ‘universal’ and ‘timeless’ psychological facts about the origins of morality, 
namely why, how and under what kind of psychological conditions one is driven to need, create 
and accept a certain type of morality and a related conception of god (see Chapter 2-A). And in 
his view, the slave type of morality and the related life-denying conception of god, typified by 
Christian morality and the Christian God, are always created “out of the spirit of ressentiment” 
(EH: GM). They are needed, created and accepted by a type of beings whom he calls ‘men of 
ressentiment’, whose psychology is characterised by the feeling of weakness and powerlessness 




                                                 
6 This approach is plausible, since Nietzsche makes clear that what he discusses in GM is not some specific historical 
moralities but “two basic types” of morality that can be found throughout history (see BGE: 260), and that the 
establishment of Christian morality by the Jews is “the most notable example” (GM: I, 7) – and apparently the 
earliest example (see BGE: 195) – of the slave revolt in morality, among others. Moreover, he claims explicitly that 
the priests appear “regularly and universally . . . in almost every age”, belong to “no one race” and prosper 
“everywhere”, and that their mode of valuation “stands inscribed in the history of mankind not as an exception and 
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In GM, Nietzsche repeatedly describes ‘the priests’, or ‘a priestly people’, of which he uses 
the Jews as a representative, as individuals who are members of high social standing like ‘the 
masters’ and yet weak and unhealthy both in body and soul like ‘the slaves’: despite being noble 
in socio-political sense, they are not the worldly nobles, since they are slavish in both 
physiological and psychological sense (see, e.g., GM I: 6-7). However, at one point, he also 
remarks that the priest “emerges from every class of society” (GM: III, 11). And later in EH, he 
claims that what he offered in GM was “the first psychology of the priest” (EH: GM). Moreover, 
as we saw before, while Nietzsche regards political superiority, and also to some degree 
physical superiority, as what originally enabled the worldly nobles to develop their ‘master 
morality’, he also insists that what really concerns him and us is superiority of soul, “nobility of 
soul” as a “typical character trait” of the worldly nobles (see GM: I, 4-6). So, in the light of 
these, it is clear that what we ought to focus on is the priests’ or priestly people’s lack of 
‘nobility of soul’, the psychological characteristics they share with ‘the slaves’, which Nietzsche 
does not ascribe to worldly nobility.
7
 
Psychologically, the crucial element that unites the priests and the slaves is that although 
they both hate the masters for their own reasons – the slaves are oppressed by the masters, and 
the priests are held in contempt by the knightly masters for their inactive and unwarlike way of 
life – and want to take revenge on the masters, they both are also envious of the masters’ power 
                                                                                                                                               
curiosity, but as one of the most widespread and enduring of all phenomena” (see GM: III, 11). For an approach to 
this issue similar to mine, see Owen (2007): pp. 83-85. 
7 Likewise, in my view, while Nietzsche uses the terms ‘the Jews’ and ‘the priests’ interchangeably, he does not 
necessarily mean that the historical Jews were actually the priests who belonged to a high socio-political class. Rather, 
the Jews are transformed by him into a people who typically possess certain psychological characteristics which the 
‘the priests’ as the archetype symbolises. That is, what really concerns us is the fact that Nietzsche consider ‘the Jews’ 
to be “the people embodying the most deeply repressed priestly vengefulness” (see GM: I, 7). This way of 
approaching things enables us to avoid speculating on such issues as how the Jews in captivity were able to retain – 
or regain – the high social status, their status as noble in the socio-political sense. 
260 
 
and strength: they wish to be just like the masters. And at one level, this envy and these desires 
of theirs – which also constitute their hatred of the masters – make them psychologically 
unhealthy by causing them to deny their own self as well as their surrounding world. However, 
because they are physically weak and impotent, they can neither become like the masters nor 
express their instincts and desires towards the masters freely in physical action. This has two 
implications. Firstly, by being unable to discharge their instincts and desire properly in action, 
they acquire great inner depths through the ‘internalization’, which makes them clever, prudent 
and calculating individuals: they become inactive “contemplative men”, in contrast to the 
masters who are active ‘men of action’. And secondly, their forcibly repressed envy, hatred and 
vengefulness amplify, fester and eventually turn into ressentiment. Further, because of their 
physical impotence and great inner depths, their ressentiment becomes poisonous, in contrast to 
that of the masters which “consummates and exhausts itself in an immediate reaction, and 
therefore does not poison”. And this makes them psychologically even unhealthier. And in 
Nietzsche’s view, the slave revolt in morality happens when these powerless ‘men of 
ressentiment’ are prompted by their poisonous ressentiment to express their instincts and desires 
not by means of physical actions, but by means of their great inner depths instead (see GM: I, 
6-7, 10, II, 16, III, 10 & EH: GM; also Chapter 4-A). 
I explained in Chapter 4-A how the way ressentiment produces slave morality is reactive in 
nature. Since those men of ressentiment do not possess sufficient power to carry out physical 
revenge as “the true reaction” against their hatred and envy towards the masters, they try to 
compensate themselves with ‘an imaginary revenge’, namely, with an establishment of new 
values that would devalue the masters. But, in the light of their inability to affirm their self, they 
cannot create their own values ‘spontaneously’ out of themselves as the worldly nobles can. 
Hence, they instead, out of their ressentiment, invert the masters’ morality with the 
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value-distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Through this inversion, they first design the 
concept ‘evil’ as the primal value of their morality, which represents what harms them, namely, 
the masters. Then, they define the concept ‘good’ as the negation of ‘evil’, which represents 
what is unlike the masters, namely, the ‘men of ressentiment’ themselves. And by establishing 
their own ‘slave morality’ with the value-distinction between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in this way, they 
imaginarily place themselves above the masters spiritually, and gratify their unsatisfied 
vengefulness against the masters: they deceive themselves and convince themselves of their 
goodness and their spiritual superiority over the masters (see GM: I, 7 & 10-11). 
But then, the situation will not improve for the men of ressentiment, unless the masters 
accept those ‘slave’ valuations. So, as a part of their imaginary revenge, in order to solidify and 
make their valuations appear justifiable to others as well as to themselves, they also falsify the 
masters’ conception of god[s] to create their own conception of god, namely, the Christian God, 
and invent the Christian ‘moral world order’ founded on the ascetic ideal. And with this, they 
establish the ‘priestly interpretation of suffering’ that involves the exploitation of guilt and the 
bad consciousness through their ‘moralization’: which I examined in Chapter 4-C.8 And, as I 
also suggested, Nietzsche considers the nobles – who increasingly suffer from pre-moral guilt 
and the pre-moral bad conscience – ultimately to fall victim to such ‘priestly interpretation of 
suffering’, through which they come to experience moral guilt and the moral bad conscience: 
                                                 
8 One of the confusions here is that whereas Nietzsche in AC says that the Christian God was invented when the 
Israelites who had lost worldly nobility changed the nature of their Yahweh, in GM he says that the Christian God 
was invented when the men of ressentiment inverted the masters’ conception of god[s]. But, in my view, though it is 
impossible to construct a coherent historical narrative out of these two different accounts, there is no real discrepancy 
between them, since Yahweh and the masters’ god[s] are the same type of god[s] which the worldly nobles typically 
possess as the symbol of their life-affirmation. That is, though expressed in two different story lines, Nietzsche’s 
main point is that the rise of the life-denying type of god, typified by the Christian God, always involves the 
falsification of the life-affirming type of god[s] out of ressentiment. 
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the highly clever and cunning ‘men of ressentiment’ find no difficulty in converting the nobles 
to their own ‘slave’ valuations. 
Nietzsche’s attitude towards this establishment of Christianity is positive in some respect. 
For, as I discussed in Chapter 4-A, in terms of producing new forms of human greatness, the 
profound reactive creativity of the men of ressentiment, which is founded on great inner depths 
and a wide variety of drives, possesses greater potentialities than the unrefined active creativity 
of the nobles who are inwardly empty. Indeed, in Nietzsche’s view, it was the way the men of 
ressentiment reactively conceived values through their rigorous evaluations of the causes of 
their suffering that first made mankind – its history and culture – complex, interesting and 
attractive. Further, what the men of ressentiment achieved through the establishment of 
Christianity was the creation of a new set of original values by ‘a revaluation of all values’, 
which is precisely what Nietzsche urges us to achieve (see BGE: 46, 195, 250 & GM: I, 6-7).
9
 
But then, his attitude towards Christianity is predominantly critical. He believes that the triumph 
of the Christian ‘slave’ morality and the related Christian conception of God over the last two 
millennia or so is the chief cause of the sickness of modernity, of the decadence of 
contemporary ‘life’ and ‘culture’. 
Nietzsche’s criticism of Christianity is extremely extensive and diverse, which makes it 
difficult to establish what exactly he criticises. In particular, one of the chief interpretative 
issues concerns whether he attacks the ‘truth’ of the Christian beliefs or the ‘value’ of the 
Christian beliefs. 
Some commentators suggest that the core of Nietzsche’s criticism of Christianity lies with 
its ‘truth’. For instance, Schacht claims, 
                                                 
9 In AC, Nietzsche also seemingly values the scale of psychological “vital energy” the Jews expressed in the 
establishment of Christianity, which is founded on what he calls “the Jewish instinct”, namely their uncompromised 
instinct to survive at “any price” (see AC: 24). See Banham (2000): pp. 70-71. 
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For Nietzsche, it would be difficult to overestimate the importance (both practical and philosophical) 
of the question of whether or not there is a God. As he observes, with regard to belief in God, so 
much ‘was built upon this faith, propped up by it’ that its abandonment has consequences beyond 
‘the multitude’s capacity for comprehension’ (GS 343). One could fairly characterise a good deal of 
his philosophising as an attempt to draw out these consequences, for a whole range of issues: to show 
what positions are thereby rendered as untenable, and to proceed to deal with these issues in the 
manner he takes to be indicated when both the very idea of God and the long ‘shadow’ cast by this 




I think Schacht’s claim cannot be correct. Certainly, by speaking of the death of God, Nietzsche 
does express his grave concern about the effects that the decline of the belief in the Christian 
God has on modern European culture. In his view, the majority of dominant values, virtues and 
worldviews of Europe have been underpinned by Christian beliefs, including the belief in the 
existence of an otherworldly realm. So, once this underpinning is gone, we would suddenly face 
a situation where there is nothing really worth affirming. But then, Nietzsche clearly does not 
seem to concern himself with the conventional question of the existence of God itself. For he 
claims explicitly in AC, “That we find no God – either in history or in nature or behind nature – 
is not what differentiates us” (AC: 47). Likewise, he remarks in the Nachlass, “Hitherto one has 
always attacked Christianity not merely in a modest way but in the wrong way . . . the question 
of the mere ‘truth’ of Christianity – whether in regard to the existence of its God or to the 
legendary history of its origin . . . is quite beside the point” (WP: 251). 
Indeed, while Nietzsche often critically speaks of the Christian beliefs and conceptions – 
‘God’, ‘sin’, ‘the kingdom of God’, ‘eternal life’, and so on – as being all imaginary and 
                                                 
10 Schacht (1985): p. 119 
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irrational, that they are ‘errors’ (see, e.g., TI: III, 6 & AC: 15), he elsewhere seemingly suggests 
that the implausibility of Christianity is not in itself objectionable, since he also talks about how 
some ‘errors’ are necessary conditions of life. For instance, he claims in BGE, 
 
The falseness of judgement is for us not necessarily an objection to a judgement . . . The question is 
to what extent it is life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even 
species-cultivating. And we are fundamentally inclined to claim that falsest judgements (which 
include the synthetic judgments a priori) are the most indispensable for us; that without accepting the 
fictions of logic, without measuring reality against the purely invented world of the unconditional 
and self-identical, without a constant falsification of the world by means of numbers, man could not 
live – that renouncing false judgements would mean renouncing life and a denial of life. To 
recognize untruth as a condition of life – that certainly means resisting accustomed value feelings in a 
dangerous way; and a philosophy that risks this would by that token alone place itself beyond good 
and evil (BGE: 4; see, also GS: 121). 
 
As I emphasized before, even after his separation from Schopenhauer’s pessimism, Nietzsche 
nevertheless continues to believe that life will forever possess in its nature the terrible aspects 
characterised by unavoidable pain and suffering. Even after BT, he still recognises the validity 
of ‘Dionysian wisdom’, i.e. of the horrible truth about the ultimate nature of existence, and 
continues to believe that the direct recognition of such wisdom, or the sight of the world as it, is 
simply unbearable, and thus that we must somehow conceal it from ourselves as we would 
otherwise perish. In BT, he describes ‘the Apollinian type’, ‘the Dionysian type’ and ‘Socratism’ 
as three different types of “illusion spread over things”, which the world-artist uses as means to 
“detain its creatures in life and compel them to live on” despite such terrible nature of existence 
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(see BT: 18). And even in his mature works, he essentially maintains that we need such an 
‘illusion’ which can make life – at least appear – meaningful, purposeful and thus bearable. 
Hence, my view is that Nietzsche does not really question whether a certain religious belief 
or morality or conception of god is true, since he considers all religious beliefs, moralities and 
gods to be humanly-constructed ‘illusions’, which we necessarily create to preserve ourselves 
(see, e.g., Z: I, 3 & GM: III, 13).
11
 Certainly, he often proclaims his allegiance to “the rigorous 
methods of acquiring truth” (HAH: I, 109). But, as we saw before, the ‘truths’ which he is 
committed to discovering are mostly such things as the psychological facts about the origin of 
moralities and gods, that is, how and under what kind of condition one requires, creates and 
accepts a certain type of ‘illusion’ (see, e.g., GS: 7 & BGE: 187). In fact, he claims in D that the 
discovery of such psychological facts actually makes a proof of the non-existence of God 
“superfluous” (see D: 95). And more crucially, as he makes clear in the above-quoted passage 
of BGE, what truly concerns him is whether and to what extent such an ‘illusion’ is not just 
‘life-preserving’, but also ‘life-promoting’ and ‘species-cultivating’, that is, whether accepting it 
can help making individuals life-affirming and flourish as higher types (see GM: Preface, 3 & 
5). 
So, the core of Nietzsche’s criticism of Christianity lies not with the ‘truth’ of the Christian 
beliefs in the sense of their rationality and plausibility, but rather with their ‘value’ or ‘effects’, 
or more concretely, with the psychological – and also to some degrees physical – consequences 
of one’s acceptance of the Christian ‘illusions’. Still, given the extensive and diverse nature of 
his criticism of the ‘value’ of Christianity, it is impossible for me here to make any detailed 
attempt to examine all the possible aspects of Christianity that he attacks. But, in Chapter 4, I 
                                                 
11 More precisely, he considers them ‘aesthetically’ constructed illusions, since he, even after BT, continues to regard 
every outlook – worldview – that prescribes meaning to human existence as in essence an ‘aesthetic’ outlook. 
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have suggested what I consider to be two key characteristics – which are interrelated – that 
make people ‘noble’ and subsequently ‘higher types’. Firstly, ‘life-affirmation’ especially in the 
sense of a freedom from slave morality, more specifically, in the sense of overcoming the 
elements of slave morality in oneself. And secondly, ‘creativity’ especially in the sense of 
giving ‘style’ to one’s character. Hence, through the rest of this section, I shall focus on two 
chief aspects of the Christian ‘illusions’, which are, in Nietzsche’s view, particularly 
life-denying and hinder people from attaining these two characteristics. And in the process, I 
will also illustrate two key positive effects of the life-affirming type of gods which Nietzsche in 
his mature works recognises and particularly values in this regard. 
The first chief aspect of Christianity that Nietzsche finds particularly life-denying and an 
impediment to the nurturing of higher types is the way Christianity condemns certain intrinsic 
parts of life. As we saw, Christian morality and the Christian God were established by the ‘men 
of ressentiment’ in their attempt to gain superiority over the nobles: they, out of their 
ressentiment, invert and falsify the nobles’ morality and life-affirming type of god[s] as 
‘self-glorification’ to create a new value-system that would devalue the nobles. So, under the 
Christian God, what is condemned as ‘evil’ is everything that the life-affirming nobles possess 
and are proud of, everything that has allowed them to prevail and prosper. These things include 
worldly and physical power and strength, bodily – sensual – pleasures, all the natural instincts to 
which the nobles are faithful, such as cruelty and sexuality, and all those ‘egoistic’ 
characteristics and emotions such as greed, pride, envy, vanity and lust (see, e.g., AC: 5 & 21). 
As I illustrated in Chapter 4, according to the mature Nietzsche’s ideas of ‘life-affirmation’, 
which is a key characteristic of higher types, life should be affirmed totally and unconditionally, 
or at least one must try to embrace every aspect of life as something valuable in itself – ‘nothing 
in what one is should be wasted’. And Nietzsche clearly considers all those natural instincts and 
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egoistic characteristics and emotions to be an inevitable and permanent feature of life. So, in his 
view, Christianity, its ‘moral’ view of life, is life-denying, as it wrongly condemns certain parts 
of life and thus stops us from seeing and accepting life as it actually is. 
Moreover, Nietzsche also considers the Christian ‘moral’ view of life to be ‘life-harming’. 
In order to solidify their ‘slave’ valuations, the men of ressentiment invent the Christian ‘moral 
world order’ founded on the Christian ascetic ideal, which involves the postulation of an 
otherworldly realm, from whose viewpoint the nobles and everything they possess indeed 
appear ‘evil’. And with this, they establish the ‘priestly interpretation of suffering’ – through 
which the bad conscience and guilt become moralized –, which regards suffering as punishment 
of the Christian God. It claims that the reason why we are suffering is because we are being 
punished by God, which is purely the result of our being ‘guilty’ before God, i.e. having unpaid 
debt to God, of our being ‘the sinners’ by disobeying God’s will that is expressed in the 
Christian ascetic ideal (see Chapter 4-C). But, it also claims that we can be forgiven by God, i.e. 
our debt to God can be redeemed, if we repent and submit ourselves to the Christian ascetic 
ideal and its virtues such as ‘humility’, ‘compassion’ and ‘love of one’s enemies’: if we practise 
self-denial and un-egoistic actions such as self-sacrifice and pity, which Christianity promotes 
as ‘good’, we will ultimately enter the Kingdom of God where our suffering of this life will be 
compensated (see, e.g., AC: 25-27). 
At one level, by positing the Kingdom of God as a perfect afterlife, what the priestly 
interpretation of suffering, i.e. the Christian teleological ‘otherworldly’ justification of human 
existence, does is to devalue this life as a whole. It claims that nothing in this world is 
ultimately important or pointful or fulfilling, and that true meaning and happiness lie only in 
Kingdom of God: it reduces and treats this life as something inferior, as a mere path towards the 
ultimate, greater end. In this way, the men of ressentiment take revenge on the reality of this 
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world, which has made them – against their wish and hope – powerless, impotent and oppressed 
(see TI: III, 6, AC: 15 & EH: Destiny, 8). 
At another level, this Christian interpretation also generates in us a piercing sense of 
self-condemnation. Our human nature is so fundamentally anti-ascetic and self-concerned, so 
firmly characterised by aggressive instincts, sensual desires and egoistic characteristics and 
emotions, that we are bound constantly to violate the God’s will which is expressed in the 
Christian ascetic ideal. This means that we are intrinsically ‘guilty’ before God, tainted with 
‘original sin’. Further, to make the matter worse, the Christian interpretation also tells us how, 
‘out of love’ for us as the debtor, God as the creditor has sacrificed Jesus, His Son, for our guilt, 
for our sinfulness: so, our debt to God is enormous.
12
 Yet, despite such astonishing sacrifice, 
we are still fundamentally incapable of obeying God’s will, of living up to the Christian ascetic 
ideal. This makes our debt to God practically ‘irredeemable’, thereby increasing our feeling of 
guilt to the extreme: we are to be burdened with a permanent sense of guilt (see GM: II, 19-22, 
III, 20 & AC: 25-26; also Chapter 4-C). 
As we saw in Chapter 4-C, formerly, pre-moral guilt people feel towards the ancestors qua 
god[s], whether that was founded on ‘fear’ as in the case of the primitive tribal people or 
founded on ‘piety’ as in the case of the nobles, was nothing more than a mere sense of reverence 
and appreciation. It was easily solvable by the offerings of sacrifices and music or, in the case of 
                                                 
12 Nietzsche regards this establishment of Christian doctrine of ‘atonement’ as the falsification of Jesus’ teachings 
and the real meaning of Jesus’ death by Paul, whom Nietzsche often uses as a representative of ‘men of 
ressentiment’: the key moment in the establishment of Paul’s ‘historical’ Christianity (see, e.g., D: 68 & AC: 24). For, 
as we saw before, in Nietzsche’s view, Jesus was an affirmer of life. Jesus, through his teachings, abolished the whole 
traditional Jewish doctrine composed of moralized conceptions such as ‘guilt’, ‘sin’ and ‘punishment’ (see AC: 26, 
33 & 41). And what Jesus exhibited through his death on the cross was “the freedom, the superiority over any feeling 
of ressentiment” (see AC: 40). For a discussion on Nietzsche’s view of Christ as a life-affirmer, see Berkowitz 
(1995): pp. 109-114. For a discussion on Paul’s distortion of Jesus, see Han (2000): pp. 124-127. For a discussion on 
Jesus’ freedom from ressentiment, see Santaniello (1994): pp. 118-121. 
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the nobles, by victories in wars, that is, by showing off “the noble qualities” that they the nobles 
shared with their ancestors – the qualities that originally allowed their ancestors to prosper, 
which now also became manifest in the nobles themselves (see GM: II, 19): so, in a sense, 
among the nobles, pre-moral guilt ultimately promoted self-glorification.
13
 
By contrast, moral guilt, i.e. the Christian notion of ‘sin’, which one experiences before the 
Christian God is “a feeling of total depravity” (HAH: I, 114), a relentless, permanent sense of 
absolute “unworthiness” before God, which promotes a strong feeling of self-hatred, 
self-disgust and self-condemnation (see GM: II, 20-22). While it gives a meaning to suffering, 
makes our suffering bearable and thus saves us from “suicidal nihilism”, it also causes us to 
become ashamed and contemptuous of our being, of our human nature (see GM: II, 7 & III, 28; 
also Chapter 4-C). Hence, it totally undermines our ‘self-reverence’ and hinders us from 
attaining ‘self-satisfaction’, both of which are essential to another key characteristic of higher 
types, namely, active ‘creativity’ – founded on ‘life-affirmation’ – especially in the sense of 
spontaneously creating one’s own values, of giving ‘style’ to one’s character. Further, this 
permanent sense of guilt before God also intensifies and sharpens our moral bad conscience as 
will to self-torture, thereby causing it to take root more firmly in us. And all this generates in us 
an additional, much more persistent and life-harming ‘intensional’ suffering, thereby 
undermining our psychological health further (see Chapter 4-C). So, simply put, in Nietzsche’s 
view, the Christian God found on the ascetic ideal is a terrible, anti-life, anti-human illusion, in 
which one’s human nature becomes the reason to torture oneself: a life-preserving and yet 
extremely self-tormenting illusion. 
Nietzsche also objects to Christianity’s condemnation of our egoistic characteristics and 
emotions specifically in relation to ‘human greatness’: this brings us back to the points I made 
                                                 
13 See Young (2006): pp. 153-154 & Owen (2007): p. 110 
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in Chapter 4-A. That is, while Nietzsche never goes so far as to claim that all those egoistic 
characteristics and emotions such as greed, envy and vanity are simply in themselves ‘good’ and 
‘admirable’ and should be encouraged, he clearly regards them not simply as an inevitable and 
permanent feature of life, but also as essential to much that is good and valuable in life. In this 
respect, he talks about the necessity of the “spiritualization of passion”. Much as he – for 
various reasons, as I illustrated before – is fascinated by such things as war, intoxication and the 
worldly nobles’ rampages where one’s natural instincts and impulses are freely exposed in its 
purest form, he also claims that the totally uncontrolled, unrestricted raw passions and desires 
are “merely disastrous”: there exists in them “the element of stupidity” that brings “unpleasant 
consequences” (see TI: V, 1). Though he fails to explain what these ‘unpleasant consequences’ 
are, he is presumably pointing out how such unbridled raw egoistic passions can be often 
transformed into brutality and cruelty, and consequently lead to “many actions called immoral” 
that “ought to be avoided and resisted” (D: 103). But then, he argues, the way Christianity 
attempts to prevent these ‘unpleasant consequences’ by “extirpation”, that is, by rejecting and 
condemning all the intrinsic egoistic passions of ours as ‘evil’, is not only “hostile to life” but 
also “merely another acute form of stupidity”, just like “dentists who “pluck out” teeth so that 
they will not hurt any more”. Instead, we need to “spiritualize, beautify, deify” those passions, 
“wed” them to “the spirit”: we must shape and sublimate them into our virtues, make them 
contribute to our whole greatness (see TI: V, 1 & 3; also HAH: II, ii, 83). 
And Nietzsche is clearly right on this. For, as I argued in Chapter 4-A, there is no doubt that 
all those egoistic characteristics and emotions, though unpleasant in themselves and often 
painful to experience, did play an essential role in Napoleon’s relentless pursuit of worldly glory 
and thus in his great achievements, which many of us can openly admire. And had he not 
possessed and experienced them, he simply could not have flourished in the way he did. But 
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then, it is also clear that the creativity founded on unbridled raw passions – as that of the 
worldly nobles – is unlikely to yield what we call human greatness. So, in this context, 
Nietzsche throughout his mature works repeatedly emphasizes the necessity of self-discipline 
and self-moderation. And, indeed, Napoleon was in no sense a slave of his passions: he was 
someone who was very hard with himself. He managed to achieve so much in his life, and was 
able to create himself in the way he did, because he had a firm hold over his passions, and thus 
was able to regulate and incorporate them into a synthetic unity: so, he could restrain his 
passions when necessary, but could also become very bold, fearless and brutal when the 
occasion demanded. And it was this ability of his that largely made him an integrated 
life-affirming individual with an undeniable ‘style’. 
Against the background of such criticism of the Christian God who condemns certain 
intrinsic parts of our life, what Nietzsche in his mature works increasingly recognises and values 
is the way the life-affirming type of gods deify “all things, whether good or evil” (BT: 3). For 
instance, in GM, he explicitly insists that a conception of god[s] does not have to be an 
“instrument of torture” (GM: II, 22) like the Christian God. He writes, 
 
there are nobler uses for the invention of gods than for the self-crucifixion and self-violation of man 
in which Europe over the past millennia achieved its distinctive mastery – that is fortunately revealed 
even by a mere glance at the Greek gods, those reflections of noble and autocratic men, in whom the 
animal in man felt deified and did not lacerate itself, did not rage against itself! For the longest time 
these Greeks used their gods precisely so as to ward off the “bad conscience,” so as to be able to 





From what we have seen, it is clear that Nietzsche is here talking about the moral bad 
conscience, and emphasizing the idea of the life-affirming gods as ‘a transfiguring mirror’ 
which he continues to develop from BT.
14
 Being members of prosperous communities, even the 
ancient Greeks inevitably experienced the pre-moral bad conscience and pre-moral guilt (see 
Chapter 4-C). But the reason why they managed to avoid their bad conscience and guilt from 
becoming moralized and transformed into a strong feeling of self-disgust is because, under their 
Olympian gods, these conceptions did not become connected to their human nature, in the way 
they do under the Christian God. 
That is, whereas the Christian God embodies, and demands of us to conform to, the ascetic 
ideal, which is essentially an anti-human ideal, the Olympian gods as the life-affirming gods are 
the “ideal picture” of the Greeks’ own existence, the gods founded on a human ideal. Whereas 
man “apprehends in “God” the ultimate antithesis of his own ineluctable animal instincts” (GM: 
II, 22), what the Greeks saw in their Olympian gods was “only the reflection of the most 
successful exemplars of their own caste . . . , not an anti-thesis of their own nature” (HAH: I, 
114). Compared with the Christian God before whom one experiences “a feeling of total 
depravity” and a relentless sense of absolute unworthiness, the Olympian gods were gods with 
whom the Greeks “felt inter-related”, and before whom they had no need to be ashamed of 
themselves (see HAH: I, 111 & 114). Under the Christian God, who forces us to see our ‘animal’ 
instincts and egoistic characteristics and emotions as ‘evil’ – the ‘guilt’ towards Him –, our ‘bad 
consciousness’ as will to self-torture becomes – through moralization – deeply attached to our 
human nature: we are driven to torture ourselves simply for being humans (see GM: II, 22 & 
24). But, on the contrary, among the Greeks, a whole human existence was defied and justified 
by the gods who themselves live “the life of men” (see BT: 3), who themselves possess and 
                                                 
14 See Young (2006): p. 154 
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experience all those human ‘evil’ instincts and emotions: “Such a god must be able to help and 
to harm, to be friend and enemy . . . What would be the point of a god who knew nothing of 
wrath, revenge, envy, scorn, cunning, and violence? who had perhaps never experienced the 
delightful ardeurs of victory and annihilation?” (AC: 16; see, also, D: 38). In fact, under such 
gods as the Greeks’ ‘self-glorification’, those instincts and emotions were celebrated as ‘good’, 
as what had allowed the Greeks to prevail and prosper. In this way, the Greeks’ bad conscience 
never led to any feeling of self-disgust or self-condemnation, and they were able to continue 
expressing their natural aggressive instincts with ‘freedom of soul’, without becoming ashamed 
or contemptuous of them (see HAH: II, i, 220). 
So, there is clearly a change in Nietzsche’s positive valuation of the life-affirming type of 
gods. As we saw in Chapter 2-B, in BT Nietzsche values the life-affirming gods most 
particularly for the way they help people to overcome their pessimist outlook on life, both by 
veiling the terrors and horrors of existence and by transforming human existence into something 
truly “desirable in itself”. In other words, to the youthful Nietzsche, the most important thing 
about the world of the Olympians is the fact that it is an idealisation of actual world that depicts 
a “fantastic excess” of ‘human’ life (see BT: 3 & 17). But now, to the mature Nietzsche, the 
most important thing about the life-affirming gods is the fact that they are a type of gods 
founded on a human ideal, transfigured images of human life, which have no relation to 
“asceticism, spirituality, or duty” (BT: 3), and in whom “all things, whether good or evil” – 
including one’s ‘animal’ instincts and egoistic characteristics and emotions, which the Christian 
God condemns as ‘evil’ – “are deified”, so that they do not act as “a command or a reproach” 
(see BT: 3). In other words, what Nietzsche now increasingly recognises and values in such 
life-affirming gods is their ability to help one to affirm oneself entirely, by not making one 
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ashamed of one’s “natural”, “all-too-human” characteristics and emotions (see HAH: II, i, 220): 
the key characteristic Nietzsche ascribes to higher types. 
The second chief aspect of Christianity that Nietzsche finds particularly life-denying and an 
impediment to the nurturing of higher types is the way Christianity imposes upon us one 
universal norm: its forceful qualitative equalisation of all individuals and homogenisation of 
their interests. As we saw earlier, the men of ressentiment gain their spiritual superiority – their 
sense of power – by converting others who are unlike themselves – the nobles – to their 
Christian valuations, making them accept their Christian moral values and virtues. And in order 
to maintain this superiority, Christian morality claims its universal applicability and denies any 
other morality, any other perspective on life (see, e.g., AC: 9). By using its ‘monotheistic’ 
conception of God as the Eternal Law, as the absolute judge of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, Christianity 
preaches to everyone that the Christian ‘moral’ way of life founded on the Christian ‘ascetic’ 
virtues is the one and only right way to live, the only way to flourish and gain happiness: it tells 
everyone indiscriminately that “Man ought to be such and such!” (TI: V, 6).15 
However, as we saw in Chapter 4-A, it is clear from his fascination for the historical ‘men of 
prey’ that Nietzsche believes that, contrary to Christian morality which imposes a single ‘moral’ 
way of life, there could possibly exist many different ways of flourishing. While the worldly 
nobles’ way of life, which powerful ‘men of prey’ such as Napoleon have led, is deemed to be 
un-virtuous from the Christian perspective, there is no doubt that Napoleon – in one way or 
another – did flourish and did bring something new, beautiful and life-affirming to the world 
through this very way of life. 
                                                 
15 In this respect, Nietzsche considers the Christianity “Platonism for “the people”” (BGE: Preface), its universalistic, 
rationalistic and monistic understanding of human flourishing an heir to the “Socratic equation of reason, virtue, and 
happiness” (TI: II, 4). 
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But then, as we also saw, Nietzsche recognises that not everyone can flourish through the 
worldly nobles’ way of life. The chief reason why Napoleon was able to lead the worldly nobles’ 
way of life so successfully is that, as well as possessing all the characteristics which make him a 
perfect fit for such way of life, he was also placed in certain favourable socio-political 
conditions for it. And for most of us moderns who simply lack these characteristics and 
socio-political conditions, any attempt to lead this whole free, active and brutal way of life 
would only end in disaster. On the other hand, it is very likely that had Napoleon attempted to 
lead a Christian way of life, he would have been a complete failure: in the light of his extremely 
active and energetic nature, his high-mindedness, his relentless lust for worldly power and 
prestige, his less-developed moral sensitivity, and so forth, he would have been inwardly 
crushed and made miserable under the Christian virtues. At the same time, it is obvious that had 
Napoleon attempted to embrace Christian virtues while leading the worldly nobles’ way of life, 
he would also have been a complete failure: the Christian virtues such as humility, meekness, 
love of one’s enemies, kindness and compassion are so detrimental to the pursuit of worldly 
power and prestige in many respects that he would have been exploited and destroyed in no 
time. 
It is largely on the basis of this recognition that Nietzsche criticises the notion of 
universally-binding virtues or a universally-valid ‘good’ as life-denying. Each individual is – by 
and large – intrinsically different, born with different characteristics and temperaments, 
belonging to a natural different ‘character-type’, possessing different needs and interests. At the 
same time, the condition of life each individual faces is also deeply influenced and determined 
by his surroundings, for instance, by the state of the epoch, or of the community, to which he 
belongs, as well as by the position in the community which he occupies. So, naturally, every 
individual’s requirements for well-being and happiness, each individual’s ‘goods’ in the sense 
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of what “heightens the feeling of power in man” (AC: 2), are different, varying from place to 
place, and varying over time (see, e.g., GS: 116). This means that what is beneficial for one type 
of person placed in a certain life-situation can well be harmful to another type of person placed 
in another life-situation: “What serves the higher type of men as nourishment or delectation 
must almost be poison for a very different and inferior type. The virtues of the common man 
might perhaps signify vices and weaknesses in a philosopher” (BGE: 30). Further, Nietzsche 
emphasizes that not only do individuals seek different ‘goods’ or have different ideas about the 
rank of ‘goods’, but they also have different notions about what to count as “really having and 
possessing something good” (see BGE: 194). As such, he insists repeatedly that morality is a 
matter of taste, and that, instead of accepting “Good for all, evil for all” (Z: III, 11, 2), one must 
discover and create one’s own ‘virtues’, ‘goods’, ‘ideals’, which are in accordance with one’s 
own needs, interests and condition of life: the ability which Nietzsche ascribes to the worldly 
nobles and ultimately to higher types (see GS: 55, BGE: 30 & AC: 11; also Chapter 4-A). 
So, much as Nietzsche considers the Christian ‘ascetic’ way of life, in which one inflicts 
suffering on oneself and can even come to take pleasure in doing so, as life-denying and 
unhealthy in itself, he acknowledges that some people may be suited to the Christian way of life, 
that some people might flourish and become happy by being virtuous in the Christian ‘moral’ 
sense. For instance, in AC he suggests that, to the Jews who lost worldly nobility and had to 
survive as the powerless ruled, what was appropriate and useful to their conditions of 
self-preservation was no longer a national ‘life-affirming’ god and master morality as a 
delightful expression and celebration of a people’s worldly strength and power, but the 
moralised ‘good’ monotheistic God who counsels everyone to accept the Christian virtues such 
as ‘modesty’ and ‘love of one’s neighbour’: a type of god whom he calls “a cosmopolitan” (see 
AC: 16). And while our condition of life is decisively different from that of the Jews, Nietzsche 
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also suggests that, to the ordinary masses as the ‘herd type’, who possess a strong need for 
“obedience”, the Christian virtues such as “public spirit, benevolence, consideration, 
industriousness, moderation, modesty, indulgence, and pity” may indeed be appropriate and 
useful (see BGE: 199). Further, he makes clear through his extensive discussion of asceticism in 
the third essay of GM that even those who are natural commanders like Napoleon, or potential 
higher types who are destined to command, need to espouse the Christian virtues such as 
‘chastity’ voluntarily in certain situations and contexts, for instance, in order to cultivate and 
enhance their creativity and intellectuality: as I said, there can be no human greatness without 
self-discipline and self-moderation. But then, for someone like Napoleon who single-mindedly 
wished for and pursued worldly power and prestige, what was predominantly appropriate and 
useful were not the profoundly unworldly virtues of Christianity, but worldly virtues: for 
Napoleon, being the un-virtuous in the Christian ‘moral’ sense, espousing many ‘vices’, was the 
key to his success and happiness. 
Nietzsche also objects to the universal virtues on the basis of his recognition of the necessity 
of tension or conflicts between different ideas and values, which stimulate people’s creativity to 
establish new ideas and values. In this context, he emphasizes “the value of having enemies”: 
“A new creation in particular . . . needs enemies more than friends: in opposition alone does it 
feel itself necessary, in opposition alone does it become necessary” (TI: V, 3). If we wish to 
create something new, we need to act and think “in the opposite way from that which has been 
the rule” (TI: V, 3). If we wish to perform a revaluation of values to produce a new set of values, 
we need an old set of values that we can find objectionable. On the other hand, if everyone were 
to cherish and adopt the same values and virtues, there would hardly be any tension or conflict 
between different ideologies which is essential to the evolution of culture: this could lead to the 
stagnation of culture that Nietzsche deeply fears (see, e.g. HAH: I, 235). And also, particularly 
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for Nietzsche who sometimes affects to take “a kind of god’s-eye view of the world”, the world 
where everyone adopts a similar outlook and leads a similar pattern of life would be colourless 
and “tedious”.16 
Against the background of such criticism of the Christian ‘monotheistic’ God who forces on 
people one universal norm of life-denying nature, what Nietzsche in his mature works 
recognises and emphasizes in relation to the life-affirming type of gods is the value of 
‘polytheism’. 
 
For an individual to posit his own ideal and to derive from it his own law, joys, and rights – . . . The 
wonderful art and gift of creating gods – polytheism – was the medium through which this impulse 
could discharge, purify, perfect, and ennoble itself . . . Hostility against this impulse to have an ideal 
of one’s own was formerly the central law of all morality. There was only one norm, man; and every 
people thought it possessed this one ultimate norm. But above and outside, in some distant overworld, 
one was permitted to behold a plurality of norms; one god was not considered a denial of another god, 
nor blasphemy against him. It was here that the luxury of individuals was first permitted . . . 
Monotheism, on the other hand, this rigid consequence of the doctrine of one normal human type . . . 
was perhaps the greatest danger that has yet confronted humanity. It threatened us with the premature 
stagnation that, as far as we can see, most other species have long reached . . . In polytheism the 
free-spiriting and many spiriting of man attained its first preliminary form – the strength to create for 
ourselves our own new eyes – and ever again new eyes that are even more our own: hence man alone 
among all the animals has no eternal horizons and perspectives (GS: 143; see, also, Z: III, 12, 11). 
 
                                                 
16 See Tanner (2000): p. 95 
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The Christian ‘monotheistic’ God is a universal god, ‘a cosmopolitan’, who indiscriminately 
commands everyone to adopt the Christian moral values and virtues and lead the Christian 
‘moral’ way of life, irrespective of his own characteristics, desires, interests and needs: by 
claiming it to be the one and only right way to live and flourish, the Christian God denies any 
other pattern of life. On the other hand, being created as a means of ‘self-glorification’, the 
life-affirming gods such as the Olympian gods of the ancient Greeks and Yahweh of the ancient 
Israelites are a type of god[s] who reflect their own people’s peculiar condition of life, their 
specific needs and interests, and thus who are only appropriate and useful to their own people: 
this is why once the Israelites lost their nobility they should have abandoned Yahweh as the 
symbol of their life-affirmation, since such god was no longer appropriate or useful to their new 
drastically-changed condition of life (see AC: 17). 
Indeed, according to Nietzsche, the nobles, such as the ancient Greeks, discovered their 
‘virtues’ through their long and continual struggles against enemies. What the Greeks called 
‘virtues’ were practically their own distinctive ‘qualities’ that helped them continue surviving 
and prevailing in the midst of constant terrible risk of being exterminated, such as their physical 
strength, their fearless nature and their ability to express their natural aggressive instincts freely 
and delightfully (see BGE: 262): so, he at one point emphasizes, “The magnificent physical 
suppleness, the audacious realism and immoralism which distinguished the Hellene constituted 
a need, not “nature.”” (TI: X, 3). And it was through the rigorous cultivation of these virtues 
that the Greeks made sure that they as a people remained the triumphant, strong and powerful 
knightly-aristocratic type of men “beyond the changing generations” (see BGE: 262; also HAH: 
I, 96): among the Greeks, virtue was essentially “fitness”, “virtue that is moraline-free” (AC: 2), 
something appropriate and useful to their condition of life, to their battling life. And for the 
Greeks, the Olympian gods as the ‘ideal picture’ of their own existence, ‘the reflection of the 
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most successful exemplars of their own caste’, were indeed essential to the preservation of such 
virtues of theirs, to their continuous survival and flourishing. What the Greeks needed were the 
immoral “evil” gods, who defied the Greeks’ ‘animal’ nature by themselves knowing “wrath, 
revenge, envy, scorn, cunning, and violence” and experiencing “the delightful ardeurs of 
victory and annihilation”, so that the Greeks could continue expressing their natural aggressive 
instincts with ‘freedom of soul’, which was indeed appropriate and useful to their condition of 
life (see AC: 16). 
So, in contrast to the Christian God who imposes upon people one ‘universal’ ideal of 
life-denying ‘anti-human’ nature, what Nietzsche in his mature works seemingly recognises and 
values in the life-affirming type of gods is their ability to accommodate various life-affirming 
‘human’ ideals. By allowing people to posit their own ideals in accordance with their own 
‘character-types’, needs, interests and condition of life, the life-affirming gods enable and help 
people to discover and create their own virtues and goods, to discover and possess a ‘style’ of 
their own, and to flourish in their own ‘human’ ways, thereby contributing towards the 
nurturing of higher types. Further, by making the existence of various different ways of life 
possible, the life-affirming gods also encourage conflicts of different values and ideas, thereby 
promoting the evolution of culture and the creation of new forms of human greatness.
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Section B: ‘The life-affirming type of gods’ as Nietzsche’s symbolic image 
 
So far, I have outlined Nietzsche’s mature positive religious thinking, his positive valuation 
of ‘the life-affirming type of gods’ that we find in his mature works. But now, the question is 
what all those positive remarks he makes on the life-affirming type of gods actually mean to us 
moderns. Do they have any practical application? Is he suggesting that we too should create our 
own life-affirming gods, build a temple or the like, and start worshiping them, just as the ancient 
Greeks did? 
A commentator who espouses such a – what I may call – ‘institutional’ reading is, as we 
saw, Young. Young claims that Nietzsche always maintained religious communitarianism: his 
highest value always was the flourishing of community, which, he continued to believe, can 
only be achieved by the re-creation of ‘communal’ life-affirming religious festival modelled on 
pre-Socratic Greek tragedy. Further, Young also claims that “the heart of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy is, in a broad sense, a political vision”, namely, “a vision of a hierarchically 
organised community in which everyone knows and takes pride in their station within it, a 
society created, persevered and unified by an ethos-embodying communal religion”.1 On these 
bases, Young argues, “What Nietzsche is looking for is a new Greece, a new polis brought to 
unity and health by a re-created version of Greek religion”.2 It is not “a literal return to Greek 
religion”, but a creation of “something that is ‘contemporary and Greek’, something that shares 
the essential characteristics of Greek religion but at the same time makes living sense in the 
current context”: “a rebirth of something resembling the religion of the Greek temple and 
                                                 
1 Young (2006): p. 179 
2 Young (2006): p. 144 
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amphitheatre, something with the life- and humanity-affirming characteristics of Greek 
religion”.3 
According to Young, what constitutes the focal point of such a new religious ‘communal’ 
festival is a “polytheistic array” of healthy “role-modelling gods”, who represent “not a non- 
and so anti-human ideal, but rather an idealisation of humanity itself”, and who also embody a 
healthy “shared community-creating ethos”, which is essential to the creation and preservation 
of an authentic and healthy society absent from modernity: what the life-affirming type of gods 
provide is “the stratified and yet unified ethos”, which is capable of creating and unifying ‘a 
community’ and ‘a culture’, as well as giving aspiration, identity and meaning both to one’s 
‘communal’ and to one’s ‘individual’ life.4 These gods are artistically mythologized and 
glorified exemplary figures who function as objects of veneration, inspiration and imitation: 
hence, “what the healthy society worships are its own potentialities for (‘polytheistic’) 
excellence”.5 And such an array of gods must be “a living myth”, in which its figures are 
constantly reinterpreted, when necessary, “in order to make sense in the current context”, so that 
it can continue to embody and preserve the unified ethos of a community.
6
 
Now, in my view, from what we saw in the previous section, Young is correct to recognise 
Nietzsche’s positive valuation of ‘the life- and humanity-affirming characteristics of Greek 
religion’. And the idea of the life-affirming type of gods as ‘healthy’ role-models seems also in 
itself plausible. There is no doubt, as Young suggests, that for Nietzsche “a non-human role 
model is an anti-human role model”, since “a role model so perfect as to be beyond even slight 
emulation has a depressing rather than an inspirational effect”, and that “the Geek gods, unlike 
                                                 
3 Young (2006): pp. 100-101 & 192 
4 See Young (2006): pp. 32, 155, 166 & 191-192 
5 See Young (2006): pp. 42, 87 & 192 
6 See Young (2006): pp. 26 & 37 
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the Christian God, are healthy role models since they embody . . . human, and even 
all-too-human characteristics”.7 Indeed, Nietzsche remarks, “The Christian who compares his 
nature with that of God is like Don Quixote, who under-estimated his own courage because his 
head was filled with the miraculous deeds of the heroes of chivalric romances: the standard of 
comparison applied in both cases belongs in the domain of fable” (HAH: I, 133). And there is 
also something plausible and attractive about the idea of ‘a living myth’, or the idea of the 
life-affirming gods as ‘flexible’ role-models, so to speak, who can be constantly reinterpreted 
and changed, in order always to reflect the changes in people’s condition of life:8 as we saw, 
Nietzsche thinks that, just like a morality, a conception of god[s] can outlast its utility, as in the 
case of Yahweh. But, in the light of my reading of Nietzsche as ‘an individualist’ rather than a 
life-long communitarian, it seems to me more plausible to suggest that what the ‘polytheistic 
array’ of life-affirming gods embodies and provides, if it does, is not a shared ‘communal ethos’ 
which binds together and preserves a community, but rather various types of ‘life-affirming’ 
ethoi which suit different kinds of life and help individuals to flourish in their own ways. And in 
fact, I suspect that Nietzsche at one point may have indeed positively recognised and seriously 
reflected upon the possibility of the life-affirming gods’ contributing towards the nurturing of 
higher types by acting as healthy and ‘flexible’ role-models – educators of potential higher 
types –, who represent various humanistic ideals, and function as objects of inspiration and 
                                                 
7 See Young (2006): pp. 65-67 & 178. While the Christian God is a non- and thus anti-human ‘unhealthy’ role model, 
not many of us would actually ever consider Him as a role-model or an object of emulation. But still, many of us 
would likely feel a depressing sense of inferiority before Jesus the Christian God incarnate, the supreme moral 
exemplar who supposedly perfectly embodied all the Christian ‘ascetic’ values and virtues, if we were to emulate him 
seriously: though Jesus actually possessed all-too-human characteristics too, as he, for instance, famously threw the 
traders out of the Temple in a rage (John 2: 13-16). 
8 Silk and Stern document that “with no powerful priestly caste, no church, no bible, no set theology, Greek religion 
and its gods were always subject to change. They were in the hands of their worshippers, including especially the 
poets and others who perpetuated their representation” (Silk & Stern 1983: p. 167). 
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imitation: in a sense, we could also interpret his obsession with all those exceptional historical 
figures such as Goethe and Napoleon as his attempt to identify role-models who can inspire 
potential higher types to greatness.
9
 
However, I find Young’s ‘institutional’ reading problematic in several respects. To begin 
with, it seems to me doubtful that Nietzsche aimed for a revival of Greek religion, in the sense 
of creating a new temple and worshipping gods altogether as a community. Certainly, it is true 
that there are some passages in his works where Nietzsche seems to speak of a new festival: 
“The vision of a feast that I shall yet live to see” (EH: BT, 4). And, just as in the case of his 
attitude towards an old type of hierarchical society, in the light of both his persistent admiration 
for ancient Greece and the occasional proclivity to naivety his writings display in certain 
contexts, it is possible that Nietzsche might have secretly longed for the re-creation of Greek 
religion, especially when his predominate mood was nostalgic. But then, he claims explicitly in 
TI, “a reversion, a return in any sense or degree is simply not possible”, including that to “a 
former measure of virtue” (TI: IX, 43). So, it seems that, when more rigorously realistic, he 
recognises that it is not after all possible for us moderns to recreate such a religion. Further, he 
in GS also claims that we “who are homeless”, “children of the future”, to whom he addresses 
and commends his ideas and thoughts, i.e. those of us who are potential higher types, 
““conserve nothing”: neither do we want to return to any past periods” (see GS: 377). Such a 
claim also seemingly indicates that what he seeks is not a revival of Greek religion. 
Moreover, another problem with Young is that, even if it is possible for us to recreate such a 
religion, the description of this new festival he provides in his book, which, according to him, 
                                                 
9 Bertram is another commentator who regards the creation of a new religious mythology as one of Nietzsche’s chief 
aims. But, in Bertram’s view, it is not the life-affirming type of gods, who will play the leading part in this new myth: 
rather, it is Nietzsche himself as the ‘educator’ of ‘higher types’ (see Bertram 2009: passim). 
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Nietzsche seeks to create, is so abstract, that it is not at all clear what this festival would be like 
and how it would function. For instance, Young claims, 
 
Nietzsche’s ‘ideal’ for the future includes the rebirth of something resembling the hierarchical 
structure of the medieval Church, the rebirth of a society unified by the discipline of a common ethos, 
a discipline expounded and given effect through respect for the spiritual authority of those who 
occupy the role once occupied by priests. It goes without saying, of course, that the content of the 
new ‘church’s’ message will be naturalistic rather than transcendentalist, will be moulded by ‘physics’ 
(GS 290) rather than metaphysics. It will be a life-affirming rather than life-denying church, a 




However, throughout his book, Young fails to discuss basic matters such as what this new 
life-affirming church – where the festival would presumably be performed – would look like – 
whether it would look like a Christian church or a Greek temple or a Greek amphitheatre –, 
where and how many churches would be built, how often we would attend the festival, how 
these new priests – who would presumably conduct the festival – would be selected, what the 
festival would be composed of, and so on. 
Likewise, Young never explains in any detail what the content of a new community-creating 
religious myth would be like: whether it would be a poem or a prose in style, whether an epic or 
a tragedy in nature. Certainly, as we saw, Young suggests this new myth to be a life-affirming 
‘living myth’, in which its role-modelling gods are inspired by the ancient Greek gods, but also 
revised and updated, so that it would make sense and be relevant to us in the present context. So, 
for instance, in this context, Young remarks, “Figures from Greece inspired . . . the Italian 
                                                 
10 Young (2006): p. 99 
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Renaissance but that did not entail wandering around in sandals and togas. Rather, Greek 
‘moulds’ were ‘recreated’ in terms, as it were, of modern dress”.11 But then, what does it mean 
to ‘recreate’ and translate the Greek myth into a form that speaks to us moderns in a living way? 
What exactly would the ‘contemporary and Greek’ myth be like? What would the 
role-modelling gods who reflect our current life be like? Would it be like a myth in which its 
figures wear suits or T-shirts and jeans, drive a car or ride a tube, and receive e-mails and phone 
calls? Or would it be like a modern version of the Iliad, in which its figures ride tanks instead of 
chariots, and fight with guns instead of spears? And all this abstractness of Young’s descriptions 
is purely owing to the fact that Nietzsche himself never provides any detailed account on such 
matters.
12
 This, I think, gives us another reason to doubt the seriousness of Nietzsche’s 
commitment to a revival of Greek religion. 
And we could also question who will create this new ‘contemporary and Greek’ myth. 
Young seemingly suggests that it is going to be those whom Nietzsche calls the poets “as 
signpost to the future”, who will “imaginatively develop a fair image of man”, by emulating the 
artists such as those of ancient Greece who “imaginatively developed the existing images of the 
gods”: the poets who will imaginatively develop, “without any artificial withdrawal from or 
warding off of this world”, a model of “the great and beautiful soul”, through whom “the 
excitation of envy and emulation help to create the future” (see HAH: II, i, 99; also HAH: II, i, 
172).
13
 But, in Nietzsche’s view, such poets simply do not exist in the modern world: “Oh if the 
poets would only be again what there were once supposed to have been: –seers who tell us 
                                                 
11 Young (2006): p. 37 
12 While Young does claim that such abstractness – his and Nietzsche’s failure or reluctance to prescribe a specific 
content to this new myth – are owing to “Nietzsche’s formalism”, this seems to me an evasion (see Young 2006: p. 
211, n. 9). 
13 See Young (2006): pp. 74-75 & 87 
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something of the possible! . . . If only they would let us feel in advance something of the virtues 
of the future! . . . Astronomers of the ideal, where are you?” (D: 551). In other words, in 
Nietzsche’s view, an exceptional creativity which is necessarily for recreating and translating 
the Greek myth into a form that speaks to us moderns in a living way, for revising and updating 
the ancient Greeks life-affirming gods to create new role-modelling gods who reflect our current 
life, is something simply lacking in the modern world. 
Furthermore, another problem with the ‘institutional’ reading is that, even if Nietzsche is 
serious about a recreation of Greek religion, it is difficult to see, from his descriptions alone, 
how such religion is supposed to work in today’s world. For instance, in GM, during his 
discussion of how the way the ancient Greeks used the Olympian gods to “ward off” the moral 
bad conscience was “nobler” than the way men of ressentiment invented the Christian God “for 
the self-crucifixion and self-violation of man”, Nietzsche also claims, 
 
“foolishness,” “folly,” a little “disturbance in the head,” this much even the Greek of the strongest, 
bravest age conceded of themselves as the reason for much that was bad and calamitous – foolishness, 
not sin! do you grasp that? Even this disturbance in the head, however, presented a problem: “how is 
it possible? how could it actually have happened to heads such as we have, we men of aristocratic 
descent, of the best society, happy, well-constituted, noble, and virtuous?” – thus noble Greeks asked 
themselves for centuries in the face of every incomprehensive atrocity or wantonness with which one 
of their kind had polluted himself. “He must have been deluded by a god,” they concluded finally, 
shaking their heads . . . This expedient is typical of the Greeks . . . In this way the gods served in 
those days to justify man to a certain extent even in his wickedness, they served as the originators of 
evil – in those days they took upon themselves, not the punishment but, what is nobler, the guilt” 
(GM: II, 23; see, also, EH: Wise, 5). 
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From what we saw in the previous section, in the light of the context of the discussion, we could 
plausibly suggest that Nietzsche is here further emphasizing the point that the Olympian gods as 
the life-affirming type of gods were ‘a transfiguring mirror’, the gods who were founded on a 
human ideal, and “in whom the animal in man felt deified and did not lacerate itself, did not 
rage against itself” (GM: II, 23). The Christian God inflicts ‘punishment’ on one for one’s 
‘animal’ instincts and egoistic characteristics and emotions – ‘evil’ as the ‘guilt’ towards Him. 
On the other hand, by themselves possessing and experiencing all the human characteristics and 
emotions – ‘evil’ as the ‘guilt’ –, by themselves knowing “wrath, revenge, envy, scorn, cunning, 
and violence” and experiencing “the delightful ardeurs of victory and annihilation” (see AC: 
16), not only did the life-affirming gods deify the Greeks’ ‘animal’ nature, but they also 
justified even its consequences – not turning them into ‘sin’, as the Christian God does –, 
thereby enabling the Greeks to continue affirming life entirely.
14
 
However, clearly, such is possible only for the Greeks with specific characteristics and in a 
given socio-political condition. That is, compared to the Greeks as the unintelligent and 
unreflective worldly nobles with no inner depth, we moderns are extremely clever and reflective 
creatures with considerable inner depths. While the unintelligent nobles with absolute 
‘self-reverence’ may have been able to convince themselves that their misdeeds are ‘foolishness’ 
or ‘disturbances in the head’ resulted from their being ‘deluded by a god’,15 such primitive 
                                                 
14 Owen interprets this passage in relation to the notion of agency – the idea of a “doer” behind the deed, or the idea 
of “a neutral independent “subject”, i.e. ‘free choice’, which Nietzsche often rejects (see GM: I, 13; also GS: 127) –, 
suggesting that, in Nietzsche’s view, the Greek “used his gods to allow for a limited separation of agent and act 
within the context of his commitment to an expressive picture of agency” (see Owen 2007: p. 109). While I do not 
necessarily find such interpretation implausible, this point does not seem relevant to the essence of Nietzsche’s 
positive religious thinking as I understand it. 
15 In HAH, Nietzsche claims that among the worldly nobles as the ‘good men’ in master morality, it was believed 
that “In the community of the good goodness is inherited; it is impossible that a bad man could grow up out of such 
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excuses are hardly something either by which we can be convinced or which we can adopt. 
Further, along with their life-affirming gods, another key reason why the Greeks were able to 
‘ward off’ the moral bad conscience was that they possessed a sufficient way of dealing with 
the pre-moral bad conscience, i.e. a suffering caused by the intense frustration of one’s natural 
aggressive instincts. As we saw in Chapter 4-C, while the nobles experienced the frustrations of 
their aggressive instincts and thus were tormented by the pre-moral bad conscience inside their 
communities, they were still able to compensate their frustrations by engaging in hideous acts 
outside their communities. In this way, they remained relatively free from experiencing the 
‘internalization’, and hence they remained unintelligent and were able to continue using such 
primitive excuses. But, again, such a way of dealing with the suffering caused by the pre-moral 
bad conscience is simply out of question for us.
16
 
Indeed, here, the crucial fact is that the life-affirming type of gods, as presented in 
Nietzsche’s mature works, do not actually seem to provide any real solution to the suffering 
caused by the pre-moral bad conscience, or to suffering in general. As we saw in Chapter 4-C, 
according to Nietzsche’s account, the worldly nobles ultimately fell victim to the priestly 
interpretation of suffering and came to experience moral guilt and the moral bad conscience. 
And I suggested two main reasons for this. Firstly, through the eventual lack of external 
enemies, the nobles became unable to release their frustrations by going outside. And as their 
instincts and impulses became repressed and frustrated more intensely, not only did they come 
to be afflicted with ressentiment, but they also came to acquire greater inner depths, which were 
sufficient enough to drive them to start evaluating their unpleasant conditions and to seek a 
‘guilty agent’ responsible for it: which is a necessary precondition for the ‘moralization’ of guilt 
                                                                                                                                               
good soil”. Hence, when one of the nobles should commit “something unworthy of the good, one looks for excuses; 
one ascribes the guilt to a god, for example, by saying he struck the subjected, the powerless” (see HAH: I, 45). 
16 See Owen (2007): pp. 109-110 
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and the bad conscience. And secondly, the highly clever and cunning priest found no difficulty 
in persuading such nobles to blame themselves for their frustrations. 
But, here, we could question why the nobles had to resort to the Christian God for an 
interpretation of suffering, rather than to their life-affirming gods. For, after all, it is not as if 
they had always been free of suffering: they clearly suffered from the pre-moral bad conscience 
inside their community. Certainly, Nietzsche remarks that the suffering caused by the pre-moral 
bad conscience, which resulted from being “finally enclosed within the walls of society and of 
peace” (my emphasis), was something previously unknown to the nobles, about which they 
were at loss as to what to do (see GM: II, 16). In the light of such a remark, we could perhaps 
suppose that the life-affirming gods can give a meaning to every suffering except the specific 
sort of suffering caused by the most intense pre-moral bad conscience. Or, we could also 
suppose that what Nietzsche has in mind is that, even if the life-affirming gods did give a 
meaning to such suffering, the nobles in question were increasingly becoming unable to 
recognise such a ‘noble’ meaning of suffering, so to speak, since they were becoming slavish by 
being afflicted with ressentiment. But then, Nietzsche in GM claims explicitly, “The 
meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering itself, was the curse that lay over mankind so far – 
and the ascetic ideal offered man meaning! It was the only meaning offered so far [my 
emphasis]; any meaning is better than none at all” (GM: III, 28; see, also, EH: GM). This 
strongly suggests that, in Nietzsche’s view, the life-affirming gods actually did not provide any 
meaning to any suffering, and that the only reason the nobles did not originally suffer from the 
meaninglessness of suffering is either because, as we saw in the previous section, on 
Nietzsche’s picture, they, who possessed “pessimism of strength” (BT: ASC, 1), were capable of 
embracing their suffering willingly, and presumably without seeking a meaning in it, or because 
their lack of inner depth meant that they did not seriously seek a meaning in their suffering – 
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they only began to suffer from it once they acquired greater inner depth by being ‘finally 
enclosed within’ their peaceful community.17 
In Chapter 2-A, I pointed out that, according to Schopenhauer’s account of religion, the 
ability to deal with man’s suffering condition, to provide a ‘solution’ to the problem of pain and 
death, is the most essential function of any authentic religion: Young in his book actually claims 
to use Schopenhauer’s account of religion – which, in his view, is “in broad outline, correct” – 
as “a standard for assessing whether there is anything in Nietzsche’s positive [religious] 
thinking that counts as genuinely religious thinking”.18 Certainly, as we saw, the ability in 
question is recognisable in the two types of ‘life-affirming’ religion which Nietzsche presents in 
BT: the justification of suffering and death belongs to the heart of his early religious thinking. 
But if what I have suggested is correct, this ability is absent from the ancient Greek religion as 
he describes it in his mature works. It means that a new ‘contemporary and Greek’ religion, 
which, according to Young, Nietzsche aspires to create, cannot be in itself regarded as an 
authentic religion or ‘genuinely religious’ at least from Schopenhauer’s viewpoint. 
                                                 
17 Along with the puzzle concerning who really conducted the slave revolt that I mentioned before, this is another 
chief puzzle in GM, which different commentators have attempted to solve in various ways (see, e.g. Leiter 2002: pp. 
283-286 & Owen 2007: pp. 121-122). Certainly, as some commentators point out (see, e.g., Danto 2005: p. 159), in 
section 7 of the second essay of GM, Nietzsche talks about how, among the ancient Greeks, human suffering had a 
meaning, as “festival plays” for the gods. He claims that, in order to justify themselves and their “evils”, the ancient 
Greeks – and other ancient people – created their gods as “the friends of cruel spectacles”, who “will not easily let an 
interesting painful spectacle pass unnoticed”: “Every evil the sight of which edifies a god is justified” (see GM: II, 7). 
However, in my view, this idea of suffering as providing a spectacle for the gods is something which Nietzsche does 
not really develop. And more crucially, the suffering in question seems to be the suffering one inflicts on others, not 
one’s own suffering (see GM: I, 11). And looking at the context of the whole section, it appears to be something more 
like a point Nietzsche makes in relation to his psychological insights – such as his insight into our fundamental cruel 
nature –, and also, to some degree, his idea of the worldly life-affirmation, specifically its aesthetic approach to 
human suffering, rather than his positive religious thinking. 
18 See Young (2006): p. 10 
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Now, Young also seemingly notices how the life-affirming gods, as Nietzsche presents them 
in his mature works, fail to provide a meaning to human suffering. So, Young attributes the 
ability to provide a ‘solution’ to the problem of pain and death to what he calls ‘Dionysian’ 
pantheism. In Young’s view, it is, in a nutshell, an unconditional overall type of life-affirmation, 
i.e. the worldly life-affirmation expressed by ‘the eternal recurrence’, that is achieved in an 
“intoxicated” state of ecstatic “this-worldly” transcendence, where one transcends “mortality”, 
ecstatically identifies oneself with and becomes “the all-embracing totality of things”, and 
attains an extraordinary “(self-)transcendent perspective on the world”, from which one firmly 
recognises that “the world is divine” and all things in it are “absolutely good, ‘perfect’”: put 
simply, it is basically something like the Dionysian ‘tragic’ effect which Nietzsche presents in 
BT – “the idea of identifying with something other than our mortal individuality” – being 
modified and made “non-‘metaphysical’, naturalistic”.19 
However, I am sceptical about such ‘Dionysian’ pantheism. Certainly, even after BT, 
though Nietzsche no longer maintains his youthful idea of the Dionysian ‘intoxication’ as “the 
destruction of the principium individuationis” (BT: 2) – since he now rejects metaphysics –, he 
still occasionally associates the term ‘Dionysian’ with – this-worldly – ‘intoxication’ in his 
works (see TI: IX, 10). And, as I suggested before, he also continues to maintain his fascination 
for – this-worldly – ‘intoxication’. Further, it is also true that he does occasionally talk about 
‘pantheism’ (see HAH: I, 272). And at one point in TI, Nietzsche speaks of “Dionysus” as “the 
                                                 
19 See Young (2006): pp. 107-111 & 141-143. Parkes is another commentator who attributes ‘Dionysian pantheism’ 
to Nietzsche (see Parkes 2000). Benson also attributes the similar kind of an unconditional overall type of 
life-affirmation achieved in an ecstatic ‘this-worldly’ self-transcendence, what he calls ‘Dionysian Pietism’ or 
‘Dionysian faith’, to Nietzsche: but, unlike Young, Benson regards ‘music’ as the key to reaching such state (see 
Benson 2008: passim, especially Introduction & Chapter 9). Also, in this connection, there are commentators who 
emphasize Nietzsche’s mysticism, ‘mystical’ elements in his writings (see Roberts 2000, Urpeth 2000 & Marsden 
2000; also De Lubac 1995: pp. 82-95 & 469-50 & Salomé 2001: pp. 91, 123-124 & 138). 
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faith that only the particular is loathsome, and that all is redeemed and affirmed in the whole” 
(TI: IX, 49). But then, it seems to me that Nietzsche never really develops the idea of 
‘Dionysian’ pantheism. Moreover, from what we saw in Chapter 4-B, there seems no reason 
why the worldly life-affirmation cannot be achieved without transcending our everyday self. 
Indeed, nowhere in his works does he indicate that such affirmation would require the 
identification with ‘the totality of things’: he often seems to use ‘the Dionysian’ simply as 
another term to describe his idea of the worldly life-affirmation (see TI: III, 6 & X, 5). 
Furthermore, looking at the way Young discusses ‘Dionysian’ pantheism in his book, it actually 
appears that there is no practical connection between this pantheism and the new ‘contemporary 
and Greek’ religious festival: what enables one to enter the ‘intoxicated’ sate of ecstatic 
transcendence is not the new religious festival.
20
 If that is indeed the case, the new religious 
festival itself would still not be regarded as an authentic religion or ‘genuinely religious’ at least 
from the viewpoint of Schopenhauer’s account of religion. 
On the basis of all those points, my suggestion is that Nietzsche does not aim to recreate a 
Greek religion or a new religious myth. Rather, in my view, what Nietzsche actually provides or 
wishes to offer through his continuous positive valuation of ‘the life-affirming type of gods’, 
through his idea of the life-affirming gods, is a particular religious perspective on ‘life’. More 
concretely, through his image of the life-affirming gods, what he tries to give us readers is a 
new religious sensibility. 
My view might be best explained by using an example. Consider, for instance, Rilke’s 
‘Angel[s]’ in his Duino Elegies.21 When we read the Duino Elegies, not many of us would 
                                                 
20 See Young (2006): pp. 142 & 176 
21 For writing the rest of this section, I have widely referred to ‘Introduction’ & ‘Commentary’ of Rilke’s Duino 
Elegies by J. B. Leishman, which is found in the Hogarth Press edition (see Rilke 1968: pp. 9-21 & 101-147). I have 
also drawn many ideas from Heller (1988). 
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seriously ask whether the Angel really exists. For, it is obvious that the Angel is an imaginary 
being. In fact, we could easily and plausibly see that the Angel is a ‘symbol’, a symbolic image, 
which Rilke creates and uses as an expression of his inward experiences, his innermost feelings 
and aspirations, his desires and longings, his impressions and views, his beliefs and visions, and 
so on. 
Rilke’s conception of the Angel of the Duino Elegies is complicated and often obscure, and 
thus it is difficult to define what exactly Rilke meant and wanted to express by it. But the Angel 
is basically, as Heller puts it, “Rilke’s embodiment of “the fullness of being””.22 Or more 
concretely, as Leishman suggests, 
 
The Angel may be described as the hypostatization of the idea of a perfect consciousness, – of a 
being in whom the limitations and contradictions of present human nature have been transcended, a 
being in whom thought and action, insight and achievement, will and capability, the actual and the 
ideal, are one. He is both an inspiration and a rebuke, a source of consolation and also a source of 
terror; for, while he guarantees the validity of man’s highest aspirations and gives what Rilke would 
call a “direction” to his heart, he is at the same time a perpetual reminder of man’s immeasurable 




From Leishman’s suggestion, it is clear that it is “impossible” for us to “become like the 
Angels”.24 And it is also evident that, in the Duino Elegies, Rilke himself is in no sense telling 
us to become like the Angel: he makes clear elsewhere that the Angel is indeed ““terrible” to us” 
                                                 
22 Heller (1988): p. 84 
23 Rilke (1968): pp. 101-102 





 Rather, by contrasting the ‘terrible’ Angel with us humans, Rilke is trying to 
illustrate and illuminate his insight into the nature and meaning of human existence, or more 
specifically, “the limitations and deficiencies of human nature”, such as “our transitoriness, our 
inability to accept it as a condition, our distractedness and half-heartedness, our fear of death”.26 
And through this symbolic image of the Angel, what Rilke also tries to do is to show us readers 
a possibility of seeing and accepting our human existence and the world differently, to give us a 
new viewpoint or a new sensibility, from which or with which we can positivity affirm and 
celebrate ‘life’ as a whole, including those certain fundamental defects, limitations and 
weaknesses of our human nature, such as ‘suffering’ and ‘death’: in essence, he is trying to 
convey his idea or vision of what we should be, and how we can become it. As Rilke himself 
says, “This world, regarded no longer from the human point of view, but as it is within the angel, 
is perhaps my real task, one, at any rate, in which all my previous attempts would converge”.27 
Rilke is, of course, not alone in such attempt. As I suggested in Chapter 2-A, what many 
great novelists and poets typically aim to achieve through their literary works is to offer a new 
worldview. These novelists and poets all possess their own ‘world’, just as Rilke does. And 
their literally works are essentially representations of such a ‘world’ of theirs, in which their 
attitude towards life, their insights into the nature and meaning of human activities such as 
suffering and love, their outlook such as on morality, on human existence and on god[s], their 
ideas and visions such as those of human liberation, of human redemption, and of the future 
destiny of humanity, are tactfully articulated and endorsed: this is surely the reason why some 
novelists, such as Dostoevsky, are also often regarded as a psychologist, as a philosopher, as a 
religious writer, and as a prophet. And given that their literary works are of such nature, what 
                                                 
25 See Rilke (1968): p. 101 
26 See Rilke (1968): pp.103-104 & 132 
27 Rilke (1968): p. 10 
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they want to do is to guide us readers into this ‘world’ of theirs, in order to move people, to urge 
people to see themselves and the world from a different perspective in a certain new light, to 
change people’s sensitivity and attitude towards ‘life’. 
And my argument is that Nietzsche’s life-long positive valuation of the life-affirming type 
of gods should also be approached in this spirit. That is, just like Rilke’s ‘Angel’, Nietzsche’s 
‘life-affirming gods’ are best interpreted as essentially a symbolic image, a symbolic expression 
of his inner experiences, his innermost feelings and aspiration, his ideas and visions, which he 
wants to convey to people. And by contrasting this symbolic image of ‘the life-affirming gods’ 
with the Christian God, Nietzsche is trying to articulate and express his imaginative vision of 
‘ideal’ life. Further, with this symbolic image of the life-affirming gods, what Nietzsche also 
ultimately aims to do is to show us a new possible way of looking at life, and to change our 
religious sensibility and steer it in the right direction, thereby evoking in us a new religious 
sensibility, with which we can positively see and feel our human existence and the world as 
something ‘embraceable’. 
Let me clarify my view. One of the key points about Nietzsche’s – religious – thinking as a 
whole is that he never at any point denies the existence of our fundamental religious instinct or 
sensibility. As we saw, he finds nothing wrong with the ancient Greeks or the ancient Jews 
creating their god[s]. In his view, it is natural for people to feel the need to create and possess 
god[s]. Indeed, unlike some philosophers, he clearly believes that our religious instinct or 
sensibility is something that cannot and will not go away. While we are no doubt increasingly 
becoming atheists, this does not mean that our religious instincts or sensibility have become 




However much one may believe one has weaned oneself from religion, the weaning has not been so 
complete that one does not enjoy encountering religious moods and sentiments without conceptual 
content, for example in music; and when a philosophy demonstrates to us the justification of 
metaphysical hopes and the profound peace of soul to be attained through them, and speaks for 
example of ‘the whole sure evangel in the glance of Raphael’s Madonna’, we go out to meet such 
assertions and expositions with particular warmth of feeling; the philosopher here has an easier task 
of demonstration, for he here encounters a heart eager to take what he has to offer (HAH: I, 131). 
 
And in fact, he observes in BGE, “It seems to me that the religious instinct is indeed in the 
process of growing powerfully – but the theistic satisfaction it refuses with deep suspicion” 
(BGE: 53). 
So, it is in this context that, in AC, he remarks in the midst of his merciless attack on 
Christianity, 
 
That the strong races of northern Europe did not reject the Christian God certainly does no credit to 
their religious genius – not to speak of their taste. There is no excuse whatever for their failure to 
dispose of such a sickly and senile product of decadence. But a curse lies upon them for this failure: 
they have absorbed sickness, old age, and contradiction into all their instincts – and since then they 
have not created another god. Almost two thousand years – and not a single new god! But still, as if 
his existence were justified, as if he represented the ultimate and the maximum of the god-creating 
power, of the creator spiritus in man, this pitiful god of Christian monotono-theism! This hybrid 
product of decay, this mixture of zero, concept, and contradiction, in which all the instincts of 




Nietzsche criticises the Christian God, not simply because he denies the existence of ‘god[s]’, 
but because he finds the Christian conception of God to be “one of the most corrupt conceptions 
of the divine ever attained on earth”, which represents “the low-water mark in the descending 
development of divine types” (AC: 18). As he claims, “That we find no God – either in history 
or in nature or behind nature – is not what differentiates us, but that we experience what has 
been revered as God, not as “godlike” but as miserable, as absurd, as harmful, not merely as an 
error but as a crime against life. We deny God as God” (AC: 47). In his view, the development 
of the conception of god over the last two millennia or so – from the life-affirming gods as the 
noble’s self-glorification and the transfiguration of life to the Christian God as an “instrument of 
torture” and “the contradiction of life” – is not “progress”, but degeneration, “a reduction of the 
divine” (see GM: II, 22 & AC: 17-18). And it is clear from the above passage that what 
Nietzsche objects to, and is concerned about, is the state of our religious instinct or sensibility, 
which has failed to reject the Christian God. 
In James Joyce’s novel Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, a character called Cranly 
remarks dispassionately, “It is a curious thing, do you know . . . , how your mind is 
supersaturated with the religion in which you say you disbelieve”.28 This remark, I think, 
summarises the state of our religious sensibility as Nietzsche sees it. Indeed, Nietzsche writes in 
GS, “God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in 
which his shadow will be shown. – And we – we still have to vanquish his shadow, too” (GS: 
108). In his view, while many of us no longer believe in the Christian God, we are still very 
much under the influence of Christianity, and still blindly and half-heartedly cling to Christian 
morality and values, or at least to their secularised versions (see, e.g., TI: IX, 5). For instance, 
Nietzsche emphasizes that even “we men of knowledge of today”, who claim to believe neither 
                                                 
28 Joyce (1992): p. 261 
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in God nor metaphysics, are under the influence of Christianity, since our belief in truth, our 
‘unconditional’ will to truth, is actually an expression of the Christian ascetic ideal, of its faith 
in the value of ‘truthfulness’ (see GM: III, 24; also GS: 344 & GM: III, 27). 
And more crucially, as his extensive examination and criticism of the Christian moralised 
conceptions such as ‘guilt’, ‘bad conscience’, ‘punishment’ and ‘sin’ indicates, Nietzsche 
clearly believes that, despite our disbelief in the existence of the Christian God, our inner life – 
our way of thinking, our attitude towards ourselves and the world – is still, at the deepest level, 
imbued with these conceptions: “We modern men are the heirs of the conscience-vivisection 
and self-torture of millennia: this is what we have practiced longest, it is our distinctive art 
perhaps, and in any case our subtlety in which we have acquired a refined taste. Man has all too 
long had an “evil eye” for his natural inclinations, so that they have finally become inseparable 
from his “bad conscience.” (GM: II, 24). In many ways, we are still unable to free ourselves 
from the one ‘universal’ ideal of ‘anti-human’ nature which the Christian God imposes. To put 
it differently, our conception of ‘the divine’ is still fundamentally that of Christianity: “Modern 
men, obtuse to all Christian nomenclature, no longer feel the gruesome superlative that struck a 
classical taste in the paradoxical formula “god on the cross.”” (BGE: 46). And in Nietzsche’s 
view, it is this continuous enslavement of ours to those Christian moralised conceptions, to the 
one ‘universal’ norm of ‘anti-human’ nature, to the image of ‘god on the cross’, that has largely 
prevented us from affirming life entirely, prevented us from truly flourishing in our own ways 
and becoming ‘higher types’. 
Certainly, in his works of the middle period, Nietzsche claims that we can become free from 
the Christian moralised conceptions such as ‘guilt’, ‘punishment’ and ‘sin’ simply by the means 




When one has grasped how ‘sin came into the world’, namely through errors of reason by virtue of 
which men mistake one another – indeed, the individual man mistakes himself – to be much blacker 
and more evil than is actually the case, then all one’s feelings are very much relieved and lightened, 
and man and world sometimes appear in a halo of harmlessness the sight of which fills one with a 
thorough sense of wellbeing (HAH: I, 124; see, also, HAH: I, 133 & 135). 
 
And in his works of the late period, while continuing to devote himself to his task of exposing 
the real origins of the Christian moralised conceptions, he claims that the demise of our faith in 
the Christian God will possibly help us achieve freedom from those conceptions. So, for 
instance, in GM, as well as pointing out the fact that ‘sin’ is nothing more than “physiological 
depression” (GM: III, 16) or “a piece of animal psychology” (GM: III, 20) being misinterpreted 
by the priests qua the men of ressentiment, he writes, 
 
The advent of the Christian God, as the maximum god attained so far, was therefore accompanied by 
the maximum feeling of guilty indebtedness on earth. Presuming we have gradually entered upon the 
reverse course, there is no small probability that with the irresistible decline of faith in the Christian 
God there is now also a considerable decline in mankind’s feeling of guilt; indeed, the prospect 
cannot be dismissed that the complete and the definitive victory of atheism might free mankind of 
this whole feeling of guilty indebtedness toward its origin, its causa prima. Atheism and a kind of 
second innocence belong together (GM: II, 20). 
 




We know, today our conscience knows, what these uncanny inventions of the priests and the church 
are really worth, what ends they served in reducing mankind to such as state of self-violation that its 
sight can arouse nausea: the concepts “beyond,” “Last Judgement,” “immortality of the soul,” and 
“soul” itself are instruments of torture, systems of cruelties by virtue of which the priest became 
master, remained master. Everybody knows this, and yet everything continues as before (AC: 38). 
 
By the time Nietzsche writes this, he is well aware of the fact that most of his contemporaries 
are already atheists: as he says in the above passage of GM, he observes ‘the irresistible decline 
of faith in the Christian God’ in modern Europe. Indeed, he already acknowledges this fact in 
GS, in the fable of ‘the madman’: the people in the market place – the modern Europeans – 
laugh at the madman who declares ‘the death of God’, because they are no longer concerned 
with God (see GS: 125). In other words, Nietzsche now clearly seems to recognise more than 
ever that the issue here is not only ‘knowledge’ or ‘conscience’, not only a matter of intellectual 
conviction, but also ‘religious sensibility’. That is, what is really needed for us to overcome the 
elements of Christian ‘slavish’ morality and concepts in ourselves, to free ourselves from the 
one universal norm of ‘life-denying’ nature, and to attain a new ‘second innocence’, is a change 
in our ‘religious sensibility’. And this change in our religious sensibility is, I suggest, what 
Nietzsche ultimately hopes to bring out through his symbolic image of ‘the life-affirming type 
of gods’. 
So, who exactly are ‘the life-affirming gods’? What is the content of this symbolic image of 
‘the life-affirming gods’? 
As we have seen, in his works, through his discussions of ‘higher types’, ‘nobility’, 
‘life-affirmation’, and so on, Nietzsche constantly indicates and reveals his idea of what he 
wants us to become, which is, of course, in many and significant ways, what he himself wants to 
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become. For instance, roughly speaking, he wants us to embrace life entirely, including those 
aspects of ourselves which are condemned and rejected as ‘evil’ by the Christian God, such as 
our animal instincts and egoistic characteristics and emotions. He wants us not to get rid of our 
‘evil’, but to accept it without a feeling of shame, sublimate – “spiritualize” (TI: V, 1) – it, and 
use it productively for positive purposes: “I know of the hatred and envy of your hearts. You are 
not great enough not to know hatred and envy. Be great enough, then, not to be ashamed of 
them” (Z: I, 10). He wants us to overcome the elements of Christian ‘slavish’ morality and 
concepts – such as ressentiment, ‘guilt’, ‘sin’ and ‘punishment’ – in ourselves, and stop feeling 
our being as something fundamentally guilty, something fallen or flawed by nature. He wants us 
to attain complete satisfaction with ourselves, give a synthetic unity to our character, possess a 
‘style’ of our own and create our own virtues and goods. He wants us to abandon, not waste 
ourselves on, unhealthy metaphysical speculation. Instead, he wants us to take better care of our 
physiological well-being by attending properly to “nutrition, place, climate, recreation”: he 
wants us to shake off punitive and contemptuous attitude towards the body and not to despise 
“these small things” that could significantly grace and enrich our life (see EH: Clever, 10). He 
wants us to possess a certain vitality, dynamism and grandness in body and spirit, and grasp and 
approach life not in a mercenary spirit – a petty obsession for the balancing up of good and bad 
in one’s life – but with an over-flowing energy and intensity, as ‘the squandering spirit’ does. 
He wants us to accept suffering not as some deserved punishment but as the hallmark of our life, 
and turn it to account. He wants us to cherish friendship, to have friends with whom we can 
share and exchange healthy kinds of thoughts and ideas and the joy of life. He wants us to be 
“Honest towards ourselves and whoever else is a friend to us; brave towards the enemy; 
magnanimous towards the defeated; polite – always” (D: 556). And his symbolic image of the 
life-affirming gods is, I suggest, what sums up all these kinds of things he has in mind. That is, 
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what the life-affirming gods symbolise is Nietzsche’s imaginative vision of a certain ‘ideal’ way 
of living, of a certain ‘ideal’ life, which, he believes, the Christian God renders impossible. 
In Chapter 6 of Town of Lucca, Heinrich Heine, whom Nietzsche admires (see EH: Clever, 
4), begins with eight lines from Homer’s Iliad, in which the Olympian gods of ancient Greece 
are enjoying a splendid feast, full of delight and bliss.
29
 Heine then writes, 
 
Then suddenly a pale, bloodstained Jew came panting in, with a crown of thorns on his head and a 
great wooden cross over his shoulder; and he threw the cross on to the gods’ high table, so that the 
golden goblets trembled, and the gods fell silent and turned pale, and become paler and paler, till at 
last they entirely dissolved into mist. Now there was a sorrowful time, and the world turned grey and 
dark. They were no longer any happy gods; Olympus became a hospital where gods who had been 
flayed, roasted and impaled crept tediously about, bandaged their wounds, and sang dismal songs. 





Nietzsche clearly shares with Heine the same religious sentiment expressed in the above 
passage. For, again and again, his writings articulate the sense of ‘oppressiveness’ and 
‘melancholy’ which the Christian God instils in one’s spirit. As we have seen, Christianity 
claims that nothing in this world is ultimately important or pointful or fulfilling, and that true 
meaning and happiness – ‘consolation’ – lie elsewhere: all our worldly desires and efforts will 
ultimately lead to failures, mistakes, and disappointments. It also claims that we are intrinsically 
‘guilty’ before God, tainted with ‘original sin’, because of who we are, of our human nature, and 
                                                 
29 For writing this part, I have widely referred to Christopher Hamilton’s unpublished conference paper “Nietzsche 
and Religious Melancholy”. I have also drawn some ideas from Hamilton (1998) & Hamilton (2007). 
30 Heine (2006): p. 160 
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that we are now irredeemably ‘sinful’, owing to the sacrifice God made for us – the image of 
‘god on the cross’: our suffering is deserved ‘punishment’ for our unworthiness before God. 
And all this makes this world a place of misery and sorrow, where everything is fundamentally 
worthless, and where we are burdened with a permanent sense of ‘guilt’ and a piercing feeling 
of shame and self-disgust. And it is clear that Nietzsche himself keenly feels this sense of 
‘oppressiveness’ and ‘melancholy’, especially in the light of both the dreadful sense of 
unredeemable loss which afflicts his writings – he certainly does not believe in the Christian 
‘consolation’ – and the fact that he himself suffers from those Christian moralised conceptions: 
his deeply ‘cinematic’ imagination is clearly often captured by the Christian God, by the image 
of ‘god on the cross’ (see Chapter 1-C, 2-A & 3-C). So, in response to this sense of 
‘oppressiveness’ and ‘melancholy’ – ‘the spirit of gravity’, as he also often calls it –, what 
Nietzsche’s writings repeatedly express is a longing for a ‘lightness’ or ‘cheerfulness’ of spirit, 
a desire to be “superficial – out of profundity” (GS: Preface, 4), that is, to be able “to look into 
the depths of the suffering and yet find life bright and cheerful”.31 And such a sense of 
‘lightness’ and ‘cheerfulness’, a way of living or a view of things that enables one to possess 
and retain such freedom of spirit in the midst of the harsh reality of life, is what Nietzsche has in 
mind when he speaks of the life-affirming gods, especially those of the Greeks. 
And just as Heine does in the above passage of his, what Nietzsche repeatedly does in his 
work is to contrast these two different religious worldviews. As we have seen, throughout his 
works, he continually portrays the life-affirming gods as “a transfiguring mirror”, in which “all 
things, whether good or evil, are deified” (BT: 3), including one’s human nature, things that are 
condemned as ‘evil’ by the Christian God. Unlike the Christian God before whom one 
experiences “a feeling of total depravity” and a relentless sense of ‘guilt’ and self-disgust, they 
                                                 
31 I have borrowed this phrase from the above-mentioned unpublished conference paper of Hamilton’s. 
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are gods with whom one can feel “inter-related”, and before whom one has no need to be 
ashamed of oneself (see HAH: I, 111 & 114). They are gods who take upon themselves “not the 
punishment but . . . the guilt” (GM: II, 23). Unlike the Christian God who disturbs or destroys 
one’s joy, they are gods whom one thanks for one’s joys and delights. They are cheerful gods 
who laugh and dance: “I would believe only in a god who could dance” (Z: I, 7; see, also, e.g., 
Z: III, 8 & 12). And by contrasting this symbolic image of the cheerful life-affirming gods as his 
own conception of ‘the divine’ with the oppressive and melancholic image of ‘god on the cross’ 
as “one of the most corrupt conceptions of the divine ever attained on earth” (AC: 18), what 
Nietzsche tries to do is not only to illustrate and illuminate his criticism of the life-denying 
nature of the Christian God, but also to express his imaginative vision of an ‘ideal’ way of 
living, of an ‘ideal’ life, of human existence and the world no longer tainted or condemned or 
devalued by those Christian conceptions such as ‘guilt’ and ‘punishment’ but instead re-deified: 
a world ‘beyond good and evil’, “a world without feeling of sin”, which he typically sees in 
“Greek antiquity” (GS: 135). And through this symbolic image of the life-affirming gods, what 
Nietzsche is also trying to do is to move us readers, to give us a new religious perspective on 
‘life’, and to evoke in us a new religious sensibility, which can assist us in overcoming the 
elements of Christian ‘slavish’ morality and concepts in ourselves, in releasing ourselves from 
the universal norms of ‘life-denying’ nature, in purifying our inner life that is still in some way 
haunted by the image of ‘god on the cross’, and hence in attaining a new ‘second innocence’. 
That is, in my view, Nietzsche is not telling us to create the life-affirming gods. Nor is he 
trying to get us to believe in the life-affirming gods, in the way the ancient Greeks and the 
ancient Israelites did believe in their god[s]. Instead, what he is articulating and offering through 
his symbolic image of the life-affirming gods is a possibility of living our life and seeing and 
feeling ourselves and the world differently and in a certain new light, specifically, in that 
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particular way I described earlier. Certainly, it is very likely that Nietzsche is wishing or hoping 
that we will agree with and accept this imaginative vision of his of a certain ‘ideal’ way of 
living, of a certain ‘ideal’ life, which his life-affirming gods symbolise. He presumably wants to 
say, and wants to convince us, that we ought to see, feel and live life in this particular way. But, 
this is something that, in truth, a central strand of his philosophical position does not really 
allow him to do, since, while he often speaks of a “counterideal” or an “opposing ideal” to the 
Christian ascetic ideal (see EH: GM & GM: III, 25), he also writes explicitly at one point, 
““What are you really doing, erecting an ideal or knocking one down?” I may perhaps be asked. 
But have you ever asked yourselves sufficiently how much the erection of every ideal on earth 
has cost? How much reality has had to be misunderstood and slandered, how many lies have 
had to sanctified, how many consciences disturbed, how much “God” sacrificed every time?” 
(GM: II, 24). So, rather, he is better understood as suggesting that we could see, feel and live 
life in that particular way, that we might in fact find our life better and become more creative 
and life-affirming if we could see, feel and live life in that particular way. 
Commenting on Rilke, Leishman remarks, 
 
In 1917 he [Rilke] had written that only through one of the greatest and innermost renovations it has 
ever gone through will the world be able to save and maintain itself, and two years later he declared 
that the task of the intellectual in the post-war world would be to prepare in men’s hearts the way for 
those gentle, mysterious, trembling transformations, from which alone the understandings and 
harmonies of a serener future will proceed. The Elegies and the Sonnets to Orpheus were Rilke’s 
contributions to this task, and the story of them, which has here been related in some detail, is a proof 
that the task is possible.
32
 
                                                 
32 Rilke (1968): pp. 15-16 
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Reading the Duino Elegies, not everyone will feel exactly the same way. Not everyone will 
agree with or accept Rilke’s insights or visions expressed in his ‘Angel’. Not everyone will care 
about them. But it seems to me clear that, for those of us who sympathize with and accept his 
visions, or, even for those of us who are willing at least to be open to accepting his visions, this 
simple experience of being in touch with the ‘Angel’ does have a subtle and yet profound 
transformative effect on our whole inner being. As we read through the Duino Elegies, we are 
aware that, somehow, in some way, our inner life and our spiritual condition have been 
renovated and transformed simply by temporarily being in touch with “This world, regarded no 
longer from the human point of view, but as it is within the angel”.33 
And I think that what Nietzsche is at least trying to achieve with his symbolic image of the 
life-affirming gods is, similarly, such a renovation and a transformation. Certainly, just like 
Rilke’s ‘Angel’, his symbolic image of the life-affirming gods is in a way intensely ‘personal’, 
inextricably bound up in his own personality and personal experiences, heavily invested with 
his own deepest desires, longings and needs. He sees something wrong with his own religious 
sensibility and his own way of being, and wants to change them. And his symbolic image of the 
life-affirming gods and his imaginative vision of the ‘ideal’ life expressed through it are 
undoubtedly a part of such personal attempt of his. They are amongst other things his own 
means to release himself from the image of ‘god on the cross’ that haunts him and holds him 
captive, his own means to deal with the sense of ‘oppressiveness’ and ‘melancholy’ that 
Christianity generates, by which he is tormented, and from which he seeks to escape. But then, 
despite his emotional investment in them, they are not ‘merely personal’, since they are also 
largely the fruit of his life-long philosophical investigation into the life-denying and 
life-harming nature of Christianity, what are offered in response to his socio-psychological or 
                                                 
33 Rilke (1968): p. 10 
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socio-cultural diagnosis of the general condition of modern Europeans’ inner life and culture 
after the death of God: he recognises that, despite the decay of Christian belief, the negative 
influence of Christianity is still spreading over various realms of human affairs, and that the 
conditions of our ‘life’ – our well-being in general – are still profoundly undermined by it. In 
this sense, they possess a kind of universal validity and general appeal to us all, whether we can 
actually recognise this or not. And what Nietzsche is hoping is that at least some of us will 
recognise this and accept his symbolic image and his imaginative vision, and that his own 
personal attempt can also help us in our own attempt to change our religious sensibility and our 
own way of being. 
As we read Nietzsche’s works, and as we are repeatedly brought into contact with his 
symbolic image of the life-affirming gods and invited into his imaginative vision – or 
understanding – of the ‘ideal’ way of living, of the ‘ideal’ life, of ‘a world without feeling of 
sin’, not only do we learn and grow morally and spiritually, but also our religious sensibility 
becomes gradually transformed by being moved by this symbolic image and this imaginative 
vision. Simply by being in touch with them repeatedly, we are again and again encouraged to 
reflect on our own way of living, on our own life, on our own religious sensibility, and are given 
opportunities to realise how our – inner – life is still fundamentally ingrained and darkened with 
the Christian moralised conceptions, the universal norm of ‘anti-human’ nature and the image of 
‘god on the cross’, and how this undermines our psychological health and makes us life-denying. 
And through such a ‘therapeutic’ process (see, e.g., Chapter 2-A & 4-B), Nietzsche hopes, we – 
and he himself – will eventually come to acquire a new religious sensibility, with which we 
might gradually become better equipped to embrace ourselves and the world entirely in the way 
which his ideas of life-affirmation suggest, to discover and possess a ‘style’ of our own, to 
flourish in our own ways, and to achieve new forms of human greatness. This, I suggest, is how 
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he may intend the life-affirming type of gods to contribute towards the nurturing of ‘higher 
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